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Abstract
In our introduction we make some remarks on the main topics of this issue:
assertion and proof. We briefly describe how each of the papers in the present
publication has contributed from either different or complementary perspectives
to the logical reflection on assertion and proof, while also specifying the relation
between them.
1 Introductory remarks
It may sound like a philosophical cliché, but one could not stress enough the im-
portance of the notions of assertion and proof for logic, philosophy of logic and
philosophy of language.
Although these two notions have been undergoing development since the second
half of the 19th century in a relatively independent way within research programs in
logic and linguistics alike, the conceptual relationships between them are undeniable.
In this short contribution to the Special Issue (Assertion and Proof) we will
illustrate some of the (possible) links between proof and assertion.
With “assertion” we denote prima facie at least two rather different entities; the
first is a kind of act, i.e. an illocutionary act, namely the act of asserting something;
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the other entity is the outcome of the same act, that is, the asserted thing. We will
see that such prima facie duality of assertion is reflected on its logical treatment.
Consider a proposition. One and the same proposition can occur both asserted
and unasserted in different contexts. In particular, Geach [10, p. 449] pointed out
that “[a] thought may have just the same content whether you assent to its truth
or not; a proposition may occur in a discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and
yet be recognizably the same proposition”. A standard example is the justification
of modus ponens: assuming (1) α → β and (2) α, one infers (3) β. In (2), α is
usually considered asserted, while in (1), α is not asserted, because only the whole
conditional α→ β is asserted (on this, see Russell 1903). This means that the very
same proposition may be used in both its asserted and unasserted forms1.
Moreover, the same line of thought could be, somehow, extended: within any
argumentative structure, the same propositions may be the subject of various illo-
cutionary acts. For instance, one could assume that ϕ, then hypothesize that ψ,
conjecture that θ, and so on.
In the light of previous considerations, one can also ask how to provide the
expressive resources in order to describe the formal features of assertions. In a
letter to Frege, Peano wrote that the various positions in which a formula can be
placed determines whether it occurs asserted or unasserted in some truth-functional
context. Using Peano’s words, “the several positions that a proposition can have in
a formula completely determine what is asserted of it” [12, p. 191]. Frege observed
that this is because “the principal relation sign invariably carries assertoric force”
[8, p. 148] without any specific sign for assertion being present in the notation. This
means that in Peano’s notation it is impossible to show whether a complex formula
occurs asserted or unasserted.
In this regard, Frege introduced an ad hoc sign of assertion as a notational
requirement of the logical language. He indicated it with “`”, which stands for the
sign of assertion. (Nowadays, the sign “`”, has acquired the name “turnstile” and
expresses the concept of derivability or provability.)
Once given the expressive resources in order to describe assertions, it becomes
crucial to provide some criteria concerning the logical behaviour of assertions. From
this point of view, it is normally assumed that assertions, intended as acts, cannot be
iterated and cannot be connected by truth-functional connectives [15]. Reichenbach
1Bell [1] comments Russell’s views on modus ponens in the following way: “Now this would imply
that either all inferences having the modus ponens form (to take but one example) are invalid, or, at
least, that all those with either a true antecedent or a true consequent in the conditional premiss are
invalid. This is, of course, quite unacceptable” (pp. 87-88). On the analysis of Russell’s views on
modus ponens and Bell’s untoward consequences, see the justification of modus ponens in pragmatic
logic [3].
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[15, p. 346] claims this on the basis of the fact that the term “assertion” is used
in three different ways. Namely, “it denotes, first, the act of asserting; second, the
result of this act, i.e., an expression of the form ‘`p’; third, a statement which
is asserted, i.e. a statement ‘p’ occurring within an expression ‘`p’”. Regarding
the result of an assertion, Reichenbach claims that “since assertive expressions are
not propositions, they cannot be combined by propositional operators” [15, §57, p.
337]. The assertion sign works, according to him, in its “pragmatic capacity”, since
it cannot be, for instance, negated with a propositional connective. And if this is
so, then inferences can be understood as processes that allow us to derive justified
asserted conclusions once the asserted premises are also justified. This means that
there can be no nested or iterated occurrences of the assertion sign, because the
truth-functional connectives only operate on propositions and never on assertions.
Furthermore, inferences operate only on assertions and never on propositions.
The structure of an elementary assertion is thus composed by a unique assertion
sign prefixed to the asserted content. This is, for instance, the case with Frege’s [8]
Begriffsschrift. A similar restriction is presented in Reichenbach’s treatise, where
the distinction between assertions and (propositional) content is developed.
Of course, the logic of assertions must engage with the possibility of connecting
elementary assertions in order to construct more complex ones. At play here is in
fact the intertwining between the logical form of asserted contents and the logic of
assertions. It is plausible to claim that asserting a conjunction (ϕ∧ψ) is equivalent
to juxtaposing two elementary assertions, respectively of ϕ and ψ.
Things are not always so easy. Asserting a disjunction (ϕ ∨ ψ) does not seem
to be equivalent to asserting ϕ or asserting ψ. And the same holds for implication.
The logic of assertions is, thus, more complex and, somehow, different from the logic
dealing with the asserted content.
This discrepancy becomes more evident if we look at Dalla Pozza’s system
[5]. Within it, complex assertions may be logically combined by an application of
intuitionistic-like connectives. This means that complex asserted formulas may be
expressed through connectives that explicate intuitionistic meanings of logical con-
stants, without a truth-functional behaviour. Moreover, intuitionistic connectives
can indicate the (pragmatic) justification-conditions for (acts of) assertions.
On the basis of this short overview on some fundamental features of the logic of
assertion, we are able to cast some light on the link between the concept of assertion
and the concept of proof.
As we said, when assertions are intended as acts, they are neither true nor false.
Therefore, it is quite natural to employ a non-truth-functional kind of semantics in
order to construe the formula of a logic for assertion. A natural candidate is the
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concept of proof : an assertion is justified (or unjustified) depending on the existence
(or not) of a proof of the asserted content. The reference to the concept of proof
emphasizes the constructive feature of the logic of assertions.
By way of example, it is interesting to notice the justification clause pertaining
to the assertion according to Dalla Pozza and Garola’s [5] approach: in that system,
the implication between two assertions (` ϕ ⊃` ψ) is justified if and only if we have
a proof which transforms any proof of ϕ into a proof of ψ at our disposal. It is,
thus, clear why the outer logic of assertion can be different from the inner logic of
asserted contents. We can, for instance, be justified in asserting every instance of
excluded middle (ϕ∨¬ϕ) without being justified either to assert ϕ or to assert ¬ϕ.
It is sufficient to assume that ϕ describes a proposition for which we do not have
conclusive proofs.
We said that an assertion is justified if and only if we have a proof at disposal.
But what is a proof ? Here below we propose some introductory remarks. Let us
start by observing that this is a central notion of the proof-theorethic approach to
logic. According to this, a consequence is identified with deducibility: an argument
〈Γ ∴ α〉 is valid if and only if there exists a proof or a derivation of α from Γ,
each of whose steps is intuitively sound. The account is formal, insofar as logical
consequence is identified with derivability in a system of rules of a certain form.
Proof-theoretic semantics is standardly taken as an alternative to truth-condition
semantics. In a nutshell, proof-theoretic semantics is based on the assumption that
the meanings of the logical constants are assigned in terms of proof and of their
inferential role rather than in terms of truth.
Proof-theoretic accounts of consequence are sometimes quickly dismissed. Field,
for example, writes that “proof-theoretic definitions proceed in terms of some def-
inite proof procedure”, and observes that “it seems pretty arbitrary which proof
procedure one picks” and “it isn’t very satisfying to rest one’s definitions of funda-
mental metalogical concepts on such highly arbitrary choices” [7, p. 2]. Etchemendy
similarly observes that “the intuitive notion of consequence cannot be captured by
any single deductive system” [6, p. 2], since the notion of consequence is neither
tied to any particular language, nor to any particular deductive system.
In order to understand what a proof is one can first specify a notion of formal
proof or of informal proof. The formalisation of the idea of proof as a given set of
sequences of symbols underlies the meta-mathematical research pioneered by Hilbert
and Bernays and subsequently developed by Gödel, Gentzen and others. Boolos [2]
famously explored the intensional representation of formal proof through systems of
modal logic in which () is interpreted as “it is provable that” in a formal sense. A
characteristic axiom (called the “Gödel-Löb axiom”) of the notion of formal prov-
ability is (ϕ → ϕ) → ϕ. If this axiom is added to the modal system K4, we
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obtain the modal logic G. Such a system was formalized by Solovay [17]. It is com-
plete with respect to transitive and conversely well-founded frames. In this system
the reflection principle ϕ→ ϕ does not hold.
Things are different in case of informal proofs (intended, for instance, as good
mathematical arguments) which are usually assumed to justify truth, thus accepting
the reflection principle.
The notion of informal or naïve proof received some attention when Gödel, in
the Gibbs lecture [11], asserted his famous dichotomy concerning the nature of the
human mind. Then, Priest characterised a naïve proof as a process of deductive
argumentation by which one establishes certain mathematical claims to be true.
So, supposing there is a mathematical assertion whose truth or falsity is to be
established, one can look for a proof or a refutation to justify it or not. The informal
deductive arguments from basic statements are, according to Priest, “naïve proofs”
[14, 40]. It is interesting to observe that Priest [13], in his “The logic of paradox,”
developed a controversial argument, grounded in the notion of naïve proof, showing
some possible connections between Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem and the
presence of dialetheias (viz., sentences that are both true and false) in the standard
model of arithmetic. This last point has been criticized especially regarding the
notion of naïve proof itself.
2 The contents of the issue
Each of the papers in this special issue contributes from different and complementary
perspectives to the logical reflection on assertion and proof as well as on the relations
between these two concepts.
Barés Gómez and Fontaine in Defeasibility and non-monotonicity in dialogues
show how to introduce the notions of defeasibility and non-monotonicity in dialogical
logic, and discuss them in a framework of adaptive dialogical logics.
Bellucci, Chiffi and Pietarinen in Beta assertive graphs: Proofs of assertions with
quantification introduce and investigate quantification in the diagrammatic system
of assertive graphs.
Carrara and Strollo in DLEAC and the rejection paradox develop a Dialetheic
Logic with exclusive assumptions and conclusions, both understood as speech acts.
A new paradox – the rejectability paradox – is (first informally, then formally) in-
troduced. Its derivation is possible in an extension of DLEAC contanining the re-
jectability predicate.
Chiffi in Asserting boo! and horray! Pragmatic logic for assertion and moral
attitudes proposes a pragmatic logic for expressivist moral attitudes in order to
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deal with the logical problems of expressivism such as the Frege-Geach problem,
the negation problem, etc. The second part of the paper makes some analytic
comparisons with other classical logical systems for expressivist sentences.
D’Agostino, Larese and Modgil in Towards depth-bounded natural deduction for
classical first-order logic present a new proof-theory for classical first-order logic that
allows for a natural characterization of a notion of inferential depth. Unlike natural
deduction, in this framework the rules fixing the meaning of the logical operators
are symmetrical with respect to assent and dissent and do not involve the discharge
of formulas.
De Florio in Reflections on logics for assertion and denial discusses and refines
the justification conditions for assertion and denial in an extension of Dalla Pozza’s
pragmatic logic.
Fait and Primiero in HTLC: hyperintensional typed lambda calculus introduce a
new logical system termed “HTLC”. The system extends the typed lambda-calculus
with hyperintensions and rules to govern them. This allows us to reason with ex-
pressions for extensional, intensional and hyperintensional entities.
Francez in Bilateralism based on corrective denial presents a new variant of bi-
lateralism based on a strong notion of denial, called “corrective denial”. In this
framework, a ground for denial is an incompatible atomic alternative to the denied
formula.
Jespersen in Two tales of the turnstile criticizes, from a hyperintensional per-
spective, the view held by act-theoretic ‘internalists’ who invert the Frege-Geach
point by making force integral to content.
Kürbis in Normalisation for bilateral classical logic with some philosophical re-
marks presents two bilateral connectives, comparable to Prior’s tonk, for which,
unlike the case of tonk, there are reduction steps for the removal of maximal for-
mulas, arising from introducing and eliminating formulas with those connectives as
main operators.
Lemanski in Extended syllogistics in calculus CL addresses the question regarding
to what extent a syllogistic representation in CL (Lange’s Cubus Logicus) diagrams
can be seen as a form of extended syllogistics. The author shows that the ontology
of CL enables numerically exact assertions and inferences.
Morato in Assertions of counterfactuals and epistemic irresponsibility discusses
the so-called “reverse Sobel sequences”, problematic for the variably strict semantics
for counterfactuals. Morato shows, in particular, some limitations of the “principle
of epistemic irresponsibility”, which is assumed to ground the pragmatic view on
this type of counterfactual sequences.
Finally, Schang in A general semantics for logics of affirmation and negation pro-
poses some semantic considerations on the notions of affirmation and negation that
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may help us understand the possible translations among different logical systems.
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Although dialogical logic was originally defined to model deductive reason-
ing, in particular intuitionistic logic, it may be useful to model other kinds of
inferences. Dialogical logic should include the possibility of involving some kind
of defeasibility, whether it be at the play level or at the level of the strategies.
Whereas the former only involves the application of rules of interactions, the
latter is concerned with the notion of validity. Is it possible to introduce defea-
sibility in Dialogical Logic? According to Dutilh Novaes [7], monotonicity and
non-defeasibility are consequences of a strategic requisite inherent to dialogical
games. But, according to Rahman et al. [18], this position relies on a confusion
between the play and the strategy levels. Actually, the rules of dialogical games
do not involve any strategic component. As a consequence, there is room for de-
feasibility and non-monotonicity in dialogues. We finally discuss this possibility
in the context of recent developments of adaptive dialogical logics, in particu-
lar IAD of Beirlaen and Fontaine [3], and put forward a distinction between
a notion of defeasible move defined at the play level and a notion of dialogical
non-monotonicity defined at the strategy level.
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1 Introduction
As stressed by Pollock [15, p. 481], a “common misconception about reasoning is
that reasoning is deducing, and in good reasoning the conclusions follow logically
from the premises.” Indeed, it is widely recognized that a good deal of human
reasoning and argumentative practices lies beyond deductive reasoning. We often
infer conclusions defeasibly; that is, by being prepared to revise them in the light of
new information. In the context of his naturalized logic, Woods [21] explains that a
theory of inference must take into account scant resources strategies, linked to limited
memory, computational skills, time, access to information, and so on. This brings
us to the field of cognitive economy, from the perspective of which mathematical
rigor of deductive reasoning may not be the best standard of inference1: Less costly
forms of reasoning are sometimes more apt and efficient than research of accurate
results. Depending on the rational agents and their targets, it is often a more
efficient strategy to defeasibly infer conclusions, on which we can act despite a lack
of precision, and to pursue strategies of management of errors, than to refrain from
inferring and acting at all. If human beings learn through errors and corrections
processes, as it is sometimes (if not usually) the case, then a theory of inference
must also be a theory of defeasible reasoning.
Although there is no consensus with respect to its definition, we can say that
an argument is defeasible if its premises provide support for the conclusion, even
though it is possible for the premises to remain true and the conclusion to be revised
in the light of new information. Formally, we may approach defeasibility through
logics that do not respect the monotony property; i.e. if Σ ` ϕ, then Σ ∪ Σ′ ` ϕ
(where Σ ⊆ Σ′). In this paper, we discuss the possibility of approaching such notions
in the context of dialogical logic by taking advantage of the distinction between the
play level (the level of interaction) and the strategy level (the level of inference).
Dialogical games were initially defined for intuitionistic logic (see Lorenzen and
Lorenz [12]. Studies in dialogues took a pluralist turn with Rahman and his col-
laborators.2 Excepted from rare exceptions, most of them focus on deductive logic
(classical, intuitionistic, free logics, modal logics, and so on). If we wish to con-
ceive dialogical games as a framework for actual human reasoning, they should also
include non-deductive reasoning; in particular defeasible reasoning. In this paper,
we discuss this possibility. Our thesis is that dialogical games are not intrinsically
deductive and hermetic to defeasibility. Our argument is based on the distinction
between the play level and the strategy level. In general, defeasibility can be grasped
1Following Peirce [14, CP 5.602], we may also take into account economic parameters of costs,
risks and benefits.
2See e.g. Rahman and Keiff [17].
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at the play level. The Inconsistency-Adaptive Dialogical Logic (IAD) of Beirlaen
and Fontaine [3] also displays non-monotonicity at the strategy level, thanks to the
implementation of specific rules.
Nonetheless, as we will see in the Section 2, it has been recently argued by
Dutilh Novaes [7] that dialogical games are intrinsically indefeasible. But, according
to Rahman et al. [18], this thesis relies on a confusion between the play level and
the strategy level. This distinction fundamental in the construction of dialogues,
and more generally the dialogical theory of meaning, is the subject of the Section 3.
Finally, in the Section 4, we consider dialogical defeasibility and non-monotonicity
in the context of IAD, in the light of these different levels of dialogical games. The
dialogical rules and definitions are given in an Appendix (Section 6).
2 Dialogues and the BIO
Dialogues are games of argumentation between the Proponent (P) of a thesis and
the Opponent (O). The game begins with P uttering the thesis that he has to defend
against every possible criticism of O. Moves in the games, performed by means of
questions or assertions, are either challenges against previously uttered statements
or defences in response to challenges. The game is governed by two kinds of rules
–the particle rules (see Appendix 6.2) and the structural rules (see Appendix 6.3)–
that define the play level; i.e. they are definitory rules that indicate how to play, but
not how to win. The particle rules provide the local meaning of logical constants
in terms of interaction. They are abstract descriptions consisting of sequences of
moves such that the first member is an assertion, the second is an attack and the
third is a defence (when possible). Given that it is assumed that both players speak
the same language (otherwise dialogues would not make sense), they are the same
for both players. The structural rules determine the general organisation: how to
begin, who plays, when, who wins, and so on. They provide the global meaning
of the statements uttered in a dialogical game; that is, their meaning in a specific
context of argumentation. For example, by means of the rules [SR1c] and [SR1i]
we can distinguish between classical and intuitionistic games. By means of [SR5.1],
we specify the use of the particle rule for negation in the context of IAD. One of the
fundamental rules of dialogical logic is the Formal Rule [SR2], which says that only
O can introduce new atomic formulas. An initial thesis ϕ uttered by P is claimed to
be valid if and only if there is a P-winning strategy for ϕ; i.e. P can win the game
no matter how O plays. For example, P wins the following game, but this does not
mean that there is a winning strategy:
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Example 1
O P
(p ∨ q)→ (p ∧ q) 0
1 n := 1 m := 2 2
3 p ∨ q 0 p ∧ q 4
5 ?L∧ 4 p 8
7 p 3 ?∨ 6
Explanation: In this play, P’s win depends on O’s (bad) choice of p (move
7). If O had chosen q, he would have won the play. Therefore, there is no winning
strategy for P. The initial thesis is not valid.
In order to determine validity, it might seem that it must be assumed that O
always performs the best choices. According to Dutilh Novaes [7, p. 602], “[w]hat
starts as a strategic but not mandatory component of the dialogical game –putting
forward indefeasible arguments– then becomes a constitutive structural element of
the deductive method as such: only indefeasible arguments now count as correct
moves in a deductive argument.” She holds the thesis that the standard notion of
logical truth has internalized in monological practices the role of the Opponent as
an ideal interlocutor who seeks to defeat the argument by showing a case in which
the premises are true but the conclusion is false. This is what she calls the built-in
opponent conception (BIO) of logic and deduction.
Indeed, the standard view of logic is that logic is normative for correct thinking,
by providing a criterion for deductive validity in terms of necessary truth preserva-
tion (NTP). But how should we understand NTP? Several attempts to link NTP
with normative claims, by means of bridge principles, are unsatisfactory (see Dutilh
Novaes [7, p. 591 ff]. She pretends that, rather than rules for correct thinking, logic
has normative import for “specific situations of dialogical interaction” [7, p. 588].
These dialogical interactions can be represented by dialogical games beginning with
the Proponent uttering the thesis and the Opponent trying to defeat the thesis by
means of a countermove or by exhibiting a counter-model. If the Opponent cannot
succeed in defeating the Proponent’s argument, then the thesis is valid. According
to the BIO conception of logic and deduction, it is this role of the Opponent that has
been encapsulated, internalized, in the standard notion of deductive validity defined
in terms of NTP.
According to Dutilh Novaes, the Proponent’s thesis is valid if the Opponent
cannot find a countermove to block the argument. So, although she identifies two
components, one cooperative and one adversarial, dialogues are reduced to an inquiry
into logical truths. By focusing on this inquiry into logical truths, the emphasis is put
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on the Opponent’s role, trying to defeat the Proponent’s argument. As she conceives
dialogues, they assume that the Opponent always performs optimal moves. We
are led to the conclusion that dialogues intrinsically involve a strategic component.
Whereas the Proponent tries to establish the conclusion, the Opponent tries to block
the establishment of the conclusion. This adversarial component accounts for the
NTP; that is, the Opponent tries to defeat the argument, which is valid if and only
if it cannot be defeated, if it is indefeasible. According to Dutilh Novaes [7, p.
597], NTP may have emerged as a strategic component in dialectical games. The
BIO conception of deduction is the thesis according to which logic has internalized
the Opponent in the sense that its role is now built in the framework itself. The
traditional principles of deduction actually reflect rules for engaging in certain kinds
of dialogical practices.
Games are thus reduced to an inquiry into logical truth and dialogues are in-
trinsically perceived from a strategic perspective: an argument is valid if it resists
to the Opponent’s attempts to defeat it. In the BIO conception of logic, it is the
strategic role of the Opponent that has been internalized. Normativity is thus to be
understood in terms of strategic recommendation. Indeed, the Opponent must play
optimally and try to block the Proponent’s inferential steps performed in order to
derive the conclusion from the premises the Opponent has already granted. If they
intrinsically involve a strategy component, then defeasibility cannot be properly ap-
proached in dialogical games. Nonetheless, as stressed by Rahman et al. [18, p.
284], this thesis relies on a confusion between the play level and the strategy level.
3 A Dialogical Theory of Meaning
Why should we pay a peculiar attention to the distinction, but also the links, be-
tween the play and the strategy levels? On the one hand, their distinction explains
why dialogues do not intrinsically involve a strategic component. Meaning in dia-
logues arises from interactions at the play level, without being related to inferential
requisites. At the play level, it makes no sense to say that O’s role is reduced to
check the indefeasibility (or non-monotonicity) of a P’s move. On the other hand,
the link between the play level and the strategy level shows how the latter stems
from the former. We cannot think of the inferential level in dialogues without the
more fundamental play level in which no strategic component is involved. In order
to better understand how the dialogical theory of meaning is built, we refer to the
Dialogues for Immanent Reasoning (DIR) of Rahman et al. [18], in which local and
strategic reasons backing a statement are made explicit in the object language by
incorporating features of the Constructive Type Theory (CTT).
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The play level takes care of semantic issues. The strategy level is concerned
with validity, through the notion of winning strategy. The play level is concerned
with actual applications of the dialogical rules, namely the particle rules and the
structural rules. These rules are normative for interaction and do not involve any
strategic component. Particle and structural rules determine the meaning of state-
ments in terms of rights and duties; i.e. the right to challenge a statement or to ask
for reasons and the duty to answer such challenge or to give reasons. This provides a
dialogical turn to Brandom’s inferential approach to meaning [4] in terms of asking
for and giving reasons. In addition, the particle rules also have a normative aspect
with respect to the choices (see Appendix 6.2, the choice is for the challenger of a
conjunction, but for the defender of a disjunction). The structural rules determine
the general organization of dialogical games. Their correct application has no link
with the notion of winning strategy. Indeed, knowing the meaning of an expression
is knowing how to build a play for it, no matter who wins. It is only when linking
plays to winning strategies that we may talk of validity and rules of inference. In
a Wittgensteinian way, the play level reflects (i) the internal feature of meaning,
and (ii) the meaning as mediated by language-games [18, p. 278]. The first point
brings us to the necessity of a fully interpreted language, as the language of DIR
which incorporates features of the CTT in order to make explicit the reasons backing
the statements uttered by the players. The second point leads us to the notion of
dialogue-definiteness and the notion of proposition as plays.
Having local reasons in the dialogical framework provides a structure in which
the reasons asked for and given by the players actually appear in the object lan-
guage. The Proponent can locally justify his statements by explicitly copying the
Opponent’s reasons for his own statements. Local reasons also allow to fully inter-
pret contentual language within material dialogues.3 This explains why there can
be reasons put forward at the play level independently of what we might refer to as
“inferential moves”. They are reasons backing a statement at the play level, and the
Proponent can copy the reasons brought forward by his Opponent in order to locally
justify his statements even in the absence of a winning strategy, only in the context
of an actual interaction, through what Rahman et al. call “equality in action”.
A fully interpreted language is obtained by incorporating features of the CTT
within DIR. In a nutshell, statements of the CTT are called judgments. If we
consider the category set of sets, there are four forms of basic categoric judgments:
A : set (A pertains to the category set)
A = B : set (A and B are two equal elements of the category set)
3See Chapter 10 in [18] for more details on material dialogues.
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and for any set A:
a : A (a is an object of A)
a = b : A (a and b are two identical objects of A)
The assertion that a proposition A is true is based on a judgment of the form
“a is a proof of A”. We can thus identify the category prop of propositions with
the category set of sets, in accordance with the isomorphism of Curry-Howard [10],
and consequently a proposition with the set of its proofs (hence the notion of proof-
object). This led Ranta [19] to identify proof-objects of the CTT with winning
strategies of Hintikka’s Game-Theoretical Semantics.
Nonetheless, in relation to meaning as mediated by language-games, as men-
tioned in (ii) above, the notion of proposition in dialogical logic cannot be identified
with strategies but with actual plays. If meaning is mediated by language-games,
they must be actually playable by human beings. Following Lorenz [11, p. 258], a
proposition becomes a dialogue-definite expression, an expression A such that there
is an individual play about A, that can be said to be lost or won after a finite number
of moves performed in accordance with the rules of interaction. To know the mean-
ing of an expression A is to know how to build a play for A. And this is independent
of the validity of A. Therefore, in dialogical games, propositions should not be iden-
tified with winning strategies, but with plays. That is why in DIR, statements are
backed by two kinds of reasons: local reasons and strategic reasons. Local reasons
are precisely those reasons by means of which a language can be fully interpreted at
the play level, regardless the strategy level.
Local reasons are introduced in the object language of DIR as expression of the
form p : A where p is a local reason for the proposition A.The semantics of such
expressions is provided by synthesis rules and analysis rules for local reasons; i.e.
rules that explain how to compose the suitable reasons for a proposition A within a
play, and how to separate a complex local reason into the elements required by the
composition rule for A, respectively. Both are built on the formation rules for A.
The formation rules being rules by means of which we verify whether the thesis is a
well-formed expression. This device makes explicit the reasons backing a statement
in a dialogical interaction. In formal dialogues, the simple fact that O gave a reason
for an elementary proposition is sufficient for P to copy this reason for the same
proposition.
In standard dialogues, reasons were left implicit. That is, a player uttering A∧B
was committed to utter A and to utter B if his argumentative partner made this
request by challenging the conjunction. In DIR, there is first a formation play in
which it must be shown that this conjunction is well-formed; i.e. that A : prop
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and that B : prop. Then, the reasons backing the player’s utterance can be made
explicit; i.e. the player must say he has a local reason for the left conjunct (p1 : A)
or for the second conjunct (p2 : B), depending on the request of his adversary. In
the end, the local reasons for elementary propositions are subject to the Formal Rule
[SR2]. This is how DIR implements judgmental equality at the play level. Indeed,
let us assume that p : A. Reflexivity statements of the form p = p : A express the
fact that if O states the elementary proposition A, then P can do the same on the
basis of the same reasons. Intuitively, the idea can be expressed as follows: “My
reasons for stating this proposition you are now challenging are exactly the same as
the ones you brought forward when you yourself stated that very same proposition”
[18, p. 8]. In short, this equality expresses at the object language level the fact that
P’s defensive move rests on the authority O has previously asserted when producing
his local reason.
Equality in action thus gives a dialogical turn to Sundholm’s epistemic assump-
tion. According to Sundholm [20, p. 556], validity involves the transmission of
epistemic matters from premises to conclusion; i.e. upon the epistemic assump-
tion that the premises are known, the conclusion is made evident. The notion of
epistemic assumption appears when explaining what a valid inference is; i.e. an
inference from the premises J1, ..., Jn to the conclusion J is valid if one can make
the conclusion evident on the assumption that J1, ..., Jn are known. According to
Martin-Löf4, “known” cannot be taken in the sense of demonstrated; otherwise we
would be explaining the notion of inference in terms of demonstration when demon-
stration is explained in terms of inference. MartinLöf’s solution is to understand
“known” in the sense of “asserted”, “which is to say that others have taken responsi-
bility for them, and then the question for me is whether I can take responsibility for
the conclusion”. Therefore, what must be known is not that the premises are known
to be true, but that someone else take them as being such, and asserts them. In
dialogical logic, this amounts to link judgmental equality to the Formal Rule. Then,
there is a winning strategy for X only if X can base his moves leading to a win by
endorsing himself the proposition whose justification is rooted in Y’s authority. But
in dialogues, normativity is to be understood at the level of social interaction, not
at the level of rules of inferences. Local rules are rules of interaction, and not rules
of inference, telling rights and duties for the players. Inferences are built from these
interactions when tight to strategies.
The CTT notion of proof-object actually finds its counterpart in the dialogical
notion of winning strategy. It is only when linked to winning strategies that moves
4We refer to the transcription of Ansten Klev of Martin-Löf’s lecture “Is Logic Part of a Nor-
mative Ethics?” held at the research unit FRE3593, Paris, May, 2015.
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in a dialogue can be considered as inferential. Strategic reasons are a kind of re-
capitulation of what can happen for a given thesis and show the entire history of
the play by means of the instructions. They show an overview of the possibilities
enclosed in the thesis. But the fundamental level of plays is also needed. This
link clearly becomes apparent when a heuristic method to extract the strategy level
from the multiplicity of possible plays enclosed by the initial thesis is spelled out.
The strategy level is a generalization of the procedure which is implemented at the
play level; it is a systematic exposition of all the variants. The strategy level allows
to compare different plays on the same thesis. They need not be actually carried
out by the players. They are only a perspective on the possibilities offered by the
play level. Given that there is a P-winning strategy if and only if P has a way to
win regardless of O’s choices, the P’s strategies are built on O’s choices. That is,
each possible choice of O must be taken into account and dealt with in order to
determine if P is able to win in all the different cases stemming from O’s possible
choices. A heuristic method to build the P-winning strategies consists in taking into
consideration O’s choices that entail a branching. For example, as in the Example
1, there is a branching when O defends a disjunction (move 3). There is another
branching when O challenges P’s conjunction (move 5). All of these possibilities
must be explored at the strategy level. Then, there is a winning strategy if P is able
to win no matter the choices of O.5 In order to build the strategies, we must apply
every rule in order to extract every possibility of choice for O. Then, P will have a
winning strategy if he is able to win each play opened by such choices. Therefore,
strategies stem from the play level. We apply all the rules and then we consider all
the different every possible play opened by the branchings.
The distinction between the play level and the strategy level is important because
it dissociates semantic from inferential issues, while funding the latter on the former.
The particle and the structural rules are not inferential rules, they are normative
only for games of asking for and giving reasons; i.e. for the interaction between
two argumentative partners. And O, as well as P, forms part of this interaction at
the play level from which the meaning arises. His role cannot be reduced to verify
the indefeasibility of the moves played by P or to check the validity of the initial
thesis. His role is to take part in the execution of the rules by applying is right
to ask for reasons and his duty to give reasons, on which P may rely to provide
himself reasons backing his own statements. At the play level, we need not think
of the players as optimal. There is room for error and defeasibility, although it is
only from the perspective of the strategic level, we will be able to spot the best ways
5For more details on how to build a winning strategy, as well as the method of extensive forms
of dialogues, see Chapter 5 in [18].
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to play. Nothing prevents one player from playing badly, even when there exists a
winning strategy. At the play level, we may also grasp limitations of computational
skills, memory, information, and so on.
4 Non-Monotonicity in Dialogues
Given that the play level does not involve any strategic component, nothing pre-
cludes defeasibility in dialogical games. Moreover, there exists non-monotonic dia-
logical logics; e.g. the Inconsistency-Adaptive Dialogical Logic (IAD) of Beirlaen
and Fontaine [3].6
Depending on the perspective on dialogues we adopt, defeasibillity and non-
monotonicity can manifest themselves differently. On the one hand, we may speak
of defeasibility of moves, at the play level. Given that the play level is normative,
not for inferential moves, but for interactions, there is room for defeasibility of moves
without changing the notion of validity. Moves might be retracted or defeated for
various reasons; for example, if suboptimal plays or scant resources of the players
(computational skill, memory, access to information, and so on) are taken into ac-
count. On the other hand, we may also speak of defeasible strategies, which yield
non-monotonicity. Here, the notion of validity is fundamental; i.e. even by consid-
ering the strategy level, the link between the premises and the conclusions of an
argument may be broken because of the introduction of new information. Nonethe-
less, strategies are not primitive, and non-monotonicity stems from the play level
in which specific rules open new possibilities. In this last section, we discuss these
issues in the context of IAD.
Let us begin by explaining how IAD works.7 Standard dialogues are explosive:
from an inconsistent set of premises, we can derive anything. But usually, the occur-
rence of inconsistencies in the course of an argumentative interaction is not a reason
to infer random statements or to stop the process. That is why the argumentative
partners may agree to play a different argumentative game with rules of paracon-
sistent logic. In such games, a specific structural rule [SR5] governing the use of
the particle rule for negation (that remains unchanged) modifies the global meaning
of negation. Indeed, P is not allowed to challenge a negation ¬ϕ uttered by O,
unless O has previously challenged an occurrence of the same negation before. We
6See also Fontaine and Barés [9] and Barés and Fontaine [1] for an application to abductive
reasoning. Other dialogical approaches to defeasibility in dialogues have been proposed by Nzokou
[13] and Dango [6] in order to study the use of proverbs in argumentative interaction of the African
oral tradition. A dialogical approach of Belief Revison Theory based on Bonano’s semantics can be
found in Fiutek et al. [8].
7See the rules in Appendix 6.4, and Beirlaen and Fontaine [3] for more details.
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may say that by challenging a negation ¬ϕ, O concedes that this negation behaves
normally. This is enough to block explosion, but perfectly acceptable inferences like
the disjunctive syllogism (¬ϕ,ϕ ∨ ψ/ψ) are now invalid.
That is why in IAD we reason as classically as possible, at least until an incon-
sistency is encountered. More precisely, P is now allowed to challenge a negation by
means of a conditional move, even if O has not challenged an occurrence of the same
negation before (See [SR5.1] in Appendix 6.4). A conditional move is a move by
means of which P commits himself to defend an additional condition, of reliability
in the case of IAD. A formula ϕ used to challenge a negation ¬ϕ is reliable if ϕ∧¬ϕ
does not pertain to a disjunction of abnormalities Dab(Θ) derivable from the set of
premises.8 Therefore, O is allowed to challenge a condition of reliability by intro-
ducing a Dab(Θ) containing ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ, and it is P who must show in a subdialogue
that it is not derivable from the set of initial premises.




q[¬p, p, p ∨ q] 0
1 m := 2 n := 2 2
3.1 ¬p
03.2 p
3.3 p ∨ q
5 p 3.3 ?∨ 4
−−− 3.1 p RΣp 6
7 ?RΣp (p ∧ ¬p) 6 FΣ(p ∧ ¬p) 8
d1.1
9 p ∧ ¬p[¬p, p, p ∨ q] 8 −−−
11 p ∧ ¬p 9
¬p 10.1
p 10.2
p ∨ q 10.3
13 p 11 ?∧L 12
15 ¬p 11 ?∧R 14
−−− 15 p 16
17 p 10.1 −−−
8See Appendix (Section 6.4) for the definition of a a disjunction of abnormalities Dab(Θ).
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Explanation: P challenges a negation by means of a conditional move (move
6). O challenges the condition by introducing Dab({p ∧ ¬p}) (move 7). P answers
by claiming that this inconsistency cannot be derived from the set of premises (move
8). O challenges P’s claim by taking the burden of proof of p ∧ ¬p[¬p, p, p ∨ q] in a
subdialogue.9 O wins the subdialogue, thus showing that move 6 is not reliable. P
loses the main dialogue.
By contrast, there would be a P-winning strategy for the initial thesis q[¬p, p ∨
q], where no inconsistency is involved. The existence of a P-winning strategy for
q[¬p, p∨ q] does not warrant the existence of a P-winning strategy for q[¬p, p, p∨ q].
This is dialogical non-monotonicity, which is more generally defined in terms of
dialogues that do not satisfy the following property:
Dialogical Monotony: If there is a P-winning strategy for ϕ[Σ], then there is
he also a P-winning strategy for ϕ[Σ′] (where Σ ⊆ Σ′).
Although non-monotonicity is a feature of the strategy level, it arises from spe-
cific rules implemented at the play level. What is fundamental is the use of negation,
independently from the strategy level. The rules of IAD open new possibilities of
plays which eventually yield non-monotonicity. We may understand the introduc-
tion of a Dab-formula in terms of Pollock’s undercutting defeater [15, p. 485]; i.e.
as a move breaking the relation between the premises and the conclusion. The link
holds if the initial thesis is q[¬p, p ∨ q], but it is broken if p is added to the initial
set of premises. Nonetheless, from the strategy perspective, which is some kind of
a recapitulation of the various possible plays, defeasibility does not appear. If O
can defeat an argument by introducing a relevant Dab-formula, he will do it directly
and win. If there is no such a Dab-formula, then the conditional move is reliable
regardless his choices. Therefore, defeasibility of strategies, understood in terms of
non-monotonicity, does not strictly speaking involve defeasible moves at the play
level. non-monotonicity is manifested through different games with different ini-
tial theses; e.g., one with q[¬p, p ∨ q], the other with q[¬p, p, p ∨ q]. But even in
non-monotonic dialogues such as IAD, defeasibility needs not appear within the di-
alogue, whether it be at the play or at the strategy level. Defeasibility might appear
at the play level (in suboptimal plays), but this would not be specific to IAD.
In IAD, the use of the negation rule grounds a kind of dynamic at the strategy
level, since the existence of a P-winning strategy depends on the context of argu-
mentation (the set of initial premises). But the rule itself is not dynamic, the rights
and duties do not change in the course of the game. According to Batens [2, p. 461],
non-monotonicity displays an external dynamics; i.e., a conclusion may be revised
9Notice that in the subdialogues O plays formally (he has the burden of proof) and that the
rule are those of LLD with (SR5). See details in Appendix.
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in the light of new information. This has nothing to do with suboptimal plays in
dialogues. We may say that the players play optimally given a particular state of
information, and then retract themselves if new information is added. In IAD, the
existence of a P-winning strategy is determined since the beginning of a dialogical
game, so that the strategy itself is not really defeated. But, external dynamics can
be accounted for in terms of different dialogues with different initial theses (for exam-
ple, one dialogical game for ψ[¬ϕ,ϕ∨ψ] and another for ψ[¬ϕ,ϕ, ϕ∨ψ]. Therefore,
from the strategy level perspective, such an external dynamic may be understood
as a dynamic of passing from a dialogical game to another.
We may also think of external dynamics in terms of defeasibility in material dia-
logues of DIR, in which new assertions that are materially but not formally grounded
are introduced. Indeed, local reasons can also be specified for material dialogues by
means of “Socratic rules” which specify how to justify elementary assertions in re-
lation to their proper content. Whereas in formal dialogues P is allowed to state an
elementary proposition only on the ground that O has already stated it, the inquiry
may go further in material dialogues. For example, in a first-order language, if P
asserts that the ball is red, then P is committed to show that the ball is coloured. A
language game establishes for each of the predicates of the game the suitable Socratic
rule. Here, some kind of cooperation is involved, given that the players must finally
agree on the use of the predicates involved in elementary propositions. In this case,
defeasibility can be thought in relation to the propositional content, without arising
from an adversarial component of dialogues. Various examples are put forward by
Rahman et al. [16, p. 61 ff] in a dialogical framework applied to Islamic law. We
may provide the following simpler example: P may justify the interdiction of drink-
ing wine and driving because it is the product of fermented grapes. But O brings the
case of vinegar as counterexample, and may introduce date wine as another example
and justify its interdiction by its toxicity. This will yield a dynamic change and P
will be invited to start again the game with the suggested justification.10
Batens [2, p. 462], also considers an internal dynamics, triggered by an analysis of
already available information. In IAD, such an internal dynamics may be displayed
at the play level. That is, in the course of suboptimal plays, one of the argumentative
partners realizes after all that a conditional move is not reliable. The set of premises
may be so huge that O is not immediately able to spot an inconsistency and to find
the relevantDab-formula to challenge a conditional move. But this has nothing to do
with non-monotonicity, defined at the strategy level, and should not be understood
in terms of inference. From a dialogical perspective, this is not a dynamics of proof,
but a dynamics of interaction at the play level.
10We are thankful to an anonymous reviewer for this comment on material dialogues.
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5 Conclusion
Both Dutilh Novaes, Martin-Löf, and Rahman et al., highlight the fact that logic is
in first instance normative for dialogical interaction, rather than for correct think-
ing defined in terms of (deductive) inference. Nevertheless, in the absence of a
clear conception of the distinction between the play level and the strategy level, Du-
tilh Novaes eventually holds the thesis that dialogues intrinsically involve a strategic
component, and thus links again their foundations to the notion of inference. Follow-
ing the insights of DIR of Rahman et al., we part with her on this issue: no strategic
component is constitutive of dialogues at the play level. As a consequence, noth-
ing prevents us from thinking of dialogues as an interactive framework for defeasible
reasoning. It is even a requisite if we aim at considering dialogues as a general frame-
work for human reasoning. Given that dialogical rules are normative for interaction
rather than for correct (deductive) reasoning, or inference, they even constitute an
interesting framework to deal with defeasible reasoning and non-monotonicity.
There are still different ways to understand defeasibility in dialogical games.
Again, it seems that the different dialogical levels –play level and strategy level–
provide tools to shed a new light on the issue. We can indeed speak of defeasible
moves, at the play level. Defeasibility of moves has nothing to do with the notion of
winning strategy, and subsequently with the notion of inference. But it may account
for interesting features of argumentative interaction; e.g. resources limitations of
the players when they try to spot an inconsistency in a set of initial premises.
Defeasibility can also be related to the propositional content, in the context of
material dialogues. Non-monotonicity is defined at the strategy level. In IAD, as in
other monotonic dialogical approaches, the existence of a P-winning strategy for a
given thesis is determined since the beginning by all the possible plays. Therefore,
strategies are not strictly speaking defeasible. Non-monotonicity is accounted for in
terms of different dialogues with different initial theses. But, as we explained it at
the end of the previous section, such dialogues might be articulated in a dynamic
framework displaying non-monotonicity explicitly.
6 Appendix - Definition and Rules
6.1 Basic Definitions
Let L be a propositional language, defined as follows: ϕ := ϕ|ϕ∧ϕ|ϕ∨ϕ|ϕ→ ϕ|¬ϕ
Lower case letters p, q, r, ... refer to atomic formulas in L. We use lower case
Greek letters ϕ, ψ, χ, ... to refer to L-formulas, and upper case Greek letters Γ, Σ,
∆, ... to refer to finite sets of L-formulas.
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X and Y (with X 6= Y) are two player variables. P and O are two labels
standing for the players of the games, the Proponent and the Opponent respectively.
The force symbol ‘!’ is used for assertions and ‘?’ for requests.
A move is an expression of the form X−e where X is a player variable and e is
either an assertion or a request.
We use n := ri and m := rj with ri, rj ∈ N∗ for the utterance of the rank the
players choose according to the rule [SR0] below.
A play is a sequence of moves performed in accordance with the game rules. The
initial thesis will be either a formula ϕ or an argument of the form ψ[ϕ1, ..., ϕn] which
amounts to the claim that there is a winning strategy for the conclusion ψ given
the concession of ϕ1, ..., ϕn. The premises ϕ1, ..., ϕn are referred to as the initial
concessions. In case the premise set is empty, the initial thesis is simply ψ. The
dialogical game for a claim ψ[ϕ1, ..., ϕn] (respectively ψ) is the set D(ψ[ϕ1, ..., ϕn])
(respectively D(ψ)) of all the plays with ψ[ϕ1, ..., ϕn] (respectively ψ) as the initial
thesis.11
For every move M in a given sequence S of moves, pS(M) denotes the position
of M in S. Positions are counted starting with 0. We will also use a function F
such that the intended interpretation of FS(M) = [m′, Z] is that in the sequence S,




X-!ϕ ∧ ψ Y - ?∧L X - !ϕ
or or
Y - ?∧R X - !ψ respectively
X - !ϕ ∨ ψ Y - ?∨ X - !ϕ or X - !ψ
X - !¬ϕ Y - !ϕ −−−
No Defence
X - !ϕ→ ψ Y - !ϕ X - !ψ
X - !ψ[ϕ1, ..., ϕn] Y - !ϕ1 X - !ψ
...
Y - !ϕn
11Where Σ = {ϕ1, ..., ϕn}, we sometimes write [Σ] instead of [ϕ1, ..., ϕn], for the sake of presen-
tation.
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6.3 (Standard) Structural Rules
[SR0][Starting Rule]
(i) If the initial thesis is of the form ψ[ϕ1, ..., ϕn], then for any play P ∈
D(ψ[ϕ1, ..., ϕn]) we have:
(ia) pP(P−!ψ[ϕ1, ..., ϕn]) = 0,
(ib) pP(O−n := r1) = 1 and pP(P−n := r2) = 2 .
(ii) If the initial thesis is of the form ψ, then for any play P ∈ D(ψ) we have:
(iia) pP(P−!ψ) = 0,
(iib) pP(O−n := r1) = 1 and pP(P−n := r2) = 2 .
Clause (ia) (respectively (iia)) warrants that every play in D(ψ[ϕ1, ..., ϕn] (re-
spectively D(ψ)) starts with P asserting the thesis ψ[ϕ1, ..., ϕn] (respectively ψ).
Clause (ib) (respectively (iib)) says that the players choose their respective rep-
etition ranks among the positive integers.12 Clerbout [5] (p. 791) showed that there
is a P-winning strategy when O chooses rank 1 if and only if there is a P-winning
strategy for any other choice of O. In In IAD, O may need to choose rank 2 because
of the dynamics of sections.
12A move M ′ performed by X in a dialogue is a repetition of a previous move M if (i) M ′ and
M are two attacks performed by X against the same move N performed by Y, or (ii) M ′ and M
are two defences performed by X in response to the same attack N performed by Y. The ranks
guarantee the finiteness of plays by limiting the repetitions allowed in a dialogue.
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[SR1c][Classical Development Rule] For any move M in P such that
pP(M) > 2 we have FP(M) = [m′, Z] where Z ∈ {A, D} and m′ < pP(M).
Let r be the repetition rank of Player X and P ∈ Dψ[ϕ1, ..., ϕn] (respectively
D(ψ)) such that:
• the last member of P is a Y-move,
• M0 ∈ P is a Y-move of position m0,
• there are n moves M1, ..., Mn of player X in P such that FP(M1) =
FP(M2) = ... = FP(Mn) = [m0, Z] with Z ∈ {A, D}.
Let N be an X-move such that FP_N (N) = [m0, Z]. We have P _ N ∈ D(ϕ) if
and only if n < r.a
a“P _ N” denotes the extension of P with N .
Intuitionistic dialogical games are defined with a rule [SR1i], by modifying
[SR1c] so that the repetition ranks bound only the number of challenges, and play-
ers can defend only once against the last non-answered challenge.
[SR2][Formal rule] The sequence S is a play only if the following condition is
fulfilled: if N =P −!ψ is a member of S, for any atomic sentence ψ, then
there is a move M =O−!ψ in S such that pS(M) < pS(N).
This rule means that P can assert an atomic sentence ψ only if O previously
asserted the same atomic sentence ψ.
[D1][X-terminal] Let P be a play in D(ψ[ϕ1, ..., ϕn]) (respectively D(ψ)) the
last member of which is an X-move. If there is no Y-move N such that
P _ N ∈ D(ψ[ϕ1, ..., ϕn]) (respectively D(ψ)) then P is said to be X-
terminal.
[SR3][Winning Rule for Plays] Player X wins a play P ∈ D(ψ[ϕ1, ..., ϕn]) (re-
spectively D(ψ)) if and only if P is X-terminal.
These rules determine the play level. Dialogical validity is defined by taking into
account the the strategy level. The thesis of P is valid if and only if P has a winning
strategy according to the following definition:
345
Barés Gómez and Fontaine
[D2][Winning]
1. A strategy of a player X in D(ψ[ϕ1, ..., ϕn]) (respectively D(ψ)) is a func-
tion sx which assigns a legal X-move to every non terminal play P ∈
D(ψ[ϕ1, ..., ϕn]) (respectively D(ψ)) the last member of which is a Y-move.
2. A X-strategy is winning if it leads to X’s win no matter how Y plays.
On the basis of the definition of winning strategy, we can define the notion of
consequence for dialogical CL (classical logic); that is, a dialogical logic played with
[SR0]-[SR3], the so-called CL-rules:
[D3][CL-Consequence] Σ `CL ψ (respectively `CL ψ) iff according to the CL-
rules, there is a P-winning strategy for the thesis ψ[ϕ1, ..., ϕn] (respectively
ψ).
A similar definition of consequence for dialogical logic IL (intuitionistic logic) is
obtained by substituting the IL-rules to the CL-rules; i.e. by substituting [SR1i]
to [SR1c].
6.4 IAD
For the details of IAD, see Beirlaen and Fontaine (2016 REF). IAD is defined
according to the following triple:
1. LLD (Lower Limit Logic) = Paraconsistent Dialogical Logic ([SR0]-[SR3]
+ [SR5]),
2. Ω =DF {ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ|ϕ is a formula},
3. Strategy = Reliability
Ω is a set of abnormalities. Where Θ is a finite subset of Ω, Dab(Θ) (for “disjunction
of abnormalities) is the disjunction of the members of Θ. If Θ is a singleton, say ϕ,
then Dab(Θ) = ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ.
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[SR5][Paraconsistent Negation Rule] The sequence S is a play only if the
following condition is fulfilled: If there is a move N =P−!ψ − C − d in the
sequence S such that:
(i) n = pS(N1) = n1,
(ii) FS(N1) = [m1, A], and
(iii) m1 = pS(M1) such that M1 =O−!¬ψ − C − d.
Then, there is a move M2 =O−!ψ in S such that:
(i) pS(M2) = m2 and m2 < n1,
(ii) FS(M2) = [n2, A], and
(iii) n2 = pS(N2) such that N2 =O−!¬ψ − C − d.
In IAD, even if O did not challenge another occurrence of the same negation be-
fore, P can challenge a formula ¬ϕ previously uttered by ϕ by means of a conditional
move; i.e. by assuming that ϕ is reliable:
[D7][Reliability] Let ϕ[Σ] be the thesis of the Proponent. A formula ψ behaves
reliably with respect to Σ iff there is no formula Dab(Θ) such that:
(i) ψ ∧ ¬ψ ∈ Θ,
(ii) Σ `LLD DabΘ, and
(iii) Σ 0LLD Dab(Θ/{ψ ∧ ¬ψ}).
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[SR5.1][IAD Negation Rule] The sequence S is a play only if the following
condition is fulfilled: If there is a move N =P−!ψ−C − d in the sequence S
such that:
(i) n = pS(N)
(ii) FS(N) = [m,A], and
(iii) m = pS(M) such that M =O−!¬ψ − ∅ − d
Then one of the following two conditions holds:
(i) N is performed by P in accordance with the LLD negation rule [SR5], or
(ii) N =P−!ψ −RΣψ − d where RΣψ abbreviates that ψ behaves reliably in view
of the premise set Σ.
The reliability operator behaves as a logical constant whose meaning is given by
the following particle rules:
Partice rule for the reliability operator R
Assertion Attack Defence
X−!ϕ−RΣϕ − d1 Y−?RDab(Θ) X−!FΣ(Dab(Θ))− ∅ − d1
where ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ ∈ Θ
Or X counter-attacks
X−IΣ(Dab(Θ\{ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ})− ∅ − d1
(where (Dab(Θ\{ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ}) 6= ∅
Y introduces a minimal disjunction of abnormality Dab(Θ) such that ψ ∈ Θ.
Then, either X claims that Dab(Θ) cannot be LLD-drawn from Σ; this he does by
making use of the failure operator F whose meaning is given by another particle rule.
Or X claims that Dab(Θ) is not minimal (i.e. a smaller disjunction without ϕ∧¬ϕ
is LLD-derivable); this he does by making use of the indispensability operator I
whose meaning is also given by another particle rule.
Particle rule for the failure operator F
Assertion Attack Defence
X−!FΣϕ− ∅ − d1 Y−?ϕ[Σ]− ∅ − d1.i −−−
Y opens a subdialogue d1.i No defence
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The meaning of the I-operator is given by the following rule:
Particle rule for the indispensability operator I
Assertion Attack Defence
X−!IΣϕ− ∅ − di Y−?IΣϕ− ∅ − di X−ϕ[Σ]− ∅ − di.j
X opens a subdialogue di.j
That is, X must show that a Dab(Θ) shorter than the one introduced by Y can
be unconditionally derived from Σ.
When Y challenge the failure operator, he takes the burden of the proof of ϕ[Σ]
and must play under formal restriction, even if Y = O. That is why Y opens a
subdialogue, in which he commits himself to defend ϕ[Σ] by means of the LLD-
rules.
We thus replace [SR2] by [SR2.1] and [SR2.2], and we add [SR4.2]:
[SR2.1][Formal Restriction for Adaptive Dialogues] If X plays under for-
mal restriction, then the sequence ∆ is a play only if the following condition
is fulfilled: if N = X−!ψ−Cj − d is a member of ∆, for any atomic sentence
ψ, then there is a moveM = Y−!ψ−Ci−d in ∆ such that p∆(M) < p∆(N).
[SR2.2][Application of Formal Restriction] The application of the formal re-
striction is regulated by the following conditions:
(i) In the main dialogue d1, if X = P, then X plays under the formal restriction.
(ii) If X opens a subdialogue d1.i, then X plays under the formal restriction.
[SR4.2][Adaptive LLD-Rule] In a subdialogue d1.i, only LLD-rules apply.
[SR3.1][Winning rule for subdialogues] A subdialogue d1.i is won by X if it
is Y’s turn and there are no more moves available to Y. If X wins the
subdialogue, we return to the main dialogue d1 in which it is (still) Y’s turn.
Finally, we define a notion of consequence for IAD:
[D6][IAD-consequence] Σ `IAD ϕ (resp. `IAD ϕ) iff according to theIAD-rules
there is a P-winning strategy for the thesis ϕ[Σ] (resp. ϕ).
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Abstract
Assertive graphs (AGs) modify Peirce’s Alpha part of Existential Graphs
(EGs). They are used to reason about assertions without a need to resort to
any ad hoc sign of assertion. The present paper presents an extension of propo-
sitional AGs to the Beta case by introducing two kinds of non-interdefinable
lines. The absence of polarities in the theory of AGs necessitates Beta-AGs
that resort to such two lines: standard lines that mean the presence of a cer-
tain method of asserting, and barbed lines that mean the presence of a general
method of asserting. New rules of transformations for Beta-AGs are presented
by which it is shown how to derive the theorems of quantificational intuitionistic
logic. Generally, Beta-AGs offer a new non-classical system of quantification
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by which one can logically analyse complex assertions by a notation which (i)
is free from a separate sign of assertion, (ii) does not involve explicit polarities,
and (iii) specifies a type-referential notation for quantification. These proper-
ties stand in important contrast both to standard diagrammatic notations and
to standard, occurrence-referential quantificational notations.
Keywords: Existential/Assertive Graphs; Assertions; Quantifiers; Transformations;
Intuitionistic Logic; Type vs. occurrence-referential notations.
1 Introduction
Intended interpretations of logical systems often motivate the meaning of logical con-
stants and the justification of logic’s fundamental principles. A good pre-theoretical
justification of a logical system may be gained from models that are not mathemat-
ical in the strict sense, because one could then avoid a vicious circle of explaining
knowledge of mathematical structures with other mathematical structures.
According to Gödel (1961), for example, we grasp abstract mathematical objects
by means of a clarification of meaning that does not consist in formal definitions.1
An instructive further example of this view is the assertion-based interpretation of
intuitionistic logical constants, which derives from Heyting (1956). In it, conjunc-
tion, disjunction, implication, negation, etc. receive meaning via an informal notion
of assertion. For example, “P and Q” can be asserted iff both “P” and “Q” can be
asserted; “P or Q” can be asserted iff at least one of “P”, “Q” can be asserted, and
so on for other logical connectives.
Intended interpretations are thus reasonable guides by which one is to look for
and assign an informal meaning to logical elements, thus helping to obtain intuitive
models. To this effect, Dummett (1978, 214) had pointed out that “an intuitive
model is a half-formed conception of how to determine truth-conditions for a given
class of sentences. It is not an ultimate guarantee of consistency, nor the product of
a special faculty of acquiring mathematical understanding. It is merely an idea in
the embryonic stage, before we have succeeded in the laborious task of bringing it
to birth in a fully explicit form”.
These views provide the background motivation for the present paper. In many
1Gödel (1961, 383) was convinced that the phenomenological method may be used to concep-
tually clarify the meaning of abstract mathematical entities. For notice that he wrote that “now
in fact, there exists today the beginning of a science which claims to possess a systematic method
for such a clarification of meaning, and that is the phenomenology founded by Husserl. Here clar-
ification of meaning consists in focusing more sharply on the concepts concerned by directing our
attention in a certain way, namely, onto our own acts in the use of these concepts, onto our powers
in carrying out our acts, etc.”.
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logical systems, an ad hoc sign of assertion, such as the one introduced by Frege
in Begriffsschrift (Frege 1879), is commonly used (Frege 1879, Bellucci & Pietari-
nen 2017, Carrara, Chiffi & De Florio 2017). An assertion sign may then be allied
with a sign that expresses its dual, denial, as in bilateralist systems (Rumfitt 2000).
In actuality, however, there are systems that have no ad hoc sign for assertions at
all. This may be the case even when assertions do play a major inferential role in
such systems. Such is the case in the Existential Graphs (EGs), invented by Charles
Peirce in the late 19th century (Peirce 2019). Instead of an explicit sign of assertion,
these logical graphs have an embedded sign of assertion in their fundamental nota-
tion of the sheet of assertion (Peirce 2019, Roberts 1973, Bellucci & Pietarinen 2017,
Pietarinen & Chiffi 2018).
Various forms of diagrams and graphical representations offer important advice
in shaping the construction of intended models. Using the resources of Peirce’s EGs,
the present paper proposes an interpretation for acts of logical assertions involving
quantification, represented in what is termed here the system of Beta Assertive
Graphs (Beta-AGs). Beta-AGs is an extension of Alpha-AGs that was introduced in
(Bellucci, Chiffi & Pietarinen 2018). It formalises a class of quantificational linguistic
acts that are assertive in their very nature. It is an extension of Alpha-AGs in fashion
analogous to Peirce’s extension of propositional Alpha-EGs to quantificational Beta-
EGs (Pietarinen 2015a,b).
In brief, the graphical formulas of Beta-AGs are constructed by means of (i)
standard lines “ ” meaning a particular (a certain) assertion, (ii) barbed lines
“ ” meaning a universal assertion (or a general method to assert), (iii) cap-
ital letters “F”, “G”,. . . , and boxed capital letters “ F ” , “ G ”,. . . , standing for
assertions generically, (iv) a connector “ ” between any assertion (such as “F G”)
standing for disjunction, (v) a blackened dot “ ” standing for the absurdum, (vi)
a simple juxtaposition of assertions standing for conjunction (such as “F G”), and
(vii) cornerings (doubly nested connected boxes) “ ” standing for implication. In
these cornerings, antecedents are denoted by whatever rests in the area within the
outer rectangular shape, and consequents by whatever rests in the area within the
inner area of the rectangular shape. The inner rectangle shares two of its sides with
the outer one and is non-detachable from it.
The use of lines for quantification is motivated by the fundamental conceptual
and semiotic distinction between type-referential and occurrence-referential logical
languages, presented in the next section.
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2 Why Lines? Occurrence-referential Languages
How many words are there in the sentence “Venice is always Venice”? In one sense,
there are three words: “Venice”, “is” and “always”. This is the lexicographer’s sense
of the word “word”. When a lexicographer says that the Oxford English Dictionary
contains more than 300,000 words, what they mean is more than 300,000 word
types. In another sense, “Venice is always Venice” contains four words, because
in it the word type “Venice” occurs twice. This is an editor’s sense of the word
“word”. When an editor says that a book should not exceed 120,000 words, what
they mean is 120,000 word occurrences. The distinction between a linguistic type
and an occurrence of a linguistic type is familiar in linguistics (Wetzel 2018).
Logical languages may differ as to whether the sameness and distinctness of
the individuals of the universe of discourse are represented by means of variable
types or variable occurrences. Peirce’s Beta graphs that extend the propositional
Alpha graphs with quantificational lines, and the standard notation for first-order
logic with identity (hereafter, FOL=), illustrate this distinction well. Consider the
following sentences in FOL=:
1. ∃x(Fx ∧ Gx)
2. ∃x∃y(Fx ∧ Gy)
In (1), there are two occurrences of the variable type “x” within the scope of the
quantifier, and these refer to the same individual. In (2) there is one occurrence of
the variable type “x” and one occurrence of the variable type “y”. These refer to
distinct individuals (which may nonetheless coincide). In Beta graphs, (1) and (2)
are represented as in Figs. 1 and 2, respectively.
Figure 1: F G
Figure 2: F G
In Beta graphs, the variable type is the “line of identity”: a thick connector to the
“hooks” imagined to occupy the peripheries of the predicate terms. In Beta graphs,
the line of identity represents both individual existence (existential quantification)
and identity. It represents the numerical identity of the individuals denoted by its
terminal points. Since there is only one unique variable type (the line of identity),
it is the distinctness of its occurrences that determine the distinctness of the objects
denoted. Thus, in Fig. 1 there is one occurrence of the line type, and this means that
reference is made to one single individual, of which it is asserted that it is both F
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and G, just like in (1). By contrast, in Fig. 2 there are two occurrences of the line
type (each disconnected portion of the line counting as a distinct occurrence), and
this means that reference is made to two individuals (which may be the same), one
of which is said to be F and the other of which is said to be G.
The difference may be stated in the following terms. A type-referential notation
is a notation in which the sameness and the distinctness of individuals is repre-
sented by the identity of the variable-type: in such a language each occurrence of
the variable-type within the scope of a quantifier refers to the same individual.
An occurrence-referential notation, in contrast, is a notation in which the sameness
and the distinctness of individuals is represented by the identity of the variable-
occurrence: in such a language each occurrence of the variable-type within the scope
of a quantifier refers to a possibly distinct individual (for details, see Bellucci &
Pietarinen 2020). It is evident that FOL= is a type-referential notation, whereas
Beta graphs exhibit an occurrence-referential notation.
In a type-referential notation like FOL= it is possible to represent syntactically
distinct sentences such as (3), (4), and (5):
3. ∃x∃y(Fx ∧ Gy ∧ (x = y))
4. ∃x∃y∃z(Fx ∧ Gy ∧ (x = y) ∧ (y = z))
5. ∃x∃y∃z∃t(Fx ∧ Gy ∧ (x = y) ∧ (y = z) ∧ (z = t))
These three sentences are logically equivalent to (1). In Beta graphs, they all corre-
spond to the graph in Fig. 1, because it is not possible in its language to write (1)
without thereby at once also writing (3), (4), and (5).
Occurrence-referentiality thus means that one single Beta graph type corresponds
to an equivalence class of formulas in FOL=. The distinction between type- and
occurrence-referential notations impacts the possibilities of defining a translation
from one language to another: in the case of standard Beta graphs and FOL=,
each single Beta graph can always be translated to any one of the members of an
equivalence class of sentences of FOL=.
3 Beta-Assertive Graphs (Beta-AGs)
In order to represent first-order quantification in the language of Assertive Graphs
(AGs), this section defines Beta-AGs as a conservative extension of the theory of
propositional, Alpha-AGs. Being a conservative extension, all the conventions and
rules of inference that hold for the propositional level of AGs remain sound and
unchanged in Beta-AGs.
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First, the theory of Alpha-AGs is briefly reviewed; for more details, the reader
is referred to Bellucci, Chiffi & Pietarinen (2018) and Chiffi & Pietarinen (2020).
3.1 Alpha-Assertive Graphs (Alpha-AGs)
The propositional theory of AGs is, in a nutshell, the following. The characteristic
feature of AGs in general is that the graphs lack the standard notation of Existen-
tial Graphs (EGs), which are the continuous closed boundaries around any graph,
typically termed the ovals or the cuts. In EGs, cuts signify both parentheses and
contradictory negation. The absence of such cuts in AGs results from the specific
design feature of its distinct notation, in which polarities of the areas of the graphs
are not explicitly represented and in which the notation of boxes around graphs are
not cuts on the sheet of assertion. For these reasons, there is no need to introduce
a separate sign for negations.
The absence of cuts results in graphical formulas that are less cluttered, as
multiple nestings of such boundaries are avoided. On the other hand, dispensing with
polarities allows one to directly consider conditional forms of reasoning as expressed,
as will be seen below, by means of the cornering of boxes. What is expressed by
the cornering will accordingly be the main form of inference in AGs. This feature
of having cornerings as a primitive notion means that AGs are somewhat closer to
standard logical practice than EGs are.
3.1.1 Fundamental Conventions
Expressions of AGs are instances of graphs standing for assertions and their relations,
recursively constructed from primitive assertions. All graph-instances are those that
are scribed on a sheet of assertion (SA). SA is an unordered open-compact manifold.
A blank SA is a sheet of assertion on which nothing (except boxes) appears. There
are six fundamental conventions.
Convention 1. We always have a right to a blank SA.
Convention 2. We denote the assertion of a graph α by writing it enclosed within
a box. So, if α is the proposition P of the language, this gives P , which also
is a proposition of the same language.
Since graphs are scribed on the SA, anything on the SA is an assertion. A box around
a graph is not necessary for that graph to be conceived as an assertion. The boxing
is a deictic device that so to speak draws the interpreter’s attention to the graph
enclosed within it. It could mean stating “This is what I say: ”, “Have a look
at ”, “Listen,” etc. Hence the box is unlike Fregean sign of assertion, which in
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association with a content gives rise to an assertion (for details, see Carrara, Chiffi
& Pietarinen 2020). Instead, the assertoric force is designated by the SA.
Convention 3. A juxtaposition is to assert more than one graph on the SA, at any
non-overlapping position of the SA.
For example: P Q . The meaning of juxtaposed graphs is that what their
significations are is to be considered independently of the significations of the other,
that is, without being influenced by what is scribed on any other position of the SA.
Thus the juxtaposition of two graphs expresses the conjunction of two assertions of
those graphs.
Since the boxes and be freely inserted and omitted around any graph, and since
the conjunction of an assertion of two graphs is equivalent to the assertion of those
two conjuncted graphs—a standard feature of the logic of assertions—the graph
above is also equivalent to any of the following: P Q , P Q , P Q , P Q,
etc. (Remark: Comma is not part of the language of graphs and does not appear
on the SA.)
Since the SA is unordered (isotropic) in all directions, the following graphs are
likewise examples of graphs equivalent to any of the graphs presented above in the









It is important to now notice that commutativity and associativity of assertions
immediately result from this spatial representation of assertions on the SA and are
not part of any explicit rule.
Convention 4. Two graphs juxtaposed on the SA not independently but alterna-
tively asserted are connected by a thin line with a crossing bar: P Q
This notation represents disjunctive assertions. (Remark: The cross bar | added to
the thin line of the notation for disjunction is both historical from the algebraic use of
+ and its variants for disjunction as well as to distinguish it from the quantificational
line of the Beta extension.)
The next convention informs us of the fact that the box notation is nevertheless
not a superfluous design feature of these graphs, and that its importance comes from
the way in which we are to represent conditional assertions.
Convention 5. The sign of two nested boxed, one within the other and with the
inner and outer boxes connected by the sharing of two adjacent sides, is called
a cornering: P Q
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Cornering represents an implicational relation between two assertions. The graph P
that occurs on the outer area of the cornering is the antecedent and Q that occurs
on the inner area of the cornering is the consequent of an implication from P to
Q. This follows from these graphs being, just as existential graphs in general, inter-
preted in terms of what Peirce called the “endoporeutic principle” or “endoporeutic
interpretation” (R 293, Peirce 1966), namely that one is to assign the semantic val-
ues to their constituents from the outside-in fashion: the graph in the outer area of
the corner comes first, and thus makes the antecedent of the implication, while the
graph in the inner area of the corner comes second, and is the consequent of the
implication.
The notation of the cornering is not constructed from the simple nesting of two
boxes. Cornering is, as noted, a primitive sign in which the two adjacent sides of
the box that demarcate the inner area of the corner are welded with segments of the
two adjacent sides of the box that demarcate the outer area of the cornering. Hence
the graph above that expresses the implication of two assertions is not equivalent to
P Q , which expresses the assertion of the conjunction of P with an assertion of
Q.
Convention 6. An absurdity is indicated with a heavy dot ‘ ’, termed the blot.
Remark. One could imagine the heavy dot to spread to that it would fill up the
entire area in which it occurs. The idea of such blot resembles Peirce’s own proposals
(e.g., R S-30, 1906; see Pietarinen et al. 2020), according to which a blackening of an
entire area leaves no room for any assertions and thus signals absurdity. For reasons
of simplicity (that is, in order to avoid representing the entire sheet as blackened) and
analyticity (that is, in order to represent juxtaposition of the blot with assertions),
we take the blot to be a black dot bounded in the given nominal size.
This concludes our abridged presentation of the system of conventions for AGs.
3.1.2 The Language of Assertive Graphs
The set of well-formed (well-scribed) graphs of the language of AGs is defined as
follows:
1. Atomic graphs h, j, s,. . . (of a denumerable set); the blank , the blot  ,
and their boxings h , j , s , ,  scribed on the SA, are
well-formed graphs.
2. If H is a well-formed graph, then also its boxing scribed on the SA is a well-
formed graph, thus: H .
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3. If H is a well-formed graph and J is a well-formed graph, also the scribing of
them at two different positions on the SA is a well-formed graph, thus: H J .
4. If H and J are well-formed graph, also their connection with a line + is a
well-formed graph, thus: H J .
5. If H and J are well-formed graphs, then also the cornering, namely a graph in
which J appears in the corner of H, scribed on the SA, is a well-formed graph,
thus: H J .





Clearly, the following is a well-formed graph whenever H is a well-formed graph:
H  . As the blot “ ” stands for the absurdum, a denial of the content of an
assertion is expressed as a cornering in which the blot alone rests on the inside
of the cornering while the assertion that is denied rests on the outer box of the
cornering.
Since the SA is an unordered, open-compact space, the properties of commuta-
tivity, associativity and adjunction immediately follow from the properties of that
space. Hence no separate rules are to be had in order to pronounce the equivalence







the equivalence of the assertions such as H J K and J K H and
K H
J
, and so on.
Remark. When—as in the last example—graphs are connected with the line ,
the ordering of these alternating connections is immaterial. The natural reason is
that the graphical notation of logic is grounded on topological facts: for instance,
the points at which disjunctive lines are connected to the graph are not fixed in
any way. As long as the connections are preserved, any disjunct thus connected can
freely move along the SA, including passing through other disjuncts. As in the above
example, the disjunction between H , J and K means that these disjuncts are
all connected to each other with the line order-independently.
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3.1.3 Proofs in Assertive Graphs
The system of the logic of AGs is defined by graphical axioms and rules of trans-
formation on the graphs of AGs. What follows is a concise presentation of these
graphical axioms and rules.
Axioms of AGs. The blank space indicates a tautology and can appear anywhere
on the SA.
Axiom I (The blank SA): ,
Axiom II (Any graph implies a blank): H
Axiom III (Ex falso):  H
The sign ‘ ’ is used to denote the derivability relation for graphical expressions
of the language of AGs. (Remark: This sign was Peirce’s favourite to denote
logical consequence relation, and is adopted here accordingly.) Simply put, G H
means that a graph G can be transformed into a graph H according to the rules of
transformation.
Rules of Transformation. The following nine rules define the sound and complete
set of transformation rules for the propositional part of AGs.2
1. Antecedent Separation /Antecedent Merging (As/Am):
G H J G J H J
G J H J G H J
That is, the disjunction of the antecedents of a cornering can be split into
the juxtaposition of two cornerings with one (and not the same) of the two
disjuncts as the antecedent and with the same consequent as the initial graph.
Conversely, any two cornerings with the same consequent can be merged into
a cornering with the disjunction of the antecedents of the initial graph and
with the same consequent.
2Completeness can be shown by the Lindenbaum–Tarski construction, given that the underlying
algebraic theory (Heyting algebra) is a variety and defines a congruence relation. A similar graphical
intuitionistic system is defined in Ma & Pietarinen (2018), which includes the details of e.g. the
admissible rules of the system. The present set of rules for AGs has to differ from that graphical
intuitionistic system in order to compensate for the lack of polarities, and for that reason and also
because there are more logical primitives in AGs, some additional rules have to be introduced.
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2. Consequent Merging/Consequent Separation (Cm/Cs):
G H G J G H J
G H J G H G J
That is, the consequents of two cornerings with the same antecedent can be
merged into the consequent of a cornering with the same antecedent as the
initial cornerings. Conversely, the juxtaposed consequents in a cornering can
be split into the juxtaposition of two cornerings with the same antecedent and
with one (and not the same) of the two consequents.
3. Disjunct Contradiction (DC):
H H  
H  H
That is, any graph is equivalent to that graph disjuncted with the blot (ab-




That is, any graph is equivalent to the cornering with that graph in its conse-
quent and with a blank as its antecedent. This captures that if H is scribed
on the SA then H follows from the assertion of a tautology. If H follows from
the assertion of a tautology, then H holds. This latter clause is called the
uncornering rule (UCr).
Remark. An important feature of assertive graphs generically is that the boxes
can be cornered. From a simple box containing any graph inside (including the
blank graph), a cornering can be inferred, which contains the original graph in the
inner area (consequent) of the cornering, and conversely. Cornered graphs represent
conditional assertions, with antecedent (the outer) and consequent (the inner) areas.
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5. Iteration/Deiteration (It/DeIt):
For the rule of iteration and its converse deiteration, first define the context
of graphs. A graphical context is of the form K{ }, in which K is any graph-
instance of the language of AGs, graph-instances enclosed within { } are said
to be in the nest of K, and a single slot { } is the empty context. Let K{H} be
the graph obtained from K{ } by substituting H for that slot. The two rules
then are:
5.1 Iteration (It): If a graph G occurs on the SA or anywhere in the nest of
graphs K, it may be scribed on any area (which itself is not part of G)
which (i) is the same area on which G occurs or (ii) is in the nest of {G}:
(i) K{G} K{GG}. (ii) K{GH{J}} K{GH{GJ}}.
The converse of (It) is deiteration (DeIt).
5.2 Deiteration (DeIt): Anything that is the result of an iteration may be
deiterated, thus:
(i) K{GG} K{G}. (ii) K{GH{GJ}} K{GH{J}}.
Conversely, anything resulting from deiteration can also be iterated.
The following examples apply the rule of iteration in AGs:
H H H ; H H H ; H H H .
In the first example, H that lies on the antecedent area of the cornering is
iterated into the consequent area. In the second example, the occurrence of
H is iterated on the same area in which it occurs. In the third example, an
occurrence of H is likewise iterated on that same area. These three cases are
all reversible by the application of the rule of deiteration.
6. Conjunction Elimination (CE):
G H G
G H H
That is, from the scribing of independently asserted G and H on the SA
(excluding those cases in which G and H rest on the antecedent area of a
cornering, unless at least one of them is a blot), it is possible to derive one of
these assertions.





Commutativity follows immediately from the spatial and non-linear nature of
the language of AGs. Thus the second clauses in the above two pairs of rules
are redundant.
7. Disjunction Introduction (DI):
G G H
G H G
That is, from the scribing of G on the SA it is possible to derive a disjunction
of that graph with a graph H. The disjunction, as denoted by the connecting
line, means “to be alternatively asserted”. In a similar vein, from an assertion
of G it is possible to derive the assertion of G or the assertion of H:
G G H
G H G
Again, disjuncts have no priority ordering on the topology of the SA.
8. Insertion in the Antecedent (InsA):
This rule also works with the contexts K{ } of graphs. The applicability of the
rule of insertion in the antecedent (InsA) below is restricted to the antecedents
of the cornerings whose immediate context in K (that is, the area on which
the cornering is placed) is not an antecedent of another cornering. Then:
K{ G H } K{ G J H }
That is, in any unoccupied position in the area of the antecedent of the corner-
ing, which itself does not reside, as its immediate context, within an antecedent
of a cornering, it is possible to insert any graph.
9. Deletion from the Consequent (DelC):
G H J G H
That is, it is possible to delete any graph from the consequent of a cornering.
With these axioms and rules we can express all intuitionistically valid principles in
AGs.
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3.2 Quantification in Beta-Assertive Graphs
Since Beta-AGs maintain the constructive nature of AGs, two independent and prim-
itive signs are needed to signal quantification. The universal quantifier is expressed
as a line crossed by two barbs (barbed line) (Fig. 3a). The particular (existential)
quantifier is expressed by a standard, unbarbed line (Fig. 3b).
Figure 3: (a) (b)
Remark. Symbolising the two quantifiers separately stems from Peirce’s early, 1882
notation for logical graphs. In a system of proto-graphs developed around 1882
(Peirce 1989, pp. 391–393, 394–399; see Roberts 1973, pp. 18–20; Bellucci & Pietari-
nen 2016) Peirce uses two kinds of “bonds”, namely of lines, to express quantification:
a plain line of connection represents an existentially quantified relative multiplica-
tion; a line crossed by a short mark represents universally quantified relative sum.
This was long before Peirce finally managed, in mid-1890s, to introduce ovals and
ditto the distinction between negative and positive areas (polarities), which ren-
dered barbed lines superfluous. As the negation of a universal assertion is not a
particular assertion, our system of intuitionistic Beta graphs recovers the necessity
to notationally distinguish between two mutually indefinable quantifiers.
Remark. The intended meaning of the barbed line is to denote having in possession
“a general method to justifiably assert something” (Fig. 3a), while the intended
meaning of the simple, unbarbed line is to denote having in possession “a specific,
or a certain, method to justifiably assert something” (Fig. 3b). We may call both of
these lines lines of assertion, in contradistinction to the lines of identity as coined
by Peirce for classical, first-order Beta graphs.
This is not to say that the notion of identity would be detached from the meaning
of the lines of assertion. Rather, it is merely to emphasise that it is the (methods of)
assertions that are now explicitly being quantified by the outermost extremities of
those lines. In fact no language of quantified graphical intuitionistic logic along the
lines of EGs (pardon the pun) could as such be without identity—such as having its
identity defined instead via a special two-place relation of equivalence—because by
virtue of the continuity of the line, any such notation also incorporates the significa-
tion of numerical identity, in addition to the significations of universal and particular
quantification, denotation of the binding scope of the values of quantification, and
the predications that those values make.
Boxes have an important role in Beta-AGs just as they do in AGs. The box in
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Fig. 4a means that “a content is asserted”. The blank sheet (space of all assertions)
means that a logical truth is asserted (Fig. 4b).
Figure 4:
(a) (b)
In Beta AGs, boxes are furthermore used as important graphical devices to disam-
biguate the logical orderings of quantifiers, showing what the priority scopes of the
quantifiers are in addition to their binding. Boxes and lines may be combined as
in Fig. 5a, which expresses “anything is asserted of F” (or, perhaps slightly more
precisely, that “anything that is asserted means asserting F of it”). The graph of





The graph in Fig. 6 represents the FOL formula ∀x∃yF (x, y). This is consistent
with Peirce’s “endoporeutic” interpretation of graphs (that is, the interpretation
that moves in the direction from the outermost part of the graph to the innermost
parts, namely from the sheet of assertion inside the ever-more boxed or cornered
areas, and not the opposite):
Figure 6: F
Nested quantifiers are expressed as in the graph of Fig. 7, corresponding to the
formula of standard FOL ∀x∃y∀u∃zF (x, y, u, z):
Figure 7: F
The graph in Fig. 8 is an example of how to represent a quantification and disjunc-
tion, as in ∀x(Gx ∨ F ):
Figure 8:
F G
The graphs in Figs. 5–8 are examples of how quantificational lines interact with
boxes in AGs in the composition of complex formulas. The definition of well-formed
(well-scribed) Beta-AGs is easily construed from these examples.
367
Bellucci, Chiffi and Pietarinen
Notice, however, that the graph in Fig. 9, despite its apparent simplicity, is not a
well-scribed graph of the language, as it does not disambiguate between the logical
priority scopes of the two different lines of assertion:
Figure 9: F





denotes two independent, perhaps simultaneously made quantificational assertions
(Pietarinen 2001, 2002). Such possibilities do not seem to have been explored in the
literature.
4 Rules of Transformation in Beta-Assertive Graphs
The two major classes of irreversible rules of transformations, namely permissions
to insert and permissions to erase, remain as they are in the theory of AGs (Chiffi &
Pietarinen 2020). Unlike in EGs, these permissions are not defined in terms of the
polarities of the areas (negative or positive). Instead, they take into account what is
permissible within the antecedent and consequent areas of cornerings, respectively.
Just like AGs, Beta-AGs are polarity-free; a design choice resulting from the absence
of a primitive logical constant to designate negation, and the possibility of defining
negation by the blot and the cornering in the intuitionistic fashion.
Moreover, the reversible Beta-iteration rule and its converse of Beta-deiteration
behave just as they would when one is manipulating the standard lines of identity
in classical Beta-EGs (Peirce 2019, Roberts 1973).
4.1 Rules of Transformation for Lines of Assertion
In addition to the rules of Alpha-AGs, however, in order to handle inferences with
assertive quantificational lines several new rules are now needed.
In what follows, and just as is the case with ligatures (complexes of lines of
identity) in the Beta part of EGs, any line depicted on antecedent areas as having
a loose end may refer either to a continuous, branching or connected ligature.
Insertion Rules.




we may infer .
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we may infer .
Two special cases of the insertion rule are:
(Ins 1.2.1) A barb ‘ ’ can be inserted on a loose end of an unbarbed line on
antecedent areas:3
From we may infer .
(Ins 1.2.2) A box can be added to a barbed line on a consequent area:
From we may infer .
Erasure Rules.
(Er 2.1) Any unbarbed line can be cut on a consequent area of a cornering (and
on the sheet of assertion):
From we may infer .
(Er 2.2) Any barbed line can be cut on an antecedent area of a cornering:
From we may infer .
Two special cases of erasure are:
(Er 2.2.1) A barb can be erased from the barbed line whose outermost loose
end rests on a consequent area of a cornering (or on the sheet of assertion):
From we may infer .
3Remark. A line that has its extremal end on the boundary of the box from the inside is taken
to have that end inside the box, that is, on the antecedent area. In contrast, a line whose innermost
extremity lies on the boundary of the cut from the outside, is taken to penetrate into that inner
area. These further conventions are analogous to the conventions concerning the behaviour of the
line in standard Beta-EGs.
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(Er 2.2.2) On an antecedent area of a cornering, a box can be removed from
a barbed line that penetrates into it, thus:
From we may infer .
Axioms. In addition to the α-axioms of the previous section, the following β-axioms
are at play.
β-(Ax1) An unattached, unbarbed line of assertion , a simple loop made out
of such a line , and a simple dot (an atrophied loop not to be confused
with the blot of absurdity) can be inserted and erased anywhere on the sheet,
including within boxes and cornerings.
β-(Ax2) An unattached barbed line of assertion , a simple barbed loop made
out of such a line , and a barbed atrophied loop (a barbed dot) can
be inserted and erased anywhere on the sheet, including within boxes and
cornerings.
4.2 Theorems and Examples
Next, some examples are given of how to derive the theorems of first-order intuition-





1.a) ⊢i ∀x¬Fx → ¬∃xFx
(Ax)
(Cr)
(Ins) F  
(It) F  F  
β-(Ax1) F  F  
β-(It) F  F  
(Ins 1.1) F  F  
(Ins 1.2.1) F  F  
1.b) ⊢i ¬∃xFx → ∀x¬Fx
(Ax)
(Cr)
(Ins) F  
(It) F  F  
(Ins 1.2.1) F  F  
β-(Ax1) F  F  
β-(It) F  F  
(Ins 1.2) F  F  
2. ⊢i ∃x¬Fx → ¬∀xFx
From 1.a) (Ins 1.1), follow by
(Ins 1.2.1) F  F  




(Ins 1.2.1) F F




4.b) ⊢i ∀xAx → At
(Ax)
(Ins)+(It) A A
(Er 2.2.1) A A
371
Bellucci, Chiffi and Pietarinen
4.c) ⊢i ∃x(Ax → B) → (∃xAx → B)
(Ax)
(Ins) A B
(Ax)+(It) A B A B
(Ins 1.1) A B A B




B A B A
(Er 2.2) B A B
A
β-(Deit)+(Ax) B A B
A
Examples.
A couple of further examples illustrate the workings and the intuitionistic nature of
the permissive transformations of Beta-AGs.
(A) ⊢i ∃xFx → ¬∀x¬Fx
(Ax)
(Ax)  
(It)+(Cr)   
(Ins)+(It) F F   
(Ins 1.2.1) F F   
(Ax)+(It) F F   
(Ins 1.2) F F   
(B) ⊢i ∀x(G ∨ Fx) → (F ∨ ∀xGx)
(Ax) + (Ins) + (It) F G F G
(Ins) (1.2.2) F G F G
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(C) ⊢i ∃x(F → Gx) → (F → ∃xGx)












(D) 0i ¬∀xFx → ∃x¬Fx







ii. F  F  cannot be cut
iii. F  F  cannot be added to
iv. F  F  cannot be cut
The graph representing the formula (D) ¬∀xFx → ∃x¬Fx is not a theorem of the
system of Beta-AGs. Semantically, what is blocked is an attempt of moving negation
over a general method of asserting in order to turn it into a particular assertion,
because a negative of a universal does not result in a particular method of assertion
(“absence of an assertion is not an assertion of absence”).
As illustrated in the above diagrams (i)–(iv), one cannot erase a barb from the
barbed line on an antecedent of a cornering, that one cannot cut a simple line on
an antecedent, that a barb cannot be added to a simple line on an antecedent, and
that a barbed line cannot be cut on an antecedent of a cornering. This exhausts the
classes of possibilities.
In a similar vein, consider
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(E) 0i ¬∀x¬Fx → ∃xFx
One may contrast this with what is the theorem of the system, namely (A) ∃xFx →
¬∀x¬Fx. Given the intuitionistic nature of the logic of Beta Assertive Graphs,
the graph of the formula (E) is not a theorem of this system of Beta-AGs, since
asserting that ∀x¬Fx is not asserted will by itself not suffice to produce an instance
of anything that would be asserted.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, the basic notational and inferential elements and rules of the system
of Beta-AGs were sketched, thereby extending for the first time the assertive logic
of AGs to the quantificational case.
The characteristic features of the system of Beta-AGs are the following.
1. Unlike standard FOL=, the language of Beta-AGs, just like the language of
classical Beta-EGs, is occurrence-referential, meaning that it is the occurrence
and not the type of a variable that determines sameness and distinctness of
reference.
2. In Beta-AGs, two distinct notations for quantification—the lines of assertion—
are needed, because just as in intuitionistic systems in general, these two quan-
tifiers are not interdefinable. Beta-AGs maintain all the constructive features
of AGs and result in a diagrammatic system for intuitionistic quantificational
logic, represented by logical graphs with assertion-based interpretation of the
main logical constants.
3. Since boxes are deictic notational devices used to express assertions and the
grouping of formulas in lieu of parentheses, and since unlike in EGs there is no
specific sign for negation (negation is defined as an implication of absurdum),
there are no polarities, namely distinctions between negative and positive ar-
eas, in the language of AGs.
Consequently, the insertion and erasure rules are more bountiful than in the
classical case, which is necessitated by the need to circumvent the absence of
polarities. While it might look like this results in a more cumbersome system of
permissions than is the case in the classical EGs, it can be takes as the price to
be paid when one desires to approximate and regiment well the pre-theoretic




4. The graphical method of logic that explicitly represents and reasons about
assertions manages to do that without any additional ad hoc sign of assertions.
This is possible since the notion of assertion is embedded in the notion of the
sheet of assertion (SA), which in the present system may be taken to be the
canvass of all transformations, proofs or methods of asserting. The lines of
assertions scribed on that canvass make explicit the quantificational logic of
such assertions.
Completeness of the logic presented depends on the choices of interpretations of
canonical models (such as presheaves) that are to correlate with that of the pre-
theoretical notion of proofs and transformations. Other and related further lines of
research may be devoted to investigate, from a graphical perspective of logic, the
role of admissible rules in Beta Assertive Graphs (for example, (Cm/Cs) are the two
admissible rules in the Alpha part of AGs), such as the presence of Markov’s rule or
the Independence-of-Premise rule, the corresponding principles of which nevertheless
fail to hold intuitionistically.
The quantificational expressions of Beta-AGs are related to intuitionistic quan-
tification, as noted in the present paper. They may be extended to cover classical
propositional calculus by an addition of a rule of “an erasure of the coinciding cor-
ners”, as shown to be the case for propositional AGs in Chiffi & Pietarinen (2020).
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Abstract
In this paper we first develop a Dialetheic Logic with Exclusive Assumptions
and Conclusions, DLEAC. We adopt the semantics of the logic of paradox (LP)
extended with a notion of model suitable for DLEAC, and we modify its proof
theory by refining the notions of assumption and conclusion, which are under-
stood as speech acts. We introduce a new paradox – the rejectability paradox –
first informally, then formally. We then provide its derivation in an extension
of DLEAC contanining the rejectability predicate.
1 Introduction
Rejection is standardly considered a speech act that expresses an attitude of dissent.
In the last years, some calculi – whose aim is to formalize such a notion, such as the
refutation or rejection calculi – have been proposed.
For a general introduction to these calculi, specifically in propositional logic,
see [19]. Let me review two examples: Skura’s refutation calculi (developed in
[16]) and Wansing’s [21] natural deduction calculus. Skura’s refutation calculi (see
[16] but also [17], and [18]) is based on a Łukasiewicz-style refutation calculi for
propositional logics (see on this [20]). Skura proposed a system for the modal logic
of S4 in [17]. With the same purpose, H. Wansing, in his [21] (and in other papers),
introduced a natural deduction calculus whose central idea was to begin with pairs
comprising a set of assertions and a set of rejections, obtaining a similar pair by
inference. Wansing’s idea was to dualize the introduction and elimination rules for
intuitionistic propositional logic with a primitive notion of dual proof to obtain a
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kind of bi-intuitionistic propositional logic that combines verification and its dual,
i.e. falsification.
Here I propose a refutation calculus based on a dialetheic conception of negation
and refutation or denial.
Dialetheic negation is not exclusive, whereas denial is: in a dialetheic framework
A and ¬A may both be true, but you cannot correctly assert and deny A. This
is how Priest in [10] tries to recover the exclusivity of negation by introducing the
notion of rejection or denial1 as a speech act. He claims that while it is possible
to accept both a sentence and its negation2, one cannot accept and reject the same
sentence. Assertion and rejection or denial are incompatible speech acts.
In this paper, I take the impossibility of accepting and rejecting the same sentence
as primitive. In this way, I conceive the rejection of sentence A as a speech act that
– in virtue of its very meaning – expresses the fact that A is only false. Similarly,
the act of rejecting ¬A expresses the fact that A is only true.
This dialetheic use of rejection suggests a theory of natural deduction, where
the acts of assuming and concluding may be understood in an ordinary or exclusive
mode. To assume a sentence in an ordinary mode amounts to supposing that it is at
least true; to assume it in an exclusive mode amounts to supposing that it is only
true.
To assume A in the ordinary mode then corresponds to the assertion of A,
whereas to assume A in the exclusive mode corresponds to the rejection of ¬A.
Any sentence can be rightfully assumed in an ordinary or exclusive mode at will.
Similarly, to prove a sentence in an ordinary mode proves that it is (at least) true
(under certain assumptions); to prove it in an exclusive mode proves that it is only
true.
Accordingly, concluding in the ordinary mode is to be understood as the assertion
of the conclusion, and concluding in the exclusive mode as the rejection of the
negation of the conclusion.
The acts of proving A and ¬A in an exclusive mode are incompatible because
they both indefeasibly lead to the rejection of some assumptions they depend on.
Specifically, concluding A and ¬A in an exclusive mode –independent of any hy-
pothesis – cannot in principle be performed by any rational human being. In this
way, I realize the dialetheic aim of taking exclusivity as extraneous to the meaning
of logical negation and embedded in the speech acts of assuming and concluding. I
am going to formalize such speech acts within a modified natural deduction, where
they will be governed by indefeasible rules.
1 For a general background on denial in non-classical theories, see [13, §3].
2 On the thesis see, also, [8]. For a recent discussion of the topic see also [7].
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The goal of this paper is to formulate the above-mentioned modified natural de-
duction, via a dialetheic logic with exclusive assumptions and conclusions DLEAC,
where exclusivity is expressed via certain speech acts. Specifically, in DLEAC, ex-
clusivity is expressed using the speech acts of assuming and concluding. In this
paper, I adopt the semantics of the logic of paradox (LP)3 extended with a notion
of model suitable for DLEAC and I modify its proof theory by refining the notions
of assumption and conclusion, which are understood as speech acts (I follow, in this
part of the paper, [5]). In the second part of the paper, I introduce a new paradox
– the rejectability paradox – first informally, then formally; I give its derivation in
an extension of DLEAC.
2 The Basics of DLEAC
Let me first introduce the basic elements of DLEAC, specifically its syntax and
semantics.
Let L be a language of first-order logic with identity (FOL =) with individual
constants and predicates of any ariety. For the sake of simplicity, I omit function
symbols in L. I adopt the semantics for LP extended with a new, generalized notion
of the model.
Let me briefly review the semantics for LP.4
A dialetheic interpretation of the propositional logic consists of an evaluation v
that assigns to each atomic formula a member of the set {{1}, {0}, {0, 1}}. The v
is extended to the complex formulas using the following clauses:
(∨) v(A ∨B) = {1} if either 0 /∈ v(A) or 0 /∈ v(B);
v(A ∨B) = {0} if 1 /∈ v(A) and 1 /∈ v(B);
v(A ∨B) = {0, 1} otherwise.
(∧) v(A ∧B) = {1} if 0 /∈ v(A) and 0 /∈ v(B);
v(A ∧B) = {0} if either 1 /∈ v(A) or 1 /∈ v(B);
v(A ∧B) = {0, 1} otherwise.
(¬) v(¬A) = {1} if v(A) = {0};
v(¬A) = {0} if v(A) = {1};
v(¬A) = {0, 1} otherwise.
A sentence A is true if 1 ∈ v(A), is false if 0 ∈ v(A);
A is exclusively true if 0 /∈ v(A), is exclusively false if 1 /∈ v(A).
3For a general background on LP, see [1], [2], [9], [15], [3].
4For details see [11, sez. 5.2, 5.3].
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This semantics is extended in a similar way to first order logic with identity. I
simplify, making the assumption that there is a name in the language L for every
object of the domain D of quantification.
An evaluation v assigns to every individual constant a member of the domain
D, and assigns to every unary predicate P two subsets of D: the extension P+
and the counter-extension P−, possibly overlapping, with the only constraint that
P+ ∪ P− = D. Then:
v(Pa) = { 1} if a ∈ P+ − P−
v(Pa) = { 0} if a ∈ P− − P+
v(Pa) = { 0, 1} if a ∈ P+ ∩ P−
Similarly for predicates of degree > 1.
The constraints for the identity sign (=) are the following:
(=)+ = {(a, a) : a ∈ D} , while (=)− is arbitrary with the only constraint
that (=)+ ∪ (=)− = D.
The clauses for the universal and existential quantifiers are analogous to those
of conjunction and disjunction, respectively.
I extend the semantics of LP by introducing a notion of model suitable for DLEAC.
Let S be any set of sentences of a first order language L, some of which may be
starred (i.e. marked by a star *). Observe that stars * do not belong to the object
language L.
A model M of S is an LP-interpretation in which all sentences of S are
true and the starred ones are exclusively true.
A sentence A (a starred sentence A*) is a semantic consequence of a
set S of possibly starred sentences, in symbols S |= A(*), if it is true
(exclusively true) in every model of S.
3 DLEAC: Deductive rules
Let A, B, C... be formulas of a first order language L, and let Γ be a finite set of
possibly starred formulas.
A sequent is an expression of the form:
Γ: C (*),
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to be read: “From the assumptions in Γ, one can infer the conclusion C (in an
ordinary or exclusive mode).”
The non-starred formulas in Γ are assumed to be in an ordinary mode, and the
starred ones in an exclusive mode. Similarly, the conclusion C can be understood
in an ordinary or in an exclusive mode.
3.1 Basic deductive rules for DLEAC
In this section I list the primitive inference rules (I follow [5]). When stars occur in
parentheses ( ) the deductive rule holds in the double form:
• with all stars in parentheses at work




The informal reading of the first rule is the following: From the assumption that
A is only true (at least true), it follows that A is only true (at least true). The
informal reading of the second rule is: From the assumption that A is only true it
follows that A is (at least) true.
Weakening:
Γ : A(*)
Γ ∆ : A(*)
Cut:
Γ : A(*), ∆ A(*): B
Γ ∆ : B
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Γ : A(*), ∆ A(*) : B*
Γ ∆ : B*
Conjunction:
Γ : A(*), ∆ : B(*)
I∧ Γ ∆ : A ∧B(*)
Γ : A ∧B(*)
E∧ Γ : A(*)
Γ : A ∧B(*)
E∧ Γ : B(*)
Disjunction:
Γ : A (*)
I∨ Γ : A ∨B (*)
ΓA : C(*), ∆ B : C(*), Λ : A ∨B
E∨ Γ ∆ Λ : C(*)
ΓA* : C(*), ∆ B*: C(*), Λ : A ∨B*
E∨ Γ ∆ Λ : C(*)
Double negation:
A (*) : ¬¬A(*)
¬¬A (*) : A(*)
Introduction of absurd (IA):
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Γ : A*, ∆ : ¬A
Γ∆ : A ∧ ¬A*
The informal justification of IA is the following: From A and ¬A follows A∧¬A.
Furthermore, since A is only true, it cannot be a dialetheia; therefore ¬A also cannot
be a dialetheia. As a result, neither of the conjuncts of A ∧ ¬A can also be false,
and therefore, A ∧ ¬A is only true.
Since ¬(A∧¬A) is a dialetheic logical law, the conclusion A∧¬A* is an authentic
absurd, i.e. a conclusion unacceptable even by a dialetheist. Since, dialethically,
A∧¬A might be true, it does not count as an absurd. For this reason, by an absurd,
I mean a formula A ∧ ¬A that is only true.
Reductio ad absurdum (RAA):
ΓA*: B ∧ ¬B*
Γ : ¬A
ΓA: B ∧ ¬B*
Γ : ¬A*
Informally, RAA works in this way: If the assumption that A is true (only true)
leads to the authentic absurd, it cannot be true (only true), hence it is only false (at
least false).
The rules for the quantifiers are analogous to those of conjunction (∧) and dis-
junction (∨). The rules for identity are as follows:
Introduction of identity (I =):
: x = x
Elimination of identity (E =):
x = y, Px : Py
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ΓA*: ¬(t = t)*
E = Γ : ¬A
ΓA: ¬(t = t)*
E = Γ : ¬A*
Observe that, according to the semantics of identity (=), a sentence having the
form (t = t)5 cannot be exclusively false.
3.2 Derived deductive rules for DLEAC
In this section, I introduce some derived rules of DLEAC:
Material conditional:
ΓA (*): B(*)
Γ : ¬A ∨B
ΓA*: B
Γ : ¬A ∨B
ΓA: B(*)
Γ : ¬A ∨B(*)
Elimination of absurd (Ex absurdo quodlibet) (EA):
Γ : A ∧ ¬A*EA Γ : B*
Notice that EA is a derived rule.
Modus ponens (MPP):
Γ : A*, ∆ : ¬A ∨B
MPP Γ∆ : B
5where ’t’ is an individual constant or a variable.
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Γ : A, ∆ : ¬A ∨B*
MPP1 Γ∆ : B*
For an example of how DLEAC works, here is the derivation of MPP1:
1 1. A Assumption
2 2. ¬A ∨B* Assumption
3 3. ¬A* Assumption
1, 3 4. A ∧ ¬A* IA
1, 3 5. B* EA
6 6. B* Assumption
6 7. B* Reflexivity
1, 2 8. B* E∨
Following LP, the material conditional is not a genuine conditional because, in
general, it does not permit the validity of MPP.6 In this approach, the validity of
MPP is appropriate under a starred assumption. This way, we obtain the following
reading of the quasi-validity of MPP for a dialetheist: MPP is appropriate when at
least one of the two premises is starred.
The following are other derived rules of DLEAC.
De Morgan rules:
Γ : ¬(A ∧B)(*)
Γ : ¬A ∨ ¬B (*)
Γ : ¬A ∨ ¬B (*)
Γ : ¬(A ∧B)(*)
Γ : ¬(A ∨B)(*)
Γ : ¬A ∧ ¬B(*)
Γ : ¬A ∧ ¬B(*)
Γ : ¬(A ∨B)(*)
The Law of non-contradiction:
6For an extended discussion of this topic see [4].
385
Carrara and Strollo
Γ : ¬(A ∧ ¬A)
The Law of the excluded middle:
Γ : (A ∨ ¬A)
4 The Completeness of DLEAC
Let S be any set of possibly starred sentences.
I suggest that S is dialetheically consistent (d − consistent) if no con-
clusion of form (A ∧ ¬A)* is derivable from S.
Theorem 1. If S is d− consistent, then it has a model M.
Proof. Let S be d − consistent. Extend the language L to a language L′ with an
infinite sequence of new individual constants c1, c2, ..., cn, .... Let
A1, A2, ..., An, ...
be a sequence of all L’-sentences. I inductively define the sequence:
S0, S1, ..., Sn, ...
of sets of (possibly starred) L′-sentences as follows:
1. S0 = S;
2. Sn+1 = Sn if An+1 is derivable from Sn and is not an existential sentence;
3. Sn+1 = Sn ∪ {B(c)(*)} if An+1 = ∃xB(x) and Sn ` ∃xB(x)(*), where c is the
first constant not occurring in Sn nor in An+1;
4. Sn+1 = Sn ∪ {¬An+1(*)} if An+1 is not derivable from Sn.
Let us consider the following definition:
Sω = ∪n∈N Sn
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One can prove by induction that each Sn is d − consistent, so that Sω is d −
consistent.
Consider, for example, 3. Suppose, by reduction, that Sn+1 is inconsistent. If
Sn+1 = Sn ∪ {B(c)}, then Sn ` ¬B(c)* and hence Sn ` ∀x¬B(x)*, against the
d − consistency of Sn. If Sn+1 = Sn ∪ {B(c)*}, then An+1 = ∃xB(x)*. Then
Sn ` ¬B(c) and hence Sn ` ∀x¬B(x), against the d− consistency of Sn.
Sω is deductively complete: for any L′-sentence, if not Sω ` A, then
Sω ` ¬A*.
An interpretation I of L′ can be defined as follows. Take the setD of all individual
constants as domain. Evaluation v can be defined as follows:
1 ∈ v(A) iff Sω ` A, 0 ∈ v(A) iff Sω ` ¬A, for every atomic L′-sentence.
One can prove, by induction on the complexity of a sentence A, that v(A) = {1}
iff Sω ` A*, v(A) = {0} iff Sω ` ¬A *, v(A) = {0, 1} iff Sω ` A and Sω ` ¬A.
It follows that I is a model of Sω and hence of S.
Completeness. If S |= A(*) then S ` A(*)
Proof. Let S |= A. Suppose, by reduction, that it is not the case that S ` A. Then
S ∪ {¬A*} is d− consistent and hence has a model where ¬A is only true, against
the hypothesis. Similarly if S |= A*.
5 Extending a theory with the truth predicate
In this section, I show (I refer to what is done in [5]) that any dialetheic interpretation
of a first order language L can be extended to an interpretation of a language L′
capable of expressing its own truth predicate.
Let L be a first order language with predicates and individual constants (for
simplicity, I ignore functions). Let I be any interpretation of L and D its domain
of quantification. Extend L with a new predicate symbol T and infinitely many
individual constants. Extend D to D′ by adding all L′-sentences to D. Let I ′ map
the new constants 1-1 onto D′ so that any member of D′ has an L′-name. If A is an
L′-sentence, we indicate by dAe its name.
I ′ puts all sentences in the counter-extension of the L-predicates and the members
of D in the counter-extension of T. As shown (in [5]), it is possible to fix the
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interpretation of T in such a way that it turns out to be the truth predicate of I ′,
so that, for all L′-sentences A, A and T(dAe) have the same truth values.
Theorem 2. There is an extension of I to an interpretation I ′ of L′ such
that, for every L′− sentence A, A and TdAe have the same truth values,
while the values of the L− sentences, relativized to D are unchanged.
An evaluation v′ is a sub-evaluation of v, in symbols v′ ⊂ v, if v′ is obtained from
v by suppressing a truth value of some atomic dialetheias.
Lemma. If a sentence has a unique v-value, this is also the unique v′-
value, for any v′ ⊂ v.
Proof. The proof is obtained by an induction on the complexity of the sentence.
Proof of the theorem 2. The following sequence can be defined by transfinite induc-
tion:
v0 ⊃ v1 ⊃ ... ⊃ vα, ... (for all ordinals).
They are evaluations of sentences of form T(dAe) for all L′-sentences A:
v0(T(dAe) = {0, 1} for all A;
vα+1(TdAe) is defined by cases:
(i) vα+1 (TdAe) = vα(A) if vα(A) is a singleton, while vα (TdAe) is not;
(ii) vα+1 (TdAe) = vα (TdAe) otherwise.
vβ (T(dAe)) = ∩α<β vα (T(dAe)) for β limit.
One can prove, by transfinite induction, that:
for all α, if vα (TdAe) is a singleton, then vα (TdAe) = vα(A).
1. α = 0. Trivial
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2. α = β +1. Let vα (TdAe) be a singleton. We distinguish the two cases above
(i) and (ii):
(i) vα (TdAe) = vβ (A) and, since vβ (A) is a singleton and vα is a sub-
evaluation of vβ, by the lemma vα (A) = vβ(A).
(ii) vα (TdAe) = vβ (TdAe). Therefore, vβ (TdAe) is a singleton. By the
induction hypothesis, vβ (TdAe) = vβ(A) and, by the lemma, vα(A)= vβ(A).
3. α limit. If vα (TdAe) is a singleton, then vα (TdAe) = vβ (TdAe) = vβ(A), for
some β < α. By the lemma, vα(A) = vβ(A).
Observe that if vβ 6= vα with β < α, there is some sentence A such that vβ(A)
= {0, 1}, while vγ(A) is a singleton for all γ > β. And since only countably many
sentences can satisfy–for some ordinal–this condition, it follows that at least from
the first uncountable ordinal on, the sequence becomes stationary. If δ is such an
ordinal, vδ is clearly the required evaluation.
Consider then the following familiar rules for a truth predicate.
Primitive Tarki’s rules:
Γ : A (*)
Γ : T(dAe)(*)
Γ : T(dAe)(*)
Γ : A (*)
From the above-mentioned rules, it follows that, semantically, T(dAe) and A








The guiding idea of the evaluation constructed above suggests that, when Tarski’s
rules fail to determine a unique value for a sentence of form T(dAe), there is no reason
to arbitrarily choose one of the two truth values for T(dAe), which will, therefore,
be evaluated as a dialetheia.
Conservativity. The extension of any theory by means of the predicate T with
Tarski’s rules is conservative.
Proof. It is derivable from Completeness and Theorem 1.
6 The refutation paradox in DLEAC
Let us go back to the speech acts of assertion and denial. Classically, to deny A is
equivalent to asserting ¬A: A is correctly denied iff ¬A is correctly asserted,7 but
the dialetheic denial of A is stronger than the assertion of ¬A. As Littman and
Simmons observed in [6], because the dialetheist appeals to “non-standard relations
between assertability and deniability”, a full account of these notions is required.
Specifically, any such account would need to deal with apparent paradoxes that turn
on the notion of assertability and/or deniability.
In their paper Littman and Simmons proposed a paradox concerning assertion,
the assertability paradox ([6], 320). Take a sentence α having the form:
(α) α is not assertable.
They argue that (α) is a dialetheia. Here is the proof they give:
Proof.
Suppose (α) is true. Then what it says is the case. So (α) (i.e. (α) α is not assertable)
is not assertable. But we have just asserted (α). So (α) is assertable–and we have a
contradiction.
Suppose, on the other hand, that (α) is false. Then what (α) says is not the case,
and (α) is assertable. So we may assert: (α) is not assertable. Again, we have a
contradiction.
7[14] calls this the denial equivalence.
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If α is a dialetheia, then it is both assertable and not assertable. But how is it
possible to both assert and not assert a sentence? This seems to be impossible also
for a dialetheist. While acknowledging that certain sentences can be both true and
false, a dialetheist cannot admit that a sentence is assertable and not assertable:
“there seems to be no room for manoeuvre. So, the dialetheist will need to say
more” ([6], 320).
Note that there is a problem in the proof of the assertability paradox: The
mere supposition that α is true does not imply its assertability. Indeed, assertability
implies the recognition, not just the mere supposition, of the truth of (α).
In the following text, I propose a revised version of the assertability paradox
called the amended assertability paradox. To amend the argument, a reasoning by
which the truth of (α) can be recognized is provided. The reasoning is given by the
following proof.
Let us prove dialetheically that α is true by distinguishing the following two
cases:
• (1) Assume that (α) is false. Then, its negation is true, so (α) is assertable
and then it is true.
• (2) Assume that (α) is true. Then it is true.
According to the Law of the excluded middle – as formulated in classical first
order logic – (α) is true. In this way, we have a proof – not just a supposition – of
the truth of (α), and we can assert it. So (α) is assertable, in opposition to what(α)
claims and is false. Therefore it is a dialetheia. That is the revised assertability
paradox.
Now, again, let us repeat our question: If α is a dialetheia, it is both assertable
and not assertable, but how is it possible to both assert and not assert a sentence?
Is this a real problem for a dialetheist? The quick answer is, ‘No’. Why should
it be a problem for a dialetheist to admit that a sentence is both assertable and
not assertable? Once the exclusivity of logical negation has been rejected, the non
assertability of a sentence does not exclude its assertability, even if it is far from
clear what it means that a certain sentence is and is not assertable.
Here I am not interested in giving a philosophical answer to the above questions.
They concern the philosophical status of these speech acts, and this is not the place
to discuss them.
Priest, in ([12]) proposed something similar to the assertability paradox: the
irrationalist paradox. Let I be a sentence having the form:
(I): it is not rational to accept I.
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You can both accept and and reject (I).
Priest’s derivation is as follows ([12] 121).
Proof.
Let Rat be an operator expressing rational acceptance and R = ¬Rat(R), Priest
derives R from the schema






That is, R, and hence ¬Rat(R), is deducible from P : P ` R.
Assuming that rational acceptance (Rat) is closed under single-premise deducibil-
ity, and that P is rationally acceptable (and it seems to be: if someone believes A,
and, at the same time, believes that it is not rationally permissible to believe A, that
would seem to be pretty irrational – not something that is itself rationally permissi-
ble), we have Rat(P ) ` Rat(R), and we have a contradiction.
Priest calls this kind of paradox a rational dilemma. He observes that a dialethe-
ist cannot rule out a priori the occurrence of rational dilemmas:
Arguably, the existence of dilemmas is simply a fact of life ([10], 111).
Moreover, he maintains that the irrationalist’s paradox is much more problematic
for a classicist than for a dialetheist. For the latter it is not irrational to believe both
a sentence α and that it is irrational to believe α, if such a belief is also rational,
an option clearly closed to a fan of classical logic. This argument is in line with the
observation to the assertability paradox done before: if negation is non-exclusive, a
dialetheist can rightly assert a non-assertable sentence, if she has recognized that it
is also true.
Again, it is not the aim of this paper to debate Priest’s argument on the irra-
tionalist paradox.
I would like just to expand the revised assertability paradox in a rejection di-
rection. In what follow I first informally introduce the rejectability (or deniability)
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paradox, then I give its derivation in an extension of DLEAC with the rejectability
predicate.
Let R be a sentence having the form:
(R) the sentence R is rejectable.
You can both accept and reject (R).
Proof.
Assuming that (R) is true, then it is rejectable. So, there is a state of knowledge in
which one can reject it. In such a state, one recognizes that what (R) says is true,
so that one is in a position to assert (R). So you both reject and accept R. Thus,
the assumption of (R) leads to a state (of knowledge) in which one can both assert
and reject (R), and that is dialetheically inacceptable.
It then follows that (R) cannot be true. But, then, we can reject it, recognize its
truth and assert it, which, again, is in opposition of Priest’s thesis of the impossibility
of accepting and rejecting the same sentence. Again: dialetheically inacceptable.
Notice – en passant – that, in contrast with the assertability paradox, the deni-
ability paradox goes against the dialetheist thesis that assertion and rejection are
incompatible speech acts.
Since, as in the amended assertability paradox, evidence of truth or falsity must
be available, the agent is assumed to be able to recognize them by the reasoning
displayed in the informal proof. The agent is then assumed to have some minimal
logical, semantical, and pragmatical skills.8 Such requirements are fairly minimal
and are ordinarily satisfied by normal agents in normal circumstances. If a dialethe-
ist tried to avoid the paradox by rejecting such an assumption, she would make
dialetheism a viable view only for limited cognitive agents. Such an extreme move
would be like invoking the ghost of Tarski at the cognitive level, by limiting the
cognitive resources of an agent instead of the expressive capacity of the language.
In the next part of this section I logically argue that, in a dialetheic logic, such
as DLEAC (which is compatible with dialetheism), expanded with a rejectability
predicate (which is used in natural languages with some intuitive derivation rules
for the introduction and elimination of rejection) a strong absurd can be derived.
8In particular, she must be able to understand (R) and truth and falsehood predicates, be
capable of rejecting and asserting, having elementary logical skills, and some ability to reflect on
her own reasoning processes.
393
Carrara and Strollo
Let ‘R’ be the rejectability predicate R(dAe) is to be read: A is rejectable; or
more explicitly: an ideal rational human can reach indefeasible reasons for excluding
the truth of A.
While assuming an ideal agent with such epistemic capacities might be problem-
atic in general, in the context of (R) it is justified. As the informal argument of the
paradox shows, evidence for truth and falsity of (R) is indeed attainable. General-
izing the inference rules of (R) to other contexts would be possible at the price of
introducing complications unnecessary for present purposes.9
The inference rules for R are:
Γ : R(dAe)
ER Γ : ¬A*
: ¬A*IR : R(dAe)
Let k be a sentence of form R(dke):
1 1. R(dke) Assumption
1 2. ¬R(dke)* ER
1 3. R(dke) ∧ ¬R(dke)* IA
4. ¬R(dke)* RAA
5. R(dke) IR
6. R(dke) ∧ ¬R(dke)* IA
Notice that (6) is a strong absurd in DLEAC.
On the contrary, observe that – according to conservativity as it was formulated
in Sec.5 – it is impossible to use the liar paradox to obtain an absurd. Indeed, while
you obtain a formula saying that the liar is false, there is no formula saying that it
is only false, as is shown in the following proof.
Let A be a sentence of form ¬T(dAe). You have that T(dAe) is a dialetheia.
9For example, (IR) should also require that evidence is available for ¬A*, which is the case,
however, in the case of (R). To be fully complete, the proof should also incorporate the reasoning
through which the agent recovers such evidence.
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1 1. T(dAe) Assumption
1 2. ¬T(dAe) Tarski





8. ¬T(dAe) ∧ T(dAe) I∧
Observe that–even using the starred assumptions–you can not get an absurd, as
in the following proof:
1 1. T(dAe)* Assumption
1 2. ¬T(dAe)* Tarski
1 3. ¬T(dAe) ∧ T(dAe)* IA
4. ¬T(dAe) RAA
5. T(dAe) Tarski
6. ¬T(dAe) ∧ T(dAe) I∧
7 Conclusion
In the first part of the paper I exposed DLEAC, a dialetheic logic in which exclusivity
is expressed via the speech acts of assuming and concluding. An expansion of DLEAC
with a predicate for rejection and some intuitive derivation rules for its introduction
and elimination led to a strong absurd, a problem for a dialetheist.
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Abstract
The present paper puts forward a formal and pragmatic treatment of the
Frege-Geach problem and other related problems usually associated with logi-
cal connectives for sentences expressing moral attitudes within an extension of
logic for pragmatics (LP), a logic for acts of assertion. First, we present the
Frege-Geach problem, showing its relevance for distinguishing asserted from
non-asserted contexts in logical inferences. Second, we introduce the basic el-
ements of LP, underlying its capacity to clearly disambiguate asserted from
unasserted contexts. Third, we extend LP into ELP, a pragmatic logic for ex-
pressive sentences, and provide a suitable way to deal with the Frege-Geach
problem. Fourth, our framework is compared with classical expressivist sys-
tems and we clarify how in ELP it is possible to provide a plausible answer to
the remaining logical problems regarding expressive sentences. Finally, we show
the relation between assertion and attitudes in our perspective and suggest an
outline to implement ELP as a logical basis for different kinds of expressivist
systems.
1 Introduction
Expressivists believe that moral sentences are conventional devices for expressing
positive or negative attitudes towards their objects. Expressivist views on moral
∗This research has been supported by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, project Values
in Argumentative Discourse (PTDC/MHC-FIL/0521/2014). A special thanks goes to the following
colleagues who gave me many useful comments on early versions of this paper: Sergio Galvan, Erich
Rast, Javier González de Prado Salas, Francesco Orsi, Fabrizio Macagno, Dina Mendonça, Dima
Mohammed, Marcin Lewinski. Moreover, I would like to thank Massimiliano Carrara, Ciro De Flo-
rio, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen and Francesco Bellucci for the uncountable and stimulating discussions
on the logical nature of assertions. The present paper is written in memory of Carlo Dalla Pozza
(1942-2014) and based on his research in pragmatic logic.
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sentences have captured the interest of many philosophers working in metaethics,
logic, and philosophy of language, specifically in relation to the justification of infer-
ences with sentences expressing (non-cognitive) attitudes. In virtue of this, the jus-
tification of a basic form of inference as modus ponens in presence of (non-cognitive)
attitudes – i.e., the Frege-Geach problem – has received much attention since the
seminal work of Geach [23]. We will mainly focus on the logical aspects of sentences
expressing attitudes and their structure. Then, we will show how to formally treat
expressive sentences in a formal pragmatics framework. We will base our investiga-
tions on the formal framework called “Logic for Pragmatics”(LP) [12] [13] – a logical
language originally devoted to providing a fine-grained treatment of illocutionary
acts. Traditionally, the Frege-Geach problem has been interpreted as a challenge
for distinguishing asserted from non-asserted contexts. This is why it seems worth
investigating the significance of a possible application of a logic for assertions in
order to deal with sentences expressing attitudes. The proper aim of this paper is
to introduce a pragmatic logic for expressive attitudes (in an extension of LP) so as
to overcome some difficulties – specifically, the ones associated to the connectives
of statements involving attitudes – envisaged in the metaethical literature. We will
show that the presence of a variety of connectives for different types of formulas will
be useful for dealing with complex expressive sentences. The structure of the paper
is the following. First of all, we introduce in Section 2 the connection, envisaged by
Frege, between the illocutionary force of assertion and modus ponens, which will turn
out to be fundamental in the formal treatment of expressive inferences. Then, in
Section 3 the pragmatic logic for assertions LP is introduced. In this logical system
it is possible to give a proper treatment of Frege’s views on the inferential role of as-
sertion, specifically in the case of modus ponens [12] [13]. In Section 4, a pragmatic
logic for expressive attitudes (ELP) is presented in order to properly deal with logical
inferences involving expressive sentences. In Section 5, classical attempts to solve
the Frege-Geach problem are briefly analysed and compared with our perspective.
Some remarks of philosophical interest are discussed in the Conclusion.
2 Assertion and Modus Ponens
Frege [20] noticed that the proper treatment of modus ponens has to take into
account the concept of assertion, i.e., an inference occurs between assertions, not
between propositions. In this context, a judgement is the acknowledgement of the
truth of a proposition, and assertion is its external counterpart [19]. Consider the
modus ponens rule from a Fregean perspective:
(1) the assertion of α,
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(2) the assertion of (α→ β),
(3) therefore, the assertion of β.
Notice that in (2) the occurrence of β is not asserted, because only the whole
conditional is asserted. Hence, we can say that β in (2) is unasserted (as well as
α), while in (3) β is finally asserted. It has been noticed by Russell [36] that if one
places modus ponens in an unasserted framework, then two possible problems can
come up, especially if one interprets modus pones in the following way: α, α → β;
therefore β. But if one interprets β in the second premise in the same way of the
conclusion, then what we have to prove is already known, hence modus ponens is
useless, while if β in the second premise has a different meaning from β in the
conclusion, then the argument suffers from a fallacy of equivocation. An elaborated
assertive framework for modus ponens may solve these problems and explains the
inferential role of Frege’s assertion sign ‘`’, which indicates the external counterpart
of an internal judgement. This Fregean turnstile is a composed sign constituted
by a horizontal stroke, which refers to the propositional content of the judgement,
expressing what is judgeable in principe, and a vertical stroke expressing that the
assertion of the content has been executed [20]. We will now focus on the case of
modus ponens with expressive attitudes.
Geach [23] noticed that our moral judgements can resemble the formal behaviour
of assertions in a moral argument. Consider the following argument:
• (4) Tormenting the cat is wrong.
• (5) If tormenting the cat is wrong, then getting your little brother to torment
the cat is also wrong.
• (6) Therefore, getting your little brother to torment the cat is wrong.
One can see that in (4) and (6) the idea of “being wrong” expresses a gen-
uine attitude towards the world, while (5) seems to indicate an unasserted context
where there is no genuine moral position towards tormenting the cat. If one holds
an expressivist position, it is easy to handle (4) and (6) but not (5) since neither
the antecedent nor the consequent are asserted, but instead the whole conditional
is asserted. This problem is called the “Frege-Geach problem” in metaethics or,
more generally, the “embedding problem”. Since the Frege-Geach problem is about
the distinction between asserted and non-asserted contexts and ther role for logical
inferences, we will deal with this problem within the framework of the pragmatic
logic for assertions, which is introduced in the next section. Those who are already
acquainted with LP may skip it.
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3 Logic for Pragmatics: Assertion
LP is a logical language mainly inspired by Frege. However, in Frege’s system
there are no connective working on assertions in order to create complex asser-
tions. Therefore, in a certain sense LP is an extension of Frege’s logical system.
Frege distinguishes the concept of thought from the concept of judgement. The
thought expressed in a (propositional) content has a truth value assigned, while the
judgement is the acknowledgement of truth by a thought. The concept of thought
(proposition) is a semantic concept, while the concept of judgement (or assertion) is
a pragmatic one. The propositions can be either true or false, while the judgements
can be justified (J) or unjustified (U). A well-formed elementary formula in LP is ob-
tained by prefixing an operator of pragmatic mood (indicated by “`” for assertions)
to a proposition (radical formula). Sentential formulas (which we indicate with δ)
are built from the elementary formulas using the following pragmatic connectives ∩
(conjunction), ∪ (disjunction), ⊃ (implication), ∼ (negation), ≡ (equivalence). The
specification of the illocutionary-force operator shows the existence of a relation be-
tween the user of a symbol and the symbol itself. Notably, an assertion in LP is
justified iff there exists any (informal) proof of the content of the radical formula
[13]. The pragmatic language LP is the following:
The pragmatic language LP, which is the union of the set of radical formulas
RAD and the set of sentential formulas SENT, can be defined recursively:
RAD γ ::= p|¬γ|γ1 ∧ γ2|γ1 ∨ γ2|γ1 → γ2|γ1 ↔ γ2|
SENT i) Elementary sentential formulas θ ::=` γ
ii) Sentential δ ::= θ| ∼ δ|δ1 ∩ δ2|δ1 ∪ δ2|δ1 ⊃ δ2|δ1 ≡ δ2|.
Radical formulas of LP have a truth value (true or false) and sentential formulas have
a justification value (“J” justified or “U” unjustified) defined in terms of the intuitive
notion of proof or conclusive evidence. The semantics of LP is classical and provides
only the interpretation of the radical formulas, by assigning them a truth value
and interpreting propositional connectives as truth functions in the standard way.
The semantic rules for radical formulas are thus the usual classical Tarskian ones
and specify the truth conditions (only for radical formulas) through an assignment
function σ, thus regulating the semantic interpretation of LP. Let γ1, γ2 be radical
formulas and 1 = true and 0 = false; then:
1. σ(¬γ1) = 1 iff σ(γ1) = 0
2. σ(γ1 ∧ γ2) = 1 iff σ(γ1) = 1 and σ(γ2) = 1
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3. σ(γ1 ∨ γ2) = 1 iff σ(γ1) = 1 or σ(γ2) = 1
4. σ(γ1 → γ2) = 1 iff σ(γ1) = 0 or σ(γ2) = 1
5. σ(γ1 ↔ γ2) = 1 iff σ(γ1) = σ(γ2).
A distinguished feature of LP are pragmatic connectives. These connectives
have a meaning due to the BHK (Brouwer, Heyting, Kolmogorov) interpretation of
intuitionistic logical constants. The illocutionary force of assertion plays a key role in
determining the pragmatic component of the meaning of an elementary expression,
together with the semantic component expressed in radical formulas.
Justification rules regulate the pragmatic evaluation π, specifying the justifica-
tion conditions for the assertive formulas in function of the σ-assignments of truth
values for their radical sub-formulas:
JR1 – Let γ be a radical formula. π(` γ) = J iff a proof exists that γ is true, i.e.
that σ assigns to γ the value 1. π(` γ) = U iff no proof exists that γ is true.
JR2 – Let δ be an assertive formula. Then, π(∼ δ) = J iff a proof exists that δ is
unjustified. i.e., that π(δ) = U .
JR3 - Let δ1 and δ2 be assertive formulas. Then:
1. π(δ1 ∩ δ2) = J iff π(δ1) = J and π(δ2) = J ;
2. π(δ1 ∪ δ2) = J iff π(δ1) = J or π(δ2) = J ;
3. π(δ1 ⊃ δ2) = J iff a proof exists that π(δ2) = J whenever π(δ1) = J ;
4. π(δ1 ≡ δ2) = J iff π(δ1 ⊃ δ2) = J and π(δ2 ⊃ δ1) = J .
The Soundness criterion (SC) is the following:
Let be γ ∈ RAD, then π(` γ) = J implies that σ(γ) = 1.
SC states that if an assertion is justified, then the content of assertion is true.
It is evident from the justification rules that sentential formulas have an intuitio-
nistic-like formal behaviour and can be translated into the modal system S4, where
2γ means that there is an (intuitive) proof (or conclusive evidence) for γ. It is worth
noting that the justification rules are partial, since they do not allow determining
in all cases the justification value of a complex sentential formula when all the
justification values of its components are known. For instance,
NR1 π(δ) = J implies π(∼ δ) = U ,
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NR2 π(δ) = U does not imply π(∼ δ) = J ,
NR3 π(∼ δ) = J implies π(δ) = U ,
NR4 π(∼ δ) = U does not imply π(δ) = J .
Pragmatic Validity for Assertive Formulas: A formula δ is pragmatically
valid iff for every Tarskian semantic interpretation σ and for every pragmatic
function of justification π, then π(δ)=J .
LP has both an intuitionistic fragment (ILP) and a classical fragment (CLP).
The axioms of ILP are the following:
A1. δ1 ⊃ (δ2 ⊃ δ1)
A2. (δ1 ⊃ δ2) ⊃ ((δ1 ⊃ (δ2 ⊃ δ3)) ⊃ (δ1 ⊃ δ3))
A3. δ1 ⊃ (δ2 ⊃ (δ1 ∩ δ2))
A4. (δ1 ∩ δ2) ⊃ δ1; (δ1 ∩ δ2) ⊃ δ2
A5. δ1 ⊃ (δ1 ∪ δ2); δ2 ⊃ (δ1 ∪ δ2)
A6. (δ1 ⊃ δ3) ⊃ ((δ2 ⊃ δ3) ⊃ ((δ1 ∪ δ2) ⊃ δ3))
A7. (δ1 ⊃ δ2) ⊃ ((δ1 ⊃ (∼ δ2)) ⊃ (∼ δ1))
A8. δ1 ⊃ ((∼ δ1) ⊃ δ2)
The intuitionistic fragment is obtained by limiting the language of LP to complex
formulas that are valid with atomic radicals. This is an intuitionistic fragment ILP
[13]. Modus ponens rule for ILP is the following:
[MPP’] if δ1, δ1 ⊃ δ2, then δ2
where δ1 and δ2 contain atomic radicals.
The classical fragment CLP of LP can also be characterized. CLP is composed
by the set of sfs without pragmatic connectives.
Axioms for CLP are the following:
Ai ` (γ1 → (γ2 → γ1))
Aii ` ((γ1 → (γ2 → γ3))→ ((γ1 → γ2)→ (γ1 → γ3))
Aiii ` (¬γ2 → ¬γ1)→ ((¬γ2 → γ1)→ γ2))
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Modus ponens rule for CLP is:
[MPP]
(1)* ` γ1
(2)* ` (γ1 → γ2)
(3)* therefore, ` γ2
A modal translation of LP can be given by a function ()∗ from assertive formulas
to the corresponding modal ones in the system S4, where 2γ means that there is an
intuitive proof or conclusive evidence for γ:
(` γ)∗ 2γ
(∼ δ)∗ 2¬(δ)∗
(δ1 ∩ δ2)∗ (δ1)∗ ∧ (δ2)∗
(δ1 ∪ δ2)∗ (δ1)∗ ∨ (δ2)∗
(δ1 ⊃ δ2)∗ 2((δ1)∗ → (δ2)∗)
(δ1 ≡ δ2)∗ 2((δ1)∗ ↔ (δ2)∗)
Connectives for radical and sentential formulas are related by these bridge principles:
(a) (` ¬γ) ⊃ (∼` γ)
(b) ((` γ1) ∩ (` γ2)) ≡ (` (γ1 ∧ γ2))
(c) ((` γ1) ∪ (` γ2)) ⊃ (` (γ1 ∨ γ2))
(d) (` (γ1 → γ2)) ⊃ (` γ1 ⊃` γ2)
(e) (` (γ1 ↔ γ2)) ⊃ (` γ1 ≡` γ2)
Bridge principles (a)–(e) show the formal relations between pragmatic connectives
and connectives in the radicals. (a) states that from the assertion of not-γ the
non-assertability of γ can be inferred. (b) expresses that the conjunction of two
assertions is equivalent to the assertion of a conjunction; (c) states that from the
disjunction of two assertions the assertion of a disjunction is inferable. Formula
(d) expresses that from the assertion of a classical material implication follows the
pragmatic implication between two assertions. Formula (e) shows that from the
assertion of a biconditional follows the equivalence of assertions.




(2)* ` (γ1 → γ2)
(3)* therefore, ` γ2
In virtue of bridge principle (d), from (2)* follows that (` γ1 ⊃` γ2). This
means that the following variant of the modus pones rule can be justified:
(1)° ` γ1
(2)° (` γ1) ⊃ (` γ2)
(3)° therefore, ` γ2
Thus we can say that (2)* is a stronger claim compared to (2)°; the former is the
material implication, the latter is the inference in an argument when we use “there-
fore”, as it was observed by Russell [36], who named the problem of justification of
modus pones in presence of unasserted formulas as the “embedding problem”. As we
will see, this will turn out to be particularly relevant for our view on the Frege-Geach
problem.
4 Pragmatic Logic for Expressive Sentences
In this section we will explore the possibility to apply our pragmatic framework to
expressive sentences in order to better understand their logical form and inferential
relations. Two expressive and pragmatic operators are introduced in order to extend
LP, namely: HP ! that expresses a positive attitude towards the content of the radical
formula and the operator BP ! that expresses a negative attitude toward a content.
HP ! and BP ! have an intuitionistic-like formal behaviour as the assertion sign and
other pragmatic connectives in LP. As pointed out by Reichenbach [33], assertions
and other linguistic features of language can be represented as terms in “pragmatic
capacity” that do not obey to truth-functional connectives and cannot be iterated.
Given the intuitionsitic-like formal behaviour of pragmatic operators for expres-
sive statements, they are not fully inter-definable, notably HP !γ ⊃ BP !¬γ and
BP !γ ⊃ HP !¬γ, but their readings from right to left do not hold. Moreover, we
indicate by B and H the descriptions of expressive attitudes and, for this reason,
they can be true or false B and H are inter-definable because they behave like
alethic modalities (as forbidden and obligatory respectively) and are connected by
classical connectives in radical formulas. In fact, the the description of an expressive
judgment can be true or false, while a genuine moral sentence is in this framework
justified or not on the basis of a set of assumed principles.1
1In philosophy of law there is, for instance, the distinction between the logic of normative
propositions (deontic logic), in which sentences can be true or false, and the proper logic for the
404
Asserting Boo! and Horray!
The language of this extension of LP is termed ELP (Pragmatic Logic for Ex-
pressive Sentences) and it is the following:
Descriptive signs: propositional letters: p, q, r, ..
Logical signs for radical formulas: ¬,∧,∨,→,↔, H, B
Logical signs for sentential formulas: the sign of pragmatic illocutionary
force `, HP ! and BP !
Pragmatic connectives: ∼ pragmatic negation, ∩ pragmatic conjunction, ∪ prag-
matic disjunction, ⊃ pragmatic implication, ≡ pragmatic equivalence.
Formation Rules (FRs):
Radical formulas (rfs) are recursively defined by the following FRs:
FR1 (atomic formulas): every propositional letter is a rf.
FR2 (molecular formulas): (i) Let γ be a rf, then ¬γ is a rf .
(ii) Let γ1 and γ2be rfs, then γ1 ∧ γ2 , γ1 ∨ γ2 , γ1 → γ2, γ1 ↔ γ2, Hγ,
Bγ are rfs.
Sentential formulas (sfs) are recursively defined by the following FRs:
FR3 (elementary formulas): Letγ be a rf, then ` γ, HP ! and BP ! are
sfs.
FR4 (complex formulas):
(i) Let λ be a sf, then ∼ λ is a sf .
(ii) Let λ1 and λ2 be sfs, then λ1 ∩λ2, λ1 ∪λ2, λ1 ⊃ λ2, λ1 ≡ λ2, are sfs.
As we have already pointed out, descriptions of attitudes in our framework are
represented by the operators H and B, which behave formally like O (obligatory)
and F (forbidden) respectively in the modal logic KD and belong to radical for-
mulas as they can be true or false. They are different from the genuine expressive
operators HP ! and BP ! that if associated to radical formulas may form sentential
formulas which can be justified or unjustified. Hence, we have to apply the classical
connectives (used in radical formulas) to B and H. This distinction is important
in order to switch from the assertion of a descriptive ethical statement to a genuine
expressivist conception of norms in which inferences between normative jugdements can be justified




expressive statement and vice versa, even if, as we will see later on, this is not always
possible for more complex formulas2. Let us consider the following bridge principles
connecting assertions and attitudes:
(12) `B(γ) ≡BP !(γ)
(13) `H(γ) ≡ HP !(γ)3
Principles (12) and (13) require some clarification. Let us focus on (12), but a
similar discourse can be replicated for (13). In our pragmatic language the notion
of justification indicates the existence of a proof (or conclusive evidence). Indeed,
if BP !(γ) is justified, this is equivalent to say that there is a proof (or conclusive
evidence) of proposition B(γ). However, this is the same condition justifying `B(γ).
This reasoning is behind the justification of (12) and (13). For a detailed discussion
of pragmatic bridge principles, see [2], [32]. Moreover, (12) and (13) do not mean
that whatever assertive formula with the description of an attitude in the radical is
formally equivalent with a sentential formula prefixed with an expressive operator
like HP ! or BP !. Principles (12) and (13) mean that the justification conditions of
the two elementary formulas are pragmatically equivalent4 . The relation between
assertive and expressive formulas is, in fact, shaped by the logical structure. For
instance, since disjunction in the radical does not entail the pragmatic disjunction
but only vice versa (see the bridge principle (d)), therefore from ` (Hγ1 ∨ Hγ2)
cannot be derived the formula (` Hγ1) ∪ (` Hγ2) (or, if (13) is accepted, the
formula (HP !γ1) ∪ (HP !γ2))5.
In the literature there exist other hybrid or ecumenical forms of expressivism in
which moral sentences express states of mind consisting of both descriptive beliefs and
genuine attitudes6. The expressive elementary formula stating the justification of
2Since LP has a modal translation in the modal system S4 and expressive operators have a
translation in KD, then the modal translation of ELP can be expressed in a bimodal system in
which there is a fusion of KD and S4. Consistency and completeness results deriving from the
fusion of this kind of simple propositional modal systems can be shown to persist [7].
3Principles (12) and (13) might be weakened. For instance, by imposing that `B(γ)⊃BP !(γ).
The other sense of implication could be less acceptable according to different philosophical views.
4One can imagine different forms of bridge principles connecting the assertion (or a different
illocutionary act) of attitudes and genuine expressivist attitudes similarly to what happens in the
logic of normative propositions with bimodal systems equipped with both normative and alethic
connectives. On normative bridge principles, see [21], [22].
5We want to have the operator of assertion explicit in our system in order to clarify the in-
ferential and pragmatic structure of sentences expressing attitudes and to be able to speak with
a uniform structure of expressive and non-expressive sentences. Nonetheless, nothing prevents us
from presenting the language of ELP with only the expressive operators of approval and disapproval
and no explicitation of the assertion sign (and without thus proposing bridge principles like (12)
and (13)).
6See, for instance, [34] and [6]. For a similar view on aesthetic sentences, see also [17].
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HP !(γ) can be translated in the descriptive multimodal formula Hγ that indicates
the existence of conclusive evidence for Hγ, and given the factivity of the box of S4,
then it is possible to derive Hγ from Hγ. The following multimodal translation
justifies the descriptive readings of Hγ and Bγ and the choice of (12) and (13) as
bridge principles. Given the following translation function, in which ( ) ∗ ∗ is a
function from attitudes to multimodal formulas (where the box is as S4 modality
and H a deontic modality) we have that7:
λ λ ∗ ∗
(` HP !γ) 2Hγ
(∼ HP !γ) 2¬2(Hγ)
(HPγ1 ∩HPγ2) (2H1) ∧ (2H2)
(HPγ1 ∪ HPγ2) (2H1) ∨ (2H2)
(HPγ1 ⊃ HPγ2) 2((2H1) → (2H2))
(HPγ1 ≡ HPγ2) 2((2H1)↔ (2H2)
The multimodal translation above is obtained as a special case (only with ele-
mentary sentences) of the following general translation:
λ λ ∗ ∗
(` Hγ)∗∗ 2Hγ
(∼ λ)∗∗ 2¬(λ)∗∗
(λ1 ∩ λ2)∗∗ (λ1)∗∗ ∧ (λ2)∗∗
(λ1 ∪ λ2)∗∗ (λ1)∗∗ ∨ (λ2)∗∗
(λ1 ⊃ λ2)∗∗ 2((λ1)∗∗ → (λ2)∗∗)
(λ1 ≡ λ2)∗∗ 2((λ1)∗∗ ↔ (λ2)∗∗)
It is now evident that our translations provide a ground for supporting (12) and
(13)8.
Finally, we have that an analogous of the necessitation rule holds. Namely, if γ
is a truth-functional consequence of γ1, γ2.., γn, then HP !(γ) follows from HP !(γ1),
HP !(γ2), ..HP !(γn).
The validity of the moral inference is related to the Frege-Geach problem. In fact,
we can interpret the original example of the Frege-Geach problem in our pragmatic
and expressive language, i.e., we can indicate (4), (5) and (6) in ELP with the
expressive operator BP !
7 For a negative attitude, the translation can be obtained in a similar way.
8However different bridge principles expressing alternative forms of relations between the as-
sertion (or different illocutionary acts) involving attitudes and genuine moral attitudes may be




(15) ` ((Bγ1)→ (Bγ2)),
(16) therefore, (BP !γ2).
Note that in ELP it is possible to handle the three statements of Geach’s original
example for the Frege-Geach problem in a uniform way. ELP is a suitable logic
for treating expressive moral judgements. If we compare the assertive language LP
with its extension ELP, we can observe many similarities between logical assertions
and the expressive operators. Nevertheless, notice that the justified assertion of a
proposition implies the acknowledgment of the truth of the proposition, while this
is not the case for the expressive operators. That is why we need to extend LP
with ELP in order to take into account the specific features of attitudes and relating
them to the inferential structure of assertions. We will show that the Frege-Geach
problem may receive a suitable formal treatment in ELP. In fact, if (14) (15) (16)
hold in ELP, then it is possible to derive in ELP (a better form of expressive) modus
ponens9
(17) BP !(γ1),
(18) BP !(γ1) ⊃ BP !(γ2),
(19) BP !(γ2).
Note that if we want to apply (12) to (17) - (18) - (19) we can rewrite the
inference above in the following way (with the explicitation of the assertion sign):
(17)° ` B(γ1),
(18)° ` B(γ1) ⊃` B(γ2),
(19)° ` B(γ2).
So, in our pragmatic language it is possible to express material implication in
the radical formula and pragmatic conditional among sentential sentences (and their
logical relation).
The analysis of negation in ELP is even more articulated. There is the negation
in the radical formula ”¬”, the pragmatic negation ∼, and the justification values
of unjustified ”U”. The richness in the expressive logical power of ELP makes it
particularly suitable to formulate different forms of negations and connectives for
asserted and unasserted contexts and to deal with the major logical problems of
expressivism as we will see in the next Section. Indeed, the main idea behind ELP
is to provide a pragmatic tratment of connectives in order to clarify the logical
structure of the expressivist conception of moral sentences.
9See, also, [14]. The revision of that paper has been published very recenty [15].
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5 A Comparison with Other Systems
In this section we will focus on the seminal contributions to the expressivist structure
of sentences involving attitudes and compare them with our perspective10. We will
consider (i) Blackburn’s proposal based on higher-order attitudes, (ii) Gibbard’s
norm expressivism, and (iii) Schroeder’s general attitude of being for.
5.1 Blackburn’s Higher-Order Approach
Blackburn developed a logic for expressive attitudes in what he calls the “quasi-
realist” framework [3],[4]. He wants to prove the validity of judgements and infer-
ences, without any appeal to the concept of truth, referring to a possible substitute
for this notion in moral theory. He argues that the validity (or invalidity) of our
moral judgements has to depend only on the connections between attitudes (or their
failures). Blackburn called his views “quasi-realistic” and clarified their relationships
with the classical projectivism in the following manner:
“Projectivism is the philosophy of evaluation which says that evaluative prop-
erties are projections of our own sentiments (emotions, reactions, attitudes, com-
mendations). Quasi-realism is the enterprise of explaining why our discourse has
the shape it does, in particular by way of treating evaluative predicates like others,
if projectivism is true. It thus seeks to explain, and justify, the realistic-seeming
nature of our talk of evaluations - the way we think we can be wrong about them”
[3, p. 180].
Blackburn aims to discover the ‘deep structure’ of our moral arguments, i.e.,
they are not a description of the world, but they obey to some patterns of validity
as for descriptive statements, although they are not “truth apt” (i.e., they do not
aim to achieve the truth). Indeed, he presents a logical system, which seeks to
explain the particular structure of moral arguments. He introduces in this logic two
operators H! (Horray!-operator, which stands for a high-order positive attitude) and
B! (Boo!-operator, which stands for a high-order negative attitude). It is possible to
define the language of Blackburn’s system, which is usually termed as “Higher-Order
Approach” (HOA) in the following way:
HOA ::= γ| ¬γ |γ1 ∧ γ2| γ1 ∨ γ2 |γ1 → γ2| B!γ | H!γ |.
The main difference with our pragmatic system (presented in the previous sec-
tion) is that Blackburns’s operators can be iterated and can work as second-level
10Further contemporary views on expressivism are not investigated in this paper and we hope
to be capable to do it in a future work. For instance, [29].
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attitudes referring to attitudes (or beliefs) of the first level indicated within squared
brackets. Thus, the sentence (5) can be translated as:
H!([B! tormenting the cat]⇒ [B! getting your little brother to torment the cat])
And ⇒ indicates “the involvement of one mental state with another” necessary
for a conditional [4]. Thus, themodus ponens for expressive sentences in Blackburns’
framework will be:
• (20) B! tormenting the cat,
• (21) H!([B! tormenting the cat] ⇒ [B! getting your little brother to torment
the cat]),
• (22) therefore, B! getting your little brother to torment the cat.
But the sign ⇒ in this system is not a sign with a clear logical meaning; hence,
the problem of the logical validity of the inference is still open in this system. As a
matter of fact, if one endorses the premises, and not the conclusion, then no logical
contradiction arises, only a moral failure, which does not affect the rationality of the
moral agents [50].
The H! operator is definable contextually in this way: “the subjectA accepts
H!γ” is equivalent with “A hoorays that γ”. However, Unwin [46] has noted some
syntactical problems in Blackburn’s system. Such problems can be easily handled
in ELP.
Problem 1. (Negations)
The expression “A accepts H!γ” has three different negated forms, whereas “A
hoorays that γ” admits only two forms:
N1. A does not accept H!γ ≡ A does not hooray that γ
N2. A accepts notH!γ ≡ ???
N3. A accepts H!(not γ) ≡ A hoorays that not γ
N1 and N3 are unproblematic, while N2 admits no clear formulation in HOA.
From a pragmatic perspective:
N1°. A does not accept H!γ ≡ ((HP !γ) = U)
N2°. A accepts notH!γ ≡ ((` ¬Hγ) = J)
Notice that from (` ¬Hγ) = J , it is possible to derive, in virtue of the bridge
principle (a), that ((∼` Hγ) = J). From the latter formula, by principle (13) we
have ((∼ HP !γ) = J), a formula without any connective in the radical and thus a
better way to formalize expressive attitudes.
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N3°. A accepts H!(not γ) ≡ ((HP !¬γ) = J)
It is worth remarking N2 cannot be translated as BP !¬γ because of the failure
of the complete inter-definability of our expressive operators 11.
Problem 2. (Disjunctions)
Unwin [46] has showed a second problem in Blackburn’s framework for expressive
disjunctions, namely:
D1. either A accepts H!γ1 or A accepts H!γ2
D2. A accepts (H!γ1 ∨H!γ2)
D3. A accepts H!(γ1 ∨ γ2)
The expression D2 cannot be properly handled in Blackburn’s system, while in
ELP it is possible to express D1, D2 and D3. Namely,
D1°. (HP !γ1) = J or (HP !γ2) = J
D2°. (HP !γ1 ∪HP !γ2) = J
D3°. HP !(γ1 ∨ γ2) = J
The disjunction in D1° can be interpreted as a metalinguistic disjunction in ELP
of two justified formulas because it connects formulas already equipped with a jus-
tification value. Since the metalanguage of LP is classical, also the metalanguage
of ELP is classical. Therefore, disjunction in D1° is classical and principles like ex-
cluded middle can be shown, for instance, to hold. In D2°, disjunction is pragmatic
and hence it shows an intuitionistic-like formal behaviour in ELP. This form of
disjunction is difficult to express in HOA, as observed by Unwin [46]. Finally, dis-
junction in D3° is classical since it is a connective in the radical formula, so it is not
metalinguistic as in D1°12.
11If we want to deal with a normative language without having the negation in the radical and
without using the pragmatic negation ∼, it is possible to extend ELP with the illocutionary act of
denial, indicated by a. In such an extended pragmatic framework, the justification of ` ¬γ would be
sufficient to justify a γ. Indeed, if we have conclusive evidence for ¬γ, then we can justifiably deny
γ. However, from the justification of a γ does not follow the justification of ` ¬γ. The resources
required for the justification of an act of denial are not always sufficient, in fact, to justify the
assertion of the opposite content. In a sense, it is not assumed Frege’s classical denial equivalence
thesis between the assertion of negation and denial [35]. So, if we the act of denial is included
as a logical sign, from ((` ¬Hγ) = J) follows that ((a Hγ) = J), which is a weaker assumption
compared to ((∼` Hγ) = J) [16]. A further extension of LP has been proposed to deal with the
illocutionary act of hypothesis ([8]; [11]; [9]).
12Suppose that a judge must decide whether to accept or not the positive or negative evidence
towards a crime hypothesis (Hyp). If γ1 represents positive evidence and γ2 negative evidence
towards Hyp, then we have that:
• D1° expresses a situation in which the judge accepts that from the lack of positive (negative)
411
Chiffi
Problem 3. (Mixed formulas)
A formula like (H!γ1) ∨ (γ2) raises problems to an expressivist account because
the disjunction connects a purely descriptive proposition γ2 with a formula indicating
an expressive judgement [27]. Even if we cannot straightly write mixed formulas like
the previous one in ELP for they are not well-formed, there are ways to deal with
this issue in our pragmatic perspective. On the one hand, it is correct to state
that truth-functional connectives may not be applied to sentential formulas and
pragmatic connectives may not be applied to radical formulas. Nonetheless, it is
possible to connect a sentential formula expressing a moral attitude with assertive
formulas not expressing any moral attitude in virtue of the principles (12) and (13).
For instance, in ELP a formula like (HP !γ1) ∪ (` γ2) is formally equivalent with
(` Hγ1) ∪ (` γ2). From the latter, by bridge principle (c), it is finally possible to
infer ` (Hγ1∨γ2), but not vice versa. This shows that there are specific constraints
for complex formulas in ELP on the possibility to switch from sentential formulas
expressing attitudes to the assertion of (the description of) those attitudes. This
is not an ad-hoc strategy, since bridge principles (a)-(e) hold not only in ELP but
also in LP. Moreover, this means that the switch from descriptive operators B and
H and their pragmatic versions HP ! and BP ! is a delicate issue in case of complex
formulas.
Problem 4. (Iteration of operators)
A formula like H!(H!γ) cannot be expressed in ELP since it would not be a
well-formed formula13. No iteration of pragmatic operator is possible and this is a
general feature of any pragmatic operator. Pragmatic operators (also when asserting
attitudes) can be applied only to radical formulas14.
evidence per se, he or she may accept that the existence of negative (positive) evidence is
inferable.
• D2° indicates a context in which the judge accepts that from the lack of positive (negative)
evidence per se, he or she may not accept that the existence of negative (positive) evidence
is inferable.
• D3° represents a minimal situation in which the judge has to accept the positive evidence or
the negative evidence.
13One may argue that pragmatic operators like the assertion sign cannot be iterated, while
attitudes may be iterated, for instance, in a multi-agent context. For instance, we want to say
things like: “Tom approves that Tim blames his father’s behaviour”. Somehow, we agree on this
point. Therefore, it could be possible, in line of principle, to formalize iterated (or nested) non-
cognitive attitudes in a multiagent framework extending ELP, in which formulas are associated to
different agents. However, this task is out of the scope of this paper.
14Blackburn [4] developed a deontic view in which there are two operators for a positive attitude
(H!) and a tolerance-related attitude respectively (T !), which behave like the operators of obligatory
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Thus, the main problems associated to Blackburn’s proposal cannot be replicated
in ELP. Even if there are prima facie some similarities between Blackburn’s and our
pragmatic operators, their expressive and inferential power is different. Conditional
statements in ELP are not required to have different levels of attitudes to solve the
question of unasserted propositions in the Frege-Geach problem. Our perspective is
more similar to the original view of Peter Geach and prevents the unwanted iteration
of pragmatic operators. Moreover, in ELP it is possible to express a greater variety
of complex sentences compared to HOA and, as we have just seen, many of them
are required to make some remarkable logical distinctions for a deep analysis of
expressive views on moral sentences.
5.2 Gibbard’s Norm Expressivism
Other attempts to solve the Frege-Geach problem have been provided by Allan Gib-
bard. We will not go investigate all the main features of this interesting theory, but
only those that are relevant for the expressivist problems associated with connec-
tives. In [24], a logical framework was proposed in order to deal with normative
sentences with a possible-world semantics in which worlds are conceived as “factual-
normative worlds” indicated by (w, n), which is a combination of a possible world
with a set of general norms. The main idea of Gibbard is that our normative judge-
ments depend on a set of norms, and they are considered rational when based on the
acceptance of a system of norms. Acceptance is to be intended as a non-cognitive
attitude. He states that “a person’s normative judgements all told on a given matter
will typically depend on his acceptance of more than one norm, and the norms he
accepts may weigh in opposing directions... Our normative judgements thus depend
not on a single norm, but on a plurality of norms that we accept as having some
force, and on the ways we take some of these norms to outweigh or override others”
([24], pp. 86-7). And in any system of norms we have that: “we can characterize any
system N of norms by a family of basic predicates ‘N- forbidden’, ‘N-optional’, and
‘N-required’. Here ‘N-forbidden’ simply means ‘forbidden by system of norms N’,
and likewise for its siblings. Other predicates can be constructed from these basic
ones; in particular ‘N-permitted’ will mean ‘either N-optional or N-required’ ” ([24],
p. 87). These N-corresponding versions of normative predicates are descriptive and
therefore may occur in embedded contexts.
and permissible (and are therefore intertefinable) equipped with a semantics based on Hintikka’s
notion of “deontic alternatives” [28]. However, it has been pointed out that this second attempt of
Blackburn can be hardly considered expressivist [46], since normative propositions are merely true
or false. This view is a theory for normative propositions (as deontic logic) rather than a logic for
the expressive conception of norms.
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In Gibbard’s system we have that a normative judgement S holds at a factual-
normative world < w,n > if and only if S∗, the sentence which results from S by
replacing all of its normative predicates with the descriptive predicates which N-
correspond to them, is true in the possible world w [24]. However, the substitution
of genuine normative statements with descriptive ones can be problematic for ex-
pressivists [31] and, as we have seen, this is especially evident in presence of complex
normative sentences.
In this system, the meaning of a sentence depends on what is ruled out in every
world. So, (4) rules out all the normative-factual possible worlds in which torment-
ing the cat is not wrong, (5) rules out the intersection of the set of normative factual
worlds in which “tormenting the cat is not wrong” and the set of normative factual
worlds in which “it is not wrong to get your little brother to torment the cat”. There-
fore, (4) and (5) rule out all the set of normative worlds in which “it is not wrong to
get your little brother to lie” and what (6) rules out is included in the world ruled
out by the premises. But, as observed by Sinnott-Armstrong [43], this procedure can
be applied to non-normative statements as well, even if it seems that this property
was a desideratum by Gibbard’s himself in order to have a uniform treatment of
expressivist and descriptive sentences. Consider the following argument:
(23) I lie,
(24) If I lie, then my little brother lies,
(25) therefore, my little brother lies.
If we apply Gibbard’s technique, we see that the worlds ruled out by (25) are
included in the worlds ruled out by (23) and (24). This fact explains the validity of
the argument. In any case, in Gibbard’s system the description of a norm and the
expressive dimension of a norm are interchangeable and – as we have seen – this
fact may be complicated in the case of complex normative formulas. The relation
between a description of an expressive attitude and a genuine expressive attitude is
a delicate issue and requires to be somehow carefully investigated. Moreover, the
classical concept of validity turns out to be not adequate for the genuine expressive
attitudes. Unwin [47] observed that in Gibbard’s logic a sentence simply holds in
a factual normative world or else not, without any further qualification. This fact
explains the problem of negations in Gibbard’s logic, that we have already seen in
the case of Blackburn’s system. In fact, consider the following negated expressions:
N(1) A does not accept that it is obligatory that γ.
N(2) A accepts that it is not obligatory that γ.
N(3) A accepts that it is obligatory that not γ.
One can see that N(2) can be handled neither in Gibbard’s system nor in Black-
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burn’s framework, while ELP allows for such kind of distinction as already shown.
Unfortunately, the problem regarding expressivist negations remains in the new for-
mulation of Gibbard’s logic in later works [25], [26], as it has been pointed out by
Dreier [18]. In the new formulation of his theory, Gibbard argues that normative
judgements must be based on some plans. The idea that in any specific situation a
particular action is the thing to do if it expresses a plan to do it in that situation.
However, one might claim for the opposite view, i.e. it may be the case that we
judge something good or wrong and then we act according to a plan, aiming to
achieve a good or wrong target and not the other way around. Gibbard states that
a plan is what rules out all the alternatives that a moral agent has, permitting at
least one. If a plan holds for every contingency, then we have what Gibbard calls
“hyperplan”. He assumes that the external negation in N(2) corresponds to a dis-
agreement with someone’s attitude. Let us consider the following sentence within
Gibbard’s framework.
(26) Miss Manners thinks one must write thank you notes by hand.
As we have seen, this type of sentence allows three different negated formulas.
Consider the following negated sentences:
• n1. Miss Manners does not believe that one must write thank you notes by
hand.
• n2. Miss Manners believes that it is not so that one must write thank you
notes by hand.
• n3. Miss Manners believes that one must not write thank you notes by hand.
Thus, in n1 a precise plan is lacking, while in n3 there is the idea of planning
something about the negation of something. n2 “leaves open the possibility that she
is indifferent among the ways of writing thank you notes, so that, according to her,
not writing thank you notes by hand is permissible but so is writing them by hand”
([18], p. 720). In Gibbard’s system, n2 is not formalized properly, while this can be
done in ELP. We have already seen that n2 can be formalized in ELP in such a way
such that we do not logically infer anything specific about Miss Manners’ attitudes
towards ¬γ. Miss Manners is free to attribute any genuine expressive value towards
¬γ.
The pragmatic and illocutionary component of expressive sentences is made clear
in ELP and given the intuitionistic-like structure of assertion it incorporates this
means that the justification functions are only partial. Hence, there is room in ELP
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for situations like n2 in which an agent is free to attribute any expressive attitude
towards a propositional content.
5.3 Schroeder’s Being For
Mark Schroeder introduced a full expressivist semantics for moral sentences based
on a general non-cognitive attitude that he termed being for [37]. Such attitude “is
bearing a very general positive attitude” and it is expressed in normative languages.
However, he noticed that “everything I do in this paper can be done with a basic
attitude that is negative” ([37], p. 589) and this is relevant for our reading of his
views. One of the main reasons for introducing the attitude of being for relies in
the fact that Schroeder wants to solve the problems of expressivism with negation
and presents a semantics in which: (i) inconsistency (or better to say in this case
“discordance”) is explained in terms of conflict among different attitudes towards
the same content (A-type inconsistency) rather than as a conflict emerging from
the application of the same attitude to opposite contents (B-type inconsistency)15;
and (ii) it is possible to solve the problems of expressivism with negation. B-type
inconsistency seems more suitable for cognitive attitudes like beliefs, whereas A-type
inconsistency seems to handle in a better way non-cognitive attitudes.
Being for is a placeholder for some existing attitudes to be possibly filled in later
[49]. In this perspective disapproval is interpreted, for instance, as “being for blaming
for”. Schroeder seems to implicitly assumes that his theory is mainly based (at least
prima facie) on a classical framework. In fact, classical principles like excluded
middle are explicitly said to hold in his semantics [37] and used, for instance, in the
justification of Geach’s original modus ponens argument16. Specifically, if N is an
normative sentence meaning “being for n”, then the following semantics is assigned
to the following formulas:
N = being for n
v N = being for not n
N1NN1= being for n1 and n2
N1 ∨N1= being for n1 or n2
The remaining connectives of material implication and biconditional can be easily
reconstructed in a similar way. The general attitude of being for is used to create
a new place to handle the three cases of negations for expressive sentences. Let us
consider:
(27) Jon is for blaming for murdering
15See ([48]).
16However, in [39] it is said that moral sentences do not necessarily need to obey excluded middle.
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n[1] Jon is not for blaming for murdering
n[2] Jon is for not blaming for murdering
n[3] Jon is for blaming for not murdering
Schroeder justifies modus ponens (4-6) in his semantics in the following manner:
(28). being for (blaming tormenting the cat)
(29). being for (not blaming tormenting the cat or blaming getting your little
brother to torment the cat)
(30). being for (blaming getting your little brother to torment the cat)
Notice that (29) presupposes a classical view on the conditional as a material im-
plication and cannot be a felicitous expressivist reading of (5) according to Skorupski
[44]. Schroeder’s reply is that his semantics is about purely normative language [40];
but if this so, then it still remains the problem of how to deal with sentences that
are not fully normative. And many of the problems for expressivism come, indeed,
from sentences that are not fully normative17. If we want to deal with sentences
that are not fully normative, then Schroeder’s semantics is not completely capable
of differentiating things like being for a disjunction from a disjunction of being for
attitudes. Skorupski noted in general in Schroeder’s semantics that there are some
problems with the connectives involved in the construction of expressive sentences
[44], [45], (of course, of a language not fully normative). The crux of the matter is,
in fact, related to disjunction as we have seen in (29). Since Schroeder uses disjunc-
tion in his solution to the Frege-Geach problem, then Schroeder’s semantics does
not seem to have all the resources for providing an expressivist treatment for those
sentences which are not fully normative. Schroeder observes that also in a cognitive
framework, if we substitute being for with a belief operator in (28) (29) (30) we
should face a similar problem. What is not fully underlined in this discussion is the
inferential role of assertion, which is fundamental in the Frege-Geach problem and
many other logical questions related to expressivism. Moreover, Skorupski ([45], p.
484) noticed regarding negation that “the question is not about the particular case of
negation and ’wrong’, where Schroeder has offered a solution specific to a particular
case, but about the way negation can exchange scope with normative predicates in
general”.
Since Schroeder agreed that “there will be several ways of implementing” his basic
ideas, we will try to provide one possible implementation in our formal pragmatic
structure. As noted by Schroeder himself, “if the problem arises from a lack of
17ELP can differentiate fully normative sentences, in which there is no connective in the radical
formulas, from not fully normative sentences in which there are both pragmatic connectives for
sentences expressing attitudes and connectives for radical formulas.
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structure, there can be only one solution: to add structure” ([38], p. 61) and this is
what we are going to do. However, we will make use of the idea of a general attitude
of being for and adopt our pragmatic framework rather his semantics that seems to
suffer from the criticisms of Skorupski’s observations.
Let us consider the symbol D, staying for the general attitude of being for and
added in the language of ELP. Strictly speaking, D may be substituted with a
specific non-cognitive attitude, e.g. it can be an approval, disproval, etc. If Bl
stands for blaming and M for murdering, a pragmatic reading of (27) would be:
(31) (D Bl(M)) = J
Let us consider now how negation interacts with normative predicates in our
pragmatic framework. Now it is evident that we can locate negation in three different
places in order to express n_[1], n_[2], and n_[3], namely,
n_[1] (D Bl(M)) = U
n_[2] (D ¬Bl(M)) = J
n_[3] (D Bl¬(M)) = J
Notice that in the formula n_[1] there is no nested negation (so it is a fully
normative statement), while this is not the case for the last two formulas. So, our
analysis allows to clearly differentiate internal and external forms of negations.
Finally, it is possible to use the general attitude of being for in order to provide
a justification of modus ponens in ELP extended with this general attitude.
(32) D γ1,
(33) (D γ1) ⊃ (D γ2),
(34) D γ2.
Notice that (35) is a genuine pragmatic conditional with an intuitionistic-like
formal behaviour which is indeed not equivalent to the antecedent of the conditional
disjuncted with the consequent, since the logical structure of our pragmatic language
is not classical but intuitionistic-like. It is now evident thatmodus ponens holds when
D is substituted in a uniform way with a specific attitude, otherwise it may lead
to implausible results18. However, if we do not introduce explicitly the assertion
sign and its relation with attitudes, than we cannot say that (32)-(34) is a suitable
treatment of the Frege-Geach problem, since there is no unasserted formula. In
virtue of this, we indicate by . the descriptive counterpart of D in the radical formula
18A similar point is made in [39]. It is also clear that when D is not substituted in a uniform
way, then the structural rules of weakening and contraction may fail. But if this is true, then the
logic governing this general attitude is not classical.
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and also assume that a bridge principle connecting assertion and being for exists as
in the case of other attitudes, namely:
(35) ` .p ≡D p19
The original example for the Frege-Geach problem (4-6) can be now expressed
as follows:
(36) D γ1,
(37) (` . γ1) ⊃ (` . γ2),
(38) D γ2.
From (38) (39) (40), in which . is unasserted in the major premise, it is possible
to infer the propermodus ponens for attitudes (34) (35) (36) according to expressivist
views.
Finally, it is possible to disambiguate in our framework the attitude towards a
disjunction from the disjunction of two attitudes (and of course the same can be
done for all other connectives):
(39) D (γ1 ∨ γ2)
(40) (D γ1) ∪ (D γ2)
Our interpretation of the general attitude of being for seems to clarify the role
of this attitude in unasserted contexts.20 Notice that our pragmatic approach is not
per se an alternative to solve all the problems that face expressivism. The original
motivations of logic for pragmatics were not meta-ethical. Nonetheless, our logical
structure may contribute to clarify the inferential properties and the well-formed
expression of sentences involving attitudes.
6 Conclusion
After having discussed the inferential role of assertion for the justification of modus
ponens and its relevancy for the Frege-Geach problem, we have introduced the basic
19Like (12) and (13), also in this case one may imagine different forms for this bridge principle.
20Our perspective may thus clarify the role of asserted and unasserted contexts which has been
at the origins of the Frege-Geach problem. In addition, the pragmatic logic for assertions has been
used for many other applications. This makes our pragmatic treatment of sentences expressing
attitudes not an ad-hoc strategy. Finally, as observed by Charlow [10], we also believe that the
Frege-Geach problem is, in fact, not a problem for expressivism per se but it is common to many
different languages. Similarly, Schwartz and Hom [42] have also recently pointed out that the nega-
tion problem can be replicated in non-espressive contexts. The adoption of our formal pragmatic
structure seems to clarify that the logical basis of the problems that in the literature have been
associated with expressivism can be replicated in other languages. This is made particularly evident
when the assertion sign is made explicit.
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elements of the pragmatic logic LP. Then, we have extended the pragmatic language
of LP into a pragmatic language for expressive attitudes ELP. We analysed how to
deal with the issue of asserted and unasserted contexts for conditionals, showing
the merit of adopting our pragmatic view to address the Frege-Geach problem. The
remaining problems related to other connectives for expressive sentences may receive
a logical treatment in ELP. So, ELP seems to be a formally adequate structure for
the analysis of expressive sentences and their combinations, in which the pragmatic
acts of assertion (of descriptive contents) and genuine attitudes are logically related.
This seems particularly coherent with hybrid forms of expressivism.21
Finally, we showed how our logical and pragmatic perspective can be modified
and used to investigate different versions of expressivism.
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In this paper we lay the foundations of a new proof-theory for classical first-order
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with respect to assent and dissent and do not involve the discharge of formulas.
The only discharge rule is a classical dilemma rule whose nested applications
provide a sensible measure of inferential depth. The result is a hierarchy of
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pands the hierarchy of tractable approximations of Boolean logic investigated
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1 Introduction
In the Manifesto of the Vienna Circle, written in 1929, Rudolph Carnap, Hans Hahn
and Otto Neurath claimed that logic is analytic and tautological:
Logical investigation leads to the result that all thought and inference
consists of nothing but a transition from statements to other statements
that contain nothing that was not already in the former (tautological
transformation). [. . . ] The scientific world-conception knows only em-
pirical statements about things of all kinds, and analytic statements of
logic and mathematics. [5, pp. 308, 311]
In a series of papers collected in the volume Logic, Language-Games and Information
published in 1973, Hintikka attacked the logical empiricists’ thesis. Starting from the
Church-Turing result that classical first-order logic is undecidable (1936), Hintikka
argues that there is a class of polyadic first-order logical truths that are synthetic
and informative. He formulates a theory of distributive normal forms for classical
first-order logic, on the basis of which he defines two objective and non-psychological
notions of information content. The former, which he calls “depth information”, is
equivalent to Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s semantic information and is not increased by
deductive reasoning, thus justifying the traditional claim that logic is tautological.
The latter, which he calls “surface information”, might be increased by deductive
reasoning and is computable, thus vindicating the idea that logic is informative.
The non-trivial deductive reasoning that does increase surface information is,
according to Hintikka, to be regarded as synthetic. But, of course, the terms “an-
alytic” and “synthetic” are given a meaning that is different from the one used in
the Vienna Circle and that is based on an original interpretation of the distinction
put forward by Kant in his first Critique. According to Hintikka, a derivation is
synthetic if at least one of its steps introduces new individuals; a derivation is ana-
lytic if all its steps merely discuss the individuals which we have already introduced.
Inferences can be synthetic at any degree k and whether or not a sentence follows
from a given set of premises by means of a k-degree synthetic inference is decidable
for every fixed k.1
Despite Hintikka’s rejection of the idea that all logical inferences are analytic,
his approach still classifies as analytic a wide class of inferences that includes not
only many valid inferences of polyadic predicate logic, but also the entire set of valid
inferences of propositional logic and monadic predicate logic. As a result, his work
provides only a partial vindication of the idea that logical deduction is informative.
1For a thorough discussion of Hintikka’s view and its comparison with Kant’s analytic/synthetic
distinction, see [22].
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These doubts find an important confirmation in the theory of computational com-
plexity: if the decision problem for Boolean logic is (most probably) intractable2,
that is to say, undecidable in practice, how is it possible to maintain that proposi-
tional logic is analytic and uninformative?
This observation was at the origin of the approach of Depth-Bounded Boolean
Logics (DBBLs) [11, 10, 7]. In this approach the standard semantics of the Boolean
operators is replaced by a weaker “informational semantics” whereby the meaning
of a logical operator ? is fixed by specifying the sufficient and the necessary con-
ditions for an agent a to actually possess the information that a ?-sentence ϕ is
true (respectively false), and be therefore in the disposition to assent to (respec-
tively dissent from) it, solely in terms of the information that a actually possesses
about the immediate components of ϕ. An inference is analytic if its conclusion can
be established in terms of the actual information that is implicitly contained in its
premises according to this weaker explanation of the logical operators. Synthetic in-
ferences are those that essentially require the introduction of “virtual information”,
i.e., information that we do not actually possess, but must be temporarily assumed
in order to reach the conclusion (as, for example, in the discharge rules of natural
deduction). In this approach a propositional inference can be synthetic at any given
degree k (the “depth” of the inference), depending on the nested use of virtual in-
formation; moreover, whether or not a sentence follows from a given set of premises
by means of a k-degree synthetic inference is tractable for every fixed k.
Our main purpose in this paper is to lay the foundations for a unified treat-
ment of classical first-order logic that brings together the main insights of the two
approaches outlined above. More specifically, our main aim is to extend to the stan-
dard quantifiers the informational semantics for the Boolean operators in order to
obtain a general view of the analytic/synthetic distinction and of the classification
of inferences in terms of their depth.
The main contributions of this paper are: (i) a natural characterization of the
intuitive “surface” meaning of quantifiers along the same lines as the characterization
given for the Boolean operators in DBBLs; (ii) the definition of a suitable first-order
extension of the propositional natural deduction system of [7]3 and of the associated
notion of inferential depth, in such a way that k-depth inference is decidable. Typical
technical results such as soundness, completeness and subformula property are stated
but their proofs are omitted.
2See, for example, [14].
3See also [6] for a thorough proof-theoretical investigation.
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2 Is logical inference “tautological”?
What do “analytic” and “tautological” mean? The affinity between the notion of
analyticity and the discipline of logic is not something natural and atemporal, but
rather the result of a precise historical development. This development, which con-
cerns both the analytic/synthetic distinction and the conception of logic, might be
summarized in three turning points. First, according to Kant, a judgment is an-
alytic if and only if the concept of the predicate is (covertly) contained in that of
the subject [20, A6-7/B10-11]. However, although Kant uses traditional logic as an
instrument to define the notions, such as that of containment, that lie at the basis of
his definition of analyticity, in his first Critique (1781, 17872) he is not interested in
determining whether logic itself is analytic. It is with Frege’s Foundations of Arith-
metic (1884), that represents our second step, that the relationship between logic
and analyticity becomes stronger. Frege holds that a truth is analytic if and only if
it can be proved with help of logical laws from definitions only [13, §3, p. 4]; as a
result, logical truths, being provable through logical laws, are analytic. Interestingly
enough, however, Frege explicitly rejects the idea that truths or inferences that are
analytic in this sense are uninformative. With the logical empiricist movement, we
reach the third step: logical truths are assumed to be analytic and they are used
in order to catch the rest of analytic truths and inferences. Even W.V.O. Quine,
despite his thorough criticism of the sharp analytic/synthetic distinction made by
the Vienna Circle, in his Two dogmas of empiricism (1951), maintained that logical
truths can after all be safely classified as “analytic” [24, p. 23].4
Now, if we assume, as the logical empiricists do, that logical deduction is ana-
lytic — and thus its conclusions result from some kind of analysis that unfolds the
meaning of the logical operators —, then we seem to be obliged to conclude that it
must be trivial, that is, uninformative and tautological, at least on the basis of the
standard theory of semantic information [9]. This appears to be the side effect of
the paradox of analysis [21, p. 323], which states that analysis cannot be sound and
informative at the same time: for if it is sound, the analyzed and the analyzandum
are equivalent and analysis cannot be augmentative; and if it is informative, then the
analyzed and the analyzandum are not equivalent and the analysis is incorrect. The
logical empiricists were bold enough to accept the “triviality” of deductive reasoning
as a consequence of their commitment to the principle of analyticity of logic.
4On this point see also [8], Section 3.
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Figure 1: Configurations of individuals involved in the argument from premises P1,
P2 and P3 to conclusion C.
3 Hintikka on “synthetic” logical inference
In order to convey the main idea underlying Hintikka’s approach, while avoiding
technicalities, consider the following example, which is a simplified version of the
case first presented in [4] and then discussed in [17, p. 86 ff.], that illustrates a kind
of reasoning that is synthetic according to Hintikka’s sense of the term. Consider
the argument from the premises P1, P2 and P3 to the conclusion C:
P1 : ∀x∀y(Rxy → ∃z(Gxz ∧Gzy))
P2 : ∀x∀y(Gxy → ∃z(Bxz ∧Bzy))
P3 : ∀x∀y((Bxy ∧ Cx)→ Cy)
C : ∀x∀y((Rxy ∧ Cx)→ Cy).
As Figure 1 suggests, P1 says that whenever two points are connected through a red
arrow, then there exists a third point, which is interpolated through green arrows.
Similarly, P2 says that whenever two points are connected through a green arrow,
then there exists a third point, which is interpolated through blue arrows. P3 says
that whenever two points are connected through a blue arrow and the former is
colored, then also the latter is colored. Similarly, C says that whenever two points
are connected through a red arrow and the former is colored, then also the latter is
colored.
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What is the reasoning that leads us from the premises to the conclusion? We
could start from premise P1 and say that whenever two points, a and b, are connected
through a red arrow, then there exists a third point, call it c, which is interpolated
through green arrows. Then, we could use premise P2 and reason as follows. Since
a and c are connected through a green arrow, then there is another individual d,
which is linked to a and c through blue arrows; similarly, since also c and b are
connected through a green arrow, then there is a fifth point e, which is linked to
c and b by blue arrows. Then, given the premise P3, if a is colored, then also d is
colored (because they are connected through a blue arrow); for the same reason and
given that d is colored, then also c is colored; again, since c is colored then also e is
colored; last, we get that b is also colored. In this way and since we didn’t assume
anything about the instantiating individuals, we reach the general conclusion that
the colored marker ink spreads along red arrows too.
According to Hintikka’s theory, this argument is synthetic, because some of its
intermediate steps introduce new individuals into the argument. In particular, the
intermediate step depicted in Figure 1e makes use of individuals d and e, which do
not enter the configurations of the premises and conclusion of the argument, but, at
the same time, are in certain relations with the other individuals.
As mentioned in the Introduction, this approach still classifies as analytic and
informationally trivial all the inferences of propositional logic and of the monadic
predicate calculus. This has been widely regarded as unsatisfactory especially in
light of the development of the theory of NP-completeness according to which the
decision problem for propositional logic is most likely to be intractable. The tension
between the (probable) intractability of Boolean logic and its alleged informational
triviality seems very similar to the tension that motivated Hintikka in arguing that
the undecidability of first-oder logic is at odds with the philosophical claim that its
inferences are analytic and tautological.
4 Depth-Bounded Boolean Logics
Standard formalizations of classical logic cannot capture the essential difference be-








The argument to establish the soundness of the first inference is the following:
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4 Q (from 1 and 3)
5 R (from 2 and 4)
Notice that, here, at each step we are using information that we actually possess.
On the other hand, a typical argument for the second example would run as follows:
1 P ∨Q
2 P → Q
3.1 Suppose that P 3.2 Suppose that ¬P
Q (from 2 and 3.1) Q (from 1 and 3.2)
Q
The sense in which the conclusion of the first argument is “implicitly contained”
in the premises is different from the sense in which the conclusion of the second
argument is. In the latter we make essential use of information that we do not
actually possess and is not even implicitly contained in the information that we
actually possess. This is what we call “virtual information”. We simulate information
states that are richer than the actual one and consider the two possible outcomes of
the process of acquiring such information.
In Gentzen’s Natural Deduction the use of virtual information is associated with




















with the usual restrictions on a. In the propositional rules, the sentences in square
brackets represent virtual information that may not be (and typically is not) con-
tained in the information that is actually “given” in the premises. In the existential
quantifier rule, the sentence in the square brackets may represent information on an
individual that is not actually “given” in the set of individuals associated with the
quantifiers that occur in the premises.
After making this fundamental distinction between inferences that make use only
of actual information and those that require the use of virtual information, we can
ask ourselves the following question: can we fix the meaning of the logical operators
in terms of the information that is actually possessed by an agent, that is, without
appealing to virtual information?
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The informational semantics of the logical operators is based on the following
principle:
The meaning of an n-ary logical operator ? is determined by specifying
the sufficient (necessary) conditions for an agent x to actually hold the
information that a sentence of the form ?(P1, . . . , Pn) is true, respectively
false, in terms of the information that x actually holds about the truth
or falsity of P1, . . . , Pn.
Here by saying that x actually holds the information that P is true (respectively
false) we mean that this is information practically available to x and with which x
can operate (e.g., in decision-making).
In [10, 8, 7, 6] a suitable set of introduction and elimination (intelim) rules for
the Boolean operators were presented that comply with the basic principle of infor-
mational semantics. These rules characterize a subsystem of classical propositional
logic that is a logic in Tarski’s sense and is tractable. Interestingly enough, this
logical system is sound and complete w.r.t. to a non-deterministic matrix, in the
sense of [1], that complies with the basic principle of informational semantics and
was first proposed by W.V.O. Quine in [25] to capture the “primitive” meaning of
the logical operators.5 The full deductive power of classical propositional logic is re-
trieved by adding a single discharge rule that governs the use of virtual information
and consists in a form of classical dilemma rule. The maximum number of nested
applications of this single discharge rule that are needed to obtain a conclusion from
a given set of premises provides a natural measure of the propositional depth of
the associated inference. For each given k, k-depth validity can also be decided in
polynomial time, so providing an infinite hierarchy of tractable approximations to
classical propositional logic.6 In the next section we shall propose a way of extending
these rules to first-order logic, to provide a similar measure of the quantificational
depth of an inference and a hierarchy of decidable approximations to full classical
logic.
To summarize, we have examined the main ideas of two theories that reject the
logical empiricists’ tenet that logic is analytic and tautological. Hintikka focuses
on the tension between this tenet and the undecidability of first-order logic. In his
conceptual framework, an inference is analytic if it does not introduce new individ-
uals into the argument beyond those that one needs to consider in order to grasp
the premises and the conclusion. The approach of DBBLs focuses on the similar
tension between the (probable) intractability of Boolean logic and the claim, shared
5See [8] for a discussion.
6Recently in [2] the DBBL approach has been adopted as the logical foundation of a depth-
bounded approach to belief functions.
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by Hintikka and the logical empiricists, that it is informationally trivial. According
to this perspective, an inference is analytic if and only if the informational meaning
of the logical operators is sufficient to derive the conclusion from the premises; an
inference is synthetic (at different degrees) when virtual information (up to a certain
depth) is needed to derive the conclusion from the premises.
Although each of these two theories suggests a compelling reason for which logic
is informative, neither of them, if taken in isolation, is sufficient to provide a com-
plete vindication of the thesis that first-order logical inferences are synthetic and
informative. On the one hand, Hintikka’s work classifies as analytic all proposi-
tional and monadic inferences. On the other, DBBLs are restricted to propositional
logic and do not capture the dimension of quantificational depth that in Hintikka’s
work is related to the introduction of new individuals that were not “given” in a
surface understanding of the premises.
The main contribution of this paper consists in merging the two approaches
by introducing a new family of logical systems, that we call Depth-Bounded First-
Order Logics (DBFOLs), which extends DBBLs to first-order languages by exploiting
Hintikka’s insight (in particular, appropriate rules for quantifiers are added to the
introduction and elimination rules for DBBLs). The structure of DBFOLs, which
resembles that of DBBLs, is given by an infinite hierarchy of logics representing
increasing levels of syntheticity or informativeness of classical first-order logic. The
logic `0, which is the basic element of the hierarchy, validates only analytic infer-
ences; for every k > 0, the logic `k validates synthetic inferences in such a way
that the greater k is, the more synthetic and informative are the inferences that are
valid in it. Here, the terms “analytic” and “synthetic” are given a new meaning that
conciliates the intuitions of Hintikka’s work and of the DBBL-approach.
5 An intuitive informational semantics for quantifiers
In order to define inference rules that comply with the basic ideas of informational
semantics outlined in the previous section, we need to ask ourselves a fundamental
question. What do we mean when we say that we hold the information that a
sentence of the form ∀xF or ∃xF is true, respectively false?
Let’s start with the notion of actually possessing the information that ∀xF is
true. The answer cannot be that we actually possess the information that F [x/a]
is true for all the infinitely many individuals that may be denoted by a. A more
feasible answer is the following: we are in the disposition to assent to any sentence
of the form F [x/a]. A typical analogy widely used in this context is that we have an
urnW whose composition is unknown to us, and if we draw an individual at random
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from this urn, assign to it the name a (or a is its given name, in case it already has
one), then we are in the disposition to assent to F [x/a]. We may also imagine that,
once an individual has been drawn from the W urn, we move it into a box D that
represents the known domain of discourse. The composition of the box D, unlike
that ofW , is fully known and always consists of a finite number of individuals at each
stage of the reasoning process. How many draws from W are needed in association
with the given universal quantifier in order to grasp the meaning of the sentence? It
makes sense to say that, in order to grasp the meaning of ∀xF , a minimal sufficient
condition consists in envisaging a situation in which an agent is in the disposition
to assent to F [x/a] for any single random draw of an individual a from W , as well
as for all individuals a contained in D.
Similar considerations can be made for the case of the falsity of ∃xF . That an
agent actually possesses the information that ∃xF is false, or equivalently that ¬∃xF
is true, means in essence that for any possible draw of an individual a from the W
urn and for all the finitely many individuals in D, the agent is in the disposition to
dissent from F [x/a], i.e., to assent to ¬F [x/a], and this explanation is sufficient to
grasp the meaning of ¬∃xF .
What about the notion of actually possessing the information that ∃xF is true?
A natural answer is that one is informed that a search for an individual that fits
the description given by the open sentence F (assuming that F contains x as a free
variable) will eventually be successful. The search involves both the urn W and the
box D, meaning that the sought individual might be unknown or already known.
Similar considerations hold for the notion of actually possessing the information that
the sentence ∀xF is false, or equivalently that ¬∀xF is true. We are guaranteed that
the search for an individual that fits the description given by the open sentence ¬F
will eventually succeed. We can call this explanation the surface meaning of ∀ and
∃.
6 Perfect PNF and analytic rules for quantifiers
Our aim is to put forward a set of introduction and elimination rules for quantifiers
that are in accordance with their surface meaning as fixed by the intuitive informa-
tional semantics outlined in the previous section. Their application will therefore be
analytic as well as informationally trivial.
In order to keep technicalities to minimum and focus on the conceptual analysis,
we shall assume that all premises of an inference are in prenex normal form.7 It is
well-known that this involves no loss of generality, for it is computationally easy to
7Since we are restricting our attention to classical logic, this is always possible.
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transform every formula in a formula in prenex normal form such that the matrix
has exactly the same Boolean structure as the original formula — namely it results
from the original formula by removing all quantifiers. We shall not impose, however,
that any formula other than the premises is in prenex normal form.
In what follows we shall assume also that the quantified variables in the set
of premises Γ of an inference are renamed in such a way that (i) the number of
existentially quantified variables occurring in Γ is maximal and (ii) the number of
universally quantified variables occurring in Γ is minimal, modulo logical equiva-
lence (see Example 1 below). When such a renaming has been performed we shall
say that Γ is in perfect prenex normal form. This kind of transformation of the
premises, albeit non essential, makes for easier formulation of suitable analytic rules
for quantifiers. The transformation can be avoided at the price of more contrived re-
strictions on the quantifier rules or of a new kind of format for proofs, other than the
standard Gentzen-style or Fitch-style format. For the purposes of this preliminary
investigation we shall therefore adopt this simplification and leave other options for
future research.
Recall that a formula is in prenex normal form (PNF) if it has the form
Qx1 · · ·QxnF [x1, . . . , xn]
where each Qi is either an occurrence of ∀ or an occurrence of ∃, F is quantifier-free
and all variables in F are bound by some quantifier in the prefix. A formula is in
minimal PNF (min-PNF) if there is no logically equivalent formula with the same
matrix and a lower number of occurrences of quantifiers in the prefix.
Example 1. ∀x∃y∀z(Rxy∧Ryz) is in min-PNF. ∀x∃y∀z∀w(Rxy∧Ryz)is not, for
the last occurence of ∀ is redundant. ∀x∀y(Px ∧ Qy) is not, for it is equivalent to
∀x(Px ∧Qx).
A set Γ of formulae is in perfect prenex normal form (PPNF) if:
• Every formula in Γ is in min-PNF;
• All occurrences of existential quantifiers in Γ bind variables that are different
from each other and from all the universally quantified variables;
• The number of distinct universally quantified variables occurring in Γ is min-
imal.
Every set Γ of formulae in min-PNF can be easily transformed into a set Γ′ in PPNF,
by renaming of variables, in such a way that every formula A in Γ is transformed
into a logically equivalent formula A′ in Γ′ such that the matrix of A′ is the same as
the matrix of A modulo renaming of variables.
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Example 2. The set
{∀x∃y∀z(Rxy ∧Rxz),∀x∃y∀w(Sxy ∧ Sxw)}
is not in PPNF. A possible transformation of this set into PPNF is the following:
{∀x∃y∀z(Rxy ∧Rxz), ∀x∃w∀z(Sxw ∧ Sxz)}.
The main motivation behind the requirement that the set of premises of an
inference is in PPNF is given by the following:
Proposition 1. Let Γ be a set of formulae in PPNF. Then, the number of distinct
bound variables in Γ is the same as the number of distinct bound variables in any
min-PNF of ∧ Γ.
So, we can argue that when a set of premises is in PPNF the number of distinct
individuals that are considered in these premises and are required to grasp their
surface meaning is mirrored by the number of distinct bound variables. Moreover,
the situation does not change if we take any min-PNF of the conjunction of the
premises.
The preliminary transformation of any set of premises into PPNF makes the
explanation of the inference rules quite transparent. All inferences that can be
justified by means of these rules will be “analytic” in the following (informal) sense:
No more individuals need to be considered in proving the conclusion
than those that were already considered in grasping the surface
meaning of the premises.
(PQA)
PQA stands for “Principle of Quantificational Analyticity”. This sense of analyticity
is not strictly equivalent to any of the senses discussed by Hintikka in [19], except
perhaps the sense IIIc (p. 181).
Recall that when a set of premises is in PPNF, all occurrences of the existen-
tial quantifier bind different variables, while different occurrences of the universal
quantifier may bind the same variable. When a set of premises is in PPNF, every
distinct universally quantified variable involves the consideration of a distinct “ar-
bitrary” individual, and every distinct existentially quantified variable involves the
consideration of a distinct “specific” individual. These are all the individuals that
may be regarded as been “thought of” in the premises. To take a simplest example,
in order to grasp the surface meaning of the set of premises {∃x∀yRxy,∀y∃zSyz},
we need to consider three distinct individuals. The first is a specific one that results
from the search, associated with the existentially quantified variable x, of an indi-
vidual that fits the description given by the open formula ∀yRxy. The second is an
434
Towards Depth-Bounded First-Order Logics
unknown one, say b, which is drawn at random from the W urn and is associated
with the universally quantified variable y. The same “drawn” individual b can be
taken to instantiate the universally quantified variable y in the second formula. Fi-
nally we need to consider a third specific individual, say c, which results from the
search associated with the existentially quantified z and fits the description given
by the open formula Sbz.
Note that, according to our explanation of the informational meaning of ∀, hold-
ing the information that ∀x∃yRxy means that we are in the disposition to assent
to ∃yRay for any single unknown individual drawn from the W urn, as well as for
all already known individuals taken from the D box (when it is not empty). Being
in the disposition to assent to ∃yRay means that we hold the information that the
search for a suitable individual y that fits Ray will eventually be successful. This
does not immediately imply that we hold information about a specific individual that
does fit the description. However, when ∀x∃yRxy is used as premise of an inference,
we may consider as part of the surface meaning of ∀x∃yRxy that the result of this
search can somehow be “given” to us. This allows us to choose a new name for this
individual, say b, and infer Rab. These are the two individuals that are thought of in
grasping the meaning of the premises, as witnessed by the fact that any “concrete”
(e.g. graphical) explanation of what counts as a model of this sentence would need
to involve two individuals and no more. In essence, what ∀x∃yRxy says is: “let a be
an arbitrary unknown individual drawn from W and let b any result of the search
for an individual that fits the description Ray, we are in the disposition to assent to
Rab”.
Now, it makes sense to claim that the meaning of ∀ implies that we are also
in the disposition to assent to ∃yRby. However, it would not be equally natural
to assume that the new search for an individual that fits the description Rby and
the result of this search has already been thought of in the premise ∀x∃yRxy and
therefore required to grasp its surface meaning.
For the sake of simplicity we assume that our first-order language contains no
constants and is equipped with a set of parameters (as in [28]) a, b, c, . . . possibly
with subscripts, that may occur in the proof, but neither in the premises, nor in the
conclusion. Given that formulae are in PPNF, let the Q-complexity of a finite set Γ of
premises be the number of distinct variables that occur in Γ (we assume all variables
are bound by some quantifier in the prefix). Then our notion of analytic proof in
the sense of (PQA) above, that is in a sense that is restricted to the informational
meaning of the quantifiers, can be simply rephrased as follows:
A proof is analytic only if the number of distinct parameters that
occur in it never exceeds the Q-complexity of its initial premises.
(PQA∗)
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The use of “only if” stems from the fact that a proof may be analytic in the sense
of (PQA∗) above and yet be synthetic in that it may still make use of virtual
information at the propositional level. In the sequel we shall see how the structural
DBBL rule that governs the introduction of virtual information may be used to
mark the transition to the next degree of depth both at the propositional and the
quantificational level, so as to provide a unified approach to the notion of synthetic
proof for full first-order logic.
Our next problem is then: can we define a set of intelim rules for quantifiers
that comply with the surface informational meaning of the quantifiers outlined in
Section 5 and deliver only analytic inferences in the sense of (PQA∗)? Can we
construe the transition from analytic to synthetic inferences and from one degree of
depth to the next only in terms of the nested use of virtual information?
As far as no virtual information is used, we shall display our proofs in the format
of sequences of signed formulae, of the form TA or FA. In accordance with the
informational approach to classical logic our interpretation of signed formulae will
be non-standard. We take “TA” to mean “we actually possess the information that
A is true” and “FA” to mean “we actually possess the information that A is false”.
So the signs T and F do not refer to classical truth and falsity (as in Smullyan’s
semantic tableaux [28]), but to “informational truth” and “informational falsity”. As
mentioned above, a natural way of thinking of these notions is in terms of an agent’s
disposition to assent to a sentence or dissent from it depending on the available
information. A straightforward consequence of this epistemic interpretation of the
signs is that one cannot assume, in general, that for every sentence A an agent is
either in the disposition of assenting to A or in the disposition of dissenting from A.
When neither is the case, the agent may abstain for lack of sufficient information.
Although the use of signed formulae is appropriate for conceptual clarity, it is
by no means essential in our approach. For all practical purposes one can always
revert to standard formulae simply by removing all the T signs and replacing all the
F signs with the negation operator.
In the DBBL approach, for each logical operator, there are intelim rules for a
signed formula containing it as main operator as well as for its conjugate (the conju-
gate of “TA” is “FA” and viceversa). This feature is shared by the tableau method
(which, however, is restricted to refutations of sets of formulae via elimination rules
only) and other bilateral systems of deduction, such as Bendall’s [3] or Rumfit’s [26].
The first-order version of the propositional DBBL rules, that allows for the presence
of parameters in formulae, is given in Figures 2 and 3. In the sequel we shall make
use of the following notation:
• F xa denotes the result of replacing every occurrence of the variable x in F with
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Figure 2: Elimination rules for the propositional operators.
the parameter a;
• F ax denotes the result of replacing every occurrence of the parameter a with
the variable x;
• F [a/x] denotes the result of replacing some or all occurrences of a with x.







where a is any parameter that already occurs above in the proof; or else a is a new
parameter, provided that no other parameter has been already introduced above by
an application of the same rule to a formula of the form T ∀xG, respectively F ∃xG.
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Figure 3: Introduction rules for the propositional operators.
In essence, each bounded variable x in the premise of these rules can be instan-
tiated at most once by a new parameter, denoting an unknown individual drawn
from the W urn, although it can be instantiated by all the old parameters denoting
known individuals in the box D.
Example 3. Example of a wrong application of the T∀E rule (the quantifier ∀y has
been used at step 3 to introduce the new parameter b and again at step 5 to introduce
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the new parameter c).
1 T ∀x∀yRxy Premise
2 T ∀yRay T ∀E, 1
3 TRab T ∀E, 2
4 T ∀yRby T ∀E, 1
5 T Rbc T ∀E, 4
6 TRab ∧Rbc T ∧I, 3, 5
7 T ∀z(Rab ∧Rbz) T ∀I, 6
8 T ∀y∀z(Ray ∧Ryz) T ∀I, 7
9 T ∃x∀y∀z(Rxy ∧Ryz) T ∃I, 8







provided that a is a new parameter and no other parameter has been already in-
troduced above by an application of the same rule to a formula of the form T ∃xG,
respectively F ∀xG.
In essence, each bounded variable x in the premise of these rules can be in-
stantiated at most once by a new parameter, denoting the result of a search for an
individual that fits the description in F .
When these rules are applied, we say that the new parameter a in the conclusion
of the rule is critical and depends on all the other parameters occurring in F .
Example 4. Example of a wrong application of the T∃E rule (the quantifier ∃y has
been used at step 3 to introduce the new parameter b and again at step 5 to introduce
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the new parameter c).
1 T ∀x∃yRxy Premise
2 T ∃yRay T ∀E, 1
3 TRab T ∃E, 2
4 T ∃yRby T ∀E, 1
5 T Rbc T ∃E, 4
6 TRab ∧Rbc T ∧I, 3, 5
7 T ∃z(Rab ∧Rbz) T ∃I, 6
8 T ∃y∃z(Ray ∧Ryz) T ∃I, 7
9 T ∀x∃y∃z(Rxy ∧Ryz) T ∀I, 8







Provided that a is not critical and F does not contain critical parameters depending
on a. Moreover, x is not bound in F .
Example 5. Example of a wrong application of the T∀I rule (b is a critical param-
eter depending on a).
1 T ∀x∃yRxy Premise
2 T ∃yRay T ∀E, 1
3 TRab T ∃E, 2
4 T ∀xRxb T ∀I, 3
5 T ∃y∀xRxy T ∃I, 4







provided x is not bound in F .
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General restriction on quantifier eliminations. In order to guarantee that
the Principle of Quantificational Analyticity (PQA∗) is always satisfied, we also
need the following general restriction on the application of the quantifier elimination
rules: their application is allowed only if their premise is not the conclusion of an
introduction. It is easy to see how the violation of this general restriction may lead
to violations of (PQA∗). Consider, for example, the following proof:
1 T ∀x∃yRxy premise
2 T ∃yRay from 1
3 TRab from 2
4 T ∃zRaz from 3
5 T ∀x∃zRxz from 4
6 T ∃zRbz from 5
7 TRbc from 6
8 TRab ∧Rbc from 3 and 7
9 T ∃z(Rab ∧Rbz) from 8
10 T ∃y∃z(Ray ∧Ryz) from 9
11 T ∀x∃y∃z(Rxy ∧Ryz) from 10
Here, the number of parameters occurring in the proof exceeds the Q-complexity of
the premise. The proof is not analytic.
0-depth inferences (analytic sequences). An analytic sequence based on Γ,
where Γ is in PPNF, is any sequence of signed formulae starting from the formulae
in T Γ = {TB | B ∈ Γ} and such that each subsequent signed formula results from
signed formulae previously occurring in the sequence by means of an application of
the intelim rules. An analytic proof of A from Γ is an analytic sequence based on
T Γ that ends with TA. We say that A is deducible from Γ at depth 0 when there is
an analytic proof of A from Γ.
Note that A,¬A `0 B for any B, as shown by the following analytic sequence:
1 TA premise
2 T¬A premise
3 FA from 2 by T¬E
4 TA ∨B from 1 by T∨I
5 TB from 4 and 3 by T∨E
However, this sequence is not “analytic” in one of the widespread senses of this word,
in that it does not enjoy the subformula property (and indeed there is no 0-depth
proof of B from {A,¬A} with the subformula property). If we want the subformula
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property to hold in general, we need to modify our definition of 0-depth deducibility
as follows. An analytic sequence based on Γ is closed if it contains both TB and
FB for some formula B. Otherwise we say that it is open. A 0-depth refutation of
Γ is a closed analytic sequence based on Γ. Then we say that A is deducible from Γ
at depth 0 when either there is 0-depth proof of A from Γ or a 0-depth refutation
of Γ. On the other hand, if our notion of analytic proof is restricted to sequences
with the subformula property, then the previous notion of analytic proof delivers
a paraconsistent notion of 0-depth deducibility. Since our aim in this paper is to
outline a depth-bounded approach to classical first-order logic, we shall adopt the
amended definition of 0-depth deducibility. Note, however, that according to this
definition, not all classically inconsistent set of formulae are explosive, but only
those whose inconsistency can be detected at depth 0, i.e., by virtue of the surface
informational meaning of the logical operators.8
The notion of 0-depth inference intends to capture the idea of an inference that
is performed by virtue of the surface informational meaning of the quantifiers and
makes no use of virtual information (no discharge of temporary hypothetical assump-
tions). The following example illustrates the restriction on the Boolean introduction
rules that are needed to preserve the quantificational analyticity of proofs.
Example 6. Example of a wrong application of the T ∨ I rule (at step 4, a new
parameter, namely c, occurs in the second disjunct of TRab ∨Rbc).
1 T ∀x∃yRxy Premise
2 T ∃yRay T ∀E, 1
3 TRab T ∃E, 2
4 T Rab ∨ Rbc T ∨I, 3
5 T ∀z(Rab ∨Rbz) T ∀I, 4
6 T ∃y∀z(Ray ∨Ryz) T ∃I, 5
7 T ∃x∃y∀z(Rxy ∨Ryz) T ∃I, 6
8For a further discussion of this point see [6, Section 8].
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Example 7. T∀x∃yRxy, T∀x∀w(Rxw → Rwx) `0 T∀x∃y(Rxy ∧Ryx)
1 T ∀x∃yRxy Premise
2 T ∀x∀w(Rxw → Rwx) Premise
3 T ∃yRay T ∀E, 1
4 TRab T ∃E, 3
5 T ∀w(Raw → Rwa) T ∀E, 2
6 TRab→ Rba T ∀E, 5
7 TRba T→E, 4, 6
8 TRab ∧Rba T ∧I, 4, 7
9 T ∃y(Ray ∧Rya) T ∃I, 8
10 T ∀x∃y(Rxy ∧Ryx) T ∀I, 9
Let us write Γ `0 A whenever A is 0-depth deducible from Γ, and let `C denote
the relation of deducibility in classical first-order logic. The soundness of `0 with
respect to `C is trivial.
Proposition 2. Γ `0 A =⇒ Γ `C A.
It can also be shown that:
Proposition 3. If Γ `0 A, then there exists an analytic proof of A from Γ with the
subformula property.
For the propositional part, the proof can be found in [6]. Its extension to the
first-order case is immediate given the general restriction on quantifier eliminations,
according to which the premise of a quantifier elimination cannot be the conclusion
of an introduction. In principle one could impose a similar restriction on the propo-
sitional elimination rules, so as to obtain only proofs with the subformula property.
Note that, as for its propositional counterpart, `0 is a Tarskian logic, i.e. it
satisfies reflexivity, monotonicity, transitivity and substitution invariance. Moreover,
it is not difficult to show that 0-depth inferences satisfy (PQA∗), and that this fact
implies the following:
Proposition 4. The logic `0 is decidable.
Given that `0 is tractable for its propositional fragment, we conjecture that it is
tractable also in the first-order case, but a proof of this conjecture will be the topic
of future research.
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To summarize, the 0-depth first-order logic captures a notion of analytic infer-
ence that makes no use of virtual information and satisfies the (PQA∗) principle of
quantificational analyticity.
7 Depth-bounded natural deduction for full first-order
logic
Virtual information. The role of virtual information in the DBBL approach has
been briefly illustrated in Section 4 and is discussed at length in [11, 10, 8, 7, 6].
In the context of this section it will be convenient to work with the relation of k-
depth derivability between finite sets of signed formulae and signed formulae defined
in the obvious way. Accordingly we can say that A is k-depth deducibile from Γ
whenever TA is k-depth derivable from the set of signed formulae in T Γ. However,
the notion of k-depth derivability is defined for arbitrary finite sets of signed formulae
(not necessarily in PPNF) and arbitrary formulae. We shall use X, Y , Z, etc. as
variables ranging over finite sets of signed formulae and ϕ, ψ, χ, etc. as variables
ranging over signed formulae.
Starting from 0-depth derivability, the transition from one degree of depth to the
next is associated with the use of a structural rule that governs the use of virtual
information in a proof. This is the only discharge rule of the system and takes the
following form:
If ϕ is k-depth derivable from X ∪{TA} and from Y ∪{FA}, then
ϕ is k + 1-depth derivable from X ∪ Y .
(RB)
This rule simulates the transition from an information state in which we do not
possess any information about the truth or falsity of A, to a richer one, in which
the formula A is decided, that is, either we actually possess the information that it
is true or we actually possess the information that it is false. It can be seen as a
principle of potential omniscience and it is the informational version of the classical
principle of bivalence. Accordingly we call this rule “Rule of Bivalence” (RB).
Given that the virtual assumptions TA and FA introduced by an application
of this rule may contain parameters, its use suggests the need for a further restric-
tion on the T ∀I and F ∃I rules, namely that the parameter a does not occur in
any undischarged virtual assumption on which the premise of the rule application
depends.
In the following examples we shall use boxes to represent the subproofs to which
the RB rule is applied. The depth of a derivation is nothing but the maximum
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number of nested boxes occurring in it. We write Γ `k A to mean that A is k-depth
deducible from Γ (TA is k-depth derivable from T Γ).
Example 8. T∀x(Qx→ Rx), T∀x(Rx→ Sx) `1 T∀x(Qx→ Sx)
1 T ∀x(Qx→ Rx) Premise
2 T ∀x(Rx→ Sx) Premise
3 TQa→ Ra T ∀E, 1
4 TRa→ Sa T ∀E, 2
5 TQa
6 TRa T→E, 3, 5
7 TSa T→E, 4, 6
8 TQa→ Sa T→I, 7
FQa
TQa→ Sa T→I, 5
9 TQa→ Sa
10 T ∀x(Qx→ Sx) T ∀I, 9
Note that in the above proof the application of the rule T ∀I at step 10 is allowed
because the virtual assumptions containing the parameter a have already been dis-
charged.
Example 9. Consider again the example discussed in Section 3. We transform the
premises of the argument in PPNF and obtain the following set Γ = {∀x∀y∃z(Rxy →
(Gxz ∧ Gzy)),∀x∀y∃w(Gxy → (Bxw ∧ Bwy)), ∀x∀y((Bxy ∧ Cx) → Cy)}. Figure
4 illustrates the configuration of the premises in Γ. The derivation of the conclu-
sion T ∀x∀y((Rxy ∧ Cx) → Cy) from the premises T Γ, which is shown in Figure
5, has depth 2. Notice that, unlike the former, the latter application of the RB in-
troduces a new quantifier ∃v, the elimination of which permits the introduction into
the argument of a new individual e. As a result, this derivation violates (PQA) and
vindicates Hintikka’s insights.
Liberalized introduction rules. In [6], D’Agostino, Gabbay and Modgil have
shown that, towards the normalization result, it is convenient to prove that every
derivation can be transformed into its RB-canonical form, i.e. into a derivation in
which there is no application of a rule below the conclusion of an application of
RB. In that paper, the authors have shown that this outcome can be achieved by
applying the transformation depicted in Figure 6, where χ is the conclusion of a rule
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Figure 4: This figure illustrates the configuration of the premises in PPNF of the
example shown in Section 3.
having as its premise(s) ψ (and ϕ). The iterated application of this transformation
results in pushing downwards all the applications of RB so that, eventually, the
conclusion of an application of RB is never used as a premise of a rule and must be
identical to the conclusion of the whole derivation.
This theorem concerning RB-canonical derivations, that D’Agostino, Gabbay
and Modgil proved for propositional logic, might be useful also in DBFOLs. However,
the result of the transformation shown in Figure 7 is not sound, because, as we have
seen above, the T ∀I rule might be applied to a formula such as TB(c) whenever
c does not occur in any undischarged assumption on which the premise of the rule
application depends. Therefore, if we want to prove that every derivation of DBFOLs
can be transformed into an equivalent one in RB-canonical form, we are required
to liberalize the use of the rule T ∀I (and of the rule F ∃I), in such a way that the
transformation shown in Figure 7 turns out to be sound.
We say that an individual denoted by a is arbitrary for a certain property F (x)
expressed by an open formula with a free variable x, if either F xa is false, or F xa
is true for every individual a in the domain. Note that we can always assume,
with no loss of generality, that a new parameter introduced in a virtual assumption
via an application of the RB denotes an individual that is arbitrary for a certain
property F (x). The crucial point is that if a is arbitrary for F (x), then it might
not be arbitrary for a syntactically distinct property G(x). The idea behind the
liberalized versions of T ∀I and F ∃I is that if an individual denoted by the parameter
a is arbitrary for a certain property, the same individual cannot be arbitrary for a
different property:
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T∀x∀y∃z(Rxy → (Gxz ∧Gzy)) Premise
T∀x∀y∃w(Gxy → (Bxw ∧Bwy)) Premise
T∀x∀y((Bxy ∧ Cx)→ Cy) Premise
T∀y∃z(Ray → (Gaz ∧Gzy))
T∃z(Rab→ (Gaz ∧Gzb))
TRab→ (Gac ∧Gcb)
T∀y∃w(Gay → (Baw ∧Bwy))
T∃w(Gac→ (Baw ∧Bwc))
TGac→ (Bad ∧Bdc)
T∀y∃w(Gcy → (Bcw ∧Bwy))
T∃w(Gcb→ (Bcw ∧Bwb))
T∀y((Bay ∧ Ca)→ Cy)
T (Bad ∧ Ca)→ Cd
T∀y((Bdy ∧ Cd)→ Cy)



















T∀y((Bcy ∧ Cc)→ Cy)
T (Bce ∧ Cc)→ Ce
TBce ∧ Cc
TCe
T∀y((Bey ∧ Ce)→ Cy)
T (Beb ∧ Ce)→ Cb
TBeb ∧ Ce
TCb
T (Rab ∧ Ca)→ Cb
F ∃v(Gcb→ (Bcv ∧Bvb))
F (Gcb→ (Bce ∧Beb))
F ∃w(Gcb→ (Bcw∧Bwb))
×
T (Rab ∧ Ca)→ Cb
FRab ∧ Ca
T (Rab ∧ Ca)→ Cb
T (Rab ∧ Ca)→ Cb
T∀y((Ray ∧ Ca)→ Cy)
T∀x∀y((Rxy ∧ Cx)→ Cy)
Figure 5: Example of a derivation of depth 2. Due to space restrictions the justifi-
cations of the steps are omitted. 447

























Figure 6: Iterated applications of this transformation turn any derivation into an
































Provided that a is not critical, F does not contain critical parameters depending
on a and x is not bound in F . Moreover, the rule T ∀I (respectively F ∃I) is not
applied to TG(a) (respectively, FG(a)) obtaining T ∀xGax (respectively, F ∃xGax) for
any formula G syntactically distinct from F .
Example 10. Example of a wrong application of the liberalized I-rule. The T ∀I
rule cannot be applied both at step 2 left and at step 3 right, because the individual
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denoted by c cannot be arbitrary for both TAc and T¬Ac.
1 TAc
2 T ∀xAx T ∀I, 1




T ∀x¬Ax T ∀I, 2
T ∀xAx ∨ ∀x¬Ax T ∨I, 3
5 T ∀xAx ∨ ∀x¬Ax
Example 11. Example of a correct application of the liberalized I-rule:
`1 T ∀xAx ∨ ∃x¬Ax
1 TAc
2 T ∀xAx T ∀I, 1




T ∃x¬Ax T ∃I, 2
T ∀xAx ∨ ∃x¬Ax T ∨I, 3
5 T ∀xAx ∨ ∃x¬Ax
Example 12. Example of a correct application of the liberalized I-rule:
T ∀x∃y(¬Ay ∨Ax) `1 T ∃y¬Ay ∨ ∀xAx
1 T ∀x∃y(¬Ay ∨Ax) Premise
2 T ∃y(¬Ay ∨Aa) T ∀E, 1
3 T¬Ab ∨Aa T ∃E, 2
4 TAa
5 T ∀xAx T ∀I, 4
6 T ∃y¬Ay ∨ ∀xAx T ∨ I, 5
7
FAa
T¬Ab T ∨ E, 3, 4
T ∃y¬Ay T ∃I, 5
T ∃y¬Ay ∨ ∀xAx T ∨ I, 6
8 T ∃y¬Ay ∨ ∀xAx
The propositions stated above, at the end of Section 6 for the notion of 0-depth
deducibility, can be extended to the general case. Here we state them without proof.
Proposition 5. A formula A is a classical consequence of Γ if and only if there is
a k-depth proof of A from Γ for some k ∈ N.
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We just observe that completeness can be proven via simulation of a classical
natural deduction system (with or without the liberalized introduction rules). Appli-
cations of the standard quantifier eliminations that increase the number of distinct
parameters beyond the Q-complexity of the premises can be simulated via suitable
applications of the RB rule introducing virtual information and so increasing the
depth of the proof.
Proposition 6. If A is a classical consequence of Γ, there is a k-depth proof of A
from Γ with the subformula property for some k ∈ N.
A detailed proof-theoretical investigation of the normalization problem will be
the topic of a future paper.
Proposition 7. The notion of k-depth inference is decidable for every fixed k.
Decidability follows from depth-boundedness: only a finite number of new pa-
rameters can be introduced by increasing the depth of the proof. It is open whether
k-depth inference (for normal proofs with the subformula property) is tractable, i.e.,
if there exists a polynomial time decision procedure. This problem will also be a
crucial topic of further research.
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to develop and extend a framework of pragmatic
logic for assertions. The base system has been developed by Dalla Pozza and
Garola [7]; here, we want to improve the analysis of the justification conditions
of the act of assertion. Furthermore, we explore the possibility of a pragmatic
logic of denial. We analyse the relationships between denial, negation, and
assertion.
1 A Logic for Illocutionary Acts
Consider the following short story:
Emma asserts that she left her car in the garage; Tom, however, dis-
agrees: Emma didn’t leave her car in the garage. Maybe, Tom hypothe-
sizes, the car is still at Francis’ house.
Emma and Tom assert, deny, and conjecture in their short interaction. Classi-
cally, these acts are considered illocutionary acts: asserting, denying, hypothesising,
conjecturing or doubting that p are acts that can (though need not) be performed
by saying that one is doing so.1
In general, the logical characterization of these acts has to take into account
at least two phases: the characterization of the logical structure of illocutionary
acts and the analysis of the admissibility (or eligibility) of those acts. Analysis
of admissibility is the investigation of the conditions on the basis of which one can
∗I would like to thank Massimiliano Carrara and Daniele Chiffi for their friendship and our many
discussions on pragmatics.
1See, for instance, Searle and Vanderveken [12].
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consider an illocutionary act as justified or unjustified. Thus, we can define a relation
of consequence among pragmatic sentences which describe illocutionary acts.
Consider the following structure of an illocutionary act:
Act(Content) (1)
‘Act’ indicates a speech act intended to be complete at a certain level of idealiza-
tion; in fact, it can be noticed that in (1) there is no reference to the subject (Emma
or Tom, in the example) who actually performs the illocutionary act. As we will
see in the following, treatment of the justification conditions of the acts of assertion
and denial actually refers to the epistemic subject which, accordingly, asserts and
denies. However, the level of idealization at which the investigation is conducted is
deliberately left vague.
The first phase, then, consists of introducing a specific language in order to de-
scribe the illocutionary acts; analogously, another language describes the content of
those acts. Dalla Pozza and Garola [7] has seminal findings regarding such train of
thought; the authors emphasize that a logic for pragmatics must keep distinct the
two dimensions (viz. act and content) that constitute the structure of an illocution-
ary act (hereafter, we indicate Dalla Pozza and Garola’s system by LP). The content
of an illocutionary act is thus a proposition (which has a determinate truth-value
according to the Tarskian semantics); the illocutionary acts, on the other hand, are
described by a series of pragmatic operators. So, this general framework could in-
clude operators for the act of asserting, conjecturing, doubting and so on. Obviously,
there are many options about the logic through which we describe the contents of
acts; Dalla Pozza and Garola chose propositional logic but it is also possible to make
more complex the language of contents by exploiting, for instance, the expressive
resources of FOL (First-Order Logic) or HOL (Higher-Order Logics) or their modal
extensions.
The second phase of the logical characterisation of illocutionary acts concerns
the setting of the eligibility conditions of such acts. The following returns to the
story of Emma and Tom:
Emma: – Vaccines cause tremendous pathologies; among them, there is
autism!
Tom: – That’s ridiculous! How could you say such a silly thing?
Emma: – What? How dare you deny it!?
In this rather heated discussion, Emma and Tom are not merely performing
some illocutionary acts, but they are wondering about the permissibility of these
acts. The other grounding intuition of Logic for Pragmatics is the following: the
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eligibility condition of an illocutionary act lies in its justification. Emma is allowed
to assert something when her assertion is justified; in the same vein, Tom is allowed
to deny p if and only if his act is somehow justified.
But what is the justification of an illocutionary act? How do you formally char-
acterize it? Moreover, it seems that different illocutionary acts require different jus-
tification conditions. In that case, one may wonder if there are connections between
those acts and if these alleged relationships can be analyzed through a specification
of their justification conditions.
This paper adopts this train of thought. It develops Dalla Pozza’s and Garola’s
framework providing a Pragmatic Meta-Language: this allows characterization of
intuitive notion of proof which is at the basis of the justification conditions of asser-
tions. Moreover, we extend our framework to the pragmatic act of denial, focusing
on the relations between denial and negation. In the end, we cast some light on the
interaction between the logic of assertion and the logic of denial, emphasizing the
structural asymmetry between the justification conditions of those two acts.
2 Pragmatic Logic for Assertions
Dalla Pozza and Garola settled a logical framework in order to characterize the logic
of assertions. Their aim was to provide a pragmatic interpretation to intuitionistic
logic:
We propose a pragmatic interpretation of intuitionistic logic that is
based on a translation of an intuitionistic propositional calculus [...] and
of a classical propositional calculus [...] into a formalized pragmatic
language. [...] The purpose of our interpretation is mainly philosophical.
Indeed we aim to settle the conflicts between classical and intuitionistic
logic. [7, p. 81]
The key ideas of their work are the following: there are two kinds of signs,
descriptive signs and pragmatic signs. The former constitutes the language which
describes the content of the assertions; it is a stock of propositional letters (p, q, r, ...)
with the usual logical connectives (¬,∧,∨,→). We can define, then, the radical
formulas (RF) as follows:
FR1 Every propositional letter is an RF
FR2 If A is an RF, then ¬A is an RF
FR3 If A1 is an RF and A2 is an RF, then A1 ∧A2, A1 ∨A2, A1 → A2 are RFs.
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The pragmatic signs are constituted by the primitive sign of assertion (`) and by
the pragmatic connectives (∼,∩,∪,⊃), which allow construction of complex prag-
matic formulas (here, we follow the original label, AF, viz. Assertion Formulas):
AF1 If A is an RF, then ` A is an AF,
AF2 If ∆ is an AF, then ∼ ∆ is an AF,
AF3 If ∆1 and ∆2 are AF, then ∆1 ∩∆2, ∆1 ∪∆2, ∆1 ⊃ ∆2 are AF.
Therefore, Dalla Pozza and Garola provide both a semantic and a pragmatic in-
terpretation – for the radical and the pragmatic formulas respectively. The semantic
interpretation is the classical Tarskian semantics for the propositional language. On
the other hand, the pragmatic interpretation is defined on an intuitive concept of
proof. In summary, the idea is that the assertion of p is justified if and only if there
exists a proof of p.
The reference to the concept of proof triggers a further question: Are we referring
to logico-mathematical proofs or empirical proofs? Dalla Pozza and Garola are quite
neutral on this point:
[W]e intend to introduce a purely formal pragmatics, in order to
establish general semantic properties of the (metalinguistic) concept of
justification that are independent of the specific empirical and logical
procedures of proof that can be selected, so that our pragmatics can
be considered neutral with respect to the choice between different proce-
dures. In addition we note that our approach is also neutral with respect
to the interpretation of proof as actual or potential [...] so that we con-
sider the expressions "proven" and "provable", "justified" and "justifiable",
"asserted" and "assertable", as equivalent, hence interchangeable in our
framework. [7, p. 87]
What distinguishes the concept of proof is its factivity: the justification of the
assertion of p is grounded in the existence of a proof that p is true. It is, fair enough,
a very strong requirement: a certain fallibilist attitude imposes some cautions in
considering as infallible the empirical proofs. Maybe this status could be conceded to
the mathematical proofs (given the complete epistemic reliability of the axioms; but
150-year debate on the foundations of mathematics again seems to suggest caution).
Dalla Pozza and Garola introduce, then, an evaluation pragmatic function π
which maps pragmatic formulas into justification values: Justified and Unjustified
(J ,U).
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(JR1) π(` A) = J iff there is proof that A is true
(JR2) π(∼ ∆) = J iff there is proof that ∆ is unjustified
(JR3) π(∆1 ∩∆2) = J iff there is proof that ∆1 is justified
and there is a proof that ∆2 is justified
(JR4) π(∆1 ⊃ ∆2) = J iff there is proof that ∆2 is justified
whenever ∆1 is justified
Some remarks. The most interesting clauses are those concerning pragmatic
negation and pragmatic implication. A pragmatic negation of an assertion is very
strong: it is the proof that the assertion is unjustified. So, analogously, the relation
of pragmatic entailment (∆1 ⊃ ∆2) is justified if there is a proof that every proof of
∆2 is also a proof of ∆1.
These features clearly exhibit the intuitionistic flavor of the logic for pragmatic
framework. Notice that within the syntax of the logic for pragmatics the iteration
of pragmatic signs is ‘forbidden’ (that is, a formula as ` (` A) is ill-formed). This
fits well with the intuition according to which pragmatic logic is a logic of acts and
it is not possible to ‘pack’ an act into the content of another act. At the most, the
content of assertion can describe another assertion, but it cannot assert anything.
However, within the justification conditions of the pragmatic interpretation, the
‘proof operator’ is actually iterated. This fact does not seem devoid of consequences.
Although Dalla Pozza and Garola emphasize the neutrality of their notion of proof
concerning the actuality or potentiality of proofs, it is clear that – in the case of
iterations – the question becomes relevant. Consider the case of ∼` A; according
to the standard interpretation, this formula is justified if and only if there exists
a proof that A is not justified. But here, the ambiguity comes up: according to
one construal, the actual conception, ∼` A is justified if there is a proof that it is
not justified. But this leaves open the possibility that, one day, it will be proved.
According to the other approach, the possible conception, ∼` A is justified if there
is a proof that A is not provable; in other words, ∼` A is justified only if a kind of
impossibility proof of A is available.2
The next section characterizes the pragmatic interpretation of the language of
assertions and then extends the framework to the illocutionary act of denial.
3 Meta-Language for Pragmatics
In this section the idea that the justification conditions of an assertion are always




the logical behavior of the pragmatic negation and implication). However, we intro-
duce some new elements which serve both to clarify the original framework and to
prepare the extension of our framework to the illocutionary act of denial.3
The first element is the introduction of a parameter which indicates the epistemic
subject which makes the assertion. Notice that it is crucial to consider the level of
idealization at which we are working. The epistemic subject can be idealized with
reference to the contingent limitations which any empirical individuals experience;
but, moreover, the epistemic subject can (ideally) represent a community of epis-
temic subjects (think about the assertion that human activities are causing global
warming is intended as an assertion of the scientific community – or at least of a
large majority of it).4
Let s be an epistemic subject; F(s) is the subject’s epistemic framework. The
epistemic framework of a subject is constituted by a series of conceptual resources
(which can be considered beliefs and evidences) which can be used to prove the
contents of the assertions.
The relation of proof is characterized by a two-place operator; P(ϕ,ψ) means
that ϕ is a proof of ψ. But what is a proof? Our suggestion is probably much wider
than Dalla Pozza’s and Garola’s. An example can clarify.
At the base level, we have propositions which describe the state of affairs; for
instance, the proposition <Emma is at the movies> can describe an actual, obtain-
ing, state of affairs. The pragmatic level, in that case, has to do with the assertion
that Emma is at the movies, and the justification of this illocutionary act lies in the
existence of a proof of the content of assertion.
But what can a proof of <Emma is at the movies> be? Assuming that Tom is
making the assertion, there are many options:
– Tom, the epistemic subject, saw her.
– Luke said that he saw her.
– Emma is either at the movies or at the restaurant and Emma is not at the
restaurant.
– ...
It is important to notice that the relation of proof is many-many. The conceptual
resource <Tom saw Emma at the movies> is a proof that Emma is at the movies
3Extensions and applications of Dalla Pozza’s and Garola’s work are [4], [5], [6].
4Within the original framework of logic for pragmatics, there is no mention of epistemic subject
(and related notions); however, we think it allows a better characterization of dynamics of assertions
and denials.
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and that the cinema is open. So, analogously, <Emma is at the movies> can be
proved both by the conceptual resource according to which the epistemic subject
saw her and by a witness.5
The pragmatic meta-language (MP) is then constituted as follows:
– A set of well-formed closed formulas of any complexity: A,B,C, ...6
– A set of higher order variables for sets of well-formed closed formulas: X,Y, ...
– Higher order quantifiers: ∀, ∃
– Three logical signs: →,∪,⊥
The formation rules are straightforward:
MP1 If A is a well-formed closed formula of propositional logic, or first-order pred-
icate logic, A ∈MP
MP2 If A ∈MP then ∃/∀XP(X,A) ∈MP
MP3 If A,B ∈MP then A→ B,A ∪B ∈MP
MP4 ⊥ ∈MP
Now, consider the justification conditions; define, then, a pragmatic evaluation
function π with respect to the epistemic subject s:
(4) πs(` A) = J iff ∃X ⊆ F(s),P(X,A)
(5) πs(` A) = U iff ¬∃X ⊆ F(s),P(X,A), that is
∀X ⊆ F(s),P(X,A)→ ⊥
(4) says that the subject s is justified to assert A if and only if within the
epistemic framework of s there is a proof of A; analogously, the subject s is not
justified to assert A if and only if any conceptual resource aiming to be a proof of
A leads to absurdity.
(6) πs(∼ ∆) = J iff ∃X ⊆ F(s),P(X,∀Y (P(Y,∆)→ ⊥))
(7) πs(∆1 ∪∆2) = J iff ∃X,Y ⊆ F(s),P(X,∆1) and P(Y,∆2)
(8) πs(∆1 ⊃ ∆2) = J iff ∃X ⊆ F(s),P(X,∀Y (P(Y,∆1)→ P(Y,∆2)))
5Of course, it could trigger a sort of regress of justification and proofs.
6However, for the sake of simplicity, we consider the case in which the object language is
formalized in propositional logic.
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(6) states that the subject s is justified to negate the assertion of A if (and only
if) the subject has a proof such that all alleged proofs of A lead to contradiction.
Notice that in clauses (6) and (8), the membership to F(s) condition is dropped. It
ensures that the subject needs simply to have a proof about other proofs. In other
words, a subject is authorized, so to speak, to ∼` A if and only if she has at disposal
a proof that every proof of A leads to contradictions.
An important principle in Dalla Pozza’s and Garola’s framework is the exporta-
tion of negation principle. Within LP, it holds that
` ¬A ⊃ ∼` A (2)
but we have that
∼` A 6⊃ ` ¬A (3)
Let us check if our meta-theoretical framework accounts for (6). Assume that
πs(` A) = J . Therefore, ∃X ⊆ F(s),P(X,¬A). If the subject has among her
conceptual resources an X which proves ¬A, then she cannot have a Y which proves
A, that is ∀Y (P(Y,A) → ⊥). But this very argument is part of the conceptual
resources of the subject; therefore ∃X ⊆ F(s),P(X,∀Y (P(Y,A) → ⊥)), that is
∼` A. 
The converse does not hold. Having a conceptual resource X, which proves that
all the (alleged) proofs of A fail, does not mean that there is another conceptual
resource (say, Z) which proves ¬A. The point is that the required proof for the
soundness of (6) is a proof about the very structure of the (possible) proofs of A.
The subject, thus, reflecting on the structure of her epistemic framework, F , gets
this proof . But clearly the converse does not hold; in order to justify the assertion
of ¬A (` ¬A) we need a proof which has as object ¬A and not the (failed) proofs
of A.
4 A Pre-Theoretical Introduction to Denial
As an example, suppose Emma disagrees with Tom as to whether Padua is North
of Venice. Tom asserts that it is, and Emma disagrees. Emma may express her
disagreement with Tom by denying what Tom said: Padua is not North of Venice.
Whatever the exact details of one’s account of disagreement are, a way for a speaker
— Emma in this case — to disagree with another, Tom in this case, is to deny, or
to negate, what the other is asserting.7 In general one can argue that two speakers
7For a general background, see Asenjo [2], Asenjo & Tamburino [1]; Beall [3]; and Priest [10].
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disagree if they have incompatible beliefs or perform speech acts that cannot be
jointly correct. A standard way to express that one has an incompatible belief with
another is to negate the other’s assertion, as in the case of Emma and Tom.
In daily discussions, it is very common to disagree with the other speaker. When
we do that, we are, at least prima facie, performing a specific illocutionary act: the
act of denial. One may wonder whether the denial is only apparently an autonomous
illocutionary act and if it could be reduced to (some forms of) assertion. Accordingly,
we call Frege’s thesis the equivalence between the denial and the assertion of a
negation:
Frege’s Thesis to deny A ≡ to assert ¬A
It is a perfectly plausible view: that rejecting thesis A is merely asserting ¬A.
Looking back to our example, Emma could disagree with Tom by asserting that
Padua is not North of Venice. Moreover, Frege’s thesis has an undoubted econom-
ical advantage: within the project of a logic for pragmatics, the framework for the
assertions is perfectly able to include the denial as a particular case of assertion,
governed, thus, by the same justification rules of acts of assertion.8
Assume, for the sake of discussion, that Frege’s thesis holds and that LP for
assertions is able to catch the logic of denial. What are the permissibility conditions
of Emma’s act? That is, when is Emma justified in denying Tom’s view? Following
what has been previously said, we can claim that Emma is justified if and only if
there is a proof that A is false or, better, within her epistemic framework there are
the conceptual resources for proving ¬A.
Now, the justified assertion of ¬A is a denial of A; actually, it is the strongest
form of denial of A. Not only is A rejected but it is given a proof of ¬A. However,
the act of denial has less demanding justification conditions than the act of assertion;
this is our grounding intuition about denial. There are a large amount of cases in
which an epistemic subject is intuitively justified to deny A, even if she is not able
to provide a proof of ¬A.
Greg Restall underlines the two possible negations of Frege’s thesis:
Friends of truth-value gaps and truth-value gluts both must distin-
guish the assertion of a negation (asserting ¬A) and denial (denying A).
If you take there to be a truth-value glut at A the appropriate claim to
make (when asked) is to assert ¬A without thereby denying A. If you
8As we will see in the following, in LP for assertions, we have at disposal two forms of negation
of an assertion: ` ¬A and ∼` A. The advocates of Frege’s thesis are supposed to choose what form
of assertion corresponds to the denial.
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take there to be a truth-value gap at A the appropriate claim to make
(when asked) is to deny A without thereby asserting ¬A. [11, p. 1]
We assume a position of justification gap: it is possible that the denial of A
is justified, and the assertion of ¬A is not justified. How is this possible? In the
following we take into account two case studies which should help explain the point.
Case 1. Suppose that Emma is a naturalistically minded philosopher. Emma
is not concerned with metaphysics; she is a philosopher of language. Karl is a close
friend of Emma and he is a philosopher of religion. Karl is convinced that immaterial
entities, souls, exist. Emma, rather likely, disagrees that these exist. Her denial is
grounded on her background on metaphysical assumptions. Nevertheless, Emma is
not able to exhibit a proof of the non-existence of the souls.
Case 2. You hear that your friend Pat has been arrested for violence and drug
dealing. You are shocked: Pat is a kind, gentle person, who seemed far from being
involved in the criminal activity. Based on your long friendship, you are authorized
to deny the thesis according to which Pat is guilty. However, this does not constitute
at all a proof of Pat’s innocence in the court.
The two cases are quite different regarding the content of the belief on which
there is disagreement; nevertheless, they share a crucial structural feature. In both
cases, it is emphasized how the act of denial can satisfy the justification conditions
which have nothing to do with the concept of proof. It seems that in many cases we
are justified in denying a certain thesis on the basis of contextual considerations.
This is the grounding intuition of the extension of LPD (logic for pragmatic
denial). The act of denial is, thus, structurally different from the act of assertion
and, consequently, it has different justification conditions.
5 A Pragmatic Logic for Denial
Here we sketch the language for a pragmatic logic for denial. The radical part is
identical to LP; the pragmatic part is, obviously, different.
The pragmatic signs are constituted by the primitive sign of denial (a) and by
the pragmatic connectives (∩,∪,⊃) which allow to construct complex pragmatic
formulas (here, we introduce the label DF, viz. Denial Formulas). As it can be
noticed, it lacks a sign of negation. The reason is straightforward: within a the
idea of negation is already packed and it would be quite complicated to ascribe an
intuitive meaning to something like ∼a A.9
9Alternatively, to keep the pragmatic connectives of LPA in LPD, could establish the following
meta-theoretical equivalence: πs(∼a A) = J iff πs(a A) = U .
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AF1 If A is an RF, then a A is a DF
AF2 If ∆1 and ∆2 are DF, then ∆1 ∩∆2, ∆1 ∪∆2, ∆1 ⊃ ∆2 are DF
Regarding the pragmatic interpretation of LPD, the base concept is no more the
concept of proof but the concept of incompatibility with the epistemic framework.
The concept of incompatibility has a long history (see [8] for an illuminating overview
on that idea). In what follows, we will not provide an in-depth analysis of the concept
of incompatibility. We would like to remark that the notion of incompatibility at
play here is a typically semantic relation which has to do with the content of the
involved propositions. Paradigmatic examples are the well-known cases:
(8) a is a square and a is a circle
(9) a is red and a is green
But there are also more interesting cases:
(10) a is green and a is a bureaucratic procedure
(10) expresses a relation of incompatibility since it seems to be a categorial
mistake. It is not possibile that a is green and a bureaucratic procedure because the
bureaucratic procedures cannot have a color.
Thus, in the same way we did for the meta-theory of LP, we shall introduce a
two-place predicate Inc. The intended meaning of Inc(A,X) is that proposition A
is incompatible with the class (of propositions) X. Let us see now the justification
conditions; as before, we have a pragmatic evaluation function π with respect to the
epistemic subject s:
(DR1) πs(a A) = J iff ∃X ⊆ F(s), Inc(A,X)
(DR2) πs(∆1 ∪∆2) = J iff πs(∆1) = J and πs(∆2) = J
(DR3) πs(∆1 ⊃ ∆2) = J iff πs(∆1) = U or πs(∆2) = J
Principle (DR3) is a simple material conditional: if A is incompatible, then B
is incompatible means that either A is compatible or B is incompatible.
6 Denial and Negation




We established that a logic of the illocutionary acts must provide the struc-
tural conditions for the justification of these acts; thereby, we defined a function of
pragmatic interpretation:
π : {Pragmatic Formulas} → {J, U}
That said, in LP we have three levels of negation:
i. One can deny the content
ii. One can deny the act
iii. One can deny the justification value
(i) does not exhibit particular problems since the language used to describe our
contents has a sign for negation; the negation of the pragmatic act – (ii) – is more
puzzling: as we have previously stated, the intended meaning of ∼` A is not the
negation of the act of assertion but, on the contrary, a sort of meta-assertion about
the impossibility of asserting A. In case of denial, then, the very idea of denying
a denial seems too unusual. At the end – (iii) – the negation can operate – so to
speak – at the metalanguage level, on the value of the justification function. In the
following, we explore the relationships between the act of denial and the negation
of the denied content.
(1) πs(a A) = J 6⇒ πs(a A) = U
(2) πs(a A) = U 6⇒ πs(a A) = J
These two conditions simply state that our logic of denial is consistent. Much
more interesting are the following relations:
(3) πs(a A) = J ⇒ πs(a ¬A) = U
Suppose that A is incompatible with our framework and therefore we are jus-
tified to deny it. From that, does it follow the compatibility of ¬A? In some
cases, this seems to be straightforward. Consider Emma, who denies that
Padua is North of Venice since this is incompatible with a series of geograph-
ical information Emma has about Veneto. Therefore, Emma would consider
totally compatible with her framework that Padua is not North of Venice. In
some other cases, these conclusions are not so easy to make. Let us imagine
that Emma believes in horoscopes and claims that Jane is shy since she is a
Virgo and it is well-known that Virgo people are shy. Ann does not believe
in horoscopes and therefore she denies that Virgo people are shy. And she is
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justified since that proposition is incompatible with her epistemic framework.
But if (3) holds, Ann should, in some way, accept the negation of A. The
problem is that the negation of A could be ambiguous: it could mean that
Virgo people are not shy but, on the contrary, they are very exuberant. But
if this is the intended meaning of ¬A it is clear that Ann would be justified to
deny it as well.
If this is plausible, there could be counter-examples to (3), that is, cases in
which it is justified both the denial and the denial of the negation. Since the
relation of incompatibility is semantic, this happens because the contents at
play presuppose a series of background hypotheses which can be incompatible
with the epistemic framework.
We call this property negative undeniability; thus, B is negatively undeniable
if there is at least a case in which:
(NU) πs(a B) = J and πs(a ¬B) = J
The other interesting principle to discuss is the following:
(4) πs(a A) = U ⇒ πs(a ¬A) = J
The intuitive justification for (4) follows the schema of (3); however, there
could be cases in which the denial is always unjustified. Consider, for instance,
a very abstract proposition about the inner structure of energy and matter,
say A. Then consider its negation, ¬A. It is possible that both A and ¬A are
compatible with the referring framework constituted by the standard model
in fundamental physics and, thus, is not justified neither the denial of A nor
the denial of ¬A. In this case, we have cases of positive undeniability:
(PU) πs(a A) = U and πs(a ¬A) = U
7 Denial and Assertion
In this last section, we will take into account some relationships between the logics
of assertions and denial. The asymmetry between the conditions of justification is
due to the fact that the existence of a proof is a stronger requirement than incom-
patibility. We have the following result:
(5) πs(a A) = J 6⇒ πs(` ¬A) = J
A subject can be justified in denying A without any proof of ¬A. Analogously:
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(6) πs(a A) = U 6⇒ πs(` A) = J
The mere compatibility with subject’s epistemic framework does not guarantee
the existence of a proof. However, it holds that
(7) πs(a A) = J ⇒ πs(` A) = U
The subject cannot prove something which is incompatible with her epistemic
framework; logically
(8) πs(` A) = J ⇒ πs(a A) = U
The existence of a proof is sufficient to assure the compatibility with the epis-
temic framework.
(7) and (8) are clearly consistency conditions; (5) and (6) claim that the con-
ditions according to which it is rational to deny A are not sufficient to prove
¬A and, by consequence, A not being rational to deny does not mean that
there is a proof of A. On the contrary
(5*) πs(` ¬A) = J ⇒ πs(a A) = J
(6*) πs(` A) = J ⇒ πs(a A) = U
hold and they show the asymmetric feature of denial and assertion. Let us see
(5*). πs(` ¬A) = J , that is, ∃X ⊆ F(s),P(X,¬A); now, ¬A is proved and therefore
it belongs to the conceptual framework of s. But clearly, Inc(A,¬A) therefore
∃Y ⊆ F(s), Inc(A, Y ). That is πs(a A) = J . 
The converse does not hold since from ∃Y ⊆ F(s), Inc(A, Y ) does not follow
that the set Y is a proof of ¬A.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we developed a system of logic for pragmatics following Dalla Pozza’s
and Garola’s seminal paper. We provided a pragmatic interpretation for the condi-
tions of justification of the acts of assertion and denial. The key concepts involved
are, respectively, the concept of proof and the concept of incompatibility. We then
emphasized a deep asymmetry between the conditions to assert a proposition and
the conditions to deny it. Further developments can concern the extension of the
framework to other illocutionary acts (conjecturing, doubting, hypothesising and so
on) and a more fine-grained analysis of the pragmatic models.
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Lambda Calculus. The system extends the typed λ-calculus with hyperinten-
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1 Introduction
The literature in philosophical [11] and computational logic [18] has increasingly
been paying attention to the crucial distinction between reasoning about exten-
sional (functional values, like individuals or truth-values); intensional (functions);
and hyperintensional entities (abstract procedures, [6]; linguistic expressions, [18,
19, 10, 13]; proofs, [9, 8, 17, 21, 22]; or computations [3, 2]), including the dynamics
of hyperintensions, [1, 15].
The encapsulation of extensional, intensional and hyperintensional layers of rea-
soning in one logical system has been offered by Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL),
a hyperintensional, partial typed λ-calculus [6]: hyperintensional, because the mean-
ing of TIL λ-terms are procedures producing functions rather than the denoted
functions themselves; partial, because TIL is a logic of partial functions; and typed,
because all the entities of TIL ontology receive a type. TIL is endowed with a pro-
cedural semantics which explicates the meanings of language expressions as abstract
procedures encoded by the expressions. TIL is powerful in accounting for contexts
and their relations, especially for some natural language phenomena like partial de-
notations and modal modification, see e.g. [12]. But although it is technically an
extension of typed λ-calculus, it still misses a well-defined and agreed upon proof
theory. Because of this, it is not possible to reflect its semantics in properties of
derivations. A full system providing a proof-theoretic semantics to reason about
all these types of entities (extensional, intensional, hyperintensional) seems still to
be missing in the literature. In this paper, our goal is to provide an inferential
engine common to extensions, intensions and hyperintensions, able to express their
relations as well. Previous attempts in this direction are: either impure λ-calculi,
because they attempt to capture all of TIL, [16]; or ND-systems for TIL, which do
not offer a rule based semantics, see e.g. [7]. Our approach is limited compared to
the semantics of TIL, because we only aim at expressing what can be formulated in
standard proof-theoretic terms.
The system HTLC presented in this paper is an extension of a typed λ-calculus
with hyperintensions. Expressions in this language are of the form Γ ` t : T where,
as usual in typed λ-calculus: Γ is the context of assumptions; t is a term and T
is its type. Types express the extensional, intensional or hyperintensional nature
of terms. Hence, terms of HTLC denote, as usual in λ-calculus, functions from set
to set and their values, with the added hyperintensional terms denoting procedures
or computations which we call constructions; the output produced by a construc-
tion is called its product. Hyperintensional terms are defined proof-theoretically by
introduction and elimination rules, thereby extending a standard typed λ-calculus,
see Figure 2. The Trivialization rule works as an introduction rule: given an exten-
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sional or intensional term t, Trivialization returns a hyperintensional term t∗, whose
denotation is a construction. The Execution rule works as an elimination: given a
hyperintensional term t∗, Execution returns the term t denoting the product of the
corresponding construction.1 Execution eventually provides a non-hyperintensional
term as an output, in which case we say that the construction denoted by the hyper-
intensional term produces the object denoted by the non-hyperintensional one. We
also obtain higher-order hyperintensional terms by Trivialization on a term denoting
a construction; Execution applied on a term denoting a higher-order construction
results in a term denoting a lower-order construction, until it is applied to a term
denoting a construction, producing an extensional or intensional object.
To offer a very basic example, consider the number 2, which in our system is
a term of type N. Many different functional expressions may denote this number,
for example [+ 1 1] and [− 5 3] are two of those. Each of those terms denoting
the number 2 may have different constructions, or hyperintensions. For example,
hyperintensional terms having [+ 1 1] as their product are: Integer.sum(1, 1) where
the operation at hand is the Java command for addition, or S(S(0) + 0) which is
the recursive equation presenting the number 2 with addition as successor. When
moving from the term [+ 1 1] to the corresponding hyperintensional level, any of
those two terms could be obtained; we will use in our language the expression [+ 1 1]∗
to denote any hyperintensional term producing [+ 1 1]. When moving back to the
functional level, the term [+ 1 1] should always be produced, together with its
denotation the number 2. Hyperintensional terms having [− 5 3] as their products
could be Integer.minus(5, 3) and S(S(S(S(S(0)))))− S(S(S(0))), where we assume
subtraction can be redefined as a predecessor function. Each of those terms produces
[− 5 3] and this in turn denotes 2. We will use in our language the expression [− 5 3]∗
to stand for any linguistic expression (written for instance in some programming
language) denoting the operation [− 5 3]. The former is thus an hyperintension for
the latter. Again, when moving from the hyperintensional level to the functional
level, a unique functional term should be obtained. This functional term denotes only
one entity, its hyperintensional counterpart denotes instead different constructions.
Although partly inspired by TIL, and reflecting some of its terminology, our
approach differs in several aspects. First, we use a bottom-up approach: we start
from well-typed extensional and intensional terms and define hyperintensional ones
from them. Because of this strategy, there is always a term obtained by an instance
of the Execution rule. In other words, our system does not allow the derivation of
improper constructions, i.e. hyperintensions that do not produce any object. TIL
cases of improperness caused by execution of non-constructions are avoided in our
1We borrow the names for these rules from TIL.
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system by requiring that only trivialized canonical terms can be executed.2 Second,
another source of improperness in TIL is composition applied to partial functions,
i.e. when application may fail for some specific argument: we deal only with total
functions, thus function application always returns an output. Third, Composition
in TIL can fail also if the types of arguments do not match with the type required
by the bound variables in the body of the expression: in our system, type checking
will forbid the rule application in such cases. Fourth, in our calculus the product
of a construction is obtained by explicit application of Execution, i.e. it is never
implicitly denoted. Fifth, our semantics does not use quantification over worlds and
times. Finally, to show the logical and analytical (i.e. under term decomposition)
equivalence of terms denoting constructions, our only means is to perform Execution
and check identity by reduction on the terms denoting the corresponding products.
In the following, to aid readability, we will sometimes avoid referring to the terms
of the language as denoting constructions, functions, numbers etc., and we will
conventionally refer to their denotations: hence we might say that in a derivation
both intensions and hyperintensions occur, or that a function of constructions occurs,
while technically we intend that terms denoting such objects occur in the derivation.3
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the
language of HTLC . We define first the polymorphic set of rules which technically
reduces to a typing system à la Curry, i.e. where types are assigned to pure λ-
terms; for HTLC, this means that the same rules set can be instantiated not only
by extensional and intensional terms, but also by hyperintensional ones. We then
formulate those rules for each of the relevant types, offering thereby the extensional,
intensional and hyperintensional fragments. We offer examples of derivations with
terms of different types, and in particular in Section 3 we formulate an example
where the same expression is treated first at the extensional/intensional level, and
then at the hyperintensional level. In Section 4 we provide the meta-theoretical
results, including the definition of term occurrence, normalization across contexts
and completeness with respect to a Henkin’s style of general model. Finally we
provide some conclusions and ideas for possible further extensions of our work.
2The restriction on the canonicity of trivialized terms to be executed is close in spirit to the
constraint imposed by Martin-Löf on the application of β-reduction w.r.t the terms of his theory
of types, according to which a λ-term has to be β-reduced only “from without” and not “from
within”, i.e. guaranteeing that the way in which β-reduction is performed eventually coincides with
the evaluation of closed λ-terms, [14, p.160]. We owe this observation to one of the reviewers.
3For clarity: we use the expression “function of constructions” (or of functions, or of anything
else) to indicate a function that takes constructions (or functions, or anything else) as input and is
allowed to be heterogeneous, thus having something else as codomain.
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2 The System HTLC
The syntax of HTLC is a typed λ-calculus extended with a type for hyperintensional
terms.
Definition 1 (Grammar).
T ::= α | (T T1 . . . Tn) | ∗T
α ::= o | ι | τ | . . .
t ::= xi | [λx1 . . . xn.t] | [t t1 . . . tn] | t∗
The type syntax for T is inductively defined by three kinds of entities:
• Extensional entities of type α;
• Intensional entities of type (T T1 . . . Tn);
• Hyperintensional entities of type ∗T .
The set of atomic types can depend on the application, including o (set of truth
values: T, F ), ι (infinite set of individuals, members of the universe), τ (as a meta-
variable type for numbers: N,R - e.g. sets of natural and real numbers respectively
which might be added and should be defined through appropriate rules), and so
on. Functions will be defined accordingly, as mappings from the Cartesian product
of types (T1 × · · · × Tn) into the type T , for any arbitrary type (hence involving
sets of individuals, of truth values, of numbers and so on). We constraint these
to total functions. We simplify the arrow notation of multi-argument functions
(T1 → · · · → Tn → T ) with the pair notation (((T Tn) . . . )T1 ). As in standard
typed λ-calculi we use association to the left when dealing with function types,
so the curried version can be rewritten as (T Tn . . . T1).4 We can build higher
order functions that take functions as arguments and return a function as value.
Terms typed as hyperintensions denote abstract procedures whose outputs can be of
any type (including hyperintensions as we admit higher-order constructions); these
entities are constructions, computations or different “senses” in which lower order
constructions, extensional or intensional entities can be produced.
4The notation (T T1 . . . Tn) from Definition 1 and the notation (T Tn . . . T1) are equivalent:
the second one can be obtained from the first one by a simple and harmless renumbering of arbitrary
types Tx, and vice versa.
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Terms of the language have the following form: variables xi; abstraction terms
[λx1 . . . xn.t] denoting functions; application terms [t t1 . . . tn], denoting values of
functions on given arguments; and finally hyperintensional terms t∗, recursively
constructed and denoting constructions. We call a formula of our language an ex-
pression t : T , which declares a term t to belong to a given type T ; as usual in the
literature, a closed formula is one whose term does not contain any free variables,
i.e. only λ-bound ones; a list of assumptions of formulae {x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn} is
called a context; a judgement is the assertion of a formula under a given context,
denoted as x1 :T1, . . . , xn :Tn ` t : T .
Rules of the system HTLC are given below in four parts. First, we describe
the polymorphic fragment of our system with rules applicable to arbitrary terms of
any type. Then we focus on the extensional fragment, where types are extensional
values, especially truth values and functions defined on them; then we move up to
the intensional fragment, where objects of interest are functions of basic types, and
functions of higher order; finally, we present the hyperintensional fragment with
constructions and functions of constructions.
2.1 The Polymorphic Fragment
Rules for terms of arbitrary types are inference rules of the standard typed λ-calculus
(see Figure 1) extended with rules to define the meaning of hyperintensional terms
(see Figure 2): the latter are called intra-context rules as they allow to move reason-
ing from the extensional and intensional contexts to the hyperintensional one, and
back. Rules are applied on formulas of the form t : T , but we often say that a rule
is applied on a term t of type T , or that a rule returns such a term.
The Assumption rule allows for the derivation of a typed variable from its own
assumption. The Abstraction rule allows to construct a λ-term for a function type
(T T1 . . . Tn) from the corresponding judgement inferring a term t : T from variables
x1, . . . , xn having types T1, . . . , Tn. The Application rule creates a term of type T
denoting the value of a function, expressed by a term t on the n-tuple of arguments
expressed by terms t1, . . . , tn.
While inferring terms denoting intensional entities is guaranteed by Abstraction,
and their elimination is the result of Application, appropriate rules are given in
Figure 2 to shift to and from terms denoting hyperintensional entities. In line
with proof-theoretic semantics, we provide the meaning of hyperintensional terms
by defining an introduction and an elimination rule. The former establishes the
necessary conditions for the formulation of a construction; the latter provides the
minimal consequences of its use. The rules must be considered in pairs: a detour
Trivialization/Execution is well-behaving (i.e. harmonious) if given a term t of type
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Assumption
xi : T ` xi : T
Γ, x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn ` t : T AbstractionΓ ` [λx1 . . . xn .t] : (T T1 . . . Tn)
Γ ` t : (T T1 . . . Tn) Γ1 ` t1 : T1 . . .Γn ` tn : Tn ApplicationΓ,Γ1, . . .Γn ` [t t1 . . . tn] : T
Figure 1: HTLC: Polymorphic Rules System
Γ ` t : T Trivialization
Γ ` t∗ : ∗T
Γ ` t∗ : ∗T ExecutionΓ ` t : T
Figure 2: HTLC: Intra-context Rules
T inducing a term t∗ of type ∗T by Trivialization, an instance of the Execution rule
applied to the latter will return the former. The rules are formulated for a general
term, and their version for complex terms is explained below.
The Trivialization rule defines the process of going from a given term t to the
hyperintensional term t∗ which denotes a construction of the object denoted by t.
When the trivialised term t is of type α, Trivialization allows to shift from a term
denoting an extensional entity to a hyperintensional one producing it. When the
trivialised term t is of type (T T1 . . . Tn), Trivialization allows to shift from a term
denoting an intensional entity to a hyperintensional one producing it. When the
trivialised term is of type ∗T , Trivialization results in a higher-order hyperintensional
entity denoted by t∗∗ , which produces still a (lower-order) hyperintensional entity.
In this latter case we will iterate on the type: Trivialization on a term t∗ of type
∗T returns a formula t∗∗ : ∗∗T . By convention and to simplify notation, in the
following we do not iterate ∗ on terms that are trivialized and were already of type
∗T , but we agree just to rename the term; the relevant information on the iterated





` Compute : (oι∗τ )
...
` Michal : ι
...
` Plus : (τττ)
...
` 5 : τ
...
` 1 : τ Application` [Plus 5 1] : τ
Trivialization` [Plus 5 1]∗ : ∗τ Application` [ComputeMichal [Plus 5 1]∗] : o
Trivialization` [ComputeMichal [Plus 5 1]∗]∗ : ∗o
Figure 3: HTLC: Trivialization example
Definition 2 (Hyperintensional type of order n). We say that a term t∗ is of a
hyperintensional type of order n, if and only if t∗ results from n instances of the





where T is either an extensional or intensional type.
In all the cases above, the necessary condition in order for a term of type ∗T
to be properly typed is that the term to be trivialized be a properly typed term of
type T . This, in turn, means that Trivialization is always defined in its argument,
and therefore we do not allow improper constructions. As a result, the trivialized
term can always be returned (by Execution, see below). An example of the use of
the Trivialization rule is illustrated in Figure 3. To aid readability, in this example
we keep empty the contexts on the left-hand side of all formulas: the Compute
relation takes by Application an individual as first argument, and the construction
of a function to add numbers 5 and 1 as second argument; the latter is obtained
by Trivialization on the functional term whose denotation is the object “6”; the
Application returns a truth-value; the proposition “Michal computes the sum of 5
and 1” is then Trivialized in the last step of the derivation.
Execution is the opposite process of going from a hyperintensional type (even-
tually of higher order) to an extensional or intensional one (or to a hyperintensional
type of lower order). Given a canonical term t∗ of type ∗α, Execution returns the
term t denoting the product of this construction, that is a term of type α. When
the term t∗ to be executed is of type ∗(T T1...Tn), Execution returns the term t that
denotes an intensional entity of type (T T1 . . . Tn). Given a term t∗ of hyperinten-
sional type of order n + 1, Execution returns a term t∗ of hyperintensional type of
order n.5 The condition on the canonicity of the term which is executed allows a
5It might be noted that our Execution rule has a stronger requirement than what is typical for
476
Hyperintensional Typed Lambda Calculus
general formulation of the rule under a non-empty context, required not to include
variables occurring in that term. On the other hand, this also means that a term
to be executed might require first additional steps according to the computational
rules of the system (see Figure 6) when not in canonical form. Hence, by closure
under Abstraction of trivialized terms, there can be also a term of the form [λx∗.t∗]
and type (∗T ∗T1): in this case, Execution is obtained by the following detour:
` [λx∗1.t∗] : (∗T ∗T1) Execution` [λx1.t] : (T T1)
 
Assum.
x1 : T1 ` x1 : T1 Triv.
x1 : T1 ` x∗1 : ∗T1 ` [λx∗1.t∗] : (∗T ∗T1) App.
x1 : T1 ` [[λx∗1.t∗]x∗1] : ∗T [[λx∗1.t∗]x∗1]→β t∗[x∗1/x∗1] ≡ t∗ : ∗T Sub.Red.
x1 : T1 ` t∗ : ∗T Execution
x1 : T1 ` t : T Abstraction` [λx1.t] : (T T1)
In this tree we start from trivializing an assumed variable to type ∗T1 , to which
we apply our λ-term. We then have a subject reduction step where t∗[x∗1/x∗1] is
syntactically equivalent to t∗, execute this closed term,6 and abstract to obtain our
desired (now executed) λ-term. In the following we always abbreviate this detour
by direct Execution on each trivialized component of a λ-term and assume the
computational step to obtain a closed term is always performed before execution.
By closure under Application of trivialized terms, there can be a term of the
form [[λx∗1.t∗] t∗1] of type ∗T : in this case, Execution returns products for each of the
composing terms, combining the previous reduction with one additional available
premise:
` [λx∗1.t∗] : ∗T ∗T1 ` t∗1 : ∗T1 Application
` [[λx∗1.t∗] t∗1] : ∗T Execution` [[λx1.t] t1] : T
 
proof-theoretic semantics, namely that it applies to canonical terms. Typically, an elimination rule
is applicable to arbitrary terms of the required type and, as a result, a selector s is applied to this
term. Then, if the term obtained is a redex (i.e. the selector is applied on a constructor), we can
apply reduction. Our rule requires the term already in canonical form (namely to be built with
constructor ∗), and we consider the reduction step as already performed and hidden, in order to
avoid executing improper constructions.
6Note that t∗ in this expression does not actually depend on x1 in the context. Despite the fact
that the variable x∗1 appearing in t∗ has been obtained from x1 by the application of a Trivialization
rule, these two variables have to be taken as different, since in the derivation they are associated
with two different types: the variable x1 is associated with the type T1, while the variable x∗1 is




Γ ` Loves∗ : ∗(oιι) Exec.Γ ` Loves : (oιι)
...
Γ1 ` John∗ : ∗ι Exec.Γ1 ` John : ι
...
Γ2 ` Mary∗ : ∗ι Exec.Γ2 ` Mary : ι App.Γ,Γ1,Γ2 ` [Loves John Mary] : o Triv.Γ,Γ1,Γ2 ` [Loves John Mary]∗ : ∗o
Figure 4: HTLC: Execution example
...
Γ, x∗ : ∗ι, y∗ : ∗ι ` Loves∗ : ∗o
Abs.Γ ` [λx∗ y∗.Loves∗] : (∗o ∗ ι ∗ ι)
...
Γ1 ` John : ι Triv.Γ1 ` John∗ : ∗ι
...
Γ2 ` Mary : ι Triv.Γ2 ` Mary∗ : ∗ι App.Γ,Γ1,Γ2 ` [[λx∗ y∗.Loves∗] John∗Mary∗] : ∗o Exec.Γ,Γ1,Γ2 ` [[λx y.Loves] John Mary] : o
Figure 5: HTLC: Second Execution example
` [λx∗1.t∗] : ∗T ∗T1 Execution` [λx1.t] : T T1
` t∗1 : ∗T1 Execution` t1 : T1 Application` [[λx1.t] t1] : T
Note that also in this case we require the application to be done on a closed term.
Again, we always abbreviate this derivation by direct Execution on each trivialized
component of an applied term.
An example of the use of Execution is depicted in Figure 4: we first derive a
construction of the relation “loves” between two individuals (e.g. its linguistic sense
which appears on this very page between the written names of those individuals); the
hyperintensional term denoting the function “loves” as well as its arguments are all
executed for the Application to be well-typed and to obtain the propositional content
“John loves Mary”, whose type is a truth value; finally we can apply Trivialization
back to obtain a construction of such propositional content, of type ∗o. In the second
example from Figure 5, the Execution of a construction is obtained by Application of
trivialised terms, where each component of this application is a construction. In this
case, Execution is required to act on all subterms according to the detour presented
above, bringing each term to its product: the formula [λx∗ y∗.Loves∗] : (∗o ∗ ι ∗ ι) is
executed to obtain the formula [λx y.Loves] : (o ι ι).
As an extension of the lambda calculus, in HTLC β-reduction is present in the
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Γ ` [[λx1 . . . xn .t] t1 . . . tn]→β t[x1/t1 . . . xn/tn] : T
Γ, x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn ` t→β t′ : T
β-Abstr
Γ ` [λx1 . . . xn .t]→β [λx1 . . . xn .t′] : (T T1 . . . Tn)
Γ ` t→β t′ : (T T1 . . . Tn) Γ1 ` t1 : T1 . . .Γn ` tn : Tn
β-App
Γ,Γ1 . . .Γn ` [t t1 . . . tn]→β [t′ t1 . . . tn] : T
Γ ` t : (T T1 . . . Ti . . . Tn) Γ1 ` t1 : T1 . . .Γn ` tn : Tn Γi ` ti →β t′i : Ti β-App
Γ,Γ1 . . .Γn ` [t t1 . . . ti . . . tn]→β [t t1 . . . t′i . . . tn] : T
Figure 6: HTLC: β-rules
Γ ` t : T tβ t′
Γ ` t′ : T
Figure 7: HTLC: Subject reduction
form of a computational step, i.e. it expresses a purely syntactic term transforma-
tion to go from a syntactically more complex to a reduced term. We present such
computation step applied to each of the possible rules, see Figure 6: β-reduction on
a lambda term [[λx1 . . . xn.t] t1 . . . tn] corresponds to the substitution of the terms
t1 . . . tn for variables x1 . . . xn occurring inside the term t; it is closed under the rules
for Abstraction and Application; it is moreover a type-preserving operation when
we take its transitive and reflexive closure β, a fact which can be formulated as a
simple rule known as Subject reduction and illustrated in Figure 7.
The last set of rules for the polymorphic fragment reflects the structural be-
haviour of the system, see Figure 8: Weakening expresses the usual principle that
context extension is a monotonic operation in view of derivable terms; Exchange re-
flects the unstructured nature of contexts; Contraction allows to merge two variables
of the same type occurring in the same context (this latter operation is expressed in
terms of variable substitution inside the derivable term).
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Γ ` t : T WeakeningΓ, x : T1 ` t : T
Γ, x1 : T1, x2 : T2 ` t : T ExchangeΓ, x2 : T2, x1 : T1 ` t : T
Γ, x1 : T1, x2 : T1 ` t : T ContractionΓ, x3 : T1 ` t[x1/x3;x2/x3] : T
Figure 8: HTLC: Structural rules
2.2 The Extensional Fragment
In the extensional implementation of the HTLC rules, we reason with atomic types
and functions defined over them. By creation of a function from atomic types,
we move from a term occurring extensionally to a term occurring intensionally;
and viceversa, by application of a function on an argument, we move from a term
occurring intensionally to a term occurring extensionally.7
A first obvious interpretation for atomic types is by propositional terms with
truth-values o as types, and functions defined on them. Rules of this fragment are
illustrated in Figure 9. The system can be extended with connectives for conjunction
and disjunction by adding pairs of propositions and projection on pairs respectively
for appropriate introduction and elimination rules. A second possible interpretation
of the extensional fragment is given by considering computational terms (programs)
and the type of their outputs.
2.3 The Intensional Fragment
In the intensional fragment, we are able to reason about functions and higher order
functions, see Figure 10. Beginning with functions of atomic types (i.e. functions
(T T1 . . . Tn), where T and the Ti are all atomic types and hence are considered of
order one), we can create functions defined over them (functions of higher order).
Functions of hyperintensions can also be obtained by the Abstraction rule in the hy-
perintensional fragment (see Section 2.4). When reasoning with functions, we work
with terms occurring intensionally; and when applying functions, we generate terms
that occur either extensionally (if one deals with a function of atomic types), or
intensionally themselves (if one deals with a higher-order function), or hyperinten-
7See Section 4.1 for an appropriate definition of term occurrence.
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Assumption
xi : o ` xi : o
Conditional proof (CP)
Γ, xi : o ` t : o
Γ ` λxi . t : (o o)
Modus ponendo ponens (MPP)
Γ ` λxi . t : (o o) Γ1 ` ti : o
Γ,Γ1 ` t : o
Figure 9: HTLC: Extensional fragment - propositional version
sionally (if one deals with a function of constructions). Function evaluation occurs
therefore within the extensional fragment when we are reasoning with functions of
atomic types; it occurs within the intensional fragment when working with higher-
order functions; and it occurs within the hyperintensional fragment when working
with functions of constructions.
An example of a higher order function is Map : ((o T2) (T2 T1) (o T1)), which
takes two arguments of the function type, and it returns an object of a function
type. In functional programming languages Map is used to apply a function to a list
and return another list. In order to replace lists, whose type we do not have explicitly
in our language, we can give up on ordering and define a set of type T by using a
characteristic function of type (o T ). For the Map function, consider a set expressed
by its characteristic function (o T1), and a function (T2 T1) applied to every element
of the input set, to obtain an output set of type (o T2), again as the characteristic
function of a set. For example, consider a term Square of type (N N) denoting the
function that transforms any natural number into its square; and consider the term
Primes of type (o N) denoting the characteristic function that selects the subset of
prime numbers from N. Then we can think of [Map Square Primes] : (oN) as the
application of Square on all members of Primes. The result is a new set containing
the squares of prime numbers. In this particular example, the typing of our map




xi : (T T1 . . . Tn) ` xi : (T T1 . . . Tn)
Γ, x1 : F1, . . . , xn : Fn ` t : F AbstractionΓ ` [λx1 . . . xn . t] : (F F1 . . . Fn)
Γ ` t : (F F1 . . . Fn) Γ1 ` t1 : F1 . . .Γn ` tn : Fn ApplicationΓ,Γ1, . . . ,Γn ` [t t1 . . . tn] : F
where Fi = (Ti Ti1 . . . Tin)
Figure 10: HTLC: Intensional fragment
2.4 The Hyperintensional Fragment
At the highest level, we introduce the hyperintensional fragment, where our ob-
jects of interest are procedures whose products are objects of either an extensional,
or an intensional type, or procedures of lower order. Procedures are obtained by
Trivialization on a term t of a given type T . Here, we assume that the term t is
well-typed. Given a relation from the domain of basic types and function types to
their constructions as co-domain, in our calculus this relation is one-to-many.
Execution works as an elimination rule for the type ∗T ; if the rule is applied to a
higher-order construction, it lowers its degree. Note, however, that by Abstraction
on constructions, we move from a term occurring hyperintensionally to a term oc-
curring intensionally; and viceversa, by Application on constructions, we move from
a term occurring intensionally to a term occurring hyperintensionally.8 Therefore,
rules of the hyperintensional level allow us to reason about constructions, the cre-
ation of functions of constructions and their evaluation; to reason about functions
of constructions, we move down to the intensional fragment. Given a relation from
the set of constructions as domain to the set of their products as co-domain, in our
calculus such relation is many-to-one. The construction rules of this fragment are
shown in Figure 11. Note that by the explicit requirement that the term t∗ in the
syntax is defined recursively, we admit variables x∗i . While for terms appearing on
the right-hand side of the symbol `, the operator ∗ is obtained by Trivialization,
in the case of the Assumption rule for the hyperintenstional fragment, it is possible
instead to let appear the ∗ operator also on terms appearing on the left-hand side of
`, namely when these terms are variables. This is required to avoid improper con-
structions at the level of variables, i.e. obtaining hyperintensional terms on which no
8Again, in Section 4.1 we provide proper definitions of term occurrence.
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Assumption
x∗i : ∗T ` x∗i : ∗T
Γ, x∗1 : ∗T1 , . . . , x∗n : ∗Tn ` t∗ : ∗T Abstraction
Γ ` [λx∗1 . . . x∗n . t∗] : (∗T ∗T1 . . . ∗Tn)
Γ ` t : (∗T ∗T1 . . . ∗Tn) Γ1 ` t∗1 : ∗T1 . . .Γn ` t∗n : ∗Tn Application
Γ,Γ1, . . . ,Γn ` [t t∗1 . . . t∗n] : ∗T
Figure 11: HTLC: Hyperintensional fragment
Execution rule can be applied, and hence for which no product can be associated. To
avoid this, we consider variables for hyperintensional types of the form x∗i , then the
Execution rule can always be applied on them, producing a variable of extensional
or intensional type T .
In order to exemplify a derivation in which both terms of the hyperintensional
and intensional types occur, we show a tree where we move from a construction
t∗ : ∗(T T1) whose product is a function of type (T T1), to a function of type (∗T ∗T1):
for this, we require first that the function at the intensional level be obtained by
Execution and Application, followed by Trivialization and finally Abstraction:
Γ, x∗1 : ∗T1 ` t∗ : ∗(TT1) Execution
Γ, x∗1 : ∗T1 ` t : (TT1)
...
` t1 : T1 Application
Γ, x∗1 : ∗T1 ` [t t1] : T Trivialization
Γ, x∗1 : ∗T1 ` [t t1]∗ : ∗T Abstraction
Γ ` [λx∗1 . [t t1]∗] : (∗T ∗T1)
In the opposite direction, we can easily proceed from a function of type (∗T ∗T1)
whose product is a function of type (T T1) obtained by the detour illustrated in
Section 2.1 for non-canonical terms, to a construction of type ∗(T T1):
Γ ` [λx∗1. t∗] : (∗T ∗T1) ExecutionΓ ` [λx1.t] : (T T1) Trivialization




`=: (oττ) Assumx : τ ` x : τ
...
` 1 : τ Application
x : τ ` [= x 1] : o
Abstraction` [λx.[= x 1]] : (oτ)
...
` [Succ 0]∗ : ∗τ
Execution` [Succ 0] : τ Application` [[λx.[= x 1]] [Succ 0]] : o
Then we can perform β-reduction:
[[λx.[= x 1]] [Succ 0]]→β [= [Succ 0] 1]
Figure 12: HTLC: Functional identity between numbers
3 A Comparative Example
In a language like TIL, it is possible to compute with non-executed constructions and
their products. For example, one could construct the set of constructions producing
number one, and then take one element in such a set, e.g. “Successor of 0”. The
process of checking whether this element belongs to that set eventually results in
checking the equality of the product of this construction with number 1. HTLC
allows similar expressions, although it is more strict in terms of type matching, so
that the type a function requires for its argument must always be properly met:
i.e. either the functional term is of type (T1 ∗T2) and its argument of type ∗T2 (the
output type of this function is not relevant, and it can be ∗T1 as well); or respectively
(T1 T2) and T2.
The formulation of such a function at the intensional level between numbers is
reflected in the tree in Figure 12. In this example, the function = takes two numbers
as arguments (ττ) and it returns a truth-value (o). Given a variable in the type of
numbers, and number 1, by Application and Abstraction we build the λ-term that
takes a number to be substituted for a variable and it compares for equality with
1, in order to return a truth-value. Consider then a construction to produce the
successor function of the number 0, i.e a term of type ∗τ which denotes one of the
possible ways of expressing the successor of 0, for example by stroke notation 0′: by
Execution we obtain the term denoting the actual product of the construction; by
Application we pass the term denoting this number to the function of type (oτ), to
obtain a truth value. In this case the identity is at the extensional level, between
the product of a procedure (of order 1) and a number.
On the other hand, it is possible to express the same content at the hyperin-
tensional level as the equality between procedures, see Figure 13. In this case we
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...
`≈: (o ∗τ ∗τ ) Assumx : ∗τ ` x : ∗τ
...
` 1∗ : ∗τ App.
x∗ : ∗τ ` [≈ x∗ 1∗] : o
Abstraction` [λx∗.[≈ x∗ 1∗]] : (o ∗τ )
...
` (Succ 0) : τ
Trivializ.` [Succ 0]∗ : ∗τ Application` [[λx∗.[≈ x∗ 1∗]] [Succ 0]∗] : o
Then we can perform β-reduction:
[[λx∗.[≈, x∗ 1∗]] [Succ 0]∗]→β [≈ [Succ 0]∗ 1∗]
Figure 13: HTLC: Functional Identity between Procedures
consider equality between a construction for a number and a construction for the
number 1, returning a truth value. In this example, the function ≈ takes two con-
structions as arguments (∗τ∗τ ) and it returns a truth-value (o). Given a variable for
the construction of numbers, and a construction for number 1, by Application and
Abstraction we build the λ-term that takes a construction for the successor of 0 to
be substituted for a variable, and it compares for identity with a construction for 1,
in order to return a truth-value. Note that we derive here the argument by Trivial-
ization. This term β-reduces to the identity between a construction for the successor
of 0 and a construction for 1, with the identity being false or true, depending from
which construction is chosen for number 1, i.e whether the same construction is se-




HTLC allows to identify extensional, intensional and hyperintensional terms by in-
specting the derivation tree under consideration and looking at the rule applied at
the relevant step. In the following, we provide appropriate definitions of the ex-
tensional, intensional or hyperintensional occurrence of a term at a given step of a
derivation.9
9For the same properties TIL relies on the inductive definition of the structure of the relevant
construction. For details, see [5].
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Definition 3 (Extensional Occurrence). A term t occurs extensionally at step n of
a tree if and only if it results from:
1. an Assumption rule, and it is of type α;
2. an Application rule, and it is of type α;
3. an Execution rule on a term of type ∗α.
Consider as an example the following derivation:
Γ ` [λx∗. t∗] : (∗o∗o) ` t∗1 : ∗o ApplicationΓ ` [[λx∗. t∗] t∗1] : ∗o ExecutionΓ ` [[λx. t] t1] : o Weakening by x1Γ, x1 : o ` [[λx. t] t1] : o AbstractionΓ ` [λx1.[[λx. t] t1]] : (o o) Trivialization
Γ ` [λx1.[[λx. t] t1]]∗ : ∗(o o)
The term [[λx.t] t1] of type o resulting by Execution from the hyperintensional
term [[λx∗.t∗] t∗1] of type ∗o occurs extensionally at the third step of the derivation.
Definition 4 (Intensional Occurrence). A term t occurs intensionally at step n of
a tree if and only if it results from:
1. an Assumption rule and it is of type (T T1 . . . Tn);
2. an Abstraction rule;
3. an Application rule, and it is of type (T T1 . . . Tn);
4. an Execution rule on a term of type ∗(T T1...Tn).
Consider as an example the term [λx1.[[λx. t] t1]] of type (o o) in the above
derivation: it results from Abstraction, and it occurs therefore intensionally at the
fifth step of the derivation.
Definition 5 (Hyperintensional Occurrence). A term t occurs hyperintensionally
at step n of a tree if and only if it results from:
1. a Trivialization rule;
2. an Assumption rule, and it is of type ∗T ;
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3. an Application rule, and it is of type ∗T ;
4. an Execution rule on a term of type ∗∗T .
Consider as an example the term [λx1.[[λx. t] t1]]∗ of type ∗(o o) in the above
derivation: it results from Trivialization, and it occurs therefore hyperintensionally
at the last step of the derivation.
Finally, we are also able to define the occurrence of a term within a hyperinten-
sional term by inspecting the result of an Execution rule.
Definition 6. A term t occurs extensionally, respectively intensionally, or hyper-
intensionally in a hyperintensional term t∗ at step n of a tree if and only if at step
n+ 1 the term t occurs:
1. extensionally according to Definition 3, case 3;
2. intensionally according to Definition 4, case 4;
3. hyperintensionally according to Definition 5, case 4.
Consider as an example again the term [λx1.[[λx. t] t1]]∗ of type ∗(o o) obtained
by Trivialization in the above derivation from this section: it is a hyperintensional
term in which a term occurs intensionally, i.e. an application of the Execution rule
in a next step would return an intensional term.
4.2 Normalization
Execution is a converging rule, i.e. it is possible that distinct constructions can
be generated from β-equivalent terms (i.e. terms for which the symmetric closure
of β holds) of a base type or of a function type by Trivialization, and hence
they return the same entity when executed. This is the classical example of failing
identity for hyperintensions, where the expressions “bachelor” and “unmarried man”
might fail to be identified as equal, but would eventually be applied truthfully to
the same individual. Accordingly, an application of Trivialization on distinct but
reducible terms t1, t2 may induce distinct hyperintensional terms t∗1, t∗2, each denoting
a distinct construction of the same product. This relation in its general formulation
is an instance of the so-called Diamond Lemma for terms related by Trivialization:
Lemma 1 (Trivialized Diamond). Let Γ ` t1 : T , Γ ` t2 : T and t1 β t2. Let,
moreover, t∗1 : ∗T be obtained from t1 : T by Trivialization, and t∗2 : ∗T be obtained
from t2 : T by Trivialization. Then t∗1 β t∗2.
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Proof. By induction on t∗1, we only reason on the base atomic case. First reduce t∗1
to t1 by Execution; now obtain t∗2 from t2 by Trivialization. Let us now denote with
Exec the transitive closure of Execution andβ; with→Triv the term transforma-
tion resulting from Trivialization and with→Exec the term transformation resulting
from Execution. Then t∗1 Exec t2 →Triv t∗2. If t∗1 and t∗2 are syntactically identical
terms, the Lemma is trivially satisfied. Else: if it is not the case that t∗1 β t∗2 but
t∗1 →Exec t1 and t∗2 →Exec t2, then because of failure of subject reduction t1 and t2
cannot have the same type, against the assumption that t1 β t2.
Note that subject reduction implies only β-reduction of constructions, which
might not be guaranteed and is a weaker requirement than the notoriously prob-
lematic identity of hyperintensions. We can also show convergence for the transitive
and reflexive closure of β-reduction (for the general case, i.e. also considering hy-
perintensions, not used in the above last step of the Diamond Lemma):
Theorem 1 (Church-Rosser). If Γ ` t : T , tβ t′ and tβ t′′ then there is a term
u such that t′ β u and t′′ β u and Γ ` u : T .
Proof. By induction on t, t′, t′′, and u using subject reduction, and the Diamond
Lemma if the term u is of the form t′∗ (and thus t′′∗).
4.3 Completeness
A recent conjecture presented in [4] states that the non-hyperintensional fragment
of total functions, without modalities (quantifying over possible worlds and times)
of TIL is Henkin complete. HTLC only expresses total functions and proper con-
structions, without modalities quantifying over possible worlds and times. On this
basis, we show the following version of completeness:
Theorem 2. For any consistent set of closed well-formed formulas Λ of the form
t : o from HTLC there is a general model, in which
• the domain of basic and function types is denumerable,
• and the domain for hyperintensional types is non-denumerable but strongly
reducible to a model with a denumerable domain for the lower types,
with respect to which Λ is satisfiable.
Proof. We first consider standard properties of any consistent set of closed formulas
Γ in HTLC.10 We also use normalization by β-equivalence across contexts as a
10Consistency in a typed λ-calculus is notoriously guaranteed by the impossibility of typing a
term λf.[λx.[f [xx]]λx.[f [xx]]]. We assume here therefore that recursion can only be externally
added to the language in order to preserve consistency of any set of formulas Γ.
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congruence relation on terms. We now build the standard model:
M := {Dα, D(T T1...Tn), D(∗T )}
containing a family of domains, one for each type:
• Dα stands for a meta-variable for each of the domains of basic types, i.e.
Do, Dι, . . . truth-values {True, False}, individuals, and any other required
basic type;
• D(T T1...Tn) is the domain of all total functions, with input of types (T1, . . . , Tn)
and values of type T , i.e. terms which after reduction by Application and
possibly Execution are in the domain Dα;
• D(∗T ) is the domain of all proper constructions, i.e. the set of elements of type
∗T generated from elements in the types α or (T T1 . . . Tn).
Note that we define the standard model, and subsequently adding an evaluation
on the equivalence class of formulas for the general model, by considering only the
domain of constructions of order 1. This is required because the full evaluation of
such domain can only be given by obtaining the terminal product of the construction,
i.e. for proper constructions. This also means that when in the presence of higher
order constructions, completeness can be guaranteed only by multiple Execution.
By an assignment φ with respect to the standard model we mean a relation from
the set of variables into the domain of the appropriate type, i.e. the value of φ(x : T )
is an element of DT . We now define a relation Vφ associated with an assignment φ
with respect to the standard model such that it assigns every formula to elements
of a domain:
• for a formula xi : T , the evaluation Vφ(xi : T ) = φ(xi : T ) ;
• for a formula [λx1, . . . , xn.t] : (T T1 . . . Tn), the evaluation Vφ([λx1, . . . , xn.t] :
(T T1 . . . Tn)) assigns an element in the domain D(T T1...Tn), i.e. a function
whose value for arguments di ∈ DTi is Vψ(t : T), where ψ is an assignment
with the same values as φ for all variables in t except for xi, while ψ(xi : Ti)
is di; and, Vφ([λx1.t] : (o o)) has overall value False iff Vφ(x1 : o) = True and
Vφ(t : o) = False, otherwise True;
• for a formula [t t1 . . . t1] : T , the evaluation Vφ([t t1 . . . tn] : T ) assigns the value
of the function Vφ(t : (T T1 . . . Tn)) in the domain DT for the values of the
arguments Vφ(ti : Ti) in the domain DTi ;
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• for a formula t∗ : ∗T , the evaluation Vφ(t∗ : ∗T ) assigns elements in the domain
D∗T that produce elements in the domain DT for each evaluation Vφ(t : T ).
Note that Vφ is one-to-many because Vφ(t∗ : ∗T ) assigns many elements in the
domain D∗T . With Vφ defined, let us define the standard notion of valid formula:
Definition 7 (Validity in the standard sense). A wff t : o is valid in the standard
sense if Vφ(t : o) = True for every assignment φ wrt the standard model.
We now define a frame F by induction on T containing a family of domains, one
for each type as defined above:
F := {Dα, D(o T1...Tn), D(∗T )}
Recall that we use β-equivalence as a congruence relation, thus two terms t and
t′ are equivalent iff t =β t′ (i.e. the symmetric closure ofβ). Given a formula t : T ,
we denote with dt : T e the equivalence class of formulas containing terms congruent
with t. Then we can define the following:
Definition 8 (General Model). A frame F is called a general model if a one-to-
many relation f(dt : T e) of equivalence classes of closed formulas t : T is such that
it assigns elements in the domain DT .
We now build the frame which is a model of a maximal consistent set of closed
formulas Γ, which is clearly a superset of Λ, as follows:
• f(dt : oe) is the value true or false depending on term t being in the set Γ or
not, and hence Do is the set of truth values {True, False};
• f(dt : ιe) is the equivalence class of individuals dt : ιe, hence Dι is the set of
equivalence classes of all terms of the type of individuals;
• and accordingly so for any other type in α;
• Assuming that Do and DTi have been defined, as well as the value of f for
all equivalence classes of terms of types o, and Ti and that every element of
Do, DT1 , . . . , DTn is the value of f for some dt : oe, dt1 : T1e, . . . , dtn : Tne,
respectively; then f(dt : (o T1 . . . Tn)e) is the function whose value in domain
D(o T1,...,T1) is given by the value for the element f(dt1 : T1e) of DT1 , up to
f(dtn : Tne) of DTn and returns the value of f(dt : oe) of Do;11
11Note that here we consider functions which have arguments of every possible type, including
higher-order functions and hyperintensions, but only outputs of type o, i.e. truth-values. This
allows us to define formulas in frames as those for which satisfiability and validity are defined.
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• Assuming that Dα and D(o T1...Tn) have been defined, as well as the value of f
for all equivalence classes of terms of types α and of type (o T1 . . . Tn) and that
every element of Dα is the value of f for some equivalence class dt : oe or dt : ιe
and that every element of D(o T1...Tn) is the value of f for some equivalence
class of corresponding terms; then f(dt∗ : ∗T e) is a construction with value
f(dt∗ : ∗T e) in D∗T for some element f(dt : T e) of DT .
• Assuming thatD∗T has been defined, as well as the value of f for all equivalence
classes of terms of types ∗T and that every element of D∗T is one of the values
of f for some t∗ : ∗T ; then f−1(dt∗ : ∗T e) is the execution of construction
whose unique value for the element f(dt∗ : ∗T e) of D∗T is f(dt : T e) of DT .
Note that f is one-to-many as well because the domain D∗T includes many values
for f(dt∗ : ∗T e), while the function f−1(dt∗ : ∗T e) returns the only input producing
all such outputs. We now define formula validity and satisfiability of a set of formulas
for the general type T = {α, (o T1 . . . Tn), ∗T }:
Definition 9 (Validity in the general sense). A wff t : o is valid in the general sense
if Vφ(t : o) = True for every assignment φ wrt the general model.
Definition 10 (Satisfiable set of formulas). A set of formulas Λ is satisfiable with
respect to the frame {DT } for any type T , if there exists a valuation φ such that
Vφ(t : o) = True for every formula t : o in Λ.
Lemma 2. For every φ and t : T , Vφ(t : T ) = f(dt : T e)
The proof of this intermediary Lemma is by induction on t : T .
• If t : α is of the form xi : α and φ(x : α) is the element f(dt : T e) in the
domain Dα, then φ(x : α) is a consistent formula t : α such that Vφ(x : α) =
φ(x : α) = f(dt : αe) = Vφ(t : α).
• If t : T is of the form [λx1 . . . xn.t] : (o T1 . . . Tn) and Vφ([λx1 . . . xn.t]); then the
element f(dt : oe) is a consistent formula in the domainDo when each φ(xi : Ti)
is a closed formula ti : Ti in the domain DTi , and if Vφ(xi : Ti) = φ(xi : Ti) =
f(dti : Tie) = Vφ(ti : Ti) then Vφ(t : o) = φ(t : o) = f(dt : oe) = Vφ(t : o).
• If t : T is of the form [t t1 . . . tn] : o and Vφ([t t1 . . . tn]) is the element
f(d[t t1 . . . tn] : oe) in the domain Do, then φ([t t1 . . . tn]) is a closed for-
mula such that every ti : Ti is one element in the corresponding domain DTi ,
in which case [t t1 . . . t1] : o is a closed formula interpreted in the domain
D(o T1,...Tn), such that Vφ([t t1 . . . tn]) = φ([t t1 . . . tn] : o) = f(d[t t1 . . . tn]e :
o) = Vφ([t t1 . . . tn]).
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• Let us consider here the novel case t∗ : ∗T . We assume that f(dt : T e) has
already been defined for T = α or T = (o T1 . . . Tn), and Vφ(t : T ) = f(dt : T e)
and Vφ(t : (T T1 . . . Tn)) = f(dt : (T T1 . . . Tn)e) respectively. Now the value of
f(t∗ : ∗T ) is defined as one of the elements in the Domain D∗T as the relation
is one-to-many. Consider any two terms {t∗1, t∗2} such that {t∗1, t∗2} ∈ D∗T ,
then t∗1 →β t∗2 must hold by Lemma 1, assuming it holds that t1 →β t2 for
{t1, t2} ∈ DT . Hence, if Vφ(t1 : T ) = f(t1 : T ) = f(t2 : T ) = Vφ(t2 : T ),
then f(t : T ) = f−1(t∗ : ∗T ), for t any of t1, t2 and t∗ any of t∗1, t∗2. Hence
Vφ(t : T ) = f−1(dt∗ : ∗T e).
The frame F = {Dα, D(o T1...Tn), D(∗T )} is a general model because for every
formula t : T and assignment φ, Vφ(t : T ) is an element of the domain DT for
each element of f(dt : T e). The elements of Dα and D(o T1...Tn) are in one-to-one
correspondence with the normalised set (equivalence class) of formulas, hence the
domains are infinitely enumerable (and possibly finite). For the domain D∗T though,
this is not the case as the relation between the values of f(t : T ) and f(t∗ : ∗T ) is
one-to-many. Any value of Vφ(t∗ : ∗T ) in the domain D∗T normalizes with respect
to the value of Vφ(t : T ) in the domain DT for which f−1(dt∗ : ∗T e) holds. Since for
every formula t : T its denotation in the domain is given by Vφ(t : T ) for φ arbitrary,
and for every t : α and t : (o T1 . . . Tn) of any consistent Γ there is such a term in
the appropriate domain Dα and D(o T1...Tn) respectively; and for every t∗ : ∗T there
is a function which returns an element in Dα or D(o T1...Tn); it follows that for every
Λ ⊆ Γ a valuation Vφ(t : T ) assigns an element in the domain DT , i.e. Λ is satisfiable
with respect to the modelM , andDT is denumerable for T = {α, (o T1 . . . Tn)}, while
elements of D∗T normalize with respect to elements in DT .
Theorem 3. Any closed wff t : T is derivable in HTLC if and only if t : T is valid
in the general sense.
Proof. We prove by induction from the basic case.
← 1. For t : o, the formula is valid by Definition 9 iff Vφ(xi : α) is valid once
every free variable xi occurring in t has been substituted, and there is an
element in the corresponding domain of the general model Do. In such a
case, any formula t′ : o with variable x′ with evaluation Vφ(t′ : o) = False
i.e. such that Vφ(x′i : α) = False cannot be consistent with t : o; in
particular, Vφ([λx′i.t : (o α)]) = True and Vφ([t t′] : o) = True;
2. For t : T of the form [λx1 . . . xn.t] : (o T1 . . . Tn), the argument generalizes
the previous one with several arguments;
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3. For t : T of the form t∗ : ∗T , such a formula is valid iff for every value of
Vφ(t∗ : ∗T ) the picked element from the domain D∗T (satisfying congru-
ence with any other in the same domain) corresponds to Vφ(t : o) = True.
Hence, one reduces first to such a value by an application of Execution
and then the argument runs according to the previous step for either t : α
or [λx1 . . . xn.t] : (o T1 . . . Tn)
→ Starting from our Assumption as axiom, both Abstraction and Application
preserve validity, using Execution where necessary. Note that Trivialization is
not invoked and all intra-context operations are from the domain D∗T to the
domain DT .
To conclude, we reformulate the last step of the completeness proof to show satis-
fiability based on compactness; the only constraint is again that in order to preserve
denumerability of the domain of reference, sets of formulas including hyperintensions
need to be reduce to the corresponding formulas with executed terms:
Theorem 4. A set Γ of closed well-formed formulas is satisfiable with respect to
• some model of denumerable domains Do, Do T1,...,Tn
• and some model of a non-denumerable domain D∗T
if and only if every finite subset Λ of Γ is satisfiable.
Proof. → – If Γ is not satisfiable with respect to some model of a denumerable
domain Do, Do T1,...,Tn then it is inconsistent by Theorem 2, i.e. in par-
ticular Γ ` [λxn.tn] : (on Tn). Then there is a finite Λ ⊂ Γ such that Λ =
{x1 : A1, . . . xn−1 : An−1} and ` [λx1, . . . , xn−1, xn.tn] : (on T1, . . . , Tn);
but then this formula is valid because derivable for Theorem 3 hence there
is also a Vφ(xi : Ti) = False, i = 1 . . . n − 1 for every φ with respect to
any model, hence Λ is not satisfiable. Then, if every Λ ⊂ Γ is satisfiable,
also Γ is satisfiable with respect to a denumerable domain.
– if Γ has formulas of the form t : ∗T , then the domain D∗T is non-
denumerable; apply Execution to reduce to Γ′ with respect to denumer-
able domains Do, Do T1,...,Tn . Proceed as above.




The system HTLC is an extension of typed λ-calculus with hyperintensions. The
system is presented with a polymorphic rules set which can be applied to terms of
arbitrary types: a triplet of rules, namely Assumption, Abstraction and Applica-
tion known from λ-calculus are extended by Trivialization and Execution rules for
terms denoting hyperintensions, and reason with them. We have provided formal
definitions of term occurrence (which corrresponds to a proof inspection for type-
checking) and we formulated appropriate versions of the Diamond Lemma and the
Church-Rosser Theorem valid with respect to the extension to terms denoting hy-
perintensions. Finally, the system is shown to be complete in Henkin’s sense, with
respect to a general model of basic types, functions whose values belong to the set
of truth values, and constructions of these types. The important difference to be
drawn with standard completeness for Henkin’s model concerns the cardinality of
the model for hyperintensions, which cannot be denumerable. Nonetheless, our sys-
tems guarantees strong reducibility to the denumerable model of the trivialised term
for each hyperintensional one.
Further possible investigations of this system concern: a computational inter-
pretation of the extensional fragment, and the appropriate interpretation of both
intensional (by higher order computations) and hyperintensional fragments (e.g. in
terms of monads); a modal extension of the language, to express more precisely con-
texts in which lifting to hyperintensional terms is valid, e.g. on the lines formulated
in [20]; and an implementation for type-checking purposes.
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Abstract
The standard notion of denial in the bilateralism literature is based on ex-
clusion, in some sense, of the denied ϕ.
I present a new variant of bilateralism based on a different, stronger notion of
denial, not being excluding only, but also corrective. A corrective denial, while
also excluding, points to an atomic incompatible alternative to the denied ϕ,
the latter serving as the ground for the denial.
An atomic incompatibility class is a finite set of atomic sentences with at
least two elements, with the following intended interpretation: exactly one of
its members can be asserted, provided all others are denied.
the paper presents a bilateral natural-deduction proof-system for corrective
denial, with connective-independent introduction and elimination rules. Rum-
fitt’s connective-dependent rules are derivable in my system.
1 Introduction
Bilateralism is an approach to meaning taking denial (or rejection) as a primitive
attitude, on par with assertion (or acceptance) (see, for example, [1], which also
contains references to earlier work). It puts forward a claim, that there are good
reasons, pace Frege [2, pp. 384–5], and Geach [3], not to regard the denial of ϕ
to be adequately represented by an assertion of its (sentential) negation ¬ϕ. That
is, bilateralism rejects the thesis called in [4] the denial equivalence thesis. For
arguments to this end, see [5]. Rather, negation is explicated in terms of denial:
explicated by means of — but not reduced to. Negation is still needed as an operator
when some content is embedded in some other contents; denial, as a speech act,
cannot be embedded or iterated. See [4] for a discussion of this issue.
The standard notion of denial in the bilateralism literature is based on exclusion,
in some sense, of the denied ϕ. For example, Price [6] identifies denial as originat-
ing from disagreement (in dialog), where denying ϕ by a participant in the dialog
excludes ϕ from the beliefs, the latter underlying action plans.
Vol. 8 No. 2 2021
Journal of Applied Logics — IfCoLog Journal of Logics and their Applications
Francez
Exactly whatϕ is excluded from does not matter much for my concern in this
paper, so I leave it as not further specified. What does matter is that an explication
of negation in terms of a denial that only excludes (without offering an atomic
incompatible alternative) leads to a (sentential) negation operator that is also viewed
as an operator that only excludes.
Consider, for example, Rumfitt’s bilateral natural deduction rules in [1], defining1
classical negation in terms of assertion and denial. The rules use polarity marked















The negation operator emerging from this definition is an operator merely toggling
between assertion and denial of ϕ.
My aim in this paper is to present a variant of bilateralism based on a different
notion of denial, naturally leading to a different kind of negation, the latter not being
excluding only, but also corrective. Thus, denial needs a more elaborate ground
for denial. For a detailed discussion of the notion of grounds for denial (as well
as grounds for assertion) see [8, Section 4.4]. A family of contra-classical logics
exhibiting a corrective negation is presented in [9].
2 Corrective denial
The exclusion-only denial can be seen as being reflected by the following simply
structured schematic dialog De between two participants ‘A’ and ‘B’. The subscript
‘e’ on D stands for ‘exclusive (only) denial’.
De :: A : ϕB : No! (2.3)
by using No (cf. [1]), participant B expresses his denial of ϕ, excluding it and thereby
disagreeing with A who asserted it.
In order to motivate my intended kind of denial, consider the following schematic
dialog between two participants ‘A’ and ‘B’ of a somewhat more elaborate form. The
subscript ‘c’ on D stands for ‘corrective denial’
Dc :: A : ϕB : No! ψ (2.4)
1Rumfitt’s aim is to provide, by means of those rules, harmonious rules [7] for classical logic.
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The exact form of ψ and the relationship between ϕ and ψ within a corrective denial
dialog will become clear in the sequel. Here, it suffices to consider the following
simple instance of Dc.
Dapple ::
A : This apple is green (all over)
B : No! This apple is yellow (all over) (2.5)
Here participant B does not use No just for excluding this apple is green, but while
excluding it, B also points to the incompatible this apple is yellow as the ground for
the denial of A’s assertion.
The incompatibility of those two interpreted sentences results from their mean-
ings, as determined by an underlying semantics for the interpreted (natural) lan-
guage. I return to incompatibility in the logical, uninterpreted language, abstracting
from an interpretive semantics, below (Section 3.1).
An atomic incompatibility class, IC, is a finite set of atomic sentences with at
least two elements, exactly one member of which is2 true.
To direct the thought, the reader may think of a generic atomic incompatibility
class as a representation of colours, where atomic sentences assign a colour to some
specific coloured object, say o. Clearly, o has exactly one colour (all over). As
another example of an IC, consider atomic sentences assigning to o an evaluative
size, like o is short, o is long, etc. Disregarding issues of vagueness, an object o has
exactly one evaluative size.
Clearly, the set of all atomic sentences is partitioned by the underlying semantics
into ICs.
Let p, q range over atomic sentences3. Let ic map atomic sentences to their
atomic incompatibility classes: for every IC and p ∈ IC, let ic(p) = IC/{p},
the (non-empty) set of all atomic sentences incompatible with p. The mapping ic
satisfies:
•
(nref) p 6∈ic(p) (2.6)
•
(sym) p ∈ ic(q) iff q ∈ ic(p) (2.7)
2At this stage, I am relating to truth simpliciter, as if it is an absolute property of sentences. In
the logic resulting from the corrective negation (in Section 3), I will relate to the more usual notion
of truth in a model.
3By atomic sentences I mean here what is called elsewhere propositional variables. Propositional




(part) If p ∈ ic(q) then ic(p) = (ic(q)/{p})∪{q} (2.8)
A conjunction of atoms α = ∧1≤j≤mqj is ic-proper, denoted by π(α), iff no qj1 and
qj2 (for j1 6= j2) are in the same IC. A conjunction of atoms α which is not proper
is improper. The role of being proper will become clear in the sequel.
Next, the mapping ic is extended to îc, mapping also compound formulas to their
atomic incompatibility sets, again sets of conjunctions of atoms. This extension is the
heart of corrective bilateralism, inducing grounds for denial for arbitrary formulas.
Note the relata of the incompatibility relation: it does not relate compound sentences
to each other.
Compound formulas are assumed here generated by the standard connectives:
‘¬’ (negation), ‘∧’ (conjunction), ‘∨’ (disjunction) and ‘→’ (conditional). I use ϕ, ψ
as meta-variables ranging over formulas, α, β over conjunctions4 of atomic formulas.
The range of îc consists of conjunctions of atomic formulas.
îc(p) = {q∧α| q ∈ ic(p), π(α), p 6∈ α} (2.9)
îc(¬ϕ) = ∩α∈îc(ϕ)îc(α) (2.10)
îc(ϕ∧ψ) = îc(ϕ)∪îc(ψ) (2.11)
îc(ϕ∨ψ) = îc(ϕ)∩îc(ψ) (2.12)
îc(ϕ→ψ) = îc(¬ϕ)∩îc(ψ) (2.13)
Note that for every ϕ, îc(ϕ) contains only ic-proper atomic conjunctions.
There is a certain redundancy in îc, as a result of which îc(ϕ) can, in general,
contain infinitely many conjunctions of atoms. However, since ϕ may have only
finitely many atomic formulas as sub-formulas, only finitely many of the conjunctions
in îc(ϕ) are relevant to its deductive role. So, I restrict îc(ϕ) to its finitely many
relevant conjunctions. For every ϕ, denote by a(ϕ) the set of all atoms occurring in
ϕ, and by α/ a(ϕ) the restriction of α to such atoms.
Let
îcr(ϕ) =df. {α/a(ϕ) | α ∈ îc(ϕ)} (2.14)
Example 2.1. For simplicity, assume there are only three colours, and for better
readability suppose we have mnemonically-named atomic formulas. Consider
IC1 = {red, green, blue}, IC2,= {short, long}
4Where convenient, a conjunction of atomic formulas is also considered as the finite set of those
atoms.
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Thus
ic(red) = {green, blue}, ic(green) = {red, blue}, ic(blue) = {red, green}
ic(short) = {long}, ic(long) = {short}
To avoid notational clutter, the conjunctions generated by (2.9) are displayed modulo
their commutativity.
îc(red) = {blue∧short, green∧short,
blue∧long, green∧long}
îc(green) = {blue∧short, red∧short,
blue∧long, red∧long}
îc(blue) = {red∧short, green∧short,
red∧long, green∧long}
îc(long) = {blue∧short, green∧short, red∧short}
îc(short) = {blue∧long, green∧long, red∧long}




îc(red∨long) = îc(red)∩îc(long) = {blue∧short, green∧short}
îc(¬red) = {red∧short, red∧long}
îc(¬(red∧long)) = {red∧long}







I now can state the relationship between assertion and denial in the modified
conception. I refer to those revised notions as c-assertion and c-denial.
Corrective assertion and denial:
ϕ is c− assertible iff every α ∈ îcr(ϕ) is c− deniable





• ϕ can be correctively denied (and thereby excluded) only if some atomic in-
compatible alternative to ϕ is asserted.
• ϕ can be correctively asserted only if every atomic incompatible alternative to
ϕ is denied.
Note that:
• A proper α, e.g. in Example 2.1, red∧short, is:
– c-assertible just in case {blue, green, long} are all denied.
– c-deniable just in case long and one of blue, green is asserted.
• an improper α, e.g. in Example 2.1, red∧blue, cannot be c-asserted, it can be
c-denied (in case green is c-asserted).
digression: The term ‘incompatible’ has been used extensively in the literature,
alas in different senses. For example, Restall [10] uses it as a relation between states
(points) in an incompatibility frame. Brandom [11] uses incompatibility as relation
between sets of sentences and subsets of the power-set of sentences; and there are
more.
In my use of this term the relata of incompatibility change: these are not asso-
ciated with points, but are formulas and finite sets of simple formulas (conjunctions
of atomic formulas).
(end of digression)
3 A family of corrective bilateral natural deduction sys-
tems
In the sequel, I assume a propositional object language freely-generated by a set
P = {pi | i ≥ 0} of atomic formulas, ranged over by meta-variables p, q and
the standard connectives: ‘¬’ (negation), ‘∧’ (conjunction), ‘∨’ (disjunction and
‘→’ (conditional). I use ϕ, ψ as meta-variables ranging over formulas, α, β over
conjunctions5 of atomic formulas.
5Where convenient, a conjunction of atomic formulas is also considered as the finite set of those
atoms.
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3.1 Atomic incompatibility bases
The first issue to be resolved is how to define incompatibility among atomic formu-
las, which are uninterpreted in the formal object language. Traditionally, atomic
formulas are considered mutually independent. In a model-theory based on valu-
ations (assignments of truth-values to formulas), a valuation assigns a truth-value
to an atomic formula arbitrarily6, independently of the truth-value assigned to any
other atomic sentences.
Here, I deviate from this tradition, and assume an imposed incompatibility rela-
tion among atomic formulas, abstracting from some “hidden” interpretation of them.
Note that I am referring continuously to atomic formulas, not to propositional vari-
ables, as the generators of compound formulas. Indeed, this view does not support
uniform substitutions, that would not preserve the imposed incompatibility relation-
ships among atomic formulas.
The definition below of the atomic incompatibility base i is the formal counterpart
of the mapping ic presented above. I deliberately repeat it, but this time in terms of
an uninterpreted language, to emphasise the importance of this definition and the
notion of imposed incompatibility on uninterpreted atomic sentences.
Definition 3.1 (Atomic incompatibility base). An atomic incompatibility base is a
mapping i : P ⇒ Pf (P )/∅ (i.e., the range of i consists of finite, non-empty subsets




(sym) p ∈ i(q) iff q ∈ i(p) (3.17)
•
(part) If p ∈ i(q) then i(p) = (i(q)/{p})∪{q} (3.18)
Remarks:
1. By definition, for every p ∈ P, i(p) 6= ∅. Each atomic formula has at least one
(other) atomic formula incompatible with it.
2. Incompatibility is irreflexive, symmetric and transitive.
6Indeed, in the model-theory for the contra-classical logics in [9], my approach is embodied as
a restriction on valuations. Truth-values are assigned by valuations in such a way that in every
incompatibility class there is exactly one true member.
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3. The mapping i partitions P into incompatibility classes s.t. for every incom-
patibility class IC: if p, q ∈ IC then p ∈ i(q) (and, hence, q ∈ i(p)). Clearly,
incompatibility classes are not equivalence classes, as incompatibility is not
reflexive.
Next, the mapping i is extended to î, mapping also compound formulas, the
formal counterpart of îc above. The range of î consists of proper conjunctions of
atomic formulas.
Definition 3.2 (Proper conjunctions of atoms). A conjunction of atoms
α = ∧1≤j≤mqj is i-proper, denoted by πi(α), iff no qj1 and qj2 (for j1 6= j2) are
in the same IC of i.
A conjunction of atoms α which is not i-proper is i-improper. Note that proper-
ness is relative to an atomic incompatibility base.
Definition 3.3.
î(p) = {q∧α| q ∈ i(p), πi(α), p 6∈ α} (3.19)
î(¬ϕ) = ∩α∈î(ϕ)î(α) (3.20)
î(ϕ∧ψ) = î(ϕ)∪î(ψ) (3.21)
î(ϕ∨ψ) = î(ϕ)∩î(ψ) (3.22)
î(ϕ→ψ) = î(¬ϕ)∩î(ψ) (3.23)
Note that for every ϕ, î(ϕ) contains only i-proper atomic conjunctions.
From Definition (3.3) we have:
Corollary 1 (non-reflexivity). For every α: α 6∈ î(α).
Proof. Assume, towards a contradiction, that for some α = q1∧ · · · ∧ql, l ≥ 2
α ∈ î(α) =(3.21) ∪1≤i≤l̂i(qi)
W.l.o.g, assume α ∈ î(q1) =(3.19) {p∧β | p ∈ î(q1), q1 6∈ β}.
But this is impossible, as q1, a conjunct in α, cannot be p because q1 6∈ i(q1) and
cannot be in β.
Corollary 2 (Negation). For every ϕ
î(ϕ)∩î(¬ϕ) = ∅ (3.24)
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Proof. Assume, towards a contradiction, that for some α
α ∈ î(ϕ)∩î(¬ϕ)
But î(¬ϕ) =(3.20) ∩β∈î(ϕ)î(β), and α is one of those βs. Hence, α ∈ î(α), contradict-
ing the non-reflexivity Corollary 1.
Proposition 3.1 (Double negation incompatibility).
î(¬¬ϕ) = î(ϕ) (3.25)
Instead of presenting the tedious computation for the general case, consider the
special case of the double negation of a single atom, as in Example 2.1. Consider
i(¬¬red). First, recall that i(¬red) = {red}.
i(¬¬red) = ∩α∈i(¬red)i(α) = ∩α∈{red}i(α) = i(red)
3.2 Restricting î to finite sets
There is a difficulty of using î in the proof-system, namely the fact that î(ϕ) can,
in general, contain infinitely many conjunctions of atoms. However, since ϕ may
have only finitely many atomic formulas as sub-formulas, only finitely many of the
conjunctions in î(ϕ) are relevant to its deductive role. So, the first step is to restrict
î(ϕ) to its finitely many relevant conjunctions, again as a formal counterpart of the
restriction of îc.
Definition 3.4 (Restricting î). Let îr(ϕ) =df. {α/a(ϕ) | α ∈ î(ϕ)}.
Clearly, îr(ϕ) is finite for every ϕ.
3.3 The c-bilateral I/E-rules
In this section, c-bilateral I/E-rules are introduced, defining a family BN i of ND-
systems, one for each atomic compatibility base i. Note that the rules are indepen-
dent of the specific connectives used. I come back to connective-dependent rules
below.
Suppose îr(ϕ) = {α1, · · · , αm}.
α+j
ϕ−
(I−j,i), 1 ≤ j ≤ m


















, 1 ≤ j ≤ m (3.27)
In contrast to Rumfitt’s denial rules for compound formulas, where every negated
connective has its own denial rules, here all negated formulas are c-denied uniformly,
by the same rule. Thus, Rumfitt has denial rules (derived below) such as (∧−I),
(∧−E) (denial rules for conjunction), (∨−I), (∨−E) (denilal rules for disjunction),
etc. In my rules, the dependence on specific connectives is “hidden” in the definition
of î for compound formulas.












χ (¬+Ej1,··· ,jmi ) (3.28)






, 1 ≤ j ≤ m (3.29)
For the derivations of these rules, let, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m
î(αj) = {γj1 , · · · , γjmj } (3.30)
and






























Note that the applications of E+i are correct, since for 1 ≤ k ≤ p βk ∈
î(αj), 1 ≤ j ≤ m. The derivations for (¬+Ij,i) with j > 1 are similar and
omitted.
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The derivations for (¬+Ej,i) with j > 1 are similar and omitted.
3.4 Deriving Rumfitt’s bilateral rules for the binary connectives
One can easily realise that Rumfitt’s rules in [1], except the I/E-rules for negation,
can be carried over to each BN i as derived rules. Below are the derivations for
conjunction. The derivation of Rumfitt’s disjunction rules is similar and omitted.






















By (3.21), suppose î(ϕ1) = {α1, · · · , αl} and î(ϕ2) = {αl+1, · · · , αm} for some































































The derivation for i = 2 is similar and omitted.
The derivations of the denied disjunction and denied implication are similar
and omitted.
4 Conclusions
I have introduced corrective bilateralism, a new kind of bilateralism, according to
which a ground for denial is an incompatible atomic alternative to the denied for-
mula. A bilateral natural-deduction proof-system for corrective denial is presented,
in which Rumfitt’s I/E-rules are derivable.
It remains as a next step to extend corrective bilateralism to first-order; a major
obstacle is the formulation of the atomic incompatible alternatives in a way not
depending on the elements of an underlying domain of quantification.
Corrective bilateralism widens the scope of bilateral logics. It indicates that
there is still much to be learned from the actual practice of using speech acts in
natural language.
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I contrast two accounts of assertoric contexts. The Frege-Geach-style ‘exter-
nalist’ account keeps force (judgment) and content (proposition) separate. The
act-theoretic ‘internalist’ inverts the Frege-Geach point by making force inte-
gral to content. Assertoric contexts being hyperintensional, act theory cannot
assume that extensional logic (such as introduction and elimination rules for
the truth-functions) applies to act-theoretic propositions; nor that intensional
logic (e.g., distribution axioms) applies. I level an objection against internalism,
namely that the internalist is wrong to argue that the assertion of a conjunc-
tion entails the assertion of both conjuncts separately. The general insight is
that the Frege-Geach point remains intact, but also that the externalist owes
an account of the logic of assertoric contexts.
1 Introduction
This paper consists of two parts plus an appendix. The critical Part I explains why
it is problematic to weld force and content together. I exemplify the problem by
This research was supported by Grant Academy of the Czech Republic, project no. GA18-23891-S
“Hyperintensional Reasoning over Natural Language Texts”. My participation at the conference
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possible by a travel grant from the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies of Utrecht
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means of conjunctive propositions. The problem specific to conjunctive propositions
is whether the assertion of a conjunction entails the assertion of both conjuncts
individually (i.e., whether assertion distributes over conjunction). I also address the
problem how to avoid that the assertion of an atomic proposition entails the assertion
of a disjunctive proposition. The constructive Part II demonstrates how the broadly
Fregean framework of Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) can block both of the
presumed entailments in a principled manner. The discussion is couched in terms
of whether force, as represented by the turnstile, should be internal or external to
content, which is in this case fine-grained propositions. By implication, the question
becomes whether a proposition is embedded within an assertoric context or is itself
an assertoric context. Since any particular kind of context is governed by a particular
logic, the question therefore becomes which logic should govern assertoric contexts.
The appendix contains the central definitions.
2 Force vs content, externalism vs internalism
What is the logic of an assertoric context? In particular, how fine-grained are
assertoric contexts? The answer will dictate which substitutions are valid and which






Where ≈ is distinct from self-identity, what constraints apply to ≈, so that B may
be validly substituted for A within an assertoric context? For instance, if ≈ is
entailment, then since A entails A ∨ B then A ∨ B is asserted as soon as A is. By
the same token, since A∧B entails A, B then A, B are asserted as soon as A∧B is.
While the former is obviously undesirable, the latter is either trivial or contentious.
I will provide arguments against the latter claim and demonstrate how both claims
can be invalidated in identical ways.
I adhere to the standard view that an assertoric context is a pragmatic context
in which an agent a asserts that a proposition A is true, and that to assert A is to
assert that A is true. Hence, if a has asserted A, yet A turns out to be false, then a
has a problem. Typically, a will have to retract A, undoing, as it were, the original
assertion of A. The general form of an assertoric context would appear to be this:
Agent a asserts proposition A
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i.e. Assert(a, A), which makes an assertion look very much like a psychological
attitude context, i.e., a binary relation-in-intension between an agent and a propo-
sition which the agent knows, believes, hopes, etc. to be true. However, if we follow
Frege, the particular agent is irrelevant to an assertion and so can be abstracted
away.1 Therefore, instead of “a asserts A” we would have “A is asserted”. I consider
assertoric contexts to be hyperintensional par excellence, and I have two reasons for
believing so. First, assertion should be susceptible only to very restrictive princi-
ples of logical closure, because real-world agents are very far from being logically
impeccable reasoners. For instance, an agent may believe that A ∧ (B ∨ C) with-
out believing that (A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C), thus missing out on a simple distribution.
Furthermore, it is a complicating factor that assertions are acts, not states, as with
attitudes. For this reason, an agent may assert, for instance, that A ∧ (B ∨ C) and
acknowledge its being equivalent to (A∧B)∨(A∧C) and yet coherently abstain from
performing the further act of asserting that (A∧B)∨ (A∧C). While it is perfectly
appropriate to point out that such an agent is logically committed to holding that
(A∧B)∨ (A∧C) and so should not, for instance, argue against this disjunction, it
hardly follows that the agent is committed by logic to perform an additional act.
Second, an assertion is coloured by the linguistic medium in which the assertion
is made, in addition to conveying an attitude to a proposition. An assertoric act
may assume the physical form of an utterance (air vibrations) or an inscription
(pixels on a screen, ink on paper, oil on canvas), because without a suitable medium
a speaker or writer cannot reach out to their audience in the public domain. An
attitudinal state does not want to reach out to an audience and needs no intermediate
medium. From attitude logic we are familiar with positions such as sententialism
and inscriptionalism which demand exceptional fine-graining of attitude contents,
because even slight syntactic deviations between any two sentences or other pieces
of language get to matter. Therefore, I tend to think that assertoric contexts inherit
some of the extreme fine-graining that sententialism and inscriptionalism emphasize
and which is less likely to be present in non-syntactic theories of attitude contents
which instead relate agents to abstract objects, e.g., truth-conditions or modes of
presentation of truth-conditions. If this is on the right track, then assertoric contexts
1See [15]. [16] argues convincingly that ` A does not work like, say, BelaA, so `a A would be
ill-formed and ill-conceived. An assertion is inherently an act performable by an agent from the
agent’s own perspective, which is a first-person perspective, whereas BelaA is a report or attribution
from a third-person perspective to the effect that a believes that A is true. The shift in perspective
affects whether one deems judgement factive. [15] argues that judgement must be factive (a non-
factive judgement being a Scheinurteil), whereas [16] argues it need not be. When non-factive,
the judging agent makes a judgement to the best of their knowledge, and by being entitled to a
knowledge claim the agent is right about the judgement, though wrong about the proposition being
judged to be true.
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will demand a finer individuation, hence a more restrictive logic, than the one which
the day-to-day attitude theoreticians standardly impose on their attitude contexts.
To illustrate, first, let a assert that whatever does not kill you makes you stronger,
and let b assert that whatever does not make you stronger kills you. Did a and b
assert the same thing? Why, no, logical equivalence is insufficient as a principle
of individuation. Likewise, we want to distinguish between asserting, say, A and
asserting A ∨ (A ∧ B).2 Next, let a assert that chewing marrowbone for fourteen
days is healthy and b assert that masticating marrowbone for a fortnight is healthy.
Same thing? I would say so, provided we are reporting a’s and b’s attitudes, for the
only variations concern the choice of words and linguistic register and, thus, concern
only how the message was conveyed but not the content of the message conveyed.
However, the linguistic medium rubs off on the assertion.3 Syntax-sensitive theories
of attitude complements will want to say that a and b did not assert the same thing,
though they might have come close. They will want to stress that perfect synonymy,
as between ‘chews’ and ‘masticates’ or ‘lasts a fortnight’ and ‘lasts fourteen days’,
does not exist in natural language, or if it does, that there is importantly more to
an assertion than just the literal message being conveyed. I shall assume, not too
controversially, that assertoric contexts enjoy a very fine-grained principle of individ-
uation. Still, whatever particular principle is selected, it must not be too restrictive
(hence sterile), for if nothing follows from anything (other than self-substitution and
self-implication) then we are simply left without a logic.
I will contrast two conceptions of what an assertoric context is. Since Frege,
assertoric force has been indicated by means of the turnstile, ‘`’. As per the Frege-
Geach point, force and content are kept separate: a proposition may, or may not,
be accompanied by this or that force.4 I call this position externalist, force being
external to content.5 On the other hand, an internalist position conceives of propo-
sitions as being inherently forceful: those propositions whose satisfaction conditions
2Hence, where  represents assertoric acts, the rule of inference (RE) is rendered unsuitable for
attitudinal and assertoric contexts: from (A↔ B) infer (A↔ B).
3We can generate mixed cases where a word, or a string of words, is both used and mentioned
– used to point to something beyond itself, and mentioned because the reporter wants to reproduce
the attributee’s exact choice of word(s); e.g., “Jean-Luc considers Rochefort a ‘bière de dégusta-
tion’”. I expect mixed cases to demand exceptional fine-graining, but here I won’t explore just how
exceptional. Also, there is the complicating factor that their logical analysis must account for the
dual occurrence of words as both used and mentioned.
4Vide [5, §14], [7].
5Vide [6, p.32]: “Diese Trennung des Urteilens von dem, worüber geurteilt wird, erscheint
unumgänglich, weil sonst eine bloße Annahme [. . . ] nicht ausdrückbar wäre. Wir bedürfen also
eines besonderen Zeichens, um etwas behaupten zu können [. . . ], so daß wir z. B. mit “` 2 + 3 = 5”
behaupten: 2 + 3 ist gleich 5. Es wird also nicht bloß wie in “2 + 3 = 5” ein Wahrheitswert
hingeschrieben, sondern zugleich auch gesagt, daß er das Wahre sei.” Cf. footnote 19.
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are truth-conditions are imbued with assertoric force.6 To perform the act of as-
serting a proposition is to concretely token the abstract type that is a proposition
imbued with assertoric force. Externalism and internalism are the two ‘tales of the
turnstile’ I will unfold here. I side with the former against the latter. While inter-
nalism might work for atomic propositions, handling molecular propositions – even
conjunctive ones – is problematic. The source of the trouble is that a proposition is
now itself an assertoric context, and assertoric contexts are non-extensional, so the
truth-functional (‘truth-table’) logic that standardly applies to conjunctive proposi-
tions does not apply, although the internalist assumes it at least occasionally does.
Nor should we assume that the logic of possible-world semantics of intermediate
granularity, which identifies logical equivalents, applies, as soon as assertoric con-
texts are acknowledged to obey some hyperintensional logic or other. This dual fact
leaves the internalist without a principled and operative logic for assertoric contexts.
What we are treated to is instead a mixture of pragmatic maxims, rules of exten-
sional logic, and overruling of this same logic. This is the overall objection I will
be levelling against internalism here.7 Still, the internalist escapade is helpful, as it
challenges us externalists to specify exactly how we perceive of assertoric contexts.
The positive contribution I will make is a sketch of the hyperintensional logic that
an externalist theory is in a position to apply to asserted conjunctive and disjunctive
propositions.
I am aware of four ways of understanding the turnstile, ‘`’, and I wish to discuss
two of them here. The basic taxonomy is this:
(1) ` α: “There is a proof calculus in which formula α has been proved from its
axioms (i.e., α is a theorem) .” This connective can also be binary: Γ ` α
(“Formula α is provable from formulae Γ”). This is the modern-day interpre-
tation.
(2) ` A: “Proposition A is judged to be true.” This is the externalist interpretation.
6Just to be clear, when speaking of externalism and internalism above, I have in mind a dis-
tinction between two views of how assertoric contexts are structured (i.e., whether or not force is
integral to content), and I am not alluding to any sort of conceivable points of contact with semantic
externalism/internalism.
7The present paper is the twin of [12], which levels two objections against act-theoretic internal-
ism. The first is the objection to distribution of assertion over conjunction. The second objection is
that the internalist’s inversion of the Frege-Geach point requires that force be suspended with respect
to all the different kinds of molecular propositions, including conjunctive propositions, as soon as
the truth-table for conjunction is generated along the lines of, say, Sheffer’s stroke (NAND), Quine’s
dagger (NOR), or De Morgan’s ¬(¬A ∨ ¬B). But then what is the dividend of the internalist’s in-
version of the Frege-Geach point? None, it seems. Forceful propositions with their force suspended
behave pretty much like Frege and Geach predict them to behave, anyway. The internalist is back
to square one where the externalist has been all along.
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(3) ` B. Proposition ` B occurs with assertoric force. B is a sub-propositional
fragment of ` B in which a property or relation is predicated to apply to
one or more objects, or a connective is predicated to apply to one or more
propositions. This is the internalist interpretation.
Cases (2) and (3) both treat ` as a force indicator. However, (2) comes in two
flavours. (2a): while keeping proposition/Gedanke and assertion/Behauptung sepa-
rate, Frege still accords logical significance to the turnstile.8 (2b): while observing
a comparable distinction, Tichý, as a modern-day realist, relegates the turnstile en-
tirely to pragmatics.9 Here, I will be contrasting (2b) with (3). There are two kinds
of act theory: one heeding the Frege-Geach point and thus keeping force and con-
tent neatly apart; the other inverting the Frege-Geach point such that content is
intermingled with force. I will be discussing only the ‘inverted’, hence more radical,
form of act theory. [7, pp.456-457] outlines the inversion, but does not spell out
the consequences of going along with it.10 [8], [9], [10] do just that, without Hanks
presenting his theory explicitly as an inversion of the Frege-Geach point, though
advertising it as a theory that collapses the wall of separation between force and
content.
If assertoric contexts are fine-grained, thus requiring a hyperintensional logic,
then the question arises what sort of logic is a or the correct propositional logic to
go with act-theoretic propositions. In particular, to what extent can we rely on the
truth-functional (i.e., extensional) logic for the connectives ∧,∨,¬,→,↔? In [12] I
used conjunction as a test case, because conjunction is the least controversial of the
truth-functional connectives: its introduction and elimination rules are stable, hence
also in harmony. The root of the trouble with distribution is that, whereas factoring
out both conjuncts from a conjunctive proposition is trivial in an extensional context,
and the distribution of an operator works just fine if the operator and the context
are intensional (vide the K axiom) and we remain within normal modal logic, it is




10See [12] for a brief comparison.
11But invoking K – here, in this form: (A ∧ B) → (A ∧ B) – is actually pointless, for any
argument based on it must presuppose the distinction between force (here, the modality embodied
by the box) and content (here, the formula/proposition the box is prefixed to). Alternatively, if
we turn to 3(A ∧ B), we work our way from 3(A ∧ B) to 3A ∧3B via the assumption of A ∧ B,
∧-elimination, 3-introduction applied to A, B, and finally ∧-introduction. Of course, in Hanks’s
symbolism nothing matches 3A or A directly, for assertion has already been moved inside A. The
proof sketch I just gave presupposes that 3A can be factored out into 3 and A.
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To be more specific, here is the (highly problematic) key passage I want to
discuss:
It might be argued that in asserting a conjunction a speaker does not
assert each conjunct. You might think that this is an illusion generated
by the fact that each conjunct is an immediate logical consequence of
the whole conjunction. But we often quite easily distinguish between
what gets asserted and what follows immediately and obviously from what
we assert. For any p and q, ‘p or q’ is a trivial and immediate logical
consequence of p. But no one thinks that an assertion that p is also an
assertion that p or q. Furthermore, take any account of the necessary
and sufficient conditions for assertion – pick whichever account is your
favorite. If those conditions hold for the utterance of the conjunction
then they will surely also hold for the utterances of each conjunct. [8,
p.1395, fn.12] (My emphasis.)
See also [9, p.18], [9, p.104], [9, p.105], [10, p.21] where Hanks claims that the act
of asserting (i.e., tokening the abstract act type of) a conjunction is tantamount to
performing three acts: asserting the conjunction, asserting one conjunct, asserting
the other conjunct (and, in some passages, asserting the commuted structure B∧A,
something which requires hyperintensional granularity).
Let us get two interpretations of the above passage out of the way because,
appearances notwithstanding, they cannot be what Hanks has in mind. First, we
can all agree about this: an agent asserts A ∧ B, and from A ∧ B follows A, B;
an agent asserts A, and from A follows A ∨ B. ∧E and ∨I are applied outside
of assertoric contexts. Second, the act-theorist internalist surely does not want to
claim that asserting A∧B is tantamount to asserting A and asserting B, for then the
connective becomes logically irrelevant, and ∧E becomes homeless in act-theoretic
propositional logic. The remaining interpretation is the claim that the assertion of a
conjunction entails the assertion of its conjuncts. This distribution claim makes the
assertion of A, B a dual necessary condition for the assertion of their conjunction. Of
course, this condition should not be confused with agglomeration (which is evidently
invalid): asserting A and asserting B together entails asserting A ∧ B. Instead the
distribution claim requires that these two assertoric acts must conceptually precede
the act of asserting A ∧B.
The beginning and the end of the passage above makes it clear that a logical claim
– that assertion distributes over conjunction – is argued for by means of a pragmatic
maxim. For sure, if the assertability conditions for a conjunctive proposition are
satisfied then it follows that the assertability conditions for either of the conjuncts
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are also satisfied. If you were allowed to perform the act of asserting a conjunction
then that is a sufficient condition for being allowed to assert one or both of the
conjuncts. Only doing so is something you may, or may not, decide to do. I can
agree to the pragmatic point about assertability without having to agree to the
logical point about an assertion entailing other assertions. I am tempted to speak
of a confusion between entitlement and entailment.
The italicized passage also makes it clear that the internalist construes assertoric
contexts as hyperintensional: a asserts A, A entails B, but a does not assert B. The
thing, though, is that conjunction apparently plays by different rules: a asserts
A∧B, and A∧B entails A (B), so a asserts A (B). This suggests a tension between
an extensional and a non-extensional conception of propositions. The extensional
conception predicts closure of assertoric act types over conjunction, disjunction,
etc. This yields the distribution of assertion over conjunction that Hanks is after;
but also, the assertion of A ∨ B, which he wishes to avoid.12 The non-extensional
conception rules out deductive closure over assertion. This gets in the way of the
distribution claim for conjunction. On the upside, it blocks the transition from
asserting A to asserting A ∨ B, which is a restriction Hanks wants to incorporate
into his propositional logic. It should also be fairly clear why nobody would want
this: “I just completed asserting a conjunction, and I shall now proceed to factor out
both conjuncts and assert them separately.” This misconstrues what the assertion
of a conjunctive proposition is all about (and turns you into a tedious speaker).
This, however, could be interesting to pursue: “I just attributed the assertion of
a conjunction to agent a, and I shall now proceed to factor out both conjuncts
and attribute two further assertoric acts to a, one of asserting one and the other
of asserting the other conjunct.” But we would need a logical rule to make it valid
to detach the conjuncts and attribute these two new assertoric acts. We cannot
just detach A, B con forza, for the conjuncts occur within an asserted (hence non-
extensional) context. Note that the rule in question would be one that legitimates
a complex act, not legislates it.
Thus, I agree with Hanks that the assertion of A does not entail the assertion of
A ∨ B. I disagree that the assertion of A ∧ B entails the assertion of A and of B.
So, neither of these two entailments is valid, in my view:
A ∧B is asserted ⇒ A (B) is asserted
12We should discard some easy, but irrelevant, counterexamples to detachment of conjuncts.
For instance, “An empathetic midwife walks in the park, and he is whistling” is a dynamic case,
while “The whistling midwife wakes up, and he puts on his trousers” is a progressive case, thus
the conjuncts do not commute. One of the conjuncts is dependent on the other, so they cannot be
detached as stand-alone propositions that are asserted in isolation from one another. See also [1],
building on Grice.
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A is asserted ⇒ A ∨B is asserted
And they are invalid for the same reason: the laws of extensional logic (∨E,∧I) and
modal/intensional logic (distribution, i.e., any variant of the K axiom) do not apply
to hyperintensional contexts such as assertoric ones. By going hyperintensional,
we are treading on partially uncharted territory, because new rules need to be laid
down.
Note that, in arguing against both cases, I cannot invoke ‘by parity of reasoning’
as a strategy: the arguments for blocking/invalidating one do not carry over to the
other one. There are two interlocking differences between the conjunctive and the
disjunctive case one could point to. One could reasonably argue that the individual
assertability of A, B is a necessary condition for the assertability of A∧B, whereas
there would be no point in arguing that the assertability of A ∨ B is a necessary
condition for the assertability of A. And relatedly, it matters (philosophically, if
not formally) that one rule is an introduction rule and the other one an elimination
rule. The (attempted) application of an elimination rule to assertoric contexts may
have something going for it, because it trims the content of what it is applied to,
whereas the (attempted) application of an introduction rule brings in fresh content.
It is easy to argue intuitively against the transition from asserting that the sun is
shining to asserting that the sun is shining or lead melts at 325◦C, because the fresh
disjunct introduces new concepts which have nothing to do with the sun shining and
which may be beyond the ken of the agent making the original assertion. It is less
intuitively obvious that the transition from asserting that the sun is shining and lead
melts at 325◦C to asserting that the sun is shining and asserting that lead melts at
325◦C should be invalid. Still my main objection stands: conjunction elimination is
being appealed to outside its jurisdiction.
Let us scrutinize the differences between internalism and externalism a bit fur-
ther. For the internalist, the turnstile is about assertion; for the Fregean externalist
(2a), about knowledge. Frege’s turnstile is essential to his logic because of how he
thinks of logic. Logic is primarily about inference, and inference serves to generate
inferential knowledge, i.e., new knowledge extracted from old knowledge exclusively
by means of valid deductive rules. The premises must be not only true but known
to the agent drawing an inference before a new, known truth can be extracted from
them. An inference is a transition from known truths to known truths. Hence, for
instance:








` A (` B)
Note that, in keeping with the Frege-Geach point, the antecedent and the con-
sequent go unasserted while the conditional is asserted.13 Of course, logic cannot
enjoin anyone to apply →E or ∧E or any other rule. A rule issues the warrant that
if the premises are known (hence true, by factivity) then the rule will also make
the conclusion known (because you acknowledge the conclusion as true). This is
the direction from premises via rule to conclusion: how to grow your knowledge by
means of logic.14 We can also go in the opposite direction: from conclusion via rule
to premises. Then we use the rule and the premises to justify our assertion that we
know the proposition that is the conclusion: “I know B because I know that the
rule is valid and I know that each of the premises Ai is true. So, the proposition
that figures as conclusion must be true, too.”
For the modern-day externalist (2b), ` A is a pragmatic context in which A is
asserted. Eliminating ` from ` A leaves the proposition A. The proposition is a
logical object that obeys a certain formal semantics. For both kinds of internalist,
` B is a proposition that is already a pragmatic context. If B is 〈a,F〉 then ` B
is the proposition that is the act type of predicating F of a. More specifically, an
agent’s tokening this type is tantamount to the agent’s going through the multi-step
process of identifying property F , identifying individual a, and predicating F of a.
For the ‘inverted’ internalist (3), this act of predication is imbued with assertoric
force. Eliminating ` from ` 〈a,F〉 leaves the sub-propositional rump 〈a,F〉. The
structured hyperproposition ` 〈a,F〉 decomposes into the three atomic act types `,
a, F which recompose into the molecular act type of assertorically predicating F of
a.
Here is how the act-theoretic internalist scales up from atomic to molecular
propositions. The conjunctive proposition Fa ∧Gb has this form:15
` 〈(`〉a,F〉,` 〈b,G〉),Conj〉
The logical symbols involved are:
13See [9, §14].
14The paradox of inference rears its head here. See [3] for a solution within the hyperpropositional
framework of TIL.
15See[9, §4.3], [8, §3].
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• ` the act type of assertoric predication16
• ↑ the act type of target-shifted predication, which serves to make act types
such as propositions available as subjects of predication17
• Conj the act type of applying the conjunction relation to a pair of proposi-
tions18
The relevant fragment of his signature is this:
• a, b act types that refer to the individuals a, b
• F, G act types that express the properties F, G
The notation “〈. . . , . . . 〉” represents an act-theoretic structure whose ultimate
parts are one-step act types which when executed terminate in an individual, a
property, etc. If we apply the notation below (which is mine and not Hanks’s), this
formula represents a conjunctive proposition:
`↑ 〈(` A,` B),Conj〉
The key thing to note is that the constituent conjuncts occur with their assertoric
force ‘on’. A central feature of act-theoretic internalism is that assertoric force is
suspended (or ‘cancelled’, as Hanks calls it) in all molecular propositions apart from
the conjunctive ones. This is for exactly the same reason that Frege stipulated that,
e.g., the antecedent and consequent of a conditional occur unasserted. Therefore,
the corresponding formula for a disjunctive proposition would be this:
`↑ 〈(∼` A,∼` B),Disj〉
where the tilde, ‘∼’, represents suspension.19 The logical effect of ∼ is to contex-
tualize a proposition to a cancellation context, in which the assertoric force of the
16See [9, §25ff ].
17See [9, p.99].
18My [12] takes issue with the fact that Conj appears to be defined for pairs of true propositions
only. This constraint makes perfect sense, as far as the assertion of a conjunction goes (if you are
asserting a conjunction then you are committed to both conjuncts being true), but certainly not as
regards the formation of a conjunctive proposition. This objection carries over, mutatis mutandis,
to Disj.
19The tilde appears to be a logically superfluous symbol. It serves to indicate that the context
in its scope is a cancellation context. But whether a context is a cancellation context is inherent
to the context in question and not something the tilde can dictate. This objection is not unlike
Peano’s objection in [14] that Frege’s turnstile is redundant, because the very position a proposition
is embedded in already indicates whether the proposition occurs asserted (cf. “la varia posizione
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proposition is suspended. The proposition is not judged to be true (or false), as it
is not being judged at all. Put differently, the sort of act type that is a proposition
cannot be tokened in a cancellation context. Using standard terminology usually
applied to sentences, the proposition/act type is mentioned and not used.
This is how Hanks summarizes his position:
On this view, to assert a conjunction is to predicate the relation _____
and _____ are both true of two propositions, and to assert a disjunction
is to predicate the relation either _____ or _____ is true of two
propositions.[9, p.106]
The rationale for the first claim must be that since asserting A and asserting B are
a jointly necessary condition for asserting A∧B, then asserting A∧B is a sufficient
condition for asserting A and asserting B. Hence, in Hanks’s framework distribution
is not contentious, but trivial, in virtue of how rich an assertion-involving notion of
conjunction he is advocating.
However, in my view there is nothing incoherent about someone asserting a
conjunctive proposition without thereby either asserting or having already asserted
(in point of conceptual priority) both conjuncts severally. Such an agent, in making
the assertion, treats the conjunctive proposition as a unit, disregarding its truth-
conditions and their impact on the truth-conditions of the individual conjuncts. I
take this to be an option, as soon as we go hyperintensional and do not relate agents
to truth-conditions. I just need this mere theoretical possibility to make my case
that conjuncts do not automatically detach from an asserted conjunction.
Here is a way to make this point with regard specifically to internalism. The
notation `↑ 〈(` A,` B),Conj〉 obscures the fact that the act type Conj includes
the act-theoretic propositions ` A, ` B in its scope. Conj cannot be the ex-
tensional function ∧ taking a pair of truth-values to a truth-value, but must be a
non-extensional operator which turns its operand (` A, ` B) into a non-extensional
context. Therefore, we cannot apply ∧E to get us from `↑ 〈(` A,` B),Conj〉 to
che puó avere in una formula una proposizione indica completamente ció che di essa si afferma”).
Peano explains that where Frege uses “` a” to express that a is true, he himself uses the unadorned
“a” (“é vera la a”). In Peano’s own ideography (the Formulario), the proposition (a ⊃ b) ⊃ c
“non indica la veritá di a, b, c né di a ⊃ b, ma solo la veritá della relazione indicata fra queste
proposizioni”. That is, it is asserted that (a ⊃ b) implies c. The reason is that the right-hand ‘⊃’
is the main connective of the context (a ⊃ b) ⊃ c as well as of the context in which (a ⊃ b) ⊃ c
is embedded. The fact that (a ⊃ b) ⊃ c is a sub-formula of itself thus suffices for the implication
(a ⊃ b) ⊃ c to occur asserted. The absence of the turnstile does not detract from the proposition
occurring asserted, and the presence of the turnstile would add nothing. Hence, (a ⊃ b) ⊃ c and
` (a ⊃ b) ⊃ c are indiscernible in point of assertoric force. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer
for pointing out the similarity between the objections and for directing me toward [14].
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` A, ` B. The sort of rule required would be a hyperintensional counterpart of
∧E that would apply to conjuncts embedded within an assertoric context. However,
I see no cogent reason to develop one such rule. In case propositions are created
in the image of assertoric acts (i.e., propositions being, by and large, indiscernible
from judgements) then any of the rules pertaining to propositions that belong to
theories heeding the Frege-Geach point may not apply to act-theoretic propositions.
I have been assuming throughout that acts cannot be logically coerced. Therefore,
a logical investigation of acts would probably need to be a presuppositional one:
performing act X logically presupposes having already performed acts Xi. This still
does not help the internalist to a validation of their distribution claim, though. We
can happily grant that the assertability of a conjunction presupposes the assertabil-
ity of its conjuncts without granting that asserting a conjunction presupposes that
its conjuncts have already been asserted.
3 Assertion and conjunctive/disjunctive propositions
Above I described the ‘inverted’ variant of act theory (3), which combines force-
imbued propositions with force suspension. I want to contrast this position with
one at the other end of the spectrum, namely TIL (2b). TIL is a fiercer form of
semantic realism than Dummett ever attributed to Frege, because TIL exceeds truth-
conditional semantics, and because TIL does not make the turnstile (i.e., assertion or
judgement) part and parcel of its logic or semantics. This second Part demonstrates
how TIL handles the assertion of a conjunctive/disjunctive proposition, and what
follows, or rather does not follow, logically from such an assertion. Two questions
will be addressed here. The first question breaks down into two halves:
• What is a conjunctive proposition? What is a disjunctive proposition?
So does the second question:
• How can a conjunctive, or disjunctive, proposition occur asserted? What fol-
lows logically from an asserted conjunctive, or disjunctive, proposition?
For the concepts and notation specific to TIL, please refer to the Appendix.
First-order propositional logic offers sixteen binary truth-functions (functions
from a pair of truth-values to a truth-value). One of these truth-functions is con-
junction, and it is standardly denoted by ‘∧’. Its truth-table is such that only if
v(A) = v(B) = 1 is v(A ∧ B) = 1. The formula “A ∧ B” is a conjunctive one
in virtue of ‘∧’ being its main connective. But thanks to the functional complete-
ness of this logic, there is a multitude of syntactically different formulas that share
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the same truth-table without being conjunctive formulas. The syntax of first-order
propositional logic reveals nothing about the logical structure, if any, of its propo-
sitions. This logic trades exclusively in truth-values. Intensional logic trades in
truth-conditions, entailment taking truth-conditions to truth-conditions. We can
impose various constraints so as not to multiply truth-conditions, e.g., in terms of
idempotence and commutativity. But when being told that A and A ∧A, or A ∧B
and B ∧A, are idempotent, we remain at the level of syntactic transformations and
are none the wiser about in what way truth-conditions might conceivably be said to
be conjunctive, disjunctive, etc. Thus, if propositions are equal to truth-conditions,
we are none the wiser about in what way propositions are conjunctive, disjunctive,
etc. In modal logic, a contingent proposition is simply some subset of logical space.
So, since symbols such as ‘∧’ and ‘∨’ represent truth-functions, what is the upward
logical path from truth-functions to propositions? Tichý’s answer:
The [conjunction or disjunction] sign that occurs in the corresponding
formula indicates a constituent of the expressed propositional construc-
tion, not of the denoted proposition. A sentence [or formula] is not a
picture of the proposition it denotes but of a particular construction of
that proposition. [18, p.516]
A construction is a structured hyperintension, more specifically, a fine-grained
logical procedure detailing how various logical objects interact so as to produce an
output object, such as a truth-condition. A formula like “A∧B” or “A∨B” counts
as a rudimentary picture of a structured hyperproposition, which is a construction
of (i.e., a logical path leading toward) a truth-condition. The following are a con-
junctive and a disjunctive propositional construction:
λwλt [0∧ [λwλt [Awt]]wt [λwλt [Bwt]]wt]
λwλt [0∨ [λwλt [Awt]]wt [λwλt [Bwt]]wt]
which can be reduced thus:
λwλt [0∧ Awt Bwt]
λwλt [0∨ Awt Bwt]
Types: ∧,∨/(ooo); A,B/∗1 → owt; w/∗1 → ω; t/∗1 → τ .
The mapping which the turnstile represents can be typed as a logical object
and, therefore, be processed logically. Though ‘`’ is not part of the ideography of
TIL, we can nonetheless assign a type to what we stipulate to be its denotation.
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` represents, in (2) and (3), the act of making an assertion, but in the interest of
comparison we can treat it as the result of performing an assertoric act, which is
the empirical property pertaining to hyperpropositions of having been asserted (by
someone at some moment at some world). The general type is this: ` /(o∗n)τω.
Hence, the hyperproposition
λwλt [0`wt 0A]
should be glossed as “At 〈w, t〉, A has been asserted”. The sentence “The conjunction
of A, B has been asserted” goes into:
λwλt [0`wt 0[λwλt [0∧ Awt Bwt]]]
The Trivialization of the conjunctive hyperproposition that occurs asserted is cru-
cial. Thanks to Trivialization, the hyperproposition occurs embedded in a hyper-
intensional context. Therefore, it is controlled by a hyperintensional logic. TIL’s
hyperintensional logic centres around the notion of procedural isomorphism, which
in its current version is defined in terms of α-conversion together with β-reduction
by value.20 This criterion of co-hyperintensionality lays down whether any given
pair of hyperintensions are intersubstitutable. Moreover, different closure principles
for knowledge, belief, assertion, etc., need to be selected for different species of epis-
temic, doxastic, assertoric, etc., contexts. For instance, it will matter whether we
are modelling human agents or computer programs. To get a specific logic off the
ground, it must be specified which logical rules the agents master and under what
circumstances they apply them.
Let us begin with the easier case: why an asserted atomic hyperproposition A
does not entail an asserted disjunctive hyperproposition. Since we will be drawing
inferences, we want to operate on arbitrary empirical indices (i.e., world and time
variables), so λE is our first move, which yields this open construction:21
[0`wt 0A]
From this the following does not follow:
[0`wt 0[λwλt [0∨ Awt Bwt]]]
The reason is because we have not specified the rule that each agent who asserts A
must apply ∨I and go on to assert A∨B. We could, of course, decide to add such a
20See [2].
21A construction containing at least one free occurrence of a variable is an open construction.
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rule. But doing so would yield a logic of assertion that would be an unrealistic and
irrelevant modelling of what finite agents (natural or artificial) could or should do.
What follows from an asserted conjunctive proposition? In particular, is this a
valid inference, where the conclusion might equally well be [0`wt 0B]?
[0`wt 0[λwλt [0∧ Awt Bwt]]]
——————————–
[0`wt 0A]
No, it is not. I do not think it is the case that an agent asserts two propositions
separately and then goes on to form their conjunction, which then counts as an
asserted conjunctive proposition. Nor do I think that in the act of asserting a con-
junctive proposition an agent thereby necessarily asserts the conjuncts. Instead I
believe that the agent may assert a conjunctive proposition as a self-contained unit,
as it were, which tracks the syntactic structure of the uttered or inscribed sentence
pretty closely, but is unsusceptible to any rules from extensional or intensional logic.
This phenomenon is captured formally by the fact that in the premise the asserted
hyperproposition occurs Trivialization-bound: 0[λwλt [0∨ Awt Bwt]] This has the ef-
fect that every constituent subconstruction also occurs Trivialization-bound, which
in turn means that they occur in the displayed as opposed to executed mode (‘men-
tioned’ as opposed to ‘used’). Of course, a Trivialization-bound construction can
be made amenable to logical operations. We do this, for instance, when quantify-
ing into hyperintensional attitude contexts. But doing so requires the deployment of
some additional functions, none of which is mentioned in the invalid inference above.
The thing about quantifying-in is that it does not generate a new attitude from an
existing attitude, but instead spells out a logical feature of the attitude in question.
If, on the other hand, I were to make the additions required to validate the above
inference, I would be generating a new attitude or act from an existing attitude or
act. And this is exactly what I have been arguing against, on the grounds that
logic in and by itself cannot force an agent to perform an additional act or adopt
an additional attitude. To see this, pretend you are designing a program that will
make your (futuristic) AI detach the conjuncts of each conjunction it asserts and
proceed to assert the conjuncts individually. Then the program should not only
(obviously) contain the rule of ∧E, but also the command to invariably apply the
rule to each conjunction it asserts and subsequently assert the conjuncts severally.
Thus, as I have argued, distribution of assertion over conjunction is a highly con-
ditional matter. It is not an absolute or trivial matter of fact that “any account of
the necessary and sufficient conditions for [the assertion of a conjunction] will surely
also hold for the utterances of each conjunct”, as the act-theoretic internalist would
have us believe.
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Appendix
I follow the relevant definitions as formulated in, e.g., [2], [4], [11], [13], to which I
refer for further details.
Definition 1 (construction).
(i) Variables x, y, ... are constructions that construct objects (elements of their
respective ranges) dependently on a valuation v; they v-construct.
(ii) Where X is an object whatsoever (an extension, an intension or a construc-
tion), 0X is the construction Trivialization. 0X constructs (displays) X without
any change of X.
(iii) Let X, Y 1,...,Yn be arbitrary constructions. Then Composition [X Y 1...Yn] is
the following construction. For any valuation v, the Composition [X Y 1...Yn]
is v-improper if at least one of the constructions X, Y 1,...,Yn is v-improper
by failing to v-construct anything, or if X does not v-construct a function
that is defined at the n-tuple of objects v-constructed by Y 1,...,Yn. If X does
v-construct such a function then [X Y 1...Yn] v-constructs the value of this
function at the n-tuple.
(iv) The (λ-)Closure [λx1...xm Y ] is the following construction. Let x1, x2, ..., xm
be pair-wise distinct variables and Y a construction. Then [λx1 ... xm Y ] v-
constructs the function f that takes any members B1,...,Bm of the respective
ranges of the variables x1,...,xm into the object that is v(B1/x1,...,Bm/xm)-
constructed by Y (if there is such an object), where v(B1/x1,...,Bm/xm) is like
v except for assigning B1 to x1, ..., Bm to xm.
(v) The Double Execution 2X is the following construction. Where X is any entity,
the Double Execution 2X is v-improper if X is not itself a construction, or
if X does not v-construct a construction, or if X v-constructs a v-improper
construction. Otherwise, let X v-construct a construction Y and Y v-construct
an entity Z ; then 2X v-constructs Z.
(vi) Nothing is a construction, unless it so follows from (i) through (v).
Definition 2 (simple type). Let B be a base, where a base is a collection of
pair-wise disjoint, non-empty sets. Then:
(i) Every member of B is an elementary type of order 1 over B.
(ii) Let α, β1, ..., βm (m > 0) be types of order 1 over B. Then the collection (α
β1 ... βm), of all m-ary partial mappings from β1 × ... × βm into α, is a
functional type of order 1 over B.
(iii) Nothing is a type of order 1 over B unless it so follows from (i) and (ii).
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Remark. For the purposes of natural-language analysis, we are currently assuming
the following base of ground types, which form part of the ontological commitments
of TIL:
o: the set of truth-values {T, F};
ι: the set of individuals (the universe of discourse);
τ : the set of real numbers (doubling as times);
ω: the set of logically possible worlds (the logical space).
Definition 3 (ramified hierarchy of types).
T1 (types of order 1 ). See Definition 2.
Cn (constructions of order n)
(i) Let x be a variable ranging over a type of order n. Then x is a construction
of order n over B.
(ii) Let X be a member of a type of order n. Then 0X, 2X are constructions of
order n over B.
(iii) Let X, X1,..., Xm (m > 0) be constructions of order n over B. Then [X X1...Xm]
is a construction of order n over B.
(iv) Let x1, ..., xm, X (m > 0) be constructions of order n over B. Then [λx1...xm X ]
is a construction of order n over B.
(v) Nothing is a construction of order n over B unless it so follows fromCn (i)-(iv).
Tn+1 (types of order n + 1) Let ∗n be the collection of all constructions of order n
over B. Then:
(i) ∗n and every type of order n are types of order n + 1.
(ii) If 0 < m and α, β1,...,βm are types of order n + 1 over B, then (α β1 ... βm)
(see T1 (ii)) is a type of order n + 1 over B.
(iii) Nothing is a type of order n + 1 over B unless it so follows from Tn+1 (i) and
(ii).
Notational conventions. ‘y → α’ means that variable y ranges over the type α. If C
is a construction, then ‘C → α’ means that C is typed to construct an entity of type
α. That an object a is of a type α is denoted ‘a/α’. Thus, for instance, ‘C/∗n → ι’
means that the construction C is of order n (i.e., belongs to type ∗n) and is typed
to construct an individual. For the variables w, t this holds: w → ω, t → τ . If
C → αwt then the frequently used Composition [[C w] t] → α will be written as
‘Cwt’ for short.
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Definition 4 (subconstruction). Let C be a construction. Then:
(i) C is a subconstruction of C.
(ii) If C is 0X or 2X and X is a construction, then X is a subconstruction of C.
(iii) If C is [XX1 . . . Xn] then X,X1, . . . , Xn are subconstructions of C.
(iv) If C is [λx1 . . . xn Y ] then Y is a subconstruction of C.
(v) If A is a subconstruction of B and B is a subconstruction of C then A is a
subconstruction of C.
(vi) A construction is a subconstruction of C only if it so follows from (i) – (v).
Definition 5 (displayed vs executed mode of occurrence of a construction).
Let C be a construction and D a subconstruction of C. Then:
(i) If C is identical to 0X and D is identical to X, then the occurrence of D and
of all the subconstructions of D are displayed in C.
(ii) If D is displayed in C and C is a subconstruction of a construction E such that
E is not identical to 2F for any construction F , then the occurrence of D and
of all the subconstructions of D are displayed in E.
(iii) If D is identical to C, then the occurrence of D is executed in C.
(iv) If C is identical to [X1X2 . . . Xm] and D is identical to one of the constructions
X1, X2, . . ., Xm, then the occurrence of D is executed in C.
(v) If C is identical to [λx1 . . . xmX] and D is identical to X, then the occurrence
of D is executed in C.
(vi) If C is identical to 2X and D is identical to X, then the occurrence of D is
executed in C.
(vii) If C is identical to 20X such that X is typed to v-construct an object of a type
of order 1, and D is identical to X, then the occurrence of D is executed in C.
(viii) If an occurrence of D is executed in a construction E such that this occurrence
of E is executed in C, then the occurrence of D is executed in C.
Remark. This otherwise inductive definition does not contain a closure clause and
is insofar open-ended. The reason is that the further cases not defined in the pre-
ceding clauses are indeterminate/undecidable. The final definition of displayed and
executed occurrences is still work in progress.
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Normalisation for Bilateral Classical





Bilateralists hold that the meanings of the connectives are determined by rules
of inference for their use in deductive reasoning with asserted and denied formu-
las. This paper presents two bilateral connectives comparable to Prior’s tonk,
for which, unlike for tonk, there are reduction steps for the removal of maximal
formulas arising from introducing and eliminating formulas with those connec-
tives as main operators. Adding either of them to bilateral classical logic results
in an incoherent system. One way around this problem is to count formulas as
maximal that are the conclusion of reductio and major premise of an elimina-
tion rule and to require their removability from deductions. The main part of
the paper consists in a proof of a normalisation theorem for bilateral logic. The
closing sections address philosophical concerns whether the proof provides a sat-
isfactory solution to the problem at hand and confronts bilateralists with the
dilemma that a bilateral notion of stability sits uneasily with the core bilateral
thesis.
1 Introduction
It is a commonly held view that the meanings of the expressions of a language are
determined by the use its speakers make of them. One way of giving substance
to this view is to propose that that use can be systematised for the hypothetical
project of constructing a theory of meaning for a language in terms of the conditions
of the correct assertibility of sentences containing the expressions. This is the course
taken by Dummett [2, 3]. Bilateralism, by contrast, is the view that the meanings of
expressions are determined not only in terms of the conditions for the correct assert-
ibility of sentences containing them, but by these in tandem with the conditions for
I thank Julien Dutant, Dorothy Edgington, Keith Hossack, Guy Longworth and Mark Textor for
discussions about assertion and denial and audiences in Lecce, Łódź and Stirling for their comments.
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their correct deniability. The view was proposed in response to Dummett by Price,
who ‘takes the fundamental notion for a recursive theory of sense to be not assertion
conditions alone, but these in conjunction with rejection, or denial conditions’ [20,
162]. We may distinguish the two views by calling the former unilateralism.
Unilateralism and bilateralism provide alternative forms for a theory of meaning
for an entire language, but I will here only consider their restrictions to the logical
constants of propositional logic. In that region of language, Dummett’s insights
coupled with important contributions by Prawitz have lead to the development of
proof-theoretic semantics, an alternative to truth-theoretic semantics. Whereas in
the latter the meanings of the logical constants are given in terms of their contri-
butions to the truth conditions of sentences containing them, the principal tenet of
proof-theoretic semantics is that their meanings are determined by the use of such
sentences in deductive arguments.
In this paper I will present a problem for bilateral proof-theoretic semantics in
the form of bilateral connectives that are comparable to Prior’s tonk. But whereas
tonk can be excluded from unilateral logic on principled grounds that form part
of the philosophical background of proof-theoretic semantics, the issue is more in-
volved in the case of bilateralism. The main part of the paper contains a proof of
a normalisation theorem for a system of bilateral classical logic. This provides a
solution of sorts to the problem, but it also has certain philosophical drawbacks. In
particular, the proof appeals to an unrestricted version of a bilateral principle of
non-contradiction, while Rumfitt requires this principle to be restricted to atomic
premises. Secondly, the solution is based on a redefinition of the notion of a maxi-
mal formula, and it may be objected that the solution therefore merely constitutes
a change of subject. I conclude that it would appear that the best solution appeals
to bilateral analogues of Prawitz’s inversion principle. These are desirable in any
case and for independent reasons. Appeal to such principles, however, endangers
the core thesis of bilateralism and threatens collapse it into unilateralism.
2 A System of Bilateral Classical Logic
Proof-theoretic semantics along Dummett’s and Prawitz’s lines arguably does not
go any further than intuitionist logic. From their perspective, the rules governing
classical negation are defective. Advocates of bilateralism claim that this situation
is rectified in their framework. They recommend the use of systems of natural de-
duction with two kinds of rules: For each connective c, there are assertive rules
specifying the grounds for and consequences of asserting a formula with c as main
operator, and rejective rules specifying the grounds for and consequences of denying
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such a formula. The most prominent such system has been proposed by Rumfitt
[22], building on work by Smiley [23].1 Rumfitt’s system is intended to satisfy Dum-
mett’s requirements for when the rules of inference governing a connective specify
its meaning: they do so if they are in harmony or, more precisely, stable [1, Chapters
11-13]. The aim is to provide ‘a direct specification of the senses of the connectives
in terms of their deductive use’ [22, 805], where the premises and conclusions of rules
of inference are assertions and denials.
Formulas in the system B of bilateral classical logic are signed by +, indicating
asserted formulas, or −, indicating denied ones. ⊥ indicates the incoherence that
arises from asserting and denying the same formula. Deductions do not begin with
⊥. Lower case Greek letters α, β range over signed formulas, φ may also be ⊥. α∗
designates the result of reversing α’s sign from + to− or conversely. The terminology
follows Rumfitt, and the rules of B are his [22, 800ff].
Deductions in B have the familiar tree shape, with the (discharged or undis-
charged) assumptions at the top-most nodes or leaves and the conclusion at the
bottom-most node or root. Every assumption in a deduction belongs to an assump-
tion class, marked by a natural number, different numbers for different assumption
classes. Formula occurrences of different types must belong to different assumption
classes. Formula occurrences of the same type may, but do not have to, belong to
the same assumption class. Discharge of assumptions is marked by a square bracket
around the formula: [α]i, where i is a label for the assumption class to which α
belongs. If the assumption is discharged, the label is repeated at the application
of the rule. The formulas in an assumption class are discharged all together or not
at all. Empty assumption classes are permitted for vacuous discharge, when a rule
that allows for the discharge of assumptions is applied with no assumptions being
discharged. The conclusion of a deduction is said to depend on the undischarged
assumptions of the deduction. Similar terminology is applied to subdeductions of
deductions.
Upper case Greek letters Σ, Π, Ξ, possibly with subscripts or superscripts, de-
note deductions. Often some of the assumptions and the conclusion of the deduction
are mentioned explicitly at the top and bottom of Σ, Π, Ξ. Using the same des-
ignation more than once to denote subdeductions of a deduction means that these
subdeductions are exact duplicates of each other except that assumption classes may
be different: the deductions have the same structure, and at every node formulas of
the same type are premises and conclusions of applications of the same rules.2
Definition 1 (Deduction in B).
1Humberstone proposed a similar system at the same time as Rumfitt [10].
2The layout of natural deduction used here follows [25].
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(i) The formula occurrence + A n is a deduction in B of + A from the undischarged
assumption + A, and − A n is one of − A from the undischarged assumption − A,
where n marks the assumption class to which + A, − A belong.
(ii) If Σ, Π, Ξ are deductions in B, then so are the following, where the conclusion
depends on the undischarged assumptions of Σ, Π, Ξ except those in assumption
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− B− ∨ I: − A ∨B
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− B− ⊃ I: − A ⊃ B
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− A ⊃ B− ⊃ E: + A
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− A ⊃ B
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− A+¬I: + ¬A
Π




+ A−¬I: − ¬A
Π








(iii) Nothing else is a deduction in B.
Rumfitt calls reductio and non-contradiction co-ordination principles. They have
the character of structural rules required by the formal framework of bilateral logic
to regulate the interaction between +, − and ⊥.3
According to Rumfitt, non-contradiction must be restricted to atomic premises
[22, 815f]. His reason is that on a bilateral account of meaning, only the atomic
sentences are co-ordinated primitively by non-contradiction: it is a consequence of
how their use is specified in terms of the conditions of their correct assertibility and
deniability. That the complex sentences are also so co-ordinated is a consequence
of co-ordination at the atomic level and how the meanings of the connectives are
specified by their assertive and rejective rules. By contrast, I will not impose this
restriction on non-contradiction.
It is generally considered to be a necessary requirement for a system of natural
deduction to be satisfactory from the perspective of proof-theoretic semantics that
deductions in it normalise. In unilateral logic, a deduction is in normal form if it
contains no maximal formulas, where a maximal formula is one that is the conclu-
sion of an introduction rule and major premise of an elimination rule for its main
connective. This definition carries over to B, only that maximal formulas are signed
by + or −. In section 4 it will be shown that such formulas, and further undesirable
ones, can indeed be removed from deductions in B. The proof of this more general
result requires the unrestricted version of non-contradiction.
3An alternative version of reductio avoids the use of ⊥: from Γ, α∗ ` β and ∆, α∗ ` β∗, infer
Γ,∆ ` α. An intuitionist bilateral logic has been formalised in [12]. It fulfils the requirements
Rumfitt imposes on a satisfactory bilateral logic, and hence the claim that only classical bilateral
logic can do so is false. For an informal argument against the view that bilateralism inevitably leads
to classicism, see [13]. The stipulation that nothing can be both asserted and denied addresses the
problem with negation in intuitionist logic noted in [11].
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3 Some Principles of Proof-Theoretic Semantics
Proof-theoretic semantics has its roots in a comment of Gentzen’s, who formulated
the rudiments of a theory of meaning for the connectives:
The introductions constitute, so to speak, the “definitions” of the sym-
bols concerned, and the eliminations are in the end only consequences
thereof, which could be expressed thus: In the elimination of a sym-
bol, the formula in question, whose outer symbol it concerns, may only
“be used as that which it means on the basis of the introduction of this
symbol”. [8, 189]
Gentzen’s comment is the foundation of Prawitz’s inversion principle: ‘an elimi-
nation rule is, in a sense, the inverse of the corresponding introduction rule: by an
application of an elimination rule one essentially only restores what had already been
established if the major premise of the application was inferred by an application of
an introduction rule [...;] nothing is “gained” by inferring a formula through intro-
duction for use as a major premiss in an elimination.’ [19, 33f] Prawitz proposes the
normalisability of deductions as a formal criterion for when the inversion principle
is met.
According to Dummett, the meanings of expressions are determined by two as-
pects of their use, their contributions to the grounds for asserting sentences in which
they occur and to the consequences of asserting such sentences [1, 211ff]. The con-
nectives are a particularly clear cases of how this insight may be applied. The
introduction rules for a connective specify the canonical grounds for deriving a for-
mula with that connective as main operator, and its elimination rules specify the
canonical consequences that follow from such a formula. For the rules governing a
connective to determine its meaning completely, the two aspects of their use must
be stable.
Prawitz’s inversion principle captures the thought that the elimination rules for
a connective c should not licence the deduction of more formulas from a formula
with c as main operator than are justified by the grounds of its assertion as specified





The elimination rule of tonk licences the derivation of too many consequences from







The rules for tonk do not satisfy Prawitz’s inversion principle.
Prawitz’s inversion principle is not enough for meaning-theoretical purposes.
Consider a connective with the introduction rule of conjunction but only one of its
elimination rules. Something is missing: its elimination rule does not permit the
use of the connective in all the ways one should be able to use it relative to its
introduction rule.
Prawitz’s inversion principles spells out the notion of harmony. Dummett’s no-
tion of stability consists in harmony together with a suitable convers. The latter,
as Moriconi and Tesconi note [17, 111], is provided by an inversion principle of
Negri’s and von Plato’s: ‘Whatever follows from the direct grounds for deriving a
proposition must follow from the proposition’ [18, 6]. The elimination rules for a
connective should licence the deduction of all the consequences from a formula with
that connective as main operator that are justified relative to its introduction rules.4
Notice that tonk satisfies Negri’s and von Plato’s inversion principle: whatever
follows from the direct grounds for deriving AtonkB follows from AtonkB. Conse-
quently, as Prawitz’s inversion principle is tied to normalisation, it is a notion in-
teresting enough to be considered by itself, whereas a suitable converse of Prawitz’s
inversion principle, such as Negri’s and von Plato’s, is usually considered only in
combination with Prawitz’s.
If both inversion principles are satisfied, stability obtains and the elimination
rules for a connective license the deduction of all and only the consequences from a
sentence with the connective as main operator that are justified by the grounds for
deriving it as specified by its introduction rules.
4 Bilateral Dissonance
Consider the connective conk:










conk means trouble. Given reductio, the assertion of any formula follows from the
assertion of any formula:








The denial of any formula also follows from the denial of any formula:
1+ AconkB




Notice that conk permits the restriction of non-contradiction to atomic premises.
Next consider the connective honk:










honk, too, means trouble. Given reductio, the assertion of any formula follows from
the denial of any formula:
1− AhonkB




The denial of any formula follows from the assertion of any formula:
1+ AhonkB




honk also permits the restriction of non-contradiction to atomic premises.
The rules for conk and honk appear to be just as good as the rules for the connec-
tives of B. They combine old rules in novel ways. Like tonk, conk combines rules for
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conjunction and disjunction, only this time they are bilateral rules and all assertive
rules for conjunction and all rejective rules for disjunction are used. honk combines
the rejective rules for implication with assertive rules that would be correct for an-
other connective. But unlike tonk, conk and honk have the rather unusual feature
that although adding them to B gives an incoherent system, maximal formulas that
arise from concluding AconkB or AhonkB by an introduction rule and using them
as major premises of an elimination rule may be removed from deductions by the
same reduction procedures that remove such maximal formulas with conjunction,
disjunction or implication as main connectives.
The rules for the connectives of B satisfy bilateral versions of the inversion
principles. The assertive elimination rules for a connective ofB license the deduction
of all and only the consequences from an asserted sentence with the connective as
main operator that are justified by the grounds for deriving it as specified by its
assertive introduction rules. The rejective elimination rules for a connective of B
licence the deduction of all and only the consequences from a denied sentence with
the connective as main operator that are justified by the grounds for deriving it as
specified by its rejective introduction rules. Unlike tonk, the rules for conk and honk
also satisfy these bilateral inversion principles.5
It is evident where the problem lies. In the bilateral framework, it is not enough
that inversion principles balance the grounds and consequences of asserting a formula
and others balance the grounds and consequences of denying a formula. There also
needs to be a sort of stability between the assertive and the rejective rules for a
connective, a kind of inversion that balances the grounds and consequences of the
assertion and the denial of a formula.
The issue can also be put in terms of the question why the rejective and the
assertive rules for a connective of B are rules for the same connective. What is it,
for instance, that makes the assertive rules for the symbol ∧ and the rejective rules
for the symbol ∧ rules for conjunction? What justifies the use of the same symbol in
both cases? We are, of course, able to recognise that the two sets of rules are intended
to be rules for the same connective. But this depends on our previous understanding
of the connectives, while the aim was to specify their meanings completely in terms
of the rules governing them. It should not be down to our grasp of their meanings
that we can recognise which rules belong to which connective, but solely down to
5Gabbay has also proposed a connective that satisfies the bilateral inversion principles but leads
to incoherence [7]. conk and honk, however, are worse than Gabbay’s connective, as they satisfy
an additional requirement concerning the proper subformulas of premises and conclusions of rules
of inference. An exposition of the precise nature of this requirement and why it may reasonably be
imposed on rules that are to determine the meanings of the connectives they govern completely is
the subject of a piece currently in preparation.
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the meaning-theoretical framework. Without addressing this question, bilateralists
cannot claim that the meanings of the connectives of B are determined completely
by the rules of inference governing them, and should this be their objective, they
have no right to use the same symbol in the two sets of rules governing a connective.
Inversion principles that link the assertive and the rejective rules for a connective
would answer the question raised in the previous paragraphs. There is, however,
also another possible diagnosis of what has gone wrong in the four deductions,
and this leads to a result of independent interest. In each of them, a complex
formula is the conclusion of reductio and major premise of an elimination rule.
Reductio provides grounds for the assertion and denial of formulas. These should be
in harmony with the consequences of asserting and denying them as specified by the
respective elimination rules for their main connective. This motivates the demand
that formulas that are conclusion of reductio and major premise of an elimination
rule should be removable from deductions.
Furthermore, inferences by non-contradiction draw consequences from formulas
which should be in harmony with the grounds for deriving them. Finally, reduc-
tio and non-contradiction should presumably be in harmony with each other, too,
although this has nothing to do with the connectives, but rather with the formal
framework of bilateral logic.
These formulas also count as maximal in the normalisation theorem for deduc-
tions in B that is proved in the next section.
5 Normalisation for B
This section contains a proof of a normalisation theorem for deductions in B.6
Definition 2. The degree of a signed formula + A or − A is the number of connec-
tives occurring in A.
⊥ is not a signed formula and gets degree 0.
Definition 3. Amaximal signed formula is an occurrence of a formula in a deduction
that is one of the following:
(a) conclusion of an introduction rule and major premise of an elimination rule;
6The reader is invited to compare it with Stålmarck’s proof of normalisation for unilateral
classical logic [24]. There is some resemblance, if − is read as negation. However, as B has a larger
number of operational rules than Stålmarck’s system, certain complications that arise in Stålmarck’s
proof do not arise here. In particular, there is no need to consider assumption contractions separately
from reduction steps for maximal formulas. The larger number of rules also requires reduction steps
for which there are no equivalents in Stålmarck’s proof.
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(b) conclusion of reductio and major premise of an elimination rule;
(c) conclusion of reductio and premise of non-contradiction;
(d) conclusion of an introduction rule and premise of non-contradiction the other
premise of which is also the conclusion of an introduction rule.
For brevity, I will mostly use ‘maximal formula’ instead of ‘maximal signed formula’.
To distinguish the four kinds of maximal formulas, I will call those of kind
(a) maximal formulas with introduction and elimination rules or i/e maximal for-
mulas; those of kind (b) maximal formulas with reductio and elimination rules or
r/e maximal formulas; those of kind (c) maximal formulas with reductio and non-
contradiction or r/nc maximal formulas; and those of kind (d) maximal formulas
with introduction rules and non-contradiction or i/nc maximal formulas.
Formulas of the third and fourth kind are clearly ‘maximal’ in some sense, even
though the philosophical reasons for requiring the removability of maximal formulas
of the first (and perhaps the second) kind may not apply to them. They have been in-
cluded here to ensure that deductions in normal form have the subformula property.
For Rumfitt, i/nc maximal formulas do not arise, as he restricts non-contradiction
to atomic premises. The reduction steps to remove r/e maximal formulas where the
elimination rule is + ∨E or −∧E require the general version of non-contradiction.
Definition 4 (Segment, Length and Degree of a Segment, Maximal Segment).
(a) A segment is a sequence of two or more formula occurrences C1 . . . Cn in a
deduction such that C1 is not the conclusion of +∨E or −∧E, Cn is not the minor
premise of + ∨ E or − ∧ E, and for every i < n, Ci is minor premise of + ∨ E or
− ∧ E and Ci+1 its conclusion.
(b) The length of a segment is the number of formula occurrences of which it consists,
its degree is their degree.
(c) A segment is maximal if and only if its last formula is major premise of an
elimination rule or premise of non-contradiction.
I will say that the formula occurrence Ci is on segment C1 . . . Cn. A segment is above
another one in a deduction if its last formula is above the other’s first formula. I
will speak of segments being the premises or conclusions of the rules of which their
last or first formulas are premises or conclusions.
Prawitz only counts a segment as maximal if it begins with the conclusion of
an introduction rule [19, 49]. The more general notion used here is also used by
Troestra and Schwichtenberg in the proof of normalisation for intuitionist logic [25,
179]. For philosophical reasons, the more general notion is called for, as it must
be ensured that + ∨ E and − ∧ E do not introduce grounds for the derivation of
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formulas that are not in balanced by the elimination rules for their main operators.
This is irrespective of how the first formula of the segment is derived.7
Definition 5. A deduction is in normal form if it contains neither maximal formulas
nor maximal segments.
The reduction steps to be given next remove maximal formulas and maximal seg-
ments from deductions. Applying then in the systematic fashion specified in the
proof of the normalisation theorem transforms any deduction into a deduction in
normal form. ; indicates that the deduction to its left or above it is transformed
into the deduction on its right or below it. I will call the deduction to which a
reduction step is applied the original deduction and the result of the application the




means that the deduction on top is used to conclude all formulas in the assumption
class [A].
(A) Permutative Reduction Steps for Maximal Segments
The lower application of the elimination rule or of non-contradiction is permuted
upwards to conclude with a minor premise of +∨E or −∧I. Here are two examples,
the others being similar.
(1) The maximal segment consists of formula occurrences of the form + C ∨D,
















































7See [15, Ch 2] for more on these philosophical reasons.
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If some occurrence of φ forms part of a maximal segment in the original deduction,
the permutative reduction step increases its length in the reduced deduction. In the
proof of the normalisation theorem a strategy will be given to avoid increasing the
length of a maximal segment of the same or higher degree than the one shortened or
removed: in a nutshell, apply the reduction step to the rightmost segment of highest
degree first. Furthermore, it needs to be ensured that the reduction step does not
duplicate maximal formulas and segments of highest degree in Σ1 and Σ2: to do so
it is applied to a topmost maximal segment of highest degree, one above which there
is none other of highest degree.
































The reduction step shortens the right segment, but if the left premise of non-
contradiction is a maximal formula or the last formula of a segment, it duplicates
it. As α and α∗ have the same degree, it needs to be ensured that the step actually
reduces the complexity of the deduction. So for the purpose of the proof of normali-
sation, the right premise of reductio will be counted as having a degree of one higher
than the left premise, if both premises are maximal. This decides the question to
which premise of reductio a reduction step is applied first in this and other cases.
(B) Reduction Steps for Maximal Formulas
(a) Reduction Steps for Maximal Formulas with Introduction and Elimination Rules
These are not essentially different from those for intuitionist logic given by Prawitz,
except that now a + or − is carried along in front of formulas, and there are addi-
tional reduction steps for the signed negations of formulas. The reduction steps for
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maximal formulas of the forms + A ∨ B and − A ∧ B are similar to those Prawitz
gives for disjunctions, those for maximal formulas of the forms − A∨B, + A∧B and
− A ⊃ B are similar to those Prawitz gives for conjunctions, those for maximal for-
mulas of the form + A ⊃ B are similar to those Prawitz gives for implications, and
the reduction steps for maximal formulas of the forms + ¬A and − ¬A are evident
enough. Applying such a reduction step may introduce new maximal formulas and
segments into the reduced deduction, but they are of lower degree than the maximal
formula removed from the original deduction. In cases of maximal formulas of the
form + A ⊃ B, + A∨B and − A∧B, the reduced deduction may contain multiple
copies of subdeductions of the original deduction: to avoid multiplying maximal for-
mulas or segments of the same or higher degree than the one removed, in the proof
of the normalisation theorem the reduction steps are applied to maximal formulas of
highest degree such that no maximal formulas or segments of highest degree stand
above them or above the minor premises of the elimination rule of which they are
the major premises.
(b) Reduction Steps for Maximal Formulas with Reductio and Elimination Rules
In the first three reduction steps below, if + A or − A is major premise of an
elimination rule or premise of non-contradiction in Σ, the reduction step introduces
a new r/e or r/nc maximal formula of lower degree than the one removed, which
presents no problem for the proof of normalisation. In the fourth case, a more
difficult issue arises.














If any occurrences of − A ∧ B in the assumption class [− A ∧ B]i of the original
deduction are major premises of − ∧ E, then the reduction step introduces new
i/e maximal formulas into the reduced deduction that have the same degree as the
r/e maximal formula removed from the original deduction. Remove them as part
of the present reduction step by applying the reduction step for i/e formulas of
the form − A ∧ B to each of them immediately after the transformation above:
this creates at worst new maximal formulas of lower degree than the ones removed.
Similarly if any occurrences of − A ∧ B in the assumption class [− A ∧ B]i of the
original deduction are premises of non-contradiction the other premise of which is
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also derived by an introduction rule: then new i/nc maximal formulas are introduced
into the deduction, which are removed immediately after the transformation above
as part of the step, and then, as the reduction procedures for such formulas to be
given below show, at worst maximal formulas of lower degree arise.
The case where + B has been derived by + ∧ E is similar, and so are the cases
for r/e maximal formulas of the form − A ∨B.














As in case (1), the reduction step may introduce new i/e or i/nc maximal formulas
of the same degree as the r/e maximal formula removed, and this is dealt with in the
same way: apply the relevant reduction steps immediately after the transformation
above as part of the reduction step for r/e maximal formulas of the form − ¬A.
The case for r/e maximal formulas of the form + ¬A is similar.
(3) There are three options for maximal formulas arising from reductio and
elimination rules for implication:
(i) The r/e maximal formula has the form + B ⊃ A:
[− B ⊃ A]i
Π
⊥







+ B [− A]i





The reduction step may introduce new i/e or i/nc maximal formulas of the same
degree as the r/e maximal formula removed, and this is dealt with as in previous
cases.
(ii) The r/e maximal formula has the form − B ⊃ A and − A is concluded:
[+ B ⊃ A]i
Π
⊥












The reduction step may introduce new i/e or i/nc maximal formulas of the same
degree as the r/e maximal formula removed, and this is dealt with as in previous
cases.
(iii) The r/e maximal formula has the form − A ⊃ B and + A is concluded:
[+ A ⊃ B]i
Π
⊥













The reduction step may introduce new i/e or i/nc maximal formulas of the same
degree as the r/e maximal formula removed, and this is dealt with as in previous
cases.8





























8If non-contradiction is restricted to atomic premises, then the reduction step is incomplete:
if A is not atomic, the application of non-contradiction must be replaced by applications of non-
contradiction to atomic subformulas of A. This, however, poses no difficulty, as A is of lower degree
than the r/e maximal formula removed.
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If α in the original deduction is ⊥, non-contradiction is not applicable, but also not
necessary: conclude − A and − B directly by reductio in the reduced deduction.
The reduction step for r/e maximal formulas of the form − A ∨B is similar.
Π1 and Π2 get multiplied as many times as there are assumptions in assumption
class [− A ∨ B]i, so it must be ensured that when choosing a maximal formula
to which to apply the reduction step, Π1 and Π2 contain no maximal formulas or
segments of highest degree. The same strategy indicated for i/e maximal formulas
works here: choose a maximal formula of highest degree such that no maximal
formula or segment of highest degree stands above it or above the minor premises
of the elimination rule of which it is the major premise.
The reduction step may introduce new i/e or i/nc maximal formulas of the same
degree as the r/e maximal formula removed, and this is dealt with as in previous
cases. There are also three further cases to be considered.
First, if α is major premise of an elimination rule in Σ, the reduction step may
introduce an r/e maximal formula of unknown degree into the reduced deduction.
In that case, however, α is the last formula of a maximal segment in the original
deduction. To show that any deduction can be brought into one in normal form, the
proof of the normalisation theorem describes a method that systematically removes
all maximal formulas and segments from a deduction, beginning with those of highest
degree: thus if the reduction step is applied as part of this process, α cannot be of
higher degree than + A ∨ B. In the reduction steps for maximal segments and i/e
maximal formulas it was noted that they are applied to maximal formulas of highest
degree such that no maximal formulas of highest degree stand above them or the
minor premises of the rule of which they are major premises. We need to ensure
that in case the occurrence of α in Σ is the last formula of a maximal segment of
the same degree as + A∨B or forms part of such a maximal segment that continues
in Σ, then the relevant permutative reduction step is applied to the segment first.
The procedure indicated in the permutative reduction steps works here, too. If both
have no maximal formulas or segments of highest degree above them, we apply the
relevant reduction step to the rightmost one first, that is to one of which α forms
part in this case. It’ll be made more precise what ‘rightmost’ means in the proof of
the normalisation theorem.
Second, if α is the conclusion of reductio in Π1 or Π2, the reduction step may in-
troduce an r/nc maximal formula of unknown degree into the reduced deduction. In
that case, the application of non-contradiction in the reduced deduction is redundant
and dropped from the reduction step. For example, suppose the last application of a
rule in Π1 is reductio. Then Π1 has a subdeduction that derives ⊥ from assumption
classes [+ A]i and [α∗], so conclude − A directly by reductio, discharging formulas in
the assumption class [+ A]i, and assign the formulas in the assumption class [α∗] in
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Π1 to the new assumption class iii and discharge them at the application of reductio
that concludes with the α on top of Σ. Similarly if the last application of a rule in
Π2 is reductio, and if that is the last rule in both.
Third, if α is the last formula of a segment in Π1 or Π2, then the reduction step
introduces a new maximal segment into the deduction: remove it by permuting the
application of non-contradiction upwards as described in the permutative reduction
steps above as part of the reduction step. There remains one troublesome case
to be taken care of: if the first formula of the segment is concluded by reductio
in the original deduction, permuting non-contradiction upwards introduces an r/nc
maximal formula of unknown degree into the reduced deduction. A version of the
strategy of the previous paragraph works in this case, too. If the first formula of the
segment is derived by reductio, we already have a subdeduction Π′1 of Π1 of ⊥ from
[+ A]i and [α∗] or a subdeduction Π′2 of Π2 of ⊥ from [+ B]ii and [α∗]. So conclude
− A or − B directly by reductio without the redundant step of non-contradiction
and assign the formulas in the assumption class [α∗] of Π′1 or Π′2 to assumption class
iii, discharging them at the lower application of reductio marked in the reduction
step. This leaves those assumptions in Π′1 or Π′2 undischarged that were discharged
by applications of + ∨ E or − ∧ E that gave rise to the segments in Π1 or Π2: so
insert these applications before continuing with Σ, using the conclusion α of the
lower application of reductio as the required minor premise. If α is on a segment in
Σ, this increases its length. But notice that such a segment is either not maximal or
of lower degree than the r/e maximal formula removed, by the choice of the strategy
of choosing maximal segments or formulas in the proof of normalisation.
(c) Reduction Steps for Maximal Formulas with Reductio and Non-Contradiction
There are two options to be considered.
(1) The assumption discharged by the application of reductio is not premise of
non-contradiction. I give as an example the case where the left premise of non-















If any of the formulas in the assumption class [+ A]i is the major premise of an
elimination rule in Π and + A is the conclusion of an introduction rule or of reductio
in Σ, then the reduction step introduces i/e or r/e maximal formulas into the reduced
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deduction. However, in this case both premises of non-contradiction are maximal,
and the right one will be counted as one degree higher as the left one, and so the
maximal formula created by the reduction step is of lower degree than the one
removed. Similarly if + A is conclusion of + ∨ E or − ∧ E in Σ and any of the
formulas in the assumption class [+ A]i is major premise of an elimination rule in
Π: the new maximal segment is of degree one lower than the formula removed.
If the situation is the mirror image of the one displayed and reductio concludes
the left premise of non-contradiction, then the right premise is not conclusion of an
elimination rule, as that one would be removed first.
(2) The assumption discharged by reductio is premise of non-contradiction, say





















This reduction step does only what it is supposed to do: it removes one maximal
formula and introduces no complications.
(d) Reduction Steps for Maximal Formulas with Introduction Rules and Non-Contra-
diction
Two examples should suffice, the other cases being similar or obvious.









































Applying the reduction steps may introduce new maximal formulas into the reduced
deduction, but they are of lower degree than the maximal formulas removed from
the original deduction. Choice of maximal formula to which to apply the step avoids
duplicating maximal formulas of highest degree in Σ.
This completes the reduction steps for maximal formulas.
(C) Simplification Conversions
Applications of +∨E and −∧E with empty assumption classes are redundant and
may be removed from deductions.
This completes the description of the transformations of deductions applied in nor-
malisation.
The degree of a maximal formula or segment that is the right premise of reductio
the left premise of which is also a maximal formula or segment is the degree of the
formula (on the segment) plus 1. For all others, it is the degree of the formula (on the
segment). This also settles the question to which premise reduction steps for i/nc
maximal formulas are applied, although this is of comparatively minor significance.
Definition 6 (Rank of a Deduction). The rank of a deduction Π is the pair 〈d, l〉
where d is the highest degree of any maximal formula or segment in Π, and l is the
sum of the number of maximal formulas and the sum of the lengths of all maximal
segments in Π. If there are no maximal formulas or segments in Π, its rank is 0.
Ranks are ordered lexicographically: 〈d, l〉 < 〈d′, l′〉 iff either d < d′ or d = d′ and
l < l′.
As we have been rather explicit about the considerations necessary to ensure
that the complexity of a deduction is decreased in applying the reduction steps, the
proof of normalisation itself can thankfully be brief. All that remains is to explicate
the notion of a ‘rightmost’ maximal formula or segment. Here we follow Prawitz
[19, 50].
Theorem 1. Any deduction Π of α from Γ in B can be brought into a deduction in
normal form of α from some of Γ.
Proof. By induction over the rank of deductions and applying the reduction steps.
Take a maximal formula or maximal segment of highest degree such that (i) no
maximal formula or segment of highest degree stands above it in the deduction, (ii)
no maximal formula or segment of highest degree stands above a minor premise of the
elimination rule of which the maximal formula or segment is the major premises,
and (iii) no maximal segment of highest degree contains a formula that is minor
premise of the elimination rule of which the maximal formula or maximal segment




There are at least two reasons why not everyone will be satisfied that the proof of
section 5 solves the philosophical problems of section 4:
(1) It appeals to non-contradiction in its general form.
(2) The definition of ‘maximal signed formula’ merely changes the topic.
Let’s look at each charge in turn
In reduction step (B.b.4), the one for r/e maximal formulas of the form + A∨B
and − A ∧ B, non-contradiction is applied to arbitrary formulas α. According to
Rumfitt, if α is not atomic, the inference from α and α∗ to ⊥ needs to be replaced by
applications of non-contradiction to atomic subformulas of α. The difficulty is that
this may introduce new maximal formulas of unknown degree into the deduction.
Consider the construction that shows how to replace premises of the form C ∨D by
C and D:













Suppose in the original deduction displayed in the reduction step (B.b.4), α is a
disjunction on a segment that is the conclusion of +∨ I or −∧ I. If this segment is
major premise of +∨E or −∧E or non-contradiction, all is fine: either α has lower
degree than − A ∨B or its segment is removed first. If it is not, however, then the
procedure for removing complex premises of non-contradiction introduces maximal
formulas of unknown degree into the reduced deduction.
The bilateralist who insists on restricting non-contradiction to atomic premises
requires a different proof of normalisation from the one given here. Alternatively, the
bilateralist could treat ∧ and ∨ as defined in terms of ⊃ and ¬. One might also won-
der whether the restriction of non-contradiction to atomic premises is an essential
element of bilateralism. It is according to Rumfitt, but the current considerations
may constitute a recommendation to drop it.
Another option that solves the problems of section 4 would be to restrict reductio
to atomic conclusions. Ferreira observes that once non-contradiction is restricted to
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atomic premises, there may be no good reason not to restrict reductio correspond-
ingly [4, ]. Rumfitt’s reasons for restricting non-contradiction seem to apply just
as well to reductio. Reductio is a rule of the same kind as non-contradiction, a
structural rule concerning the co-ordination of assertion and denial.
Ferreira shows, however, that the resulting logic is not classical and contains
neither + A ∨ ¬A nor − A ∧ ¬A as theorems. This may not be so much a defect
of bilateralism, as rather the surprising or interesting result that the correct logic of
bilateralism is not classical logic, but a constructive logic with strong negation. This
is the position for which Wansing argues [26, ]. The current considerations may add
support to this line of thought. It certainly has something to be said for it. It was
noted by Gibbard that dropping reductio and non-contradiction altogether from B
gives a constructive logic with strong negation [9]. Reading − as ¬ and ignoring +,
it is Nelson’s logic of constructible falsity, also discussed by Prawitz [19, 96f]. While
Wansing’s logic adds further connectives, which require additional reduction steps,
the proof of section 5 also gives normalisation theorems for logics arising from B by
dropping non-contradiction and reductio or restricting both to atomic formulas.
In as much as bilateralism was supposed to justify classical logic, however, this
line of argument is problematic. Much of the motivation for bilateralism is to over-
come Dummettian objections to classical logic, in particular that the rules for classi-
cal negation are not stable. Many bilateralists will therefore prefer a different route
to excluding honk and conk.
Now for changing the subject. The requirement that r/e maximal formulas be
removable from deductions is rather different from the similar requirement on i/e
maximal formulas. The latter provides a formal criterion for fulfilment of Prawitz’s
inversion principle. Stability is a relation between the operational rules for a con-
nective, its introduction and elimination rules. The unilateral approach locates any
defects in rules for connectives in the operational rules governing them. The notion
of a maximal signed formula incorporates a relation between one rule and all elimi-
nation rules. That one rule is a structural rule, concerning the formal framework of
bilateralism, and so the notion of a maximal signed formula incorporates aspects of
a rather different kind than those on which proof-theoretic semantics was originally
built.
This objection does, I think, show something, but not that something is wrong
with the present notion of a maximal signed formula. It rather exhibits a short-
coming of bilateralism. There must obtain some balance in the inferential powers
of reductio and the other rules. If the rather obvious way of capturing that balance
employed here is objectionable, so much the worse for bilateralism.
Where I would agree is that the solution proposed here does not really go to the
heart of the matter of what is wrong with conk and honk. The problem with tonk
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lies in the mismatch of its introduction and elimination rules. One would expect a
comparable diagnosis of the problem with conk and honk from bilateralism: it lies
in a mismatch of their assertive and their rejective rules. Locating the problem with
conk and honk in reductio is not to the point. One should expect bilateral inversion
principles that provide a general basis on which to diagnose mismatch of operational
rules, just as the inversion principles in the unilateral context do, where these cut
across the divide of assertive and rejective rules.
7 Conclusion
The most promising solution to the problem of section 4 would be to formulate
a bilateral notion of stability that incorporates bilateral inversion principles and a
notion harmony between the assertive and the rejective rules of the connectives.
One proposal of how to do this has been formulated by Francez [5]. His no-
tion of vertical harmony holds between assertive introduction and elimination rules
and rejective introduction and elimination rules, while horizontal harmony holds
between assertive and rejective introduction rules. Francez modifies horizontal har-
mony slightly in a later paper, where it is also noted that it provides a notion of
harmony between rejective and assertive elimination rules [6]. Another proposal is
by the present author [14].9
There are, however, reasons to believe that adopting a bilateral notion of stability
would be counterproductive for the bilateralist.
In the unilateral framework, there are two aspects of the use, and thus meaning,
of the connectives in deductive arguments: one is captured by the introduction rules
and the other by the elimination rules for a connective. These aspects must be in
harmony, or more precisely stable, and satisfy the inversion principles. Following
Gentzen, the introduction rules for the connectives define their meanings, and the
elimination rules are consequences thereof. Following Dummett and Prawitz, they
are consequences in the sense that they are determined from the introduction rules
by the inversion principles. As stability is a requirement on rules that are to define
the meanings of the connectives completely, the process could be reversed and the
elimination rules taken as prior and the introduction rules determined from them.
Transpose this to the bilateral case. The motivating thesis of bilateralism is that
the meanings of the expressions of a language are determined by the conditions of
the correct assertibility and the correct deniability of sentences of which they form
part. The bilateralist agrees that stability must obtain between the introduction
9Both proposals allow the bilateralist to rule out the bilateral intuitionist logic of [12], the rules
of which, it must be admitted, are not as nicely symmetrical as those of B.
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and elimination rules for the connectives. Let’s follow Gentzen again and pick the
introduction rules as those that define the meaning of a connective, while its elimi-
nation rules are consequences of them by the bilateral notion of stability. honk and
conk show that we cannot simply lay down assertive and rejective introduction rules
for a connective. They, too, must be balanced by the bilateral notion of stability.
But this means that only one kind of introduction rules defines the meaning of the
connective, and the other is a consequence by bilateral stability.
In the absence of a principled way of deciding between the two kinds of intro-
duction rules, we might as well pick the assertive introduction rules as defining the
meanings of the connectives, all others being determined from them by bilateral
stability. And now the situation looks awkward for the bilateralist. The bilateralist
claims that the meanings of the connectives are defined by the assertive and rejective
rules governing them. A closer look into the matter reveals that they are defined by
the assertive introduction rules. That is exactly the thesis of the unilateralist. All
introduction rules of unilateral logic are assertive.
Nothing hangs on the choice of assertive introduction rules as defining meaning.
To rule out conk and honk, and to emulate the notion of stability of the unilateral
approach, the bilateralist needs inversion principles that determine the three other
sets of rules for a connective from any given one. Still, it is only one aspect of
the use of the connective that defines its meaning, the others being consequences
by stability, not two of them, as claimed by the bilateralist. It is not the assertive
rules in tandem with rejective rules that determine the meaning of a connective, but
only one half of one of those two aspects – either the assertive introduction rules,
or the assertive elimination rules, or the rejective introduction rules, or the rejective
elimination rules – the rest being determined by bilateral stability. Thus it looks as
if adopting a bilateral notion of stability means that the characteristically bilateral
thesis on how meanings are determined is effectively abandoned, and bilateralism
collapses into a form of unilateralism.
This looks like a dilemma for bilateralists. Formulate a bilateral notion of stabil-
ity, or else face conk and honk. But if you do the former, face giving up bilateralism.
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Abstract
Extensions of traditional syllogistics have been increasingly researched in
philosophy, linguistics, and areas such as artificial intelligence and computer
science in recent decades. This is mainly due to the fact that syllogistics is seen
as a logic that comes very close to natural language abilities. Various forms
of extended syllogistics have become established. This paper deals with the
question to what extent a syllogistic representation in CL diagrams can be seen
as a form of extended syllogistics. It will be shown that the ontology of CL
enables numerically exact assertions and inferences.
Keywords: Diagrammatic Reasoning, Extended Syllogistics, Ontology, Natural
Logic, Generalized Quantifiers.
1 Introduction
‘Calculus CL’ is a specific kind of logic diagram which is named in honor of the
so-called ‘Cubus Logicus’, designed by the German philosopher Johann Christian
Lange. At the beginning of the 18th century, Lange published his plans, based
on diagrammatic reasoning, to build a logic machine. His idea was based on the
combination of all features of diagrams which were well known during that time,
esp. tree diagrams, spatial logic diagrams (esp. Eulerian diagrams), and squares of
opposition.
One difference between Lange’s original cubus logicus and its modern version
CL already affects the technical use of Lange’s method: Lange’s idea was to have
a calculus for extended syllogistics, propositional logic, modal syllogistics, etc. This
should be achieved by only one mechanical device. Unlike Lange’s machine, the
modern diagrammatic interpretation CL requires various diagrams to depict a spe-
cific ontology and to prove inferential reasoning. This is one of the reasons why the
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name ‘Calculus CL’ was chosen instead of ‘cubus logicus’: the new name draws at-
tention to Lange’s original idea of a logic machine, on the one hand, but it indicates
that the presented type of diagram is used in various other forms, on the other hand.
Furthermore, CL is not limited to techniques of 18th century-logic, although
Lange extended traditional Aristotelian and Stoic logic in a unique way. In the
last years, Lange diagrams and especially CL were used in various context of mod-
ern logic such as ontological reasoning [9], analogical reasoning [17], oppositional
geometry [10], bitstring semantics [22] and formal systems of propositional logic [6].
In the following, I will ask the question of what kind of extended syllogistics can
be implemented in CL. I will argue that an exact description of the ontology of CL
leads to the use of numerically exact assertions and inferences. Numerically exact
syllogistics means extending the traditional Aristotelian logic by adding expressions
such as There is exactly this and that p that is this and that q. Asser-
tions such as these can be represented and calculated by CL diagrams. Section 2
outlines some differences between traditional and modern extended syllogistics. In
contrast to most approaches in extended syllogistics, CL is based on a specific on-
tology. This is shown in Section 3. Concerning this specific ontology, CL comes
closer to traditional Aristotelian syllogistics. Taking a specific ontology as a basis,
this allows CL to apply exact assertions (Section 4) that are in turn the basis of
numerically exact syllogisms (Section 5). The aim of the following paper is not to
set up a formal system of CL, but to explain how one kind of extended syllogistics
can be applied in a CL diagram.
2 Syllogistics and Extendend syllogistics
In this section, I will give a short overview of what syllogistics is and then explain
what modern extensions of syllogistics have been researched in recent years. In
presenting traditional syllogistics, I will not mainly refer to Aristotle, as there are
numerous themes and topics that are controversial in research on Aristotle. I will,
therefore, outline a modern form of syllogistics as it was developed in the (early)
modern age, e.g. in [8].
Due to the scope of this section, I will also not be able to present all the extensions
of syllogistics that have been made, esp. in the last 50 years. My goal is to draw
attention to the topics and theses of syllogistics and extended syllogistics that are
taken over in CL or are treated differently in CL.
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2.1 Doctrines of Traditional Syllogistics
Traditional syllogistics consists of three consecutive doctrines based on various para-
digmatic books. Usually, all three doctrines (D1–D3) are understood composition-
ally, so that D1 is a prerequisite for D2 and D3 is a composition of D1+D2.
(D1) The first doctrine describes the function and structure of concepts. This
doctrine goes back to Porphyrius’ Isagoge, Seneca’s Ad Lucilium 58, Aristotle’s
Categoriae, and Metaphysica. It describes mainly high-order concepts, so-called
‘categories’, such as substance, quantity, quality, etc, and certain functions applied
on categories, so-called ‘predicables’, such as genus, species, difference, etc. With
the help of categories and predicables, ontologies can be formed in such a way that
they describe the conceptual structure and content of reality. All further doctrines
of syllogistics are composed of these ontologies.
(D2) Next, assertions are formed from concepts. This doctrine goes back mainly
to Aristotle’s De Interpretatione and various commentaries. An assertion is an affir-
mative or negative connection of a subject and a predicate in a proposition, which
is true if the referents of the subject and predicate terms are in the same positive or
negative relationship as the proposition indicates. Due to the quality, an assertion
can either be affirmative or negative; and due to the quantity it can either be univer-
sal or particular. Altogether there are four types of assertions, which are classified
by letters according to Petrus Hispanus’ mnemonics: A (universal affirmative), I
(particular affirmative), E (universal negative), O (particular negative). Further-
more, assertions can form oppositional relations and can be transformed by rules of
conversion.
(D3) Assertions are used (D3.1) to form inferences and (D3.2) to formulate
proofs, which in turn can be applied to other sciences. (D3.1) Assertoric and modal
inferences are described in Aristotele’s Analytica Priora. Inferences called ‘syllo-
gisms’ usually consist of three concepts that form three assertions, two of which are
the premises and one is the conclusion. (D3.2) Proofs that specific combinations of
premises and conclusions constitute a valid assertoric syllogism are formulated in
Aristotle’s Analytica Posteriora: If so-called ‘imperfect syllogisms’ can be reduced
to perfect ones with the help of the theory of conversion, the validity of the imperfect
syllogisms is proven. According to Theophrastus and Galenus, these syllogisms are
usually classified into four figures, and according to Petrus Hispanus these syllogisms
are assigned mnemonic names such as Barbara, Celarent, etc.
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2.2 Topics of Traditional Syllogistics
In the following, I describe some topics from D1–D3 that are important in both
extended syllogistics and CL.
According to D2, the four types of assertions are composed of a subject (S) and
a predicate (P ) as follows:
(A-assertion) SaP @x Spxq Ñ P pxq All S is P.
(E-assertion) SeP @x Spxq Ñ  P pxq No S is P.
(I-assertion) SiP Dx Spxq ^ P pxq Some S is P.
(O-assertion) SoP Dx Spxq ^  P pqxq Some S is not P.
These four assertions are in several oppositional relationships, namely contrarity






• For all CD-relations it holds that both assertions cannot be true together and
cannot be false together.
• For all CT -relations it holds that both assertions cannot be true together but
both can be false together.
• For all SCT -relations it holds that both assertions can be true together but
both cannot be false together.
• For all SB-relations it holds that the universal assertion entails the particular
one.
According to D3, a syllogism consists of three assertions. Each concept occurs
exactly twice, in distinct assertions of a syllogism. The concept that is found only
in the premises and thus connects S and P in the conclusion is called ‘medius’ M .
The four perfect syllogisms are characterized above all by the fact that they express
all four types of assertions in the conclusion:
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(A-conclusion) Barbara MaP, SaM $ SaP
(E-conclusion) Celarent MeP, SaM $ SeP
(I-conclusion) Darii MaP, SiM $ SiP
(O-conclusion) Ferio MeP, SiM $ SoP
2.3 Topics of Extended Syllogistics
Traditional syllogistics is usually regarded as a fragment of predicate logic and is thus
limited in its expressiveness. In the following, we will refer to any form of syllogistics
as extended that increases the expressivity of traditional syllogistics and thus goes
beyond the designated fragment of predicate logic. In contrast to artificial systems
of formal logic, syllogistics is considered to be very close to natural language (see
[1], [12]). This is of particular interest in the field of artificial intelligence, language
processing, and ontology engineering. After all, the goal here is to understand
or simulate natural human abilities. Furthermore, extended syllogistics are often
considered as independent logical systems, which are not regarded as fragments of
e.g. first-order logic, even if both have similarities.
Similar to an economic cycle, there are ‘periods of expansion and recession’ in
the history of extended syllogistics. Already in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages,
there were various extensions of syllogistics such as relational syllogisms in Galen,
Buridan et al. (cf. [16]). In the 17th and early 18th century there was another period
of expansion, as can be seen for example in the logics of Leibniz or Lange (cf. [8]).
After a long period of recession, several authors of the 19th century simultaneously
criticized that A-assertions, in particular, were formulated in an unclear manner,
since it is not obvious whether every S is identical either to only some P or to all
P (cf. [13]). This has aroused the suspicion that the four assertions of traditional
syllogistics fall too short.
Since the middle of the 19th century two approaches to extended syllogistics
developed from this criticism (cf. (cf. [4]): Hamilton added quantifiers at the
predicate position, such as (@x pSxq Ñ @y pPyqq Ñ x “ y. De Morgan, Boole and
Jevons introduced numerical syllogisms including counting quantifiers at the subject
and predicate position. This makes it possible to form definite assertions (using at
least, at most) or exact assertions (using exactly) such as 45 S (or more) are
each of them one of exactly 70 P (Dě45x Sx^ D70x Px).
With the beginning of Frege-Russell-Whitehead logic, syllogistics were often crit-
icized in the late 19th or early 20th century of not being able to express relations
or to make assertions that went beyond the categorical judgements. Syntax and
semantics did not appear to be clearly separated from each other, thus preventing
axiomatization. Furthermore, syllogistics were accused of the fact that concepts in
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assertions are only 1-place predicates, and previously developed extensions of the
syllogistics that include 2-place predicates were ignored for a long time.
Since the middle of the 20thcentury, these misinterpretations were gradually rel-
ativized (cf. [21]). A turning point came with Mostowski’s seminal paper On a
Generalization of Quantifiers in which a natural generalization of the logical quan-
tifiers were studied. This work was continued by numerous logicians and linguists in
fields such as natural semantics, generalized quantifier theory, Montague grammar,
term logic, or natural logic ([7]).
Since the 1980s one can speak of another peak period of (extended) syllogistics,
which has not only lasted until today but is increasing (cf. e.g. [23]). One reason
for this is that traditional syllogistics can not only be extended but can also be
interpreted as a kind of ‘natural logic’ (cf. [14], [21]). Syllogistics today is seen as the
prototype of a logic that comes closest to the natural linguistic abilities of concept
users. From this perspective, syllogistics has considerable potential for technical
areas in which human faculties are transferred to artificial systems (cf. [16]).
I refer here to three possible extensions of assertoric syllogistics, which are rele-
vant for the following considerations. All three types of extensions can be combined
with each other:
1) Relational Syllogistics is a kind of extended syllogistics using transitive verbs
between concepts, which can be reflexive, symmetric, transitive, etc.
2) Nummerical Syllogistics is a kind of extended syllogistics in which numerical
quantifiers such as at least, at most, exactly for cardinals k are involved.
3) Syllogistic Systems are a form of extended syllogistics in which axiomatizations
and rules are applied in order to obtain a sound and complete system or to increase
the expressiveness compared to other logic systems.
In recent years, for example, Pratt-Hartmann has researched on numerically
definite syllogistic, numerically definite relational syllogistics and has shown that
there is a relational syllogistic that is sound and complete [18], [20]. Furthermore,
Van Rooij has argued that there is an extended syllogistic that can complete the
fragment of propositional logic [21]. From this, it can be concluded that a very
large fragment of predicate logic can already be described with extended syllogistics
today. Moss goes even further and interprets various extensions of syllogistics as
independent fragments of natural language [15].
In the following, an extended syllogistics for CL is given, which differs in sev-
eral points from other current approaches. While most of today’s syllogistics start
directly with assertions (D2), inferences, or proofs (D3.1, D3.2), CL is based on a
previously defined ontology (D1), which is described in Section 3. Based on this on-
tology CL concretizes the numerically definite syllogistic (using at least, at most)
with exact quantifiers (using exactly). This will be shown in Sections 4 and 5.
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3 Ontologies in CL
Section 3.1 first defines the basic terms needed to construct and describe the ontology
of a CL diagram. In Section 3.2, two CL diagrams are constructed and explained
as examples.
3.1 Construction of a CL Diagram
A CL diagram has the shape of a square (2-d) or a cube (3-d) in order to represent
a well-structured ontology (cf. [5]). Various geometric forms can be applied to this
square or cube in order to analyse, depict, or prove logical relations given in the
ontology. In what follows, I will speak only of 2-d, not of 3-d CL diagrams. But one
can imagine a 3-d CL as a regular hexahedron including at least two squares that
work together in a similar way as described below for one square.
In general, a 2-d CL diagram consists of several rows of boxes that can have
different sizes and represent the extension of concepts or sets (called ‘classes’) and
objects or members (called ‘basics’). The latter is displayed in small solid boxes
on the bottom row of the square diagram, the former in larger solid boxes in the
upper rows. Since the classes consist of basics, the basics contained in classes are
represented in all higher rows by dotted lines inside of solid boxes. A solid box is
one in which all sides of the box are represented by solid lines. Dotted boxes are
rectangles with four dotted lines; however, several or even all dotted lines can be
covered by solid lines of a solid box. Since basics can be contained in classes but
contain nothing themselves, classes and basics can be easily distinguished: Classes
are solid boxes that contain dotted boxes. Basics are solid boxes that do not contain
dotted boxes. The following definitions repeat in brief what has been said:
Definition 1 (Solid and dotted boxes). A solid box in a CL diagram is a rectangle
bounded by four solid lines. A dotted box in a CL diagram is a rectangle bounded by
four dotted lines. If the line of a dotted box is at the same position as the line of a
solid box, then only the line of the solid box is visible in the CL diagram.
Definition 2 (Basics and classes). Basics are solid boxes at the bottom row of the
CL diagram which do not contain dotted boxes. Basics are represented in all higher
rows by dotted boxes. Classes are solid boxes (at all other rows above the row of
basics) which contain two or more dotted boxes.
Example. Let and be two adjacent basics at the bottom row of the CL
diagram, then they are represented by two adjacent dotted boxes, and , at
all higher rows in the diagram directly above the two given solid boxes. Since in all
higher rows at least two adjacent and represented basics form a class, is a class
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including and , which represent itselves and .
Two valid types of CL diagrams can be built, namely regular and irregular diagram
types. Both diagram types differ in the number of basics in the bottom row of the
square. The more basics a CL diagram has, the more classes can be constructed in
higher rows.
A regular CL diagram is based on 2n basics. Any CL diagram that is not based on
2n basics can be called irregular. According to definition (2), basics are illustrated
by small boxes of solid lines on the lowest row of the diagram. In a regular CL
diagram each 2-tuple of basics form one higher class which is depicted by a solid
box on the row above both basics. This box has the same horizontal length as the
pair of basics given below. Every class in a higher row is a formation of two classes
which are given below. In sum, each row has half as many boxes as the number of
boxes in the row below. However, all boxes in a row are distributed on the same
length as all boxes of basics together on the bottom row.
Since the number of basics determines the size of the CL diagram, the following
principle can be stated: the more basics there are, the more classes the CL diagram
contains and the larger it is. However, there is no limit to the size of the CL diagram,
which means that CL diagrams can be enlarged at will.
Numerous mathematical methods and models can be used to describe the on-
tology of a CL diagram. In the following, I will first use the descriptions already
introduced and add some definitions:
Definition 3 (Matrix). Each basic forms a column with a solid box at the bottom
row and dotted boxes directly above. In each higher row, the dotted boxes form a row
of classes, which is supplemented by further rows above, so that a square is formed.
Each solid and all dotted boxes can thus be described by the row index m and a




a11 a12 . . . a1n
a21 a22 . . . a2n
...
... . . .
...
am1 am2 . . . amn
fi
ffiffiffifl .
Since each class in a row comprises several columns, classes are described by a row
vector.
Definition 4 (Unique Identifier). Unique identifiers are symbols to represent boxes
or the set of boxes given in a CL diagram.
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For example, for each solid box, a unique identifier, such as the Roman alphabet
with capital letters, Σ “ tA, B, C...u, is given. For each dotted box, the row and
column index, as given in Def. 3, can be used as a unique identifier.
3.2 Examples of CL diagrams
In what follows, two examples, for regular square CL diagrams are shown. Ex1 will
illustrate a larger diagram with 8 basics and Ex2 a smaller one with 4 basics, which
will be used as an example in all following sections.
Ex1 shows a diagram including eight basics for m “ 4, i.e. H “ ra41s, I “
ra42s, J “ ra43s, . . . , O “ ra48s, which is thus called a CL8 diagram. The row vector
for m “ 3, including four solid boxes as classes, comprises D “ ra31 a32s, . . . , G “
ra37 a38s; for m “ 2, two solid boxes as classes comprises B “ ra21 a22 a23 a24s, C “
ra25 a26 a27 a28s; one solid box as the highest class comprises all columns or basics,
i.e A “ ra11 . . . a18s. The dotted boxes represent the basics contained in classes: For
example, the basic H is given in a41 and furthermore comprised in D as a31, in B
as a21 and in A as a11.
A
B C
D E F G












Ex1. A regular CL8 diagram
Ex2 shows a CL4 diagram including four basics for m “ 3, i.e. D “ ra31s, E “
ra32s, F “ ra33s, G “ ra34s. Since CL4 is half as large as CL8, described above, the
number of classes as well as the row vector of each class are also smaller: for m “ 2,
two classes are given, i.e. B “ ra21 a22s, C “ ra23 a24s; for m “ 1, the highest class
comprises four dotted boxes, A “ ra11 a12 a13 a14s, which correspond with all four
basics D “ a31, E “ a32, F “ a33, G “ a34 or two classes B “ a21 22, C “ a23 24.
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Compared to all other regular CL diagrams, CL4 has a very low expressivity
in terms of basics and classes. Nevertheless, it has sufficient scope to illustrate
assertions and inferences of extended syllogistics in regular CL diagrams without
loss of generality (see [6]). We will therefore only use CL4 as an example in the
following since all results can be easily transferred to other regular CL diagrams.













Ex2. A regular CL4 diagram
4 Assertions in CL
Assertions can be expressed in CL by using arrows of straight lines between solid
boxes of the ontology. The reading direction of an assertion follows the arrow from
shaft to head.
In the following, I will first define how arrows can be used correctly in CL (syn-
tax). In a second step, I will show that the arrows can be read as assertions (se-
mantics).
4.1 Syntax of Arrows
First, it is important to show how to draw an arrow in a CL diagram.
Definition 5 (Arrows). In a CL diagram, arrows should be drawn by using a straight
line in such a way that the arrow shaft is located in one solid box and the arrowhead
in another solid box.
Next, the direction of the arrows in the ontology must be defined. In doing so,
an even more precisely defined notation is introduced.
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Definition 6 (Arrow direction). In the ontology of CL, four directions of arrows
are possible to draw: bottom-up (Ò), top-down (Ö), horizontal (Õ), and transversal
arrows (ÕÖ).
Now it is necessary to differentiate more precisely of what is a well-formed dia-
gram by using arrows.
Definition 7 (Well-formed diagram). For each arrow, the longest straight line be-
tween two solid boxes that corresponds to its orientation has to been drawn. In detail:
(C1) For all vertical (Ò, Ö) and horizontal arrows (Õ), the straight line of the
arrowhead and shaft must form an angle of 90˝ with the most distant sides of
the two solid boxes involved.
(C2) For all transversal arrows (ÕÖ), the straight line of the arrowhead and shaft
must form an internal angle of less than 90˝ with the most distant vertices of
the two solid boxes involved such a way that the main diagonal or anti-diagonal
of the matrix are given.



























Ex4. Not well-formed diagram
Examples. In the CL4 diagram of Ex3 the arrows between the solid boxes
of B ra21 a22s, D ra31s, andE ra32s show well-formed assertions or a well-formed
diagram.
Ò from a31 to a21 fullfils C1 with a 90˝ angle at the arrow shaft of a31 and the
arrow head in a21.
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Ö from a22 to a32 fullfils C1 with a 90˝ angle at the arrow shaft of a22 and the
arrow head in a32.
Õ from a31 to a32 fullfils C1 with a 90˝ angle at the arrow shaft of a31 and the
arrow head in a32.
Õ
Ö from a31 to a22 fullfils C2 with a 45˝ internal angle at the arrow shaft of a31
and the arrow head in a22 such that ÕÖ forms the antidiagonal ra31 a22s.
The arrows of the boxes C ra23 a24s, F ra33s, and G ra34s in Ex4 are not well-formed
for several reasons:
• The bottom-up arrow (Ò) in a33 and a23 is neither does not form a 90˝ angle
with the most distant sides of F and C and thus does not fullfil C1.
• The arrow shaft and the head of Ö in a24 are in one and the same box and
thus do not fulfill C1.
• The arrow going from a33 to a34 does not meet the most distant sides of the
two solid boxes. Furthermore, it is not obvious whether the arrow is horizontal
(Õ) or transversal (ÕÖ).
• The line of the transversal arrow (ÕÖ) creates at head and shaft an internal angle
less than 90˝ with the most distant vertices of a33 and a23. However, since
a23 is not a solid box, but rather a dotted, C2 is not fulfilled. Furthermore,
ra33 a23s is not an antidiagonal, thus the arrow is not a well-formed assertion.
4.2 Semantics of Arrows
Having now learned how to draw arrows in the ontology of CL, we must now define
what the arrows mean.
Definition 8 (Meaning of Arrows). The solid box including a fletching of a straight
line arrow indicates the 1st concept (subject) and the solid box with the arrowhead
the 2nd concept (predicate) of an assertion.
Since the arrows depict the 1st and 2nd term of an assertion, it is possible to
translate the arrows into A-,E-,I-,O-assertions. Instead of the mnemonic between
the two terms to be connected (SaP, SeP, SiP, SoP ) it is also possible to place the
arrow symbols (Ò, Ö, Õ, ÕÖ), which correspond to the diagrammatic representation.
The orientation of an arrow in the CL diagram corresponds to the orientation of
arrows or lines in the square of opposition, as given in Section 2.2: Vertical arrows
are positive (Ò, Ö), all other arrows are negative (Õ, ÕÖ).
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Definition 9 (Translatability). A straight line arrow fulfilling C1 or C2 can be
translated as follows:
S Ò P “ SaP S Õ P “ SeP
All S is P. No S is P.
S Ö P “ SiP _ SaP S ÕÖ P “ SoP _ SeP
Some S is P. or All S is P. Some S is not P. or No S is P.
In total there are six different interpretations of the four types of arrows or asser-
tions. This is due to the fact, that the particular assertions are ambiguous. However,
in contrast to Euler diagrams for example (cf.[2]), this ambiguity of particular asser-
tions is minimized to two possibilities. The individual arrows are explained in more
detail below:
S Ò P is a universal affirmative assertion (SaP ) if arrows are drawn (in accordance
to C1) between all dotted boxes of one solid box bottom-up to some dotted
boxes corresponding to another solid box.
S Õ P is an universal negative assertion (SeP ) if a horizontal arrow is drawn between
two solid boxes according to C1.
S Ö P is a particular affirmative assertion (SiP ) if the arrow shaft is in some but
not all dotted boxes of one solid box and leads to some other dotted boxes
of another solid box. However, if only one bottom-up arrow can be drawn
between a basic and a class, no distinction can be made between particular
and universal affirmative assertions. In this case SiP “ SaP .
S ÕÖ P is a particular negative assertion (SoP ) if a transversal arrow is drawn between
two solid boxes according to C2 and vertical arrows can be drawn between both
boxes. If no vertical arrows can be drawn between two solid boxes connected
by a transversal arrow, SoP “ SeP .
Note: In our logical notation, double bottom-up arrows (Ò) are used when all
possible arrows from all dotted boxes of a lower solid box are drawn in the diagram.
If the arrow shafts are only in some dotted boxes of a solid box, this is represented in
the notation by bottom-up/top-down arrows (Ö). For example, if only one bottom-
up arrow of is drawn from one dotted box of B to one dotted box of A, although B
has two dotted boxes, Ö is used. If the second possible bottom-up arrow is drawn
from B to A, Ò is used.
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Example. With the help of the definitions given so far, we are now able to
identify the well-formed diagrams of Ex3, describe them with the CL notation, and
translate them into the well-known notation of traditional syllogistics.
D Ò B “ DaB D Õ E “ DeE
All D is B. No D is E.
B Ö E “ BiE D ÕÖ B “ DoB
Some B is E. Some D is not B.
If we would end up with this result, however, we would only have designed a
diagrammatic description of a traditional syllogism using a concrete ontology. But
the goal is to show that the diagrammatic description of CL provides much more
exact information that goes beyond traditional syllogistics.
And a more precise description is certainly necessary, since according to tradi-
tional syllogistics (see Section 2.2) the assertions D Ò B and D ÕÖ B are contradic-
tions. To put it in other words, how can it be possible that both assertions, All D is
B and Some D is not B, should be true at the same time? This is not possible for
classic syllogistics. But already in diagram Ex3, we see that both assertions refer
to two different dotted boxes of B. Therefore we need an exact description of CL in
order to solve the problem of alleged contradictions.
5 Exact Assertions and Inferences in CL
Since a CL ontology can be described exactly with the m ˆ n-matrix, exact infor-
mation about which sets of basics and classes are related to each other in assertions
can be given. In order to read numerically exact assertions from CL, the unique
identifiers of the solid boxes tA, B, . . .u and the dotted boxes corresponding to the
respective basics in brackets are described. Section 5.1 first explains how to describe
assertions in CL exactly. Since syllogisms consist of assertions, this technique can
also be applied to syllogisms in Section 5.2.
5.1 Exact Assertions
So far we have only been able to make logical assertions about solid boxes. Quanti-
fiers were applied to solid boxes, which were themselves identified by letters of the
Roman alphabet. But now we would like to make these assertions more precise by
identifying which components of these solid boxes we mean exactly. So we have to
add unique identifiers also for the dotted boxes in logical assertions.
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Definition 10 (Exact Assertion). An exact assertion in CL adds to the unique
identifiers of the solid boxes also the unique identifiers for dotted boxes.
In the method used here, the additional information are the components of the
mˆ n-matrix.
Example. We take again the above-given diagram Ex3 and add the unique
identifiers of the mˆ n-matrix:
Dra31s Ò Bra21s Dra31s Õ Era32s
Bra22s Ö Era32s Dra31s ÕÖ Bra22s
There are several possible ways to translate this notation into common language.
A simple paraphrase would be to specify the general assertions of syllogistics with
the help of exact terms:
• Dra31s Ò Bra21s = All D is B means here exactly that ra31s of D
is ra21s of B.
• Bra22s Ö Era32s = Some B is E means here exactly that ra22s of B
is ra32s of E.
• Dra31s Õ Era32s = No D is E means here exactly that ra31s of D is
not ra32s of E.
• Dra31s ÕÖ Bra22s = Some D is not B means here exactly that ra31s of D
is not ra22s of B.
We can now see not only from the diagram but also from the notation that
the CD-problem mentioned at the end of Section 4.2 does not apply at all. In the
CL diagram used here, D Ò B and D ÕÖ B are not contradictions, since (some)
B means something different in both assertion, once Bra21s and once Bra22s. In
Hamiltonian Syllogistics, for example, we could say something like All D is some
B, but these D are not some other B, in order to avoid the CD-problem. This
would have already extended traditional syllogistics (see [4], [19]).
In CL, however, we can say diagrammatically and with the help of the m ˆ
n-matrix even more precisely what some (other) B’s are: All D are these B,
namely Bra21s, and some D are other B, namely Bra22s. But since we can de-
scribe not only the predicate term but also the subject term exactly in CL, All D is





With the help of the technique given in Section 5.1, syllogisms can now be described
exactly. For this we have to consider the following definition.
Definition 11 (Syllogistic Patterns). A syllogism in CL is a pattern of three arrows,
such that all six ends of the arrows must meet in three different solid boxes.
Example. The perfect syllogisms mentioned in Section 2.2 are now taken as
examples. We substitute basics and classes for the three terms so that the definitions
of syllogistic patterns and translatability are fulfilled.
The definition of syllogistic patterns gives us several possibilities to apply pat-
terns such as Barabara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, etc. to one ontology of a CL diagram.
In the following, we give all the possibilities for the four modes mentioned in a CL4
diagram, but only the first of them (marked with *) is shown diagrammatically:




























Barbara (MaP, SaM $ SaP )
Bra21 a22s Ò Ara11 a12s, Dra31s Ò Bra21s $ Dra31s Ò Ara11s*
Bra21 a22s Ò Ara11 a12s, Era32s Ò Bra22s $ Era32s Ò Ara12s
Cra23 a24s Ò Ara13 a14s, F ra33s Ò Cra23s $ F ra33s Ò Ara13s
Cra23 a24s Ò Ara13 a14s, Gra34s Ò Cra24s $ Gra34s Ò Ara14s
Celarent (MeP, SaM $ SeP )
Bra21 a22s Õ Cra23 a24s, Dra31s Ò Bra21s $ Dra31s ÕÖ Cra23 a24s*
Bra21 a22s Õ Cra23 a24s, Era32s Ò Bra22s $ Era32s ÕÖ Cra23 a24s
Cra23 a24s Õ Bra21 a22s, F ra33s Ò Cra23s $ F ra33s ÕÖ Bra21 a22s
Cra23 a24s Õ Bra21 a22s, Gra34s Ò Cra23s $ Gra34s ÕÖ Bra21 a22s
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Darii (MaP, SiM $ SiP )
Dra31s Ò Bra21s, Ara11s Ö Dra31s $ Ara11s Ö Bra21s*
Era32s Ò Bra22s, Ara12s Ö Era32s $ Ara12s Ö Bra22
F ra33s Ò Cra23s, Ara13s Ö F ra33s $ Ara13s Ö Cra23s
Gra34s Ò Cra24s, Ara14s Ö Gra34s $ Ara14s Ö Cra24s
Ferio (MeP, SiM $ SoP )
Bra21 a22s Õ Cra23 a24s, Ara11s Ö Bra21s $ Ara11s ÕÖ Cra23 a24s*
Bra21 a22s Õ Cra23 a24s, Ara12s Ö Bra22s $ Ara12s ÕÖ Cra23 a24s
Bra21 a22s Õ Cra23 a24s, Ara11 a12s Ö Bra21 a22s $ Ara11 a12s ÕÖ Cra23 a24s
Dra31s Õ Era32s, Bra21s Ö Dra31s $ Bra21s ÕÖ Era32s
F ra33s Õ Gra34s, Cra23s Ö F ra33s $ Cra23s ÕÖ Gra34s




























6 Conclusion and Discussion
In the previous sections, we have shown how CL diagrams can be used to develop
numerically exact syllogisms. Similar to traditional syllogistics, we first focused on
the ontology. With the help of this conceptual structure, we could define what
assertions are and how they can be represented in a CL diagram using straight
arrows. With the two types of unique identifiers (the Roman alphabet and the
m ˆ n-matrix), we were able to make assertions about entire basics and classes on
the one hand and to name certain elements of the classes precisely on the other. This
technique can be described as a kind numerical syllogistics (see Section 2.3) using a
quantifier similar to exactly. Thus, I propose to call the extended syllogistics that
can be read from CL diagrams a ‘numerically exact syllogistics’.
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The approach presented here is not yet a formal system for which soundness and
completeness have been proved. This is one of the next steps, once all definitions
and rules have been formulated. A further step would be to highlight whether and
how the inferential technique given in Section 5.2 could be useful in computational
understanding of natural language. However, the task in this paper was only to
answer the question of which kind of extended syllogistics can be derived from CL
diagrams.
For example, by looking at the first three syllogistic patterns of Ferio given in
Section 5.2, it is striking that in traditional syllogistics they would indicate only
one inference about the same three classes, i.e. BeC, AiB $ AoC. In the CL4
diagram, however, one can see that the same inference in traditional syllogistics can
be represented by three exact patterns. (In larger regular CL diagrams there would
be correspondingly more applications of the Ferio-pattern). The difference between
traditional syllogistics and the extension in CL is mainly the interpretation of AiB:
The first two specified Ferio-pattern contain only partial expressions of B, whereas
the third pattern is applied to the whole of B. Since B is composed of two dotted
boxes, ra21 a22s can again be used to determine which part of the class is involved in
diagrammatic reasoning. This can be the part of B that corresponds to D or that
corresponds to E:
Ara11 a12s Ö Bra21 a22s
Ara11s Ö Bra21s Ara12s Ö Bra22s
AiB
Dra31s Era32s
In our everyday language, we are often confronted with such assertions as AiB,
where we have to or want to distinguish exactly which relation between A and B
we are talking about. Some A are B can mean all B or even some B. If it is some
B, the question may arise as to which constituents of B it is exactly, and if it is all
B, the question of what there is in B may arise. At least since Quine, we know that
these questions posed from a logical point of view can become unpleasant if we have
not thought about our ontology before. And in CL, ontology, first of all, means the
commitment to a certain arrangement of basics and classes.
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Abstract
So-called reverse Sobel sequences seem to pose a problem for the variably
strict semantics for counterfactuals. The existence of such sequences is taken
by some scholars to be the main evidence in favour of an alternative, dynamic
approach to the semantics of counterfactuals. According to Moss, however,
a pragmatic approach to RSSs would be able to save the standard account.
Central to her proposal there is a principle called ‘principle of epistemic irre-
sponsibility’, according to which it is irresponsible to assert a counterfactual
which contradicts a possibility that has become salient in the discourse. While
agreeing on a pragmatic take on RSSs, in this paper I discuss the EI principle
and highlight some problems of it.
Keywords: Counterfactual conditionals, assertion, dynamic semantics, salience
1 Introduction
This paper is about a problem concerning the assertion of counterfactual condi-
tionals. In particular, it is about a problem posed to the standard variably strict
semantics developed in [7] and [3] by so-called reverse Sobel sequences (RSSs). The
existence of such sequences is taken by some scholars to be the main evidence in
favour of an alternative semantic approach to counterfactuals, such as the dynamic
strict conditional approach developed in [8] and [1].
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According to [5], however, a pragmatic approach to RSSs would be able to save
the standard account. Central to her proposal there is a principle called ‘principle
of epistemic irresponsibility’, according to which it is irresponsible to assert a coun-
terfactual which contradicts a possibility that has become salient in the discourse.
By means of this principle, the infelicity of RSS can be explained without any need
to abandon the standard semantics. A pragmatic approach to RSSs is preferable
to a semantic approach and Moss is right when she claims that some linguistic evi-
dences go against a semantic approach to RSS. However, the principle of epistemic
irresponsibility on which Moss’s account is based is problematic and in this paper,
I am going to explain why.
2 Sobel and sequences: Strict and variably strict anal-
yses
The variable strict approach to counterfactuals is reputed for being able to explain
the felicity of so-called Sobel sequences (SSs). Consider the following two sequences
of counterfactuals:
(1) (a) If the USA had thrown their nuclear weapons into the sea, there would
have been war.
(b) But if the USA and all other nuclear powers had thrown their weapons
into the sea, there would have been peace.
(2) (a) If Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.
(b) But if Sophie had gone to the parade and been stuck behind a tall
person, she would not have seen Pedro.
Intuitively, given some plausible background assumptions (for example, that So-
phie does not push away people in front of her or that aliens make war to humans
after the dismantling of nuclear weapons), asserting these two pairs of counterfac-
tuals seems felicitous.
The way in which the variably strict account explains the felicity of asserting
such sequences is semantical. 2 and 1 are felicitous, because they are consistent,
both sets – 1a and 1b and 2a and 2b – are true.
Consider the logical form of an SS (i.e., the logical form of each constituent of
an SS):
(3) (a) φ > ψ
578
Counterfactuals and Epistemic Irresponsibility
(b) φ ∧ χ > ¬ψ.
To claim that 3a and 3b are consistent is to claim that> is a conditional for which
‘strenghtening the antecedent’ does not hold: from φ > ψ it does not necessarily
follow φ ∧ χ > ψ for arbitrary χ.
Stalnaker-Lewis semantics for counterfactuals is able to explain how strengthen-
ing the antecedent could fail for a conditional. A variably strict conditional, φ ψ,
quantifies over all φ-worlds most similar to the world of evaluation and claims that,
in those worlds, the consequent is true. But the φ ∧ χ-worlds most similar to the
actual world are not necessarily all part of the most similar φ-worlds. Some of them
may be less similar to the actual world than φ∧¬χ worlds. In such worlds, ψ could
be false. So if φ > ψ is φ ψ, the constituents of 3 can be true together. The
felicity of 1 and 2 is thus semantically explained.
The felicity of SSs cannot be explained, at least through consistency, by those
analyses of conditionals for which strengthening the antecedent holds. A strict
conditional analysis of counterfactuals is a case in point. A (non-variably) strict
conditional quantifies over all worlds where the antecedent φ is true and claims
that, in those worlds, the consequent is true. But, if there are some worlds where
φ ∧ χ is true, such worlds form a subset of the set formed by the worlds where φ
is true, so if ψ is true in the latter, it cannot be false in the former. So, if φ > ψ
is 2(φ → ψ), the constituents of 3 cannot be true together; they are inconsistent.
If SSs forms inconsistent pairs, then the felicity of asserting 1 and 2 cannot be
explained semantically in this account.
Both the success and the failure to explain the felicity of both 1 and 2 rest on the
following principles that relate the semantic dimension of consistency/inconsistency
to the pragmatic dimension of felicity/infelicity of an assertion:
(Cons → Fel) If φ and ψ are consistent, ψ can felicitously be asserted after φ.
(Incons → Infel) If φ and ψ are inconsistent, then ψ cannot felicitously be asserted
after ψ.
The idea behind the first principle is that, given an assertion of φ, consistency
with φ is a condition for felicitous assertability after φ in a discourse. Of course,
not everything consistent with φ should be asserted, but consistency seems to be a
sufficient condition for the possibility of assertion.1
1The principle should not be confused with a principle that claims that consistency is sufficient
for felicitous assertion. Cons → Fel claims that, if φ and ψ are consistent, then somone is allowed
to – in the sense that one can – assert them together felicitously. In effect, the principle states that
consistency is a sufficient condition for asserta-bility, not for assertion.
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The second principle is stronger: it claims that after an assertion of φ, nothing
that is inconsistent with it should be asserted.
These principles commit the two views under discussion to a general position
with respect to SSs.
(Cons → Fel) commits the variably strict analysis to the view that SS can be
felicitous. From this it follows that the account does not exclude the existence of
infelicitous SSs. Consider, for example, the following:
(4) (a) If Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.
(b) # But if Sophie had gone to the parade and she had worn a red T-shirt,
she would not have seen Pedro.
Given some obvious background assumptions (i.e., that wearing red t-shirts does
not make it difficult to see people at parades), the variably strict analysis is perfectly
able to explain the infelicity of such a sequence.
(Incons → Infel) commits instead the (non-variably) strict conditional analysis
to the view that SS can never be felicitous.
3 Reverse Sobel sequences
The problem for the variably strict analysis comes in the case we reverse the order
of assertion in 1 and 2 to obtain 5 and 6:
(5) (a) If the USA and all the nuclear powers had thrown their weapons into
the sea, there would have been peace.
(b) # But if the USA had thrown their nuclear weapons into the sea, there
would be war.
(6) (a) If Sophie had gone to the parade and been stuck behind a tall person,
she would not have seen Pedro.
(b) # But if Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.
These are reverse Sobel sequences, and in both cases they seem infelicitous to
assert.
The explanation of the felicity of 1 and 2 through consistency is not able to
explain the infelicity of 5 and 6. Consistency is in fact a symmetric relation, so if
φ > ψ is consistent with φ∧χ > ¬ψ, also the opposite is true. In the absence of any
other semantic or pragmatic mechanism, the variably strict account predicts thus
that 5 and 6 should be felicitous, contrary to linguistic intuitions.
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Notice that, in view of (Cons → Fel), the variably strict account is committed
to the general view that RSS can be felicitous. This does not exclude the capacity
of the variably strict account to explain cases of infelicitous RSSs. The problem,
however, is local: the same pair of counterfactuals that are felicitous in the guise of
an SS are infelicitous in the guise of an RSS.
The opposite is true for the variably strict account. Also inconsistency is a sym-
metric relation. So, in the absence of any other semantic or pragmatic mechanism,
the strict account rightly predicts that 5 and 6 are infelicitous.
Notice further that, given (Incons → Infel), the strict conditional account is
committed to the general view that RSS cannot be felicitous.
With respect to 1, 5, 2, and 6, the situation is thus the following:
• The variably strict account accounts for the felicity of 2, and 1 and it does not
account for the infelicity of 5, and 6
• The strict conditional account accounts for the infelicity of 5, and 6 and it
does not account for the felicity of 1, and 2
As we have seen, however, according to the variably strict account, there can be
felicitous and infelicitous SSs and RSSs, while, according to the strict conditional
account, there cannot be felicitous SSs and RSSs.
With respect to our examples, the variably strict account needs some story to
explain the infelicity of 5 and 6 (given that it treats 1 and 2 as felicitous), while the
strict conditional account needs some story to explain the felicity of 1 and 2 (given
that it treats 5 and 6 as infelicitous).
This seems a symmetrical situation, but if we look at the general commitments of
the theories, some differences emerge: the variably strict account is compatible with
the existence of felicitous and infelicitous RSSs and SSs, while the strict conditional
account excludes the possibility of felicitous SSs and RSSs.
The real problem for the strict conditional analysis is that of explaining the
felicity of SSs, not the infelicity of RSSs (even though we will discover that the way
in which the strict conditional analysis explains the infelicity of RSSs is probably
too strong).
4 The dynamic approach
von Fintel [8] and Gillies [1] have independently proposed a dynamic variant of the
strict conditional analysis that apparently is able to explain both the felicity of SSs
like 1 and 2 and the infelicity of their reversed versions, 5 and 6.
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In their analysis, the assertion of a counterfactual in a discourse is able to update
the context in which subsequent counterfactuals are evaluated. Updating a context
means that, when a counterfactual is asserted in a context, at least some antecedent
worlds (i.e., worlds where the antecedent is true) become accessible. After the con-
text is updated, counterfactuals behave semantically like strict conditionals within
this set of contextually determined worlds.
According to Gillies, the context is taken to be a hyperdomain, which is a class of
domains nested by the subset relation and ordered by a similarity relation with the
world of evaluation. Similarity thus plays a role even in these new strict conditional
analyses. When a counterfactual φ > ψ is asserted, the context gets updated in
the sense that the hyperdomain includes now the closest φ-worlds. Given that the
hyperdomain is a set of nested subdomains, now every domain in the hyperdomain
contains at least a φ-world. The counterfactual behaves like a strict conditional with
respect to this hyperdomain. This mechanism is able to explain the infelicity of 6:
the prior assertion of 6a makes contextually available parade-worlds where Sophie
is stuck behind someone tall and thus worlds where she does not see Pedro.2 These
worlds are more distant to the world of evaluation than worlds where Sophie goes
to the parade and has a clear view. Given that domains are nested, now every do-
main contains at least a world where Sophie goes to the parade and is stuck behind
someone tall. In these conditions, 6b is thus false. With the hyperdomain already
enlarged to contain ‘parade-and-stuck-behind-someone-tall’ worlds, the assertion of
6, requiring that there are parade-worlds, has no further effect on the hyperdomain.
But within such domains, 6b cannot be true, because not all worlds in the hyperdo-
main where Sophie goes to the parade are worlds where she sees Pedro. The reverse
Sobel sequence is thus infelicitous, because 6b is false. The dynamic approach is thus
able to explain the infelicity of the RSS and such infelicity of assertion is explained
semantically by the falsity of 6b. We have seen however, that the infelicity of RSSs
through the falsity of the second component of the sequence is something that the
simple strict conditional approach was already capable to explain.
The real advantage of the new dynamic strict conditional approach is that it
is now able to explain the felicity of SSs. When 2a is asserted, the worlds where
Sophie goes to the parade and has a clear view become contextually accessible. By
assumption these are the parade-worlds most similar to the world of evaluation.
With respect to this hyperdomain 2a is thus true. When 2b is asserted, the hyper-
domain is enlarged to include the less similar parade-worlds where Sophie is stuck
behind someone tall. Given that the domains are nested this assures that in every
2The fact that Sophie does not see Pedro in worlds where she is stuck behind someone tall is
an assumption: we are assuming that, in normal conditions, Sophie, when stuck behind someone
tall, does not push this person away or always change position, etc.
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domain of the hyperdomain there is now a parade-world where Sophie is stuck be-
hind someone tall. In all these worlds, Sophie does not see Pedro, so in every nested
domain of the hyperdomain, Sophie does not see Pedro. Thus 2b comes out true.
Of course, there will be parade-and-stuck worlds where Sophie is able to see Pedro,
but such worlds are less similar to the actual world than parade-and-stuck worlds
where Sophie does not see Pedro, so they do not belong to any subdomain of the
hyperdomain.
5 Felicitous RSSs
According to the dynamic strict conditional analysis, RSSs are always infelicitous:
once the context is updated with the antecedent worlds of the first counterfactual, it
cannot be ‘shrunk’ to accomodate the second counterfactual. A semantic approach
to the infelicity of RSSs makes their infelicity a systematic feature of their assertion.
It seems, however, that there are felicitous RSSs, and furthermore it seems that
infelicitous RSSs can be made felicitous. The existence of felicitous RSS is the
main evidence [5] uses against the dynamic approach and in favour of her pragmatic
approach.
Consider the following case. Assume that Anne is a friend of Sophie’s and a very
good friend of Pedro’s and that every time Pedro sees Anna, he invites her, and
whoever is with her, to drink something. Assume further that Pedro is an otherwise
shy guy who usually does not invite people to drink, unless they are very good
friends.
Given such a scenario, consider thus the following RSS:
(7) (a) If Sophie had gone to the parade with Anne, she would have gone to
drink something with Pedro.
(b) But if Sophie had gone to the parade, she would not have gone to drink
something with Pedro.
This sequence is of the following form:
• φ ∧ χ > ψ
• φ > ¬ψ
and it is a felicitous RSS. For the dynamic approach it should be counted as
infelicitous. The assertion of the first counterfactual expands the context to worlds
where Sophie goes to the parade with Anne and in such worlds, given the assump-
tions, Pedro would invite her, and Anne to drink. At this point, there is no way to
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assert 7b in a felicitous way, because it has no chance of being true. So the dynamic
approach counts 7 as infelicitous because 7b is false (if 7a is true).
One of the cases mentioned in [5, p. 575] is the following:
(8) (a) If Sophie had gone to the parade and been shorter than she actually is,
she would not have seen Pedro.
(b) But if Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro.
Even in such a case the RSS seems felicitous, and this is perfectly compatible
with the variably strict conditional analysis (in this case, the corresponding SS is
also felicitous).
Not only are there felicitous RSSs, but at least some RSSs can be made felicitous.
Consider for example this modified version of 5:3
(9) (a) If all the nuclear powers had thrown their weapons into the sea, there
would have been peace.
(b) But if only the USA had thrown their weapons into the sea, there would
have been war.
In such a case, the application of an ‘exhaustive’ operator only is able to rescue
the sequence and make it felicitous. According to [5, p. 575] the felicity of a SS
could be rescued even by adding up some material aimed to show that the possibility
raised by the first component of the sequence is not really salient:
(10) (a) If Sophie had gone to the parade and been stuck behind a tall person,
she would not have seen Pedro.
(b) But hey, listen upâ I am telling you: if she had gone, she would have
seen him.
All these linguistic data point to a pragmatic solution to the problem of RSSs,
and as we have seen, the variably strict account seems better suited than the dynamic
account to deal with it.
6 The principle of epistemic irresponsibility
According to [5, p. 158], the variably strict account can explain the infelicity of RSSs
and, in particular, the infelicity of RSSs whose corresponding SSs are felicitous, by
means of a pragmatic principle which she calls ‘principle of epistemic irresponsibility.’
3The example and the phenomenon, in the context of a much larger and systematic approach
to sequences of conditional and disjunctive sentences, is taken from [2].
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Principle of epistemic irresponsibility, EI: It is epistemically irresponsible to
utter sentence S in context C if there is some proposition φ and possibility µ
such that when the speaker utters S:
• (i) S expresses φ in C
• (ii) φ is incompatible with µ
• (iii) µ is a salient possibility
• (iv) the speaker of S cannot rule out µ.
The EI principle is a general principle regulating assertability, and it is not
intended to work only for counterfactual conditionals. In its generality, the principle
claims that it is epistemically irresponsible to assert something if it is incompatible
with a salient possibility that cannot be ruled out. The assumption is that, if an
epistemically irresponsible assertion is effectively asserted, the result is an infelicitous
assertion.
By means of this principle, it seems that the infelicity of RSSs can be explained.
Take the case of Sophie, namely 6. According to Moss, after the assertion of the first
counterfactual, the possibility that Sophie might be stuck behind someone tall, if she
had gone to the parade, becomes salient. This possibility is incompatible with the
proposition expressed by the second counterfactual, namely that if Sophie had gone
to the parade, she would have seen Pedro. Furthermore, the speaker seems to be not
in a condition, given the background assumptions, to rule out the possibility raised to
salience expressed by the first counterfactual. In this situation, the principle implies
that it is epistemically irresponsible to utter the second counterfactual, even though
it is true (under the variably strict semantics). Thus the sequence is infelicitous.
Let us see how it works in the case of 5. As in the previous case, the first
counterfactual raises to salience the possibility that the USA might have thrown
their weapons into the sea, if all the other nuclear powers had thrown theirs. This
possibility seems incompatible with what is expressed by the first and the second
counterfactuals, given the background assumptions. In a situation where all powers
throw their weapons, there would be peace, not war. Given that the possibility
cannot be ruled out, it is epistemically irresponsible to assert 5b, and thus the
sequence is infelicitous.
The principle is based on the assumption that the assertion of a counterfactual in
a discourse makes a possibility salient. But what kind of possibility becomes salient
after the assertion of a counterfactual? Given a counterfactual such as φ ∧ χ > ψ
(the first component of an RSS) one would expect that the possibility that becomes
salient is simply φ ∧ χ (so what becomes salient is really 3(φ ∧ χ)). Indeed, it
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seems natural to assume that the assertion of a counterfactual raises to salience the
possibility of its antecedent.
However, in Moss’s approach the possibility that becomes salient is χ  φ.
Choosing χ  φ is not intuitive, but is very useful for the point Moss wants to
make. Once χ φ is the salient possibility we can actually prove, within Lewis’s
logic of counterfactual VC, the incompatibility of χ φ, φ ∧ χ ψ and φ ψ
(the second counterfactual of an RSS).4 What is needed is just that be treated as
the dual of (as it is normally assumed in Lewis’s approach) and that φ∧χ ψ
is a background assumption.
7 Problems for EI
In this section, I want to highlight some problems for the pragmatic approach devel-
oped by Moss. I will present three problems and comment on another one presented
in [4].
The first problem is that, as anticipated in the previous section, it is not at all
clear why it is φ χ that gets raised to salience. Moss suggests (p. 569) that often
‘merely mentioning’ the possibility of χ is sufficient to raise to salience φ χ. But
how is this supposed to work? Not many indications are given in the article, so one
might ask: Is 3χ the salient possibility that in turn makes φ χ salient? How
exactly is 3χ able to make salient φ χ?
For a start, it is not clear why mentioning 3χ in a discourse should make salient
φ χ. Take our examples. It is not at all clear why the mere mentioning that
Sophie might be stuck behind someone tall should raise to salience also that she
might be stuck behind someone tall if she goes to the parade, as it is not clear why
the mere mentioning that all nuclear powers distinct from the USA might throw
their weapons into the sea raises to salience the possibility that all other nuclear
weapons might throw their weapons into the sea if the USA throw their weapons.
Maybe, 3χ makes φ χ salient only if something of the form φ ∧ χ ψ is
previously asserted, but then it is not ‘merely’ mentioning the possibility of χ that
makes φ χ salient. It is rather the combination of φ ∧ χ ψ and 3χ makes
φ χ.
But why? What are the ‘laws’ of salience that are relevant here? Is some
proposition salient, if it is implied by other two salient propositions? Is salience
closed under logical consequence? It seems difficult to think that salience works
this way and in general Moss does not give any indications on how possibilities get
salient in a context or what notion of salience is relevant.
4For the complete proof, see [5, p. 570].
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The notion of ‘salience’ developed in cognitive-linguistic contexts ([6], for exam-
ple) seems not applicable in such a case: one striking feature of salience, at least
in these contexts, is that what becomes salient has to be easy to activate and with
a minimal cognitive effort. When one asserts φ ∧ χ ψ is instead difficult to see
how φ χ could become, easily and immediately, the center of attention.
A further issue related to this problem is that, even granting that some possibility
becomes salient after an assertion of φ∧χ ψ, φ χ does not seem just the right
salient possibility. Note that, as far as we are try to understand what possibilities get
raised to salience, felicitous and infelicitous RSS should be on a par. The mechanism
of ‘salience raising’ should be independent on the felicity of the sequence. Consider
thus a felicitous RSSs such as 8. If we follow Moss, the possibility that gets raised to
salience when one asserts the first counterfactual (‘If Sophie had gone to the parade
and been shorter than she actually is, she would not have seen Pedro’) should be
‘Sophie might have been shorter, if she had gone to the parade,’ but this seems
wrong. It is definitely more plausible to think that the salient possibility, in this
case, should be that Sophie might be shorter than she actually is, and in such a
situation, she might have gone to the parade, something of the form 3(φ ∧ χ). But
as we know, from 3(φ ∧ χ) it is not possible to derive the desired incompatibility
between φ ∧ χ ψ, φ χ and φ ψ.
The second problem comes from an observation in [4]. Even conceding that the
possibility raised to salience by φ ∧ χ ψ is of the form φ χ, the duality of
 and  is valid in Lewis’s logic of counterfactuals, but not in Stalnaker’s. So
one can use the principle EI to prove the incompatibility among the three items
only if Lewis’s semantics is adopted. To avoid this, Moss claims that one could
alternatively choose φ  χ as the salient possibility; from this possibility, and
the two counterfactuals of the RSS, a contradiction is now derivable in Stalnaker’s
system, but not in Lewis’s one. According to K. Lewis, however, this is somewhat
‘surprising’, because it makes what is psychologically salient dependent on semantic
theory. If we choose Lewis’s logic, φ  χ gets raised to salience, while, if we
choose Stalnaker’s logic, φ χ gets raised to salience. Moss’s approach is thus not
sufficiently theory-neutral.
After this critical point, K. Lewis actually offers a way out to Moss. One could
try to react by claiming that what gets raised to salience is the ‘neutral’ possibility
that there is a φ ∧ χ-world among the closest possible worlds; this possibility can
then be ‘interpreted’ either as φ χ within Lewis’s semantics and as φ χ in
Stalnaker’s semantics. The truth of 3φ ∧ χ in one of the closest possible worlds
implies the truth of φ χ in Lewis’s logic and ¬(φ ¬χ) in Stalnaker’s logic,
according to Lewis.
But, again, why this salient possibility and not simply 3(φ∧χ)? The constraint
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on similarity is probably intended to capture the idea that the possibility of φ ∧ χ
is salient. The thought is that the more a possibility is ‘near’ the actual world,
the more is salient. The idea is that what becomes salient is the antecedent of the
asserted counterfactual in the closest possible worlds.
But ‘φ ∧ χ in the closest possible worlds’ is a very strange thing to become
salient. Why also an information about the similarity relation should be part of
what becomes salient to a speaker? Should we attribute to speakers some explicit
representation of the similarity relation? What becomes salient should be a plain
proposition, not also a piece of information about the mechanics of the semantics we
are using. In the end, claiming that ‘φ ∧ χ in the closest possible worlds’ becomes
salient amount to the simpler claim that ‘φ ∧ χ’ becomes salient.
There is then the further problem that the actual formulation of the EI principle
has it that the incompatibility is among the salient possibility and the proposition
expressed by an utterance, not, as it would be in this case, between a consequence
of the salient possibility and the proposition expressed. If we first need to determine
the consequences of what is salient, the application of the principle would become
very difficult. In the case of RSS, for example, we would need first to calculate the
consequence of ‘φ ∧ χ in the closest possible worlds’ (depending on one’s favourite
logic of counterfactuals) and then to calculate the incompatibility between such a
consequence and the two counterfactuals of the RSS. And notice: all of this should
happen before asserting the second counterfactual, that, in case the incompatibility
obtained, should then be deemed as epistemically irresponsible to assert. I do not
think that the capacity of performing such process is plausibly attributable to a
competent speaker using counterfactuals. So I think that, contrary to what Lewis
claims against her own point against EI, the problem of theory-neutrality is, in effect,
a serious problem for EI.
The third problem is that, according to EI, the infelicity of an RSS is now
basically grounded on the validity of a proof, because it is based on the capacity
to derive a contradiction. This makes the infelicity ‘systematic’ in the sense that it
is based on the logical forms of the counterfactuals involved and that of the salient
possibility. In every case we have φ∧χ ψ and φ χ and φ ψ a contradiction
follows and thus infelicity of assertion.
Surely, the conditions under which these counterfactuals ‘enter’ the proof are
pragmatic: salience in the case of φ χ and being part of the common ground in
the case of φ∧χ ψ. But these conditions seem to be quite easily satisfied or not
specified enough. On the one hand, Moss does not specify how φ ∧ χ ψ comes
to be part of the common ground; the mere assertion of it seems to be enough. On
the other hand, as we have seen, the salience of φ χ could be obtained, for Moss,
simply by making χ salient.
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But if salience and common-groundedness are so easily obtained, then the in-
compatibility, being based on a logical proof, is also immediately obtained. Any
RSS with the first counterfactual in the common ground is a sequence for which
we can prove an incompatibility. There is only an ‘event’ that could block, at this
point, the derivation of a contradiction: the capacity of the speaker of ruling out
the possibility raised to salience.
But assume that the speaker is indeed able to rule out the possibility made salient
by the first counterfactual. This would be a very strange situation: a situation where
we have a counterfactual that is part of the common ground, but it is such that the
possibility made salient by it is capable of being ruled out. One should rule out
a possibility made salient by something one accepts as a common ground of the
assertion.
But how something could enter the common ground in case the possibility that
it makes salient is capable to being ruled out? It seems natural to expect that either
a counterfactual becomes part of the common ground because the possibility that
it makes salient is not capable of being ruled out or the counterfactual does not
become part of the common ground because the possibility that it makes salient is
capable of being ruled out.
So if the counterfactual enters the common ground, the incompatibility could be
proved and from this the infelicity will follow. But then, just the acceptance of the
first counterfactual is enough to make the RSS infelicitous. But then we have the
very strange conclusion that the only way to make an RSS felicitous is not accepting
the first counterfactual as part of the common ground. So, in effect, it does not
seem possible to make RSS felicitous.
If this is true, there seems to be a tension in EI principle between condition (i)
and condition (iv).
Another (related) point is the following. When we prove that an RSS is infelic-
itous we show that from φ ∧ χ ψ, φ χ, and φ ψ a contradiction follows.
But then at least one of them has to be false. But consider the case of Sophie. In
Lewis’s approach, both 6a and 6b are true. To be false, then, is the salient possi-
bility φ χ, namely it is false that there is some parade-world among the closest
worlds to the actual world where Sophie gets stuck behind someone tall. But then,
we are in a situation where a true counterfactual raises to salience a false possibility.
This might not be per se wrong. Analogous phenomena exist: for example, a true
proposition could have a false implicature so, one might argue, a true proposition
might raise to salience a false proposition. The relation between of an expressed
proposition with, respectively, an implicature and a salient proposition is different.
The relation of the salient proposition with what is semantically expressed seems to
be much stricter; as it is known, an implicature could have nothing to do with the
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proposition expressed and, in some cases, might be the only thing communicated
in a discourse. What is salient seems to be intimately related to what is said, it
depends on it and so it seems more reasonable to expect that it should also have the
same truth-value or at least that the falsity of the salient proposition should have
some effect on the epistemic status of the proposition expressed. In such a case, the
functioning of the EI principle seems to be compromised.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, after reviewing some problems for a semantic approach, I have pre-
sented some problems for a pragmatic solution to the problem of RSSs.
As pointed out in [5] and [4], the dynamic semantics developed by Gillies and
von Fintel does not work because it builds in the semantics of counterfactuals a
mechanism of expansion of the domains whose existence is falsified by plain felicitous
RSSs and infelicitous RSSs made felicitous.
The pragmatic solution developed by Moss is problematic because it is based on
a principle, the EI principle, which is problematic. The principle is based on the
idea that the assertion of a counterfactual makes salient some possibility, but it is
not clear what possibility gets raised to salience and for what reasons. Furthermore,
there seems to be some tensions between the main conceptual components of the
principle, in particular between the idea that the explanation of the infelicity of an
RSS is explained by proving an incompatibility and the notion of ruling out the
salient possibility.
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Abstract
A general framework for translating various logical systems is presented,
including a set of partial unary operators of affirmation and negation. Despite
its usual reading, affirmation is not redundant in any domain of values and
whenever it does not behave like a full mapping. After depicting the process
of partial functions, a number of logics are translated through a variety of
affirmations and a unique pair of negations. This relies upon two preconditions:
a deconstruction of truth-values as ordered and structured objects, unlike its
mainstream presentation as a simple object; a redefinition of the Principle of
Bivalence as a set of four independent properties, such that its definition does
not equate with normality.
1 Introduction: Identifying Logics
The issue of how a logical system is to be characterized may receive a simple answer:
by identifying the set of its theorems. Correspondingly, any two logics differ from
each other whenever they do not include the same set of theorems. The point is,
however, that any such set is infinite, and it is difficult to characterize anything in
such a case. A way out is a comparative analysis of logics with respect to a reference
or ‘pattern’: classical logic is supposed to be such one. Then non-classical logics are
those logics that lack either of the characteristic theorems of classical logic.
Another trickier issue is the philosophical matter of meaning: Why do such logical
systems differ with respect to the meaning of the ‘same’ logical constants, assuming
that those are? Understanding such a difference is not only being able to explain
where the disagreement comes from, but also being able to express this disagreement
without favoring either of the logical points of view at stake. The disagreement may
∗The author wants to thank the referee for their valuable comments.
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be dubbed ‘fundamental’ or ‘deep’ otherwise, if the origin of the problem cannot even
be expressed in common terms between the opposed speakers. A central assumption
of the paper is that such a main disagreement between logical systems is about what
‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ mean according to these. One ensuing challenge is to find a way
to illustrate such a discrepancy without favoring either of the particular readings of
both truth-values, all the more that the relation between the latter need not be the
same throughout the various logical systems. This semantic issue also leads to the
underlying matter of translation between logical systems, in order to avoid the dead
end of incommensurability.
How to translate some logic into another one, so that any ‘source logic’ may turn
into a ‘target logic’ whilst making use of one common language to account for it? A
number of works have been devoted to this topic of translation between logics.1There
are cases in which one given logical system is translated into another one, so that
the formal language of the latter becomes the reference. For instance, Béziau [4]
claimed that “S5 is a paraconsistent logic, and so is first-order classical logic”. In
this example, the modal logic S5 becomes the formal system in terms of which the
characteristic theorems of both paraconsistent and first-order classical logic may
be translated. His account relied upon a structural identity between two kinds of
formulas, namely: modal formulas of the form 2ϕ, and quantified formulas of the
form ∀xϕ. Then Béziau showed that paraconsistent negation ‘¬P ’ is to be translated
modally as ¬2ϕ↔ 3¬ϕ (in S5), just as Gödel [11] translated intuitionistic negation
‘¬I ’ modally as 2¬ϕ↔ ¬3ϕ (in S4).2
Now there can also be cases into one logic is translated into another one within a
third common formal language that embraces both. Such a common pattern will
be presented in the following to translate non-modal and modal logics; furthermore,
logics will not be distinguished from each other according to the meaning of their
respective negations but, rather, their respective affirmations.
The content of the paper is the following. In Section 2, the use of many-valued
frames will be motivated. In Section 3, we argue that truth-values are structured
objects and streamline their features into a general constructive process. In Section
4, the notion of bivalence is reassessed in the light of such constructive truth-values.
In Section 5, a general logic of affirmation and negation is presented as a set of
logical systems including distinctive affirmative operators. In Section 6, various
logical systems are translated and some properties of them are proved into this
general framework.
1See e.g. [5], [17].
2Note that the first author to show the translatability of paraconsistent logic into S5 was Jerzy
Perzanowski, in his translation of [9]. I thank the referee for reminding this historical point.
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2 Affirmation and negation
A deep discrepancy obtains about the meaning of truth-values, and this point will
be of importance throughout the paper since the final semantic background crucially
relies on a many-valued algebra. This discrepancy can be located around the status
of a formula in logic, depending upon whether it should be treated broadly as a
sentence or, much more narrowly, as a proposition in the Fregean sense of a thought
that speakers may have in common. Therefore, clarifying this point is a precondition
to the introduction of our semantic framework.
Take the sentence p, ‘It is daylight’. What is the range of truth-values that can
be assigned to p? From a classical point of view:
(T ) p is true iff it is the case that it is daylight.
(F ) p is false iff it is the case that it is not daylight.
Now two additional non-classical views may be supported in specific contexts of
discourse, especially when the sentence is uttered at dawn or a dusk:
(B) p is both true and false iff it is the case that it is daylight and it is the case that
it is not daylight.
(N) p is neither true nor false iff it is not the case that it is daylight and it is not
the case that it is not daylight.
Two objections can be raised against the last two valuations. On the one hand,
the sentence p has no truth-value because it is an incomplete proposition; rather,
‘It is daylight at the time when this sentence is written out’ is entitled to receive
a truth-value. On the other hand, if both (B) and (N) may be said right when
uttered at dawn or at dusk then p is true-and-false and neither-true-nor-false at
once; such a valuation appears to be plainly absurd, however. Two replies can
be given, as well. About the first point, the distinction between sentences and
propositions relies upon the view that a truth-value is an object or, at the least, a
standing property of propositions the speaker aims at. About the second point, (B)
and (N) do make sense together if truth-value is taken to be a property relative to
different viewpoints. Also, a side-effect of the putative objective truth is deflationism,
according to which the predicate ‘true’ adds nothing substantial to the information
afforded by a proposition. That is: the affirmative proposition ‘ϕ’ means the same
as ‘ϕ is true’, and the negative proposition ‘¬ϕ’ means the same as ‘ϕ is false’. If so,
then how to account for formulas whose truth-value stands beyond the basic values
of truth and falsehood?
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One helpful reference to combine the two views of truth-value as an object and
a predicate is von Wright’s logic of truth [23]. There the author introduces truth-
values either as unary operators X prefixed to sentences or as the usual operands X
of these sentences, such that v(Xϕ) = X. Moreover, von Wright argues that some
imprecise or vague contexts of utterance (like the aforementioned one about daylight)
may variably lead to the interpretations (B) and (N) of non-classical truth-values.
Thus, the end of rainfall can be considered as a ‘glutty’ situation at which it both
rains and does not rain or, on the contrary, as a ‘gappy’ situation at which it neither
rains nor does not rain. Instead of favoring either of these explanations, von Wright
proposes a general domain of values including all these four possibilities.
Let Tϕ for ‘It is true that ϕ’, T′ϕ for ‘It is not false that ϕ’, and Fϕ for ‘It is false
that ϕ’. This results in the following four-valued truth-table:
ϕ Tϕ T′ϕ Fϕ
B T F T
T T T F
F F F T
N F T F
Roughly speaking, the above truth-table assigns truth to any sentence that includes
the truth-valueX expressed by the unary operator X, so that v(Xϕ) = T whenever ϕ
includes the value X and v(Xϕ) = F otherwise. For example, v(Fϕ) = T whenever
v(ϕ) = B because the glutty value B includes falsity, so that it is true to say that
ϕ is true whenever ϕ is both-true-and-false; at the same time, v(Fϕ) = F whenever
v(ϕ) = N since the gappy value N does not include falsity, so that it is false to say
that ϕ is false whenever ϕ is neither-true-nor false.
This binary treatment of logical values as including or not including truth or falsity
is a way to restore 2-valuedness from a 4-valued domain, accordingly. Is von Wright’s
above logic an adequate semantics for explaining the concepts of truth and falsity,
however? We want to develop it into a broader framework, so that the meaning of
truth can be weakened or strengthened according to the context of discourse.
The following sections want to develop and extend the case of von Wright’s logic
of truth in the light of a bilateralist approach, according to which truth and falsity
are independent values: truth need not entail the failure of falsity, and conversely.
In a nutshell, the basic independence of falsity and untruth appears to be instruc-
tive and insightful for logical purposes. We can summarize our guideline through
the following four statements: truth is made on a par with a number of different
affirmations, whilst falsity and untruth refer to a number of different negations; the
truth-value of falsity F is not equated with untruth T ; truth receives different in-
terpretations, according to the speaker’s accepted criteria of justification; different
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logics are to be explained in terms of different conditions of correctness, and these
directly interfere with the ensuing domain of truth-values.
3 Structured values
A bias has been mentioned in the preceding section, leading to the rejection of non-
classical truth-values. This bias can be caught under what Suszko called the ‘Fregean
Axiom’ [22] and includes two clauses, namely: that the reference of a proposition is
a truth-value; that a truth-value is either the True or the False. The latter clause
seems to assume a third one, viz. that truth-values are simple objects. In other
words, any truth-value is to be viewed as a simple item: either the True T or its
failure T , which is taken to mean the same as the False F . Thus only T and F
are properly logical values in this view, whereas B or N would be superficial items
corresponding to the range of algebraic values. In the following, we depart from this
pair of statements by endorsing the use of algebraic or structured values.
Let us see how truth-values can be constructed and lead to structured items.
The first constructive step is the set including a unique element, the singleton {T},
such that this set V1 includes x = 1 element that is the True. Thus, V1 = {T}.
The second constructive step is the set V2 such that it includes x = 2 elements: T ,
and T . In V2, T is a failure of value corresponding to the the empty set and can
be called the False: T = F , so that every sentence that is said non-true is thereby
false in V2. And conversely, every sentence that is said non-false is thereby true in
V2. Thus, V2 = {T, T} = {T, F}. The third constructive step is the set of values V4
that includes x = 4 elements: T, T = F, TT = B, and TT = N . In V4, the empty
set TT is the Neither-True-Nor-False and this means that not every sentence that
is not true is thereby false (and conversely): T 6= F in V4.
A generalization of this constructive process consists in augmenting the number of
truth-values by relativizing the denotation of the empty set in an arbitrary domain
of values V2n . For one thing, any such set includes a number of 2n structured objects
x that are made of n simple elements x1, . . . , xn from the previous set V2n−1 . Then
an empty set can be defined as the denial of all the n simple elements: T is the
empty set of V2 including n = 1 simple element, TT is the empty set of V4 including
n = 2 simple elements, etc. Let us symbolize each such structured object x ∈ V2n by
an integer, according to its order of constructive occurrence: 1 for T , 2 for T = F ,
3 for TT = B, 4 for TT = N , etc. Then the set of designated values D is a set in
which every structured object includes the simple element x1 = T : D = {1} in V2,
D = {1, 3} in V4, etc. Moreover, all the 3-valued systems {V3,D} constructed on the
above pattern are subsets of V4. Three cases of 3-valued domains are given by the
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logical systems of Łukasiewicz’s L3 [16], Kleene’s (strong) KS3 [13], and Priest’s P3
[18]. These systems somehow differ from each other by their characteristic subsets
of designated values: with Ł3 and K3, V−3 = {{1, 2, 4}, {1}} includes one single
designated value, whilst the domain V+3 = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2}} includes two ones with
P3. Whatever the feature of any logical system may be, truth-values always occur
hereby as Boolean structured objects. This does not mean that every sentence is
every true or false but, rather, that every truth-value results from a combination of
two simple values T or T . For sake of simplicity, any truth-value will be symbolized
thereafter as an arbitrary combination of basic Boolean values xi = 1 and xi =
0. It results in an increasing set of truth-values such that V1 = {1}, V2 = {1, 0},
V4 = {11, 10, 01, 00}, etc. The rest of the paper will be entirely devoted to the latter
domain V4, due to its greater expressive power.
4 Bivalence
Another issue can be clarified in the light of the previous constructive view of truth-
values, namely: what is to be meant by a ‘classical’ logic. In the commonsensical
sense, a logical system is said ‘classical’ whenever it includes a 2-valued domain,
V2. But it can be shown that two-valuedness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for a logical system to be classical. On the one hand, a 2-valued system
may not be classical as, e.g., da Costa’s hierarchy of logical systems C1-Cω [8]. On
the other hand, a classical system may not be 2-valued as will be shown in the next
framework of 4-valued systems AR4[Oi]. A safer way to characterize classicality is
to say that it validates a closed set of characteristic theorems, irrespective of the
cardinality of its interpretative domain. These theorems include the main following
ones:
Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC) |=CL ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)
Law of Excluded Middle (LEM) |=CL (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ)
Law of Double Negation (LDN1) |=CL ϕ→ ¬¬ϕ
(LDN2) |=CL ¬¬ϕ→ ϕ
De Morgan Laws (DML1) |=CL ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ (¬ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ)
(DML2) |=CL (¬ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ)→ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(DML3) |=CL ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)
(DML4) |=CL (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)→ ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)
Law of Explosion (LE) ϕ,¬ϕ |=CL ψ
Modus Tollens (MT) ϕ→ ψ,¬ψ |=CL ¬ϕ
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Disjunctive Syllogism (DS) ϕ ∨ ψ,¬ϕ |=CL ψ
Finally, classical logic is usually associated with the so-called Principle of Bivalence
(LBV). Albeit basic, this principle is not so obvious as it may appear and can be
formulated in various ways. For example, Kubishkina & Zaitsev [14] distinguished
a strong and a weak version of bivalence. The strong version equates bivalence with
the structured values {T ,F} in V2; it states that “each sentence takes as its value
precisely one of two truth values: truth or falsehood”. At the same time, the weak
version equates bivalence with the Boolean basic values {1,0} in V2n ; it states that
“there are exactly two possible truth values of a sentence: truth and falsehood” [14,
p. 501]. The former version is like a referential view of bivalence, in the sense that
it deals with truth-values as the proper names ‘True’ and ‘False’; the latter version
is like a descriptive view of bivalence, in the sense that it deals with truth-values
as the definitive descriptions ‘what is true and not false’ and ‘what is not true and
false’. In order to combine both versions into a common definition, (LBV) can be
depicted as a set of four clauses such that, for any sentence ϕ:
Definition 1.1: Law of Bivalence
(i) If ϕ is true, then ϕ is not false.
(ii) If ϕ is false, then ϕ is not true.
(iii) If ϕ is not true, then ϕ is false.
(iv) If ϕ is not false, then ϕ is true.
The clauses (i)-(ii) refer to the clause of exclusiveness: every sentence must refer to
at most one simple value among truth and falsehood, whilst (iii)-(iv) refer to the
clause of exhaustiveness: every sentence must refer to at least one simple value xi
among truth and falsehood. This shows that (LBV) assumes that V2 is both the
minimal and maximal domain of values to interpret any formal language, insofar as
it must include at least and at most the two simple elements T and T = F . The
clause of exclusiveness also entails that no further domain of values can be accepted
once any truth-value must remain a simple element. In V2, (i)-(ii) obviously hold
by virtue of the ensuing equation T = F ; but it is not so anymore from the next
constructive set V4 onwards, where T 6= F . And nevertheless, (LBV) can be applied
outside V2 by restricting the admitted ways of affirming truth and falsity, with the
help of the coming unary operators [Ai]. More generally, exclusiveness refers to any
case in which the occurrence of one value xi entails the failure of the other one xj ;
and exhaustiveness refers to any case in which the failure of any value xi entails the
occurrence of the other one xj .
Another way to characterize classical logic proceeds by satisfying another pair of
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metalogical properties that characterize normal logics, namely: consistency (Cons),
and completeness (Comp). Thus, for any formal language L and any formula ϕ ∈ L:
Definition 2: Consistency
|= Lϕ ⇒ 6|= L¬ϕ
Definition 3: Completeness
6|= Lϕ ⇒ |= L¬ϕ
Any logic is to be said normal whenever is satisfies both (Cons) and (Comp), ac-
cordingly. Paraconsistent logics PcL do not satisfy (Cons) whilst satisfying (Comp),
whereas paracomplete logics PmL satisfy (Cons) whilst not satisfying (Comp). Log-
ics that do not satisfy either (Cons) or (Comp) are paranormal logics PnL. Finally,
bivalent logics are those satisfying the above conditions (i)-(iv).
5 Logics of affirmation and negation
One aim of the present paper is to show that bivalence is neither a necessary nor
a sufficient condition for a logical system to be said ‘classical’, for a logical system
may be bivalent without being classical and conversely. Another aim is to present
a number of unary operators that modify the conditions of affirmation in various
ways and are able to restore the properties of consistency, completeness, or both
(normality). Such a challenge has been already faced, with another set of formal
tools at hand [7]. To account for the same point, the common semantic framework
AR4[Oi] is going to encompass a variety of logical systems and to show how these
partly subscribe to (LBV). The formal language of AR4[Oi] can be depicted in the
usual Backus-Naur form:
ϕ ::= [Oi]p | [Oi](ϕ • ψ) | [Oi]ϕ • [Oi]ψ | ¬1[Oi]ϕ | ¬2[Oi]ϕ
where ϕ is any complex formula of the form p • q, • ∈ {∧,∨,→} being the set of the
usual binary connectives and [Oi] ∈ {[Ni], [Ai]} being a set of two unary connectives,
viz. negative and affirmative operators. The above well-formed formulas show that
unary operators [Oi] must always be prefixed to sentences: no formula occurs with-
out being affirmed or denied, that is, taken to be true or false or none, so that the
expressions ‘p’ and ‘ϕ’ are ill-formed formulas in AR4[Oi]. Furthermore, two kinds
of negation must be prefixed to formulas: the first negation ¬1 applies to complex
formulas, whereas the second negation ¬2 applies to simple formulas. As AR4[Oi]
is a set of 4-valued logical systems, its domain of interpretation is the constructive
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set of truth-values V4 = {11, 10, 01, 00} such that, for any formula ϕ of AR4[Oi],
v4(ϕ) ∈ V4. Two of these values are designated: D = {11, 10}, so that any formula
of AR4[Oi] is designated whenever it is told true. Consequence is defined hereby as
a relation of truth-preservation such that, for any sets of formulas Γ and a formula ∆,
Definition 4: Logical consequence
For every ϕ ∈ Γ, Γ |=AR4[Oi] ψ ⇔ v4(ψ) ∈ D if v4(ϕ) ∈ D.
Let v4(ϕ) = 〈a, b〉 and v4(ψ) = 〈c, d〉 be the valuation functions of V4 assigning
structured values x = 〈x1, x2〉 to arbitrary formulas ϕ,ψ in AR4[Oi]. Then the logi-
cal constants can be defined accordingly, assuming the Boolean ordering relation 1
> 0 between the simple elements x1, x2 of x:
Definition 5: Logical connectives
Conjunction
v4(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 〈min(a, c),max(b, d)〉
Disjunction
v4(ϕ ∨ ψ) = 〈max(a, c),min(b, d)〉
Conditional
v4(ϕ→ ψ) = 〈max(b, c),min(a, d)〉
∧ 11 10 01 00
11 11 11 01 01
10 11 10 01 00
01 01 01 01 01
00 01 00 01 00
∨ 11 10 01 00
11 11 10 11 10
10 10 10 10 10
01 11 10 01 00
00 10 10 00 00
→ 11 10 01 00
11 11 10 11 10
10 11 10 01 00
01 10 10 10 10
00 10 10 00 00
These connectives match with the standard equivalence of ϕ→ ψ and ¬ϕ∨ψ.3 The
real innovative part of AR4[Oi] concerns its unary operators [Oi]. Unlike most of
the formalized systems, affirmation does not collapse with its sentential content and
refers hereby to the attitude of agents with respect to it. In other words: every agent
‘affirms’ or ‘negates’ arbitrary sentences, insofar as these are not given a truth-value
per se but are taken to be true or false by agents.
Affirmation and negation can be defined intensionally, as partial operators map-
ping on structured values x = 〈xi, xj〉. Thus, T = 10 means that a sentence is true
3Unlike the 4-valued logical system characterized in [20] by a non-standard ‘defective’ or strong
conditional, AR4[Oi] includes the standard conditional or ‘material’ implication. This is due to our
central task of translating logical systems that always assume the paradoxes of material implication
in their formal languages.
601
Schang
(xi = 1) and not false (xj = 0); F = 01 means that a sentence is not true (xi = 0)
and false (xj = 1); B = 11 means that a sentence is true (xi = 1) and false (xj = 1);
and N = 00 means that a sentence is not true (xi = 0) and not false (xj = 0).
It may seem queer to talk about sentences being both true and false, due to the
usually ontological interpretation of truth-values as correlating with facts or not.
However, our point is to use a common domain of values interpreted in terms of
available evidence. Thus we will take truth and falsity to mean the occurrence of
evidence for or against a sentence, respectively. From this evidential reading of
truth-values, the unary operators of affirmation will essentially occur as affording
various criteria of justification for sentences.
On the one hand, the operator of affirmation means that some given agent ac-
cepts or assigns some truth-value to a sentence ϕ according to its proper criteria
for truth, in the sense that affirming a sentence is on a par with taking it to be
so-and-so. The logical syntax of an affirmation is [Ai]ϕ, which can be read ‘It is the
case that ϕ is xi’. This means that, following a deflationist reading, any occurrence
of an arbitrary sentence ϕ means the same as ‘ϕ is xi’. The lower case subscript i
refers to the plurality of affirmative operators; for there may be as much affirma-
tive operators as different criteria of truth assumed by the agents, depending upon
whether truth excludes falsity or whether failure of truth entails falsity according
to them. A general definition of affirmation may be given for any single values xi, xj :
Definition 6.1: Affirmation
[A]ϕ : xi 7→ xj .
That is, affirming that ϕ is true (or false) entails that ϕ is not false (or true) in
V4. It may seem paradoxical to define affirmation in that way, i.e., by introducing
a metalinguistic negation xj into its characterizing mapping. Now the point is that
any meaningful operator does not admit every value and must exclude at least one of
these in order to make sense. And unlike negative operators, affirmative operators
are those which do not exclude the value on which they apply but another one.
Thus, affirming that ϕ is true (or false) entails that ϕ is not false (or true) in V4.
On the other hand, the operator of negation consists in stating that some agent
rejects or denies some truth-value to ϕ according to its proper criteria of truth; so
by negating a sentence, the agent takes it not to be so-and-so. A general definition
of negation may be given for any single values xi, xj :
Definition 6.2: Negation
[N ]ϕ : xi 7→ xi.
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That is, negating that ϕ is true (or false) entails that ϕ is not true (or false) in V4.
A first example of such functions relates to affirmation. Let [A1] ∈ [Ai] be an exam-
ple of partial affirmation mapping from truth to unfalsity, and nothing else. That
is:
[A1]ϕ : T 7→ F
which a case of affirmation where xi = T and xj = F .
Its characteristic truth-table makes a difference between two kinds of output, namely:
those which are partly altered by the operators (in boldface), whereas all the outputs






A second example has to do with negation. Let [N1] ∈ [Ni] be an example of partial
negation mapping from truth to untruth, and nothing else. That is:
[N1]ϕ : T 7→ T
which a case of negation where xi = T .
Again, not all the outputs are altered in its characteristic truth-table since [N1] only






As it has been said earlier, affirmation and negation are intensional operators: these
are rules of mapping between domain of truth-values, and there may be several
exemplifications or extensions of these mappings in AR4[Oi]. Such an intensional
characterization is made possible by our central distinction between simple and com-
plex truth-values, insofar as the mappings of unary operators [Oi] do not range over
603
Schang
the compounds like x, but, rather, on either of their components xi, xj . This brings
more expressive power to the formal language and leads to a further distinction be-
tween two kinds of unary operators: partial, and total.
Definition 7.1: Partial operators
Partial operators map onto simple values of a domain V2n : xi/j 7→ xi/j .
Definition 7.2: Total operators
Total operators map onto structured values of a domain V2n : x 7→ x.
A third category of unary operator is a combination of the preceding two ones.
This consists in a special mapping involving [A] or [N ].
Definition 8: Combination
If [Oi]ϕ : xi 7→ xj , then [OOi]ϕ : xi 7→ xj .
Assuming that, for every simple value xi : xi = xi, this means that
[ANi]ϕ = [NAi]ϕ : xi 7→ xj = xi 7→ xj
[AAi]ϕ = [NNi]ϕ : xi 7→ xi = xi 7→ xi
Turning back to bivalence, the four clauses (i)-(iv) of (LBV) can be rephrased as a
product of affirmative operators. Thus
Definition 1.2: Affirmative Bivalence
[A1]ϕ : T 7→ F
[A2]ϕ : F 7→ T
[A3]ϕ : T 7→ F
[A4]ϕ : F 7→ T
Two main operations can be performed upon such partial operators, whose applica-
tion is essential to the coming translation of several logical systems. A first operation
is product, which helps to construct the general principle of bivalence.
Definition 9: Product
The product of partial operators [Oi]⊗ [Oj ] consists in an aggregation of operators
such that, letting [Oi] : a 7→ b and [Oj ] : c 7→ d,
([Oi]⊗ [Oj ])ϕ = a 7→ b⊗ c 7→ d.
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To give an example, a product of the affirmative operators [A3] and [A4] consists in
fulfilling the last two clauses of (PBV).
([A3]⊗ [A4])ϕ = T 7→ F ⊗ F 7→ T
ϕ [A3]ϕ [A4]ϕ ([A3]⊗ [A4])ϕ
11 11 11 11
10 10 10 10
01 01 01 01
00 01 10 11
Product can be characterized by a number of algebraic properties such that, for any
partial operators [Ox], [Oy], [Oz]:
Idempotence [Oi]ϕ⊗ [Oi]ϕ = [Oi]ϕ
Commutativity [Oi]ϕ⊗ [Oj ]ϕ = [Oj ]ϕ⊗ [Oi]ϕ
Associativity [Oi]ϕ⊗ ([Oj ]⊗ [Ok])ϕ = ([Oi]⊗ ([Oj ])ϕ⊗ [Ok]ϕ
Distributivity [Oi]ϕ⊗ ([Oj ]⊗ [Ok])ϕ = ([Oi]⊗ ([Oj ])ϕ⊗ ([Oi]⊗ [Ok])ϕ
Affirmative and negative operators can be constructed following the same pat-
tern. For any domain of structured truth-values V2n including n basic elements, there
is an amount of (2n)2−1 kinds of unary operators [Oi]. Thus, there is (22)2−1 = 15
cases of operators [Ai] and [Ni] in V4. Here is a list of the corresponding 15 affirma-
tive operators, where single mappings may be combined variously until the ultimate,
total operator [A15] that proceeds as an exhaustive product of partial operators:
[A1]ϕ : T 7→ F
[A2]ϕ : F 7→ T
[A3]ϕ : T 7→ F
[A4]ϕ : F 7→ T
[A5]ϕ = ([A1]⊗ [A2])ϕ = T 7→ F ⊗ F 7→ T
[A6]ϕ = ([A1]⊗ [A3])ϕ = T 7→ F ⊗ T 7→ F
[A7]ϕ = ([A1]⊗ [A4])ϕ = T 7→ F ⊗ F 7→ T
[A8]ϕ = ([A2]⊗ [A3])ϕ = F 7→ T ⊗ T 7→ F
[A9]ϕ = ([A2]⊗ [A4])ϕ = F 7→ T ⊗ F 7→ T
[A10]ϕ = ([A3]⊗ [A4])ϕ = T 7→ F ⊗ F 7→ T
[A11]ϕ = ([A1]⊗ [A2]⊗ [A3])ϕ = T 7→ F ⊗ F 7→ T ⊗ T 7→ F
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[A12]ϕ = ([A1]⊗ [A2]⊗ [A4])ϕ = T 7→ F ⊗ F 7→ T ⊗ F 7→ T
[A13]ϕ = ([A1]⊗ [A3]⊗ [A4])ϕ = T 7→ F ⊗ T 7→ F ⊗ F 7→ T
[A14]ϕ = ([A2]⊗ [A3]⊗ [A4])ϕ = F 7→ T ⊗ T 7→ F ⊗ F 7→ T
[A15]ϕ = ([A1]⊗ [A2]⊗ [A3]⊗ [A4])ϕ = T 7→ F ⊗ F 7→ T ⊗ T 7→ F ⊗ F 7→ T
The same ordering of partial operators can be obtained with negation [Ni], turning
the mapping pattern xi 7→ xj into xi 7→ xi. This results in two sorts of ‘degenerate’
negations in AR4[Oi], including more than the two single instances of degenerate
operators > and ⊥ in CL.
On the one hand, some of these are the tautology-forming operators such that, for
any truth-value of V4,
v4(ϕ) 6∈ D ⇒ v4([Ni]ϕ) ∈ D
This is so with any operator including [N3] by mapping onto truth:
[N3](ϕ) : T 7→ T
and such that no other valuation is undesignated. Therefore, any such operator of
AR4[Oi] is a tautology-forming operator: [N3], [N8], [N10], [N14].
On the other hand, some of these are the antilogy-forming operators such that, for
any truth-value of V4,
v4(ϕ) ∈ D ⇒ v4([Ni]ϕ) 6∈ D
This is so with any operator including [N1] by mapping onto untruth:
[N1](ϕ) : T 7→ T
and such that no other valuation is designated. Therefore, any such operator of
AR4[Oi] is a antilogy-forming operator: [N1], [N5], [N7], [N12].
All the remaining negative operators include both designated and undesignated val-
uations, accordingly: [N2], [N4], [N6], [N9], [N11], [N13], [N15].
The following wants to show that only two kinds of negation [Ni] are relevant to
translate a number of logical systems in V4. Unlike the main translation processes,
we argue that the various logical systems do not differ from each other by their
characteristic negations; these are the same in each of these systems. Rather, the
difference between these relies on their characteristic affirmative operators in V4.
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These two operators result from a combination of single operators [Oi], and only
one of these can be considered as a ‘pure’ negation in the sense of being one of the
15 single operators [Ni].
The first main negation is Boolean negation ¬1, such that the corresponding formula
¬1[Ai]ϕ can be read ‘It is not the case, according to the agent’s criteria for truth,
that ϕ is xi’. Following our deconstruction of unary operators into partial ones, it
turns out that Boolean negation can be reconstructed as an operator that turns any
designated value into an undesignated one and conversely. Interestingly, the variety
of negative operators [Ni] makes more than only one possible candidate for Boolean
negation. This means that, given a translation function τ mapping from any formula
into a formula of AR4[Oi], we obtain the following counterparts of Boolean negation
into V4 and their characteristic truth-tables:
τ(¬1[Ai]ϕ) = {[N11][Ai]ϕ, [N13][Ai]ϕ, [N15][Ai]ϕ}
given that
[N11]ϕ : ([N1]⊗ [N2]⊗ [N3] = T 7→ T ⊗ F 7→ F ⊗ T 7→ T
[N13]ϕ : ([N1]⊗ [N3]⊗ [N4])ϕ = T 7→ T ⊗ T 7→ T ⊗ F 7→ F
[N15]ϕ : ([N1]⊗ [N2]⊗ [N3]⊗ [N4])ϕ = T 7→ T ⊗ F 7→ F ⊗ T 7→ T ⊗ F 7→ F
[Ai]ϕ [N11][Ai]ϕ [N13][Ai]ϕ [N15][Ai]ϕ
11 00 01 00
10 00 01 01
01 10 11 10
00 10 11 11
For sake of simplicity, however, such a main candidate for ‘pure negation’ will be
equated with [N15] hereafter and may be applied to any affirmation of the sentential
content ϕ.
The second main negation is Morganian negation ¬2, whose logical form ¬2[Ai]ϕ
may be read ‘It is the case that, according to the agent’s criteria for truth, ϕ is xj ’.
This means that, by negating in that way, the agent affirms the second ordered value
xj when negating the first ordered value xi. Unlike Boolean negation, Morganian












Once again, it is important to note that any sentence is affirmed in either way before
being negated: agents always assume one’s own criteria of truth by introducing any
sentence, so that negation does not apply to the sentential content ϕ but, rather,
to the basic formula [Ai]ϕ. In other words, agents negate according to one’s own
commitments into what truth and falsity mean. Thus, the usual syntactic distinction
between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ negation does not make sense in AR4[Oi] since
formulas like [Ai]¬iϕ are ill-formed formulas in it. The scope of Morganian negation
is important to modify the value of its argument [Ai]ϕ in a specific way, as is shown
in the following truth-table where the well-formed formula ¬2[A6]ϕ does not yield
the same valuations as the ill-formed formula [A6]¬2ϕ.
ϕ [A6]ϕ ¬2[A6]ϕ [A6]¬2ϕ
11 10 01 10
10 10 01 01
01 01 10 10
00 10 01 10
Note also that the failure of internal negation does not entail any lack of expres-
sive power for AR4[Oi]; for as it will appear in the following (see Theorem 8 and
Theorem 9), the usual notion of contrary negation can be rephrased hereafter as
a composition of Boolean negation and duality.
About the latter expression, the peculiar behavior of both negations is such that
duality needs to be explained in another way than the usual relation between [Ai]ϕ
and ¬[Ai]¬ϕ in AR4[Oi]. Alternatively, duality can be redefined in terms of map-
pings between an arbitrary formula [Oi]ϕ and its dual d([Oi]ϕ) by reverting the
value of the former’s inputs and outputs. That is: for any simple values xi, xj ,
Definition 10: Duality
If [Oi]ϕ : xi 7→ xj then d([Oi]ϕ) : xi 7→ xj .
The above reformulation of duality accounts for its following usual properties, to-
gether with a list of duals and self-duals among the affirmative operators of AR4[Oi]:
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d([Ai]ϕ ∧ [Ai]ψ) = (d(Ai]ϕ) ∨ d([Ai]ψ))
d([Ai]ϕ ∨ [Ai]ψ) = (d(Ai]ϕ) ∧ d([Ai]ψ))
d([A1]ϕ) = [A3]ϕ, d([A2]ϕ) = [A4]ϕ, d([A5]ϕ) = [A10]ϕ, d([A7]ϕ) = [A8]ϕ
d([A6]ϕ) = [A6]ϕ, d([A9]ϕ) = [A9]ϕ, d([A15]ϕ) = [A15]ϕ
An alternative way of defining duality [19] is by applying Boolean negation to the
reversed ordered elements of a characteristic matrix for a given formula, m([Ai]ϕ) =
(a1, b1)(a2, b2)(a3, b3)(a4, b4), so that d(m([Ai]ϕ)) = ¬1(a4, b4)¬1(a3, b3)¬1(a2, b2)
¬1(a1, b1).
Taking [A1]ϕ as an example, its characteristic truth-table m is such that
(a1, b1) = 10, (a2, b2) = 10, (a3, b3) = 01, (a4, b4) = 00.
Hence
d(m([A1]ϕ)) = ¬1(00)¬1(01)¬1(10)¬1(10) = (11)(10)(01)(01) = m([A3]ϕ).
A proof theory can also be devised for the set of logical systems AR4[Oi], including
a set of axioms (A1)-(A9) that hold for every interpretation of the affirmative oper-
ators [Ai].
(A1) [Ai]ϕ→ ([Ai]ψ → [Ai]ϕ)
(A2) ([Ai]ϕ→ [Ai]ψ)→ (([Ai]ψ → ([Ai]γ)→ ([Ai]ψ → [Ai]γ))
(A3) [Ai]ϕ→ ([Ai]ψ)→ ([Ai]ϕ ∧ [Ai]ψ))
(A4.1) ([Ai]ϕ ∧ [Ai]ψ)→ [Ai]ϕ
(A4.2) ([Ai]ϕ ∧ [Ai]ψ)→ [Ai]ψ
(A5.1) [Ai]ϕ→ ([Ai]ϕ ∨ [Ai]ψ)
(A5.2) [Ai]ψ → ([Ai]ϕ ∨ [Ai]ψ)
(A6) ([Ai]ϕ→ [Ai]γ)→ (([Ai]ψ → [Ai]γ)→ (([Ai]ϕ ∨ [Ai]ψ)→ [Ai]γ))
(A7) ([Ai]ϕ→ [Ai]ψ)→ (([Ai]ϕ→ ¬1[[Ai]ψ)→ ¬1[Ai]ϕ))
(A8) [Ai]ϕ→ (¬1[Ai]ϕ→ [Ai]ψ)
Once a semantics and a general proof theory are set up, a general proof of sound-
ness and completeness should be available. Instead of affording such an important
result, however, the main issue that remains is rather the semantic ambiguity of
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what affirmation and negation mean in various logical systems. For this purpose,
it is possible to tackle the main issue of translating the formulas of various logical
systems into one and the same semantic background.
6 Logics in translation
We saw in Section 1 that there is a mainstream formalization for such usual state-
ments as affirmation and negation, and that process matches with the deflationist
theory of truth. Roughly speaking, any occurrence of a formula like ϕ is expected to
mean ‘ϕ is true’; and any occurrence of a formula like ‘¬ϕ’ is expected to mean ‘ϕ is
false’. Let FL be this usual formal language; then we want to show two main things.
Firstly, there is a common logical form for every formula in AR4[Oi]. Secondly,
the difference between various logical systems in AR4[Oi] depends on the various
interpretations of [Ai] whilst negations [Ni] remain the same.
A general translation of the aforementioned formulas (see section 4) will be used as
a test for characterizing logical systems in which these formulas are valid or not.
The main properties of τ can be displayed by a set of clauses for translating logical
systems into AR4[Oi]. Thus for any translation of a given formula from a source
logic FL onto AR4[Oi]:
τ(ϕ)FL = [Ai]ϕ
τ(ϕ • ψ)FL = [Ai]ϕ • [Ai]ψ, for any binary connective • = {∧,∨,→}
τ(¬ϕ)FL = ¬1[Ai]ϕ if ϕ is a compound formula,
= ¬2[Ai]ϕ if ϕ is a single formula.
The above ambiguity of sentential negation is due to the twofold meaning of it,
i.e., as an affirmation of falsity with ¬2 or a mere denial with ¬1. Correspondingly,
double negation is to be disentangled as a denial of affirming falsity. This can be
implemented by the characteristic formulas of ‘classical’ logic, especially when these
include more than one negation. These can be translated as a set of uniform formu-
las into AR4[Oi]:
τ(LNC)FL = ¬1([Ai]ϕ ∧ ¬2[Ai]ϕ)
τ(LEM)FL = [Ai]ϕ ∨ ¬2[Ai]ϕ
τ(LDN1)FL = [Ai]ϕ→ ¬1¬2[Ai]ϕ
τ(LDN2)FL = ¬1¬2[Ai]ϕ→ [Ai]ϕ
τ(DML1)FL = ¬1([Aiϕ ∧ [Ai]ψ)→ (¬2[Ai]ϕ ∨ ¬2[Ai]ϕ)
τ(DML2)FL = (¬2[Ai]ϕ ∨ ¬2[Ai]ϕ)→ ¬1([Ai]ϕ ∧ [Ai]ψ)
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τ(DML3)FL = ¬1([Ai]ϕ ∨ [Ai]ψ)→ (¬2[Ai]ϕ ∧ ¬2[Ai]ϕ)
τ(DML4)FL = (¬2[Ai]ϕ ∧ ¬2[Ai]ϕ)→ ¬1([Ai]ϕ ∨ [Ai]ψ)
τ(LE)FL = [Ai]ϕ,¬2[Ai]ϕ |=CL [Ai]ψ
τ(MT)FL = [Ai]ϕ→ [Ai]ψ,¬2[Ai]ψ |=CL ¬2[Ai]ϕ
τ(DS)FL = [Ai]ϕ ∨ [Ai]ψ,¬2[Ai]ϕ |=CL [Ai]ψ
Accordingly, a variety of such interpretations help to translate different logical sys-
tems and result in the following theorems.
Theorem 1. A translation of CL into AR4[Oi] is such that
τ(v4(ϕ))CL = {10, 01}, that is:
τ([Ai])CL = {[A6], [A7], [A8], [A9]}
ϕ [A6]ϕ [A7]ϕ [A8]ϕ [A9]ϕ
11 10 10 01 01
10 10 10 10 10
01 01 01 01 01
00 01 10 01 10
Proof. Classical logic CL is such that it validates all the formulas (LNC)-(DS). The
reader may observe that all of these are validated in V2 = {10, 01}. Hence every oper-
ator [Ai] mapping from V4 onto V2 is a translation of CL into AR4[Oi] by proceeding
as a normality operator [7], i.e., as a consistency- and completeness-forming operator.

‘Classical’ logic CL may be viewed in AR4[Oi] as a normal and semi-bivalent system
satisfying both (Cons) and (Comp). ‘Semi-bivalence’ means hereby that the above
affirmative operators [A6], [A7], [A8] and [A9] include only one half of the four prop-
erties (i)-(iv) of (LBV). To be more precise, any proper version of CL is a logical
system of AR4[Oi] such that its characteristic affirmative operator [Ai] includes ei-
ther one property of consistency (i)-(ii) or one property of completeness (iii)-(iv).
Such is the case with the above four affirmative operators, whose valuation processes
have the common form [Ai]ϕ : xi 7→ xj ⊗ xi 7→ xj .
Theorem 2. A translation of PmL into AR4[Oi] is such that
τ(v4(ϕ))PmL = {10, 00, 01}, that is:
τ([Ai])PmL = {[A1], [A2], [A5], [A11], [A12]}
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ϕ [A1]ϕ [A2]ϕ [A5]ϕ [A11]ϕ [A12]ϕ
11 10 01 00 00 00
10 10 10 10 10 10
01 01 01 01 01 01
00 00 01 00 01 10
Proof. Paracomplete logics PmL always invalidate the following formulas: (LEM),
(LDN1), (DML3). The reader may observe that all of these are respectively val-
idated and invalidated with V −3 = {10, 01, 00}, in addition with (DML1). Hence
every operator [Ai] mapping from V4 onto V −3 is a translation of PmL into AR4[Oi]
by proceeding as a consistency- and incompleteness-forming operator. 
Paracompleteness in AR4[Oi] includes either none of the two properties of com-
pleteness (iii)-(iv) or both properties of consistency (i)-(ii). That is, each case of
PmL includes an affirmative operator [Ai] such that neither [Ai]ϕ : xi 7→ xj nor
[Ai]ϕ : xj 7→ xi, or [Ai]ϕ : xi 7→ xj ⊗ xj 7→ xi. In other words, each logical system
including both properties of consistency entails a domain with undetermined values.
The above systems match with the truth-tables of PmL, since their characteristic
affirmative operators yield only the three output values T = 10, F = 01, and N =
00. Thus, there cannot be ‘glutty’ situations therein. Besides that, their character-
istic mappings also match with the paracomplete import of PmL by requiring that
any false formula be non-true and any true formula be non-false, but not conversely:
it does not follow from a formula being non-false or non-true that it should be re-
spectively true or false, in accordance to the intuitionistic interpretation of truth as
constructive proof [21].
Theorem 3. A translation of paraconsistent logic PcL into AR4[Oi] is such that
τ(v4(ϕ))PcL = {11, 10, 01}, that is:
τ([Ai])PcL = {[A3], [A4], [A10], [A13], [A14]}
ϕ [A3]ϕ [A4]ϕ [A10]ϕ [A13]ϕ [A14]ϕ
11 11 11 11 10 01
10 10 10 10 10 10
01 01 01 01 01 01
00 01 10 11 11 11
Proof. Paraconsistent logics PcL always invalidate the following formulas: (LNC),
(LE), (RAA), (DS). The reader may observe that all of these are invalidated with
V+3 = {11, 10, 01}, in addition with (LDN2) and (DML4). Hence every operator [Ai]
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mapping from V4 onto V+3 is a translation of PcL into AR4[Oi] by proceeding as a
completeness- and inconsistency-forming operator. 
Paraconsistency in AR4[Oi] includes either none of the two properties of consis-
tency (i)-(ii) or both properties of completeness (iii)-(iv). That is, each case of
PcL includes an affirmative operator [Ai] such that neither [Ai]ϕ : xi 7→ xj nor
[Ai]ϕ : xj 7→ xi, or [Ai]ϕ : xi 7→ xj ⊗ xj 7→ xi. In other words, each logical system
including both properties of completeness entails a domain with overdetermined val-
ues. The above paraconsistent systems match with the truth-tables of PcL, insofar
as their characteristic affirmative operator yield only the three truth-values B = 11,
T = 10, and F = 01. This means that there are no ‘gappy’ situations therein.
Theorem 4. Each paracomplete logic PmL has its proper dual paraconsistent logic
PcL in AR4[Oi].
Proof. The affirmative operators of PmL include (a) neither of the properties of
completeness, i.e., neither [Ai]ϕ : xi 7→ xj nor [Ai]ϕ : xj 7→ xi, or (b) both proper-
ties of consistency: [Ai]ϕ : xi 7→ xj ⊗ xj 7→ xi. The affirmative operators of PcL
include (a′) neither of the properties of consistency, i.e., neither [Ai]ϕ : xi 7→ xj nor
[Ai]ϕ : xj 7→ xi, or (b′) both properties of completeness: [Ai]ϕ : xi 7→ xj ⊗ xj 7→ xi.
Hence every mapping a 7→ b of PmL has its proper dual a 7→ b of PcL whenever
(a) = d(a′) and (b) = d(b′). 
The corresponding duals of PmL and PcL are the following, respectively: [A1] =
d([A3]), [A2] = d([A4]), [A5] = d([A10]).
The above dual relation means that the truth of one of its relata always entails the
truth of the other one, by reference to the relation between the modal operators of
necessity  and possibility 3. Hence some of the affirmative operators leading to
PmL and PcL are duals whenever any case of truth of the former is also a case
of truth in the latter –but the converse does not hold. PcL being a paraconsistent
logic, then PmL can be said a dual paraconsistent logic [21]. Their partial mappings
help to understand why PmL and PcL are duals by affording two opposed readings
of the truth-values: as a conclusive proof, in the former; as an available evidence
in the latter, such that the assignment of truth or falsity need not prevent from
assigning falsity or truth as well.
Theorem 5. A translation of paranormal logic PnL into AR4[Oi] is such that









Proof. The paranormal logic AR4[A15] is such that it invalidates all the formulas
(PNC)-(DS), thus equating with Belnap’s logical system FDE [1]. The reader may
observe that all of these are invalidated with V4 = {11, 10, 01, 00}. Hence every
operator [Ai] mapping from V4 onto V4 is a translation of PnL into AR4[Oi] by
proceeding as an incompleteness- and inconsistency-forming operator. 
It follows from these features that AR4[A15] is both a bivalent and paranormal sys-
tem: it satisfies the four properties (i)-(iv) of (LBV) without satisfying any of
(Comp) and (Cons). Therefore, bivalence and normality are opposed to each other
into AR4[Oi] whereas normality usually calls for bivalence in most logical systems.
Furthermore, AR4[A15] can be depicted as an anti-classical logic, following the ter-
minology adopted in Bensusan & Costa-Leite & De Souza [2]: for any formula ϕ, if
|=CL ϕ then 6|=PnL ϕ.
Theorem 6. A translation of TL into AR4[Oi] is such that
τ(Tϕ) = [A6]ϕ, that is:
[A6] = ([A1]⊗ [A3])ϕ : T 7→ F ⊗ T 7→ F
τ(T′ϕ) = [A9]ϕ, that is:
[A9]ϕ = ([A2]⊗ [A4])ϕ : F 7→ T ⊗ F 7→ T
τ(Fϕ) = ¬2[A9]ϕ.
Proof. The above truth-table is equivalent to that of von Wright’s logic TL [23],
according to the following symbolic translation of truth-values from TL to AR4[Oi]
(see Section 1): B = 11; T = 10; F = 01; N = 00, where D = {B, T}.
ϕ [A6]ϕ [A9]ϕ ¬2[A9]ϕ
11 10 01 10
10 10 10 01
01 01 01 10
00 01 10 01
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It follows from this that every theorem of TL is also a theorem of AR4[A6]. 
The translations of the above truth-operators T and T′ as [A6] and [A9], respectively,
belong to the class of normalization operators in CL, as shown in Theorem 1. This
means that there is more than one way to express truth in AR4[Oi], including two
further operators that may translate the normal modal logic S5 (see Theorem 8).
Theorem 7. The operators T and T′ of TL are not duals.




Therefore [A6]ϕ 6= d([A9]ϕ), and [A6]ϕ is self-dual since [A6]ϕ = d[A6]ϕ. 
This result shows that von Wright’s operators T and T′ are no counterparts of the
modalities of necessity and possibility, contrary to the formal appearances. This is
due to differences in the structural relations between the four truth-values of TL
and the two modalities of modal logic. However, the following is going to show that
modal logic can also be translated into AR4[Oi].
Theorem 8. AR4[A8] is a translation of S5, such that:
τ(ϕ) = [NN15]ϕ : T 7→ T ⊗ F 7→ F ⊗ T 7→ T ⊗ F 7→ F
τ(ϕ) = [A8]ϕ = ([A2]⊗ [A3])ϕ : (F 7→ T )⊗ (T 7→ F )
τ(3ϕ) = [A7]ϕ = ([A1]⊗ [A4])ϕ : (T 7→ F )⊗ (F 7→ T )
τ(¬ϕ) = τ(¬3ϕ) = ¬2[A7]ϕ
τ(3¬ϕ) = τ(¬ϕ) = ¬2[A8]ϕ
ϕ [NN15]ϕ [A7]ϕ [A8]ϕ ¬2[A7]ϕ ¬2[A8]ϕ
11 11 10 01 01 10
10 10 10 10 01 01
01 01 01 01 10 10
00 00 10 01 01 10
Proof. Modal logic S5 can be characterized by the following logical relations:
(1) |=S5 ϕ↔ ¬3¬ϕ
(2) |=S5 (ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ (ϕ ∧ψ)
(3) |=S5 (ϕ→ ψ)↔ (ϕ→ ψ)
(4.1) (ϕ ∨ ψ) 6|=S5 (ϕ ∨ψ) (4.2) (ϕ ∨ψ) |=S5 (ϕ ∨ ψ)
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(5.1) 3(ϕ ∧ ψ) |=S5 (3ϕ ∧3ψ) (5.2) (3ϕ ∧3ψ) 6|= 3(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(6.1) ϕ |=S5 ϕ (6.2) ϕ 6|=S5 ϕ
(7.1) ϕ |=S5 3ϕ (7.2) 3ϕ 6|=S5 ϕ
(8) |=S5 ϕ↔ ϕ
(9) |=S5 3ϕ↔ 33ϕ
(10) |=S5 3ϕ↔ 3ϕ
Then it can be checked that each of the above valid and invalid formulas of S5 are
so in AR4[A8], provided that the non-modal formulas ϕ be also translated by the
redundant combined operator [NN15]. Therefore, AR4[A8] is an appropriate trans-
lation of S5 and its dual operators {,3}, given the dual relation between their
affirmative counterparts {[A8], [A7]}. 
Two related notes are in order about the above theorem.
First, such a translation overcomes what Béziau [3] called ‘Łukasiewicz’s Paradox’,
according to which the formula (5.2) is valid in Łukasiewicz’s modal system [15].
Thus, Łukasiewicz’s failure did not entail that no many-valued system would be
unable to characterize modal logic after all.
Nevertheless, Dugundji [10] has shown that no finitely many-valued matrix was able
to characterize any modal system between Lewis’ systems S1 and S5. Actually, some
other theorems that lie outside the Lewis systems –including non-normal modal
systems, might be also characterized by AR4[A8]. Indeed, it can be shown that
any formal language including at least k atomic formulas {p1, . . . , pk} results in an
equivalence formula (Dk),
p1 ↔ p2 ∨ · · · ∨ pk−1 ↔ pk.
Such a formula can be easily validated in any 4-valued logical system of AR4[Oi],
thereby including the above system AR4[A8]. Now given that such an equiva-
lence formula does not belong to the characteristic theorems of S5, this means that
AR4[A8] includes at least one more formula than the S5-theorems and cannot charac-
terize it strictly speaking. At any rate, it can be said again that S5 is a semi-bivalent
logic through this translation of  and 3 resorting to two dual properties of (LBV).
Theorem 9. The logical relations of opposition can be translated in AR4[Oi] such
that, for any affirmative operator [Ai]: its dual is its subaltern or superaltern; the
Boolean negation of its dual is its contrary or subcontrary; its Boolean negation is
its contradictory.
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Proof. [Ai]ϕ is the superaltern of [Aj ]ϕ iff the truth of [Ai]ϕ entails the truth of [Aj ]ϕ,
that is, v([Ai]ϕ) ∈ D ⇒ v([Aj ]ϕ) ∈ D; and [Ai]ϕ is the subaltern of [Aj ]ϕ iff the
untruth of [Aj ]ϕ entails the untruth of [Ai]ϕ, that is, v([Aj ]ϕ) 6∈ D ⇒ v([Ai]ϕ) 6∈ D.
Now duality is to be viewed into AR4[O] as inverting mappings, so that [Ai]ϕ : xi 7→
xj entails d([Ai]ϕ) : xi 7→ xj . Hence v(d([Ai]ϕ)) ∈ D whenever v([Ai]ϕ) ∈ D, and
v(d([Ai]ϕ)) 6∈ D whenever v([Aj ]ϕ) 6∈ D. Therefore, [Ai]ϕ = d([Ai]ϕ) whenever
[Ai]ϕ is the superaltern of [Aj ]ψ or the subaltern of [Aj ]ϕ.
[Ai]ϕ is the contrary or subcontrary of [Aj ]ϕ iff both formulas cannot be true at once
or false at once, that is, v([Ai]ϕ) ∈ D entails v([Aj ]ϕ) 6∈ D or v([Ai]ϕ) 6∈ D entails
v([Aj ]ϕ) ∈ D, respectively. Now it has been proved here above that duality is such
that v([Ai]ϕ) ∈ D ⇒ v(d([Ai]ϕ)) ∈ D and v([Ai]ϕ) 6∈ D ⇒ v(d([Ai]ϕ)) 6∈ D, and
Boolean negation ¬1 is such that v([Ai]ϕ) ∈ D iff v([Aj ]ϕ) 6∈ D. Hence v([Ai]ϕ) ∈ D
entails v(¬1(d([Ai]ϕ))) 6∈ D and v([Ai]ϕ) 6∈ D entails v(¬1(d([Ai]ϕ))) ∈ D. There-
fore, [Ai]ϕ = ¬1(d([Ai]ϕ)) whenever [Ai]ϕ is the contrary or subcontrary of [Aj ]ϕ.
[Ai]ϕ and [Aj ]ϕ are contradictories iff v([Ai]ϕ) = x ⇔ v([Aj ]ϕ) 6= x. Now Boolean
negation ¬1 is such that v([Ai]ϕ) ∈ D iff v([Aj ]ϕ) 6∈ D. Therefore [Ai]ϕ and [Aj ]ϕ
are contradictories iff [Ai]ϕ = ¬1[Aj ]ϕ. 
Note that the central notion of duality restricts to only one case the values of con-
traries and subcontraries, although formulas may have more than one contrary or
subcontrary. Likewise, the commutative behavior of duality and Boolean negation
explains why contrariety and subcontrary are defined in the same way, and the
same holds with subalternation and superalternation. Indeed, the Boolean negation
of duality equates with the duality of Boolean negation in AR4[Oi]:
¬1(d([Ai]ϕ)) = d(¬1[Ai]ϕ)
The above kinds of logical relations between affirmative operators may be summa-









More precisely, let m/2([Ai]ϕ) = (a1)(b1)(c1)(d1) be semi-matrices including only
the first ordered single values x1 depicting the truth x1 = T or untruth x1 = T of




m/2([A2]ϕ) = m/2([A5]ϕ) = m/2([A8]ϕ) = m/2([A11]ϕ) = (0)(1)(0)(0);
m/2([A9]ϕ) = m/2([A12]ϕ) = m/2([A14]ϕ) = m/2([A15]ϕ) = (0)(1)(0)(1);
m/2([A1]ϕ) = m/2([A3]ϕ) = m/2([A6]ϕ) = (1)(1)(0)(0);
m/2([A4]ϕ) = m/2([A7]ϕ) = m/2([A10]ϕ) = m/2([A13]ϕ) = (1)(1)(0)(1).
Then the above relations of opposition obtain between the 15 affirmative operators
of AR4[Oi], where the arrows express the up-bottom relation of superalternation.
(0)(1)(0)(0)
[A2]ϕ, [A5]ϕ, [A8]ϕ, [A11]ϕ
↙ ↘
(1)(1)(0)(0) (0)(1)(0)(1)
[A1]ϕ, [A3]ϕ, [A6]ϕ ↓ [A9]ϕ, [A12]ϕ, [A14]ϕ, [A15]ϕ
↘ ↙
(1)(1)(0)(1)
[A4]ϕ, [A7]ϕ, [A10]ϕ, [A13]ϕ
The bottom-up relation of subalternation between affirmative operators [Ai] and
[Aj ] does not entail that AR4[Ai] is a sublogic of AR4[Aj ] in the sense given by
Bensusan & Costa-Leite & De Souza [2], correspondingly. Indeed, the relation of
subalternation between such affirmative operators does not mean that every theorem
of the former corresponding logical system of AR4[Oi] is also a theorem of the latter,
insofar as neither paracomplete nor paraconsistent systems are sublogics of either of
them. Classical logic is a sublogic of both, but such a metalogical property differs
from duality.
7 Conclusion: Semi-bivalent logics
Only some properties of (LBV) are required to translate logical systems into the
general semantic framework AR4[Oi]. Not only classical logic CL, but also the modal
logic S5 can be ‘grasped’ alongside the ‘non-classical’ logics, namely: paracomplete
logics PmL, paraconsistent logics PcL, and paranormal logics PnL. It has been
shown that the main difference between these systems relies upon their affirmative
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operators, whilst sentential negations are the same throughout. An open question
is about whether how many other logical systems could be characterized in AR4[Oi]
in a similar way.
A connection has also made between this work and the well-known theory of oppo-
sitions. We have seen that the operators of truth and falsity are not contraries in
von Wright’s logic of truth TL, whereas the Boolean and Morganian negations are
both main negations in any system of AR4[Oi]. Duality has also been shown to be
a property connected with to the relation of subalternation.
Other similar features will be investigated in a later work in order to reconstruct the
theory of opposition as a semantic set of (partial or total) mappings, in addition to
non-Boolean semantics in which the constitutive elements x1, . . . , xn of structured
values x do not merely map into {1,0}.4 Such a kind of extension beyond (PBV)
would also consist in going from AR22[Oi] to ARmn[Oi], thus including more than
2n = 4 structured ‘truth-values’. The whole result leads to a so-called ‘Question-
Answer Semantics’, wherein 4-valuedness occurs as a particular case of truth-values
based on n = 2 questions (whether ϕ is true, or whether it is false) and m = 2
answers (yes, and no).5 Exploring new logical systems with more than m = 2
answers should constitute the real novelty of our semantic program, pending an
account of their philosophical relevance.
References
[1] Belnap, N. A Useful Four-Valued Logic. In J. M. Dunn & G. Epstein (eds.), Modern
Uses of Multiple-Valued Logic. Dordrecht Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1977:
8-37.
[2] H. Bensusan & A. Costa-Leite & E. De Souza. Logic and their Galaxies. In: The Road
to Universal Logic, Vol. II, Springer: 243-252.
[3] J.-Y. Béziau. A New Four-Valued Approach to Modal Logic. Logique et Analyse.
54(2011): 109-121.
[4] J.-Y. Béziau. S5 is a Paraconsistent Logic and so is First-Order Logic. Logical Investi-
gations, 9(2002): 301-309.
[5] W. Carnielli. Possible-Translations Semantics for Paraconsistent Logics. In: Frontiers in
Paraconsistent Logic: Proceedings of the I World Congress on Paraconsistency, Ghent,
1998, pp. 159-72, edited by D. Batens et al., Kings College Publications, 2000.
[6] A. Costa-Leite & F. Schang. Une sémantique générale des croyances justifiées. CLE
e-prints, 16(3), 2016: 1-24.
4See F. Schang, “Quasi-concepts of logic”, in Abstract Consequence and Logics Ð Essays in
Honor of Edelcio G. de Souza, A. Costa-Leite (ed.), London: College Publications, 2020: 245–266.




[7] R. Cuini & M. Carrara. Normality Operators and Classical Collapse. In T. Arazim &
P. Lavicka (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2017. London, United Kingdom (2018): 2-20.
[8] N. C. da Costa, On the Theory of Inconsistent Formal Systems. Notre Dame Journal
of Formal Logic, 15(1974): 497-510.
[9] S. Jaśkowski. On the Discussive Conjunction in the Propositional Calculus for Incon-
sistent Deductive Systems. Logical and Logical Philosophy, 7(1999): 57-59.
[10] J. Dugundji. Note on a Property of Matrices for Lewis and Langford’s Calculi of Propo-
sitions. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 5(1940): 150-151.
[11] K. Gödel. Eine Interpretation des intuitionistischen Aussagenkalküls. Ergebnisse Math.
Colloq., 4, 1933): 39-40.
[12] A. Kapsner. Logics and Falsifications: A New Perspective on Constructivist Semantics,
Springer, Cham (2014).
[13] S. K. Kleene. On a Notation for Ordinal Numbers. The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
3(1938): 150-155.
[14] E. Kubishkina & D. Z. Zaitsev. Rational Agency from a Truth-Functional Perspective.
Logic and Logical Philosophy, Vol. 25(2016): 499-520.
[15] J. Łukasiewicz. A System of Modal Logic. The Journal of Computing Systems, 1(1953):
111-149.
[16] J. Łukasiewicz. On Three-Valued Logic. In S. McCall (ed.). Polish Logic 1920-1939,
Oxford: Clarendon, 1967: 16-18.
[17] H. J. Ohlbach. Semantics-Based Translation Methods for Modal Logics. Journal of
Logic and Computation, 1(1991): 691-746.
[18] G. Priest. The Logic of Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8(1979): 219-241.
[19] F. Schang. Epistemic Pluralism. Logique et Analyse, 60(2017) 337-353.
[20] F. Schang. A Four-Valued Logic of Strong Conditional”. South American Journal of
Logic, 3(2017): 59-86
[21] Y. Shramko. Dual Intuitionistic Logic and a Variety of Negations: The Logic of Scientific
Research. Studia Logica, 80(2005): 347-367.
[22] R. Suszko. The Fregean Axiom and Polish Mathematical Logic in the 1920’s. Studia
Logica, 36(1977): 373-380.
[23] G. H. von Wright. Truth logics. Logique et Analyse, 30(1987): 311-334.
Received 22 November 2019620
